Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy

DISCOURSES ON LIVY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, LTD, LONDON
© 1996 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved Published 1996
Paperback edition 1998
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ISBN 0-226-50036-5 (paperback)

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The Press acknowledges the generous contribution of
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1469-1527

[Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio English]

Discourses on Livy / Niccolo Machiavelli; translated by Harvey C Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov
p cm

Includes bibliographical references and index
ISBN 0-226-50035-7 (cloth alk paper)

1 Livy 2 Political science—Early works to 1800 I Mansheld, Harvey Clahn, 1932- II Tarcov,
Nathan III Title
JC143.M16313 1996
320 973—dc20

95-50910

CIP

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,

ANSI Z39 48-1992

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

DISCOURSES ON LIVY

325

Translated by

Harvey C. Mansfield
and

Nathan Tarcov

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
Chicago & London

Contents

List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Suggested Readings
A Note on the Translation
Translators’ Acknowledgments
Dedicatory Letter

first Book

Preface

1. What Have Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and
What Was That of Rome

2. Of How Many Species Are Republics, and Which Was the Roman
Republic

3. What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be Created in Rome,
Which Made the Republic More Perfect

4. That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That
Republic Free and Powerful

5. Where the Guard of Freedom May Be Settled More Securely, in the
People or in the Great; and Which Has Greater Cause for Tumult, He Who
Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain

6. Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered in Rome That Would Have
Taken Away the Enmities between the People and the Senate

7. How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in a Republic to Maintain It in
Freedom

8. As Much As Accusations Are Useful to Republics, So Much Are
Calumnies Pernicious

9. That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic
Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient Orders

10. As Much As the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are
Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a Tyranny Are Worthy of Reproach

11. Of the Religion of the Romans

2

12. Of How Much Importance It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How
Italy, for Lacking It by Means of the Roman Church, Has Been Ruined

13. How the Romans Made Religion Serve to Reorder the City and to Carry
Out Their Enterprises and to Stop Tumults

14. The Romans Interpreted the Auspices according to Necessity, and with
Prudence Made a Show of Observing Religion When Forced Not to
Observe It; and If Anyone Rashly Disdained It, They Punished Him

15. The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting Them,
Had Recourse to Religion

16. A People Used to Living under a Prince Maintains Its Freedom with
Difficulty, If by Some Accident It Becomes Free

17. Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt People Can with the Greatest
Difficulty Maintain Itself Free

18. In What Mode a Free State, If There Is One, Can Be Maintained in
Corrupt Cities; or, If There Is Not, in What Mode to Order It

19. After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince Can Maintain Himself, but
after a Weak One No Kingdom Can Be Maintained by Another Weak One

20. Two Virtuous Princes in Succession Produce Great Effects; and That
Well-Ordered Republics Have of Necessity Virtuous Successions, and So
Their Acquisitions and Increases Are Great

21. How Much Blame That Prince and That Republic Merit That Lack
Their Own Arms

22. What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the
Three Alban Curiatii

23. That One Should Not Put All One’s Fortune in Danger, and Not All
One’s Forces; and Because of This, the Guarding of Passes Is Often Harmful

24. Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards and Punishments for Their
Citizens and Never Counterbalance One with the Other

25. He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated State in a Free City May
Retain at Least the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes

26. A New Prince Should Make Everything New in a City or Province
Taken by Him

27. Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be Altogether Wicked or Altogether
Good

28. For What Cause the Romans Were Less Ungrateful toward Their
Citizens Than the Athenians

3

29. Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince

30. Which Modes a Prince or a Republic Should Use So As to Avoid the
Vice of Ingratitude; and Which a Captain or a Citizen Should Use So As
Not to Be Crushed by It

31. That the Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for an
Error Committed; nor Were They Ever Punished When Harm Resulted to
the Republic through Their Ignorance or through Bad Policies Adopted by
Them

32. A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer Benefiting Men in Their
Necessities

33. When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either in a State or against a State,
the More Salutary Policy Is to Temporize with It Rather Than to Strike at It

34. The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and Not Harm, to the Roman
Republic; and That the Authorities Citizens Take for Themselves, Not
Those Given Them by Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life

35. The Cause Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome Was Hurtful
to the Freedom of That Republic, Notwithstanding That It Was Created by
Public and Free Votes

36. Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors Should Not Disdain Lesser
Ones

37. What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave Birth to in Rome; and That to
Make a Law in a Republic That Looks Very Far Back and Is against an
Ancient Custom of the City Is Most Scandalous

38. Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and Do Not Know How to Decide;
and If They Ever Take Up Any Policy, It Arises More from Necessity Than
from Choice

39. In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be Seen

40. The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and What Is to Be Noted in
It; Where It Is Considered, among Many Other Things, How through Such
an Accident One Can Either Save or Crush a Republic

41. To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due
Degrees Is Something Imprudent and Useless

42. How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted

43. Those Who Engage in Combat for Their Own Glory Are Good and
Faithful Soldiers

4

44. A Multitude without a Head Is Useless; and That One Should Not First
Threaten and Then Request Authority

45. Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been Made, and Especially by Its
Author, Is a Thing That Sets a Bad Example; and to Freshen New Injuries
Every Day in a City Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It

46. Men Ascend from One Ambition to Another; First One Seeks Not to Be
Offended, and Then One Offends Others

47. However Deceived in Generalities, Men Are Not Deceived in
Particulars

48. He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be Given to Someone Vile or
Someone Wicked Should Have It Asked for Either by Someone Too Vile
and Too Wicked or by Someone Too Noble and Too Good

49. If Those Cities That Have had a Free Beginning, Such as Rome, Have
Difficulty in Finding Laws That Will Maintain Them, Those That Have Had
One Immediately Servile Have Almost an Impossibility

50. One Council or One Magistrate Should Not Be Able to Stop the Actions
of Cities

51. A Republic or a Prince Should Make a Show of Doing through
Liberality What Necessity Constrains Him to Do

52. To Repress the Insolence of One Individual Who Rises Up in a Powerful
Republic, There Is No More Secure and Less Scandalous Mode Than to
Anticipate the Ways by Which He Comes to That Power

53. Many Times the People Desires Its Own Ruin, Deceived by a False
Appearance of Good; and That Great Hopes and Mighty Promises Easily
Move It

54. How Much Authority a Grave Man May Have to Check an Excited
Multitude

55. How Easily Things May Be Conducted in Those Cities in Which the
Multitude Is Not Corrupt; and That Where There Is Equality, a Principality
Cannot Be Made, and Where There Is Not, a Republic Cannot Be Made

56. Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or in a Province, Signs Come
That Forecast Them, or Men Who Predict Them

57. The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself Weak

58. The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince

59. Which Confederation or Other League Can Be More Trusted, That
Made with a Republic or That Made with a Prince

5

60. That the Consulate and Any Other Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was
Given without Respect to Age

Second Book

Preface

1. Which Was More the Cause of the Empire the Romans Acquired, Virtue
or Fortune

2. What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat, and That They Obstinately
Defended Their Freedom

3. Rome Became a Great City through Ruining the Surrounding Cities and
Easily Admitting Foreigners to Its Honors

4. Republics Have Taken Three Modes of Expanding

5. That the Variation of Sects and Fanguages, Together with the Accident
of Roods or Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things

6. How the Romans Proceeded in Making War

7. How Much Fand the Romans Gave per Colonist

8. The Cause Why Peoples Feave Their Ancestral Places and Inundate the
Country of Others

9. What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise among Powers

10. Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is according to the Common
Opinion

11. It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a Friendship with a Prince Who Has
More Reputation Than Force

12. Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It Is Better to Bring On or
Await War

13. That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More through Fraud Than
through Force

14. Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing That through Humility They
Will Conquer Pride

15. Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in Their Resolutions; and Slow
Decisions Are Always Hurtful

16. How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do Not Conform to the Ancient
Orders

17. How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed by Armies in the Present
Times; and Whether the Opinion Universally Held of It Is True

6

18. How by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of the Ancient
Military Infantry Should Be Esteemed More Than Horse

19. That Acquisitions by Republics That Are Not Well Ordered and That Do
Not Proceed according to Roman Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not Their
Exaltation

20. What Danger That Prince or Republic Runs That Avails Itself of
Auxiliary or Mercenary Military

21. The First Praetor the Romans Sent Anyplace Was to Capua, Four
Hundred Years after They Began to Make War

22. How False the Opinions of Men Often Are in Judging Great Things

23. How Much the Romans, in Judging Subjects for Some Accidents That
Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled from the Middle Way

24. Fortresses Are Generally Much More Harmful Than Useful

25. To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize It by Means of Its Disunion
Is a Contradictory Policy

26. Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred against Those Who Use Them,
without Any Utility to Them

27. For Prudent Princes and Republics It Should Be Enough to Conquer, for
Most Often When It Is Not Enough, One Foses

28. How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a Prince Not to Avenge an Injury
Done against the Public or against a Private Person

29. Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to
Oppose Its Plans

30. Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy Friendships Not with Money
but with Virtue and the Reputation of Strength

31. How Dangerous It Is to Believe the Banished

32. In How Many Modes the Romans Seized Towns

33. How the Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies

m Third Book

1. If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Five Fong, It Is Necessary to Draw
It Back Often toward Its Beginning

2. That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Craziness at the Right Time

3. That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain
a Newly Acquired Freedom

7

4. A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a Principality While Those Who Have
Been Despoiled of It Are Living

5. What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a Kingdom Lose It

6. Of Conspiracies

7. Whence It Arises That Changes from Freedom to Servitude and from
Servitude to Freedom Are Some of Them without Blood, Some of Them
Full of It

8. Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic Should Consider Its Subject

9. How One Must Vary with the Times if One Wishes Always to Have Good
Fortune

10. That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When the Adversary Wishes Him to
Engage in It in Any Mode

11. That Whoever Has to Deal with Very Many, Even Though He Is
Inferior, Wins If Only He Can Sustain the First Thrusts

12. That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose Every Necessity to Engage in
Combat on His Soldiers and Take It Away from Those of Enemies

13. Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good Captain Who Has a Weak Army
or a Good Army That Has a Weak Captain

14. What Effects New Inventions That Appear in the Middle of the Fight
and New Voices That Are Heard May Produce

15. That One Individual and Not Many Should Be Put over an Army; and
That Several Commanders Hurt

16. That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find True Virtue; and in Easy
Times Not Virtuous Men but Those with Riches or Kinship Have More
Favor

17. That One Individual Should Not Be Offended and Then That Same One
Sent to an Administration and Governance of Importance

18. Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain Than to Foretell the Policies of
the Enemy

19. Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than
Punishment

20. One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do More with the Falisci Than
Any Roman Force

21. Whence It Arises That with a Different Mode of Proceeding Hannibal
Produced Those Same Effects in Italy as Scipio Did in Spain

8

22. That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Kindness of Valerius
Corvinus Acquired for Each the Same Glory

23. For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled from Rome

24. The Prolongation of Commands Made Rome Servile

25. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of Many Roman Citizens

26. How a State Is Ruined Because of Women

27. How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and How That Opinion Is Not
True That to Hold Cities One Needs to Hold Them Divided

28. That One Should Be Mindful of the Works of Citizens Because Many
Times underneath a Merciful Work a Beginning of Tyranny Is Concealed

29. That the Sins of Peoples Arise from Princes

30. For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by
His Authority, It Is Necessary First to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing
the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City

31. Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Spirit and Their
Same Dignity in Every Fortune

32. What Modes Some Have Held to for Disturbing a Peace

33. If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is Necessary to Make the Army
Confident Both among Themselves and in the Captain

34. What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the People Begin to Favor a
Citizen; and Whether It Distributes Magistracies with Greater Prudence
Than a Prince

35. What Dangers Are Borne in Making Oneself Head in Counseling a
Thing; and the More It Has of the Extraordinary, the Greater Are the
Dangers Incurred in It

36. The Causes Why the French Have Been and Are Still Judged in Fights at
the Beginning As More Than Men and Later As Less Than Women

37. Whether Small Battles Are Necessary before the Main Battle; and If
One Wishes to Avoid Them, What One Ought to Do to Know a New Enemy

38. How a Captain in Whom His Army Can Have Confidence Ought to Be
Made

39. That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of Sites

40. That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a Glorious Thing

41. That the Fatherland Ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or
with Glory; and It Is Well Defended in Any Mode Whatever

9

42. That Promises Made through Force Ought Not to Be Observed

43. That Men Who Are Born in One Province Observe Almost the Same
Nature for All Times

44. One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and Audacity What One Would
Never Have Obtained through Ordinary Modes

45. What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to Resist the Thrust of Enemies
and, Having Resisted It, to Charge Them; or Indeed to Assault Them with
Fury from the First

46. Whence It Arises That One Family in One City Keeps the Same
Customs for a Time

47. That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget Private Injuries for Love of His
Fatherland

48. When One Sees a Great Error Made by an Enemy, One Ought to Believe
That There Is a Deception Underneath

49. A Republic Has Need of New Acts of Foresight Every Day If One
Wishes to Maintain It Free; and for What Merits Quintus Fabius Was
Called Maximus

Glossary

Notes

Index of Proper Names

10

Abbreviations

AW Machiavelli, The Art of War

D Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy
FH Machiavelli, Florentine Histories
Livy Titus Livy, Ah urbe condita
NM Niccolo Machiavelli
P Machiavelli, The Prince

Introduction

In this introduction we offer a quick tour through Machiavelli’s Discourses
on Livy. We shall mark the four-star attractions that tourists will want to
visit repeatedly and wish to remember. The great Machiavellian themes of
politics, morality, fortune, necessity, and religion will be set forth, together
with the controversies they have touched off. For Machiavelli, to say the
least, did not write in such a mode as to prevent dispute about what he said.
We consider the fact that Machiavelli wrote at the same time two very
different books on the whole of politics, The Prince and the Discourses. We
provide a brief appraisal of the latter’s scholarly reputation today as the first
source of classical republicanism, as the recollection of ancient liberty that
calls us to venture from the settled and secure realm of property and self-
interest. And we present Machiavelli himself, not a disengaged philosopher
but the instigator in the schemes he advised, an actor in his own enterprise
of bringing “new modes and orders ... for [the] common benefit of
everyone” (D I pr.l). As befits an introduction, we try to speak with both
modesty and authority.

Machiavelli and the Renaissance

Machiavelli lived in the Renaissance, and the Renaissance lived in
Machiavelli; the communion between the man and the time seems
complete. Jacob Burckhardt, the nineteenth-century historian who
established our idea of “the Renaissance” and who despite new discoveries
still reigns over it, gave Machiavelli the greatest prominence in that period
and allowed him to define its politics in the section of his famous book The
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy titled “The State as a Work of Art.”

The Renaissance is a rebirth, the rebirth of the classical times of ancient
Greece and Rome. These times had already been reborn, one could say,
with the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth century and his adoption by
the Christian church, after initial rejections, through the immense
achievements and good offices of Thomas Aquinas. It is not customary to
consider the work of the scholastics as a renaissance, however, because the
distinction between human reason and divine law, required for the adoption
of the pagan Aristotle into Christian learning, did not liberate human beings

12

from the tutelage of the church. Even more wayward souls such as Dante or
Marsilius of Padua in the early fourteenth century did not take this step;
they remained within the broad ambit of scholasticism and stayed true to
Aristotle. In Italy later in the fourteenth century Petrarch led a change in
the direction of greater freedom from the church, which now seemed to
require greater freedom from Aristotle. Petrarch criticized those who
thought every problem could be solved by pronouncing the five syllables in
Aristotle’s name (so it is in Latin) and declared himself an admirer of
Cicero. 1 Cicero became, as it has been said, the principal figure of the
Renaissance. Cicero’s rhetoric, as well as his philosophy, came to receive
the attention of the learned, and the goal of Renaissance rhetoric became
the promotion of a morality of Roman manliness ( virtus ) that Cicero had
glowingly described.

This movement, led by Petrarch in Italy and including such illustrious
names as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Marsilio Licino, and Pico
della Mirandola, was pronounced to be the Renaissance. Part of it is also
known as humanism because it concentrated on humane studies, or the
“humanities,” rather than physics, metaphysics, and theology, and it was the
immediate intellectual inheritance for anyone born in Machiavelli’s time.
But Machiavelli refused it almost totally and made his own way against his
time. In the Discourses he refers to only three modern authors—Dante,
Lorenzo de’ Medici, and Llavio Biondo—in contrast to nineteen ancient
ones. Although the notion of rebirth implies in itself dissatisfaction with
current ways, Machiavelli was profoundly dissatisfied with the Renaissance
he saw underway. At the beginning of the Discourses he complains that
those of his time are content to honor antiquity by buying fragments of
ancient statues for their homes and having them imitated rather than by
imitating the “ancient virtue” in politics, of which no sign remains (D I pr.).
To remedy their political ills, he continues, they go to the ancient jurists,
not to the examples set by ancient princes, republics, and captains.

Thus Machiavelli accepts the necessity of returning to the ancients
because they were superior to the moderns, but, waving aside the marvelous
works of art created in his own lifetime and even in his own city of Llorence
under his very eyes, he calls for imitating the deeds of the ancients. He
shares in the new esteem for Rome but carries it to the point of preferring
Rome to Greece and adopting the imperial Roman republic, and not the
Greek polis, as his model. Together with his six references to “ancient
virtue” in the Discourses are four to Roman virtue but none to Greek.
Ancient virtue is to be found mainly with the Romans, and especially in the

13

Roman historian Titus Livy, who narrates the deeds of the republican
Romans. Because deeds take precedence over words, Rome has primacy
over Greece and the historians over the philosophers. Machiavelli’s
complaint against the Renaissance can be seen in his low opinion of Cicero,
not a hero for him. Cicero used rhetoric to advance the cause of philosophy,
a Greek discovery, in a Rome suspicious of the influence of Greek softness.
Machiavelli accuses both rhetoric and philosophy of attempting to rule
deeds with words, and he shows sympathy for Cato’s desire to rid Rome of
foreign philosophy that corrupts the virtue of doers (D III 1.3; FH V 1). He
too objects to softness, the idleness or leisure ( ozio ) of contemplators, both
philosophic and religious, who look down on doers.

Despite its literal meaning as the “rebirth” of something old, the
Renaissance is better known as the beginning of something new that has
come to be called modernity. It is doubtful that the Renaissance would have
that meaning were it not for Machiavelli. For modernity is not merely
something new but also a new idea that favors innovation in principle and
constantly promotes new ideas and institutions, a change that wants to be
receptive to further change. Whatever is modern does not stay the same but
keeps becoming more modern. Such are Machiavelli’s “new modes and
orders” in the Discourses and his new prince in The Prince. Nothing like
Machiavelli’s encouragement of innovation as such, topped off with the
proud advertisement of his own originality, can be found in other writers of
his time or before. If they were original, they disguised it by claiming
merely to return to the true origins of an institution or an idea in the past
before the present rot set in—as, for example, Marsilius of Padua claimed
to be restoring original Christianity in his criticism of the church.

Machiavelli’s claim of ancient virtue appears to have this character only
at first glance. He praises ancient virtue in order to improve on it. He wants
to free it from inhibitions placed on it by writers such as those who
inconsiderately blamed Hannibal’s cruelty when in fact it was one of his
infinite virtues (.P 18; D III 21.4, 40.1). This is what he means when in the
first preface to the Discourses he speaks of the “true knowledge of the
histories” that is lacking in his time and is responsible for the failure of
moderns to have recourse to ancient examples (D I pr.2). Ancient virtue, it
turns out, needs a Machiavellian interpretation to ensure that it is reported
correctly. Even Livy, who is not the type to enthuse and philosophize about
ancient virtue, and who is treated with such reverence by Machiavelli, needs
at least occasionally, and perhaps generally, to be set right. Among other
things, Livy did not properly appreciate the need for innovation; he did not

14

see that the ancient virtue of actual Romans brought opportunity to new
men to enter upon new enterprises and make new conquests. When
examined, ancient virtue turns out to show little respect for things ancient.
Those with virtue, like Machiavelli himself, characteristically act without
any respect (sanza alcuno rispetto, one of his favorite phrases).

The Machiavellian interpretation transforms ancient virtue into virtue
proper, Machiavellian virtue. At the same time it changes the Renaissance
from a rebirth of the ancient into the dawn of the new, the modern. When
Machiavelli speaks of the “moderns,” it is always with disrespect, as of the
weak. He does not openly claim that the moderns can be stronger than the
ancients, as Francis Bacon was to do. But he offers remedies for modern
weakness that will have the effect of making the moderns stronger than the
ancients. “Modernity” is the opinion that the moderns are, or can become,
stronger than the ancients—that the moderns can benefit from an
irreversible progress in their favor. Because of Machiavelli’s contribution to
the transformation of the Renaissance into modernity, one can say with
faithfulness to both him and his time that he did as much for the
Renaissance as it did for him.

The Discourses on Livy and The Prince

When we begin to examine Machiavelli’s remedies for modern weakness,
we come upon an obvious difficulty that has been much discussed.
Machiavelli is most famous today as the author of The Prince , a witty and
attractive, proudly original, short and apparently easy, but wicked and
dangerous book that advises princes on how to “seize absolute authority” (.P
9) and to learn how not to be good to their subjects and friends—in short, to
be criminally wicked tyrants. But Machiavelli has also been famous among
devotees of republics as the author of the Discourses, which by contrast is a
long, forbidding, apparently nostalgic, obviously difficult, but decent and
useful book that advises citizens, leaders, reformers, and founders of
republics on how to order them to preserve their liberty and avoid
corruption. The relation between the two books is notoriously obscure. How
could two such books be written by the same man, apparently at more or
less the same time?

The Prince appears from its first two chapters to be a dispassionate
analysis of all kinds of principalities that does not include reasoning on
republics only because its author has reasoned on them at length another
time—that is, in the Discourses. But the reader soon perceives that its

15

author recommends the imitation especially of what he calls “new princes,”
private individuals who become princes of new states that they found. He
emphasizes the most excellent and glorious examples of founders, such as
Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, but he does not seem to distinguish
them much from ordinary tyrants, such as Hiero of Syracuse, or even from
infamous and criminal tyrants, such as Agathocles of Syracuse. Accordingly,
he advises their imitators to come to power and rule by force and fraud.

In contrast, the Discourses not only includes reasoning about republics but
recommends them over principalities. Machiavelli writes a chapter entitled
“The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince” in which he
proclaims that peoples are more stable and have better judgment than
princes, that their governments are better, and that the people are superior
in goodness and glory (D I 58.3). He adds that republics keep their word
better than princes and therefore can be trusted more than princes ( D I 59).
He also argues that the common good is observed only in republics, whereas
usually what suits a prince hurts the city and what suits the city hurts him
(.D II 2.1). So he concludes that “a republic has greater life and has good
fortune longer than a principality” (D III 9.2). The Discourses praises
republican founders and their peoples for their goodness and virtue and
their love of liberty, the fatherland, and the common good (D I 9.2, 58.3-4;
II 2).

In perhaps the most famous passage in The Prince , with professed
timidity but transparent pride, Machiavelli proclaims the work’s radical
originality as he promises to go to the effectual truth and ignore imaginary
states. He attacks “the writers” whose inconsistent moralism allows them to
admire great deeds but not the cruel acts necessary to accomplish them. He
rejects the republics and principalities of the writers as imaginary because
they recommend a kind of goodness and virtue that leads to ruin and they
condemn virtues necessary for preservation, such as stinginess, cruelty, and
faithlessness. Based on his acceptance of the “very natural and ordinary
desire to acquire” as a “necessity,” and the consequent “natural and ordinary
necessity” to offend those whom or from whom one acquires (P 3),
Machiavelli in The Prince abandons the moral teachings of the classical and
biblical traditions for a new conception of virtue as the willingness and
ability to do whatever it takes to acquire and maintain what one has
acquired.

Again, in contrast to the spirit of self-conscious innovation in The Prince ,
the Discourses is a sort of commentary on the first decade, or 10 books, of
Livy’s history of Rome (of which most of the other 132 books are lost and

16

available to us only in summary form). Machiavelli says at the beginning
that he writes only what he judges to be necessary for readers’ greater
understanding, as if he were merely an auxiliary to Livy and his book
merely a supplement to Livy’s (D I pr.2). In a spirit of apparently nostalgic
antiquarianism, Machiavelli seems at first deferential toward ancient writers
and content with trying to stimulate love and imitation of “the most
virtuous works the histories show us, which have been done by ancient
kingdoms and republics” (D I pr.2), so that the spirits of youths who may
read his writings can flee their times and prepare themselves to imitate the
times of the ancient Romans ( D II pr.3).

The common opinion that The Prince is an innovative but wicked and
tyrannical book, whereas the Discourses is an antiquarian and virtuous
republican book, leaves us shocked and puzzled as to why Machiavelli
should have written two such opposite books. Nonetheless, the view that the
two books are opposed to each other, although based on obvious features of
each of them, represents only part and not the whole of Machiavelli’s
intention. Neither book is as opposed to the other as first appears.

The Prince is not simply about princes or tyrants, and it does not endorse
principalities or tyrannies over republics in the way that the Discourses
recommends republics over principalities or tyrannies. Indeed, republican
political philosophers such as Spinoza and Rousseau understood The Prince
to be a secretly republican book. 2 What basis is there for such a judgment?
Although Machiavelli says early in The Prince that he will not discuss
republics, he soon puts forward, and later confirms, the Roman republic as
the model for wise princes (P 2-5). Romulus, the founder and first king of
Rome, is cited among the most excellent and glorious of new princes (.P 6),
but although a king, he is praised in the Discourses for laws establishing a
free and civil way of life—for being the founder of a republic or
protorepublic (D I 9.2, 18.5, 49.1; II 2.1; III 1.2). Moreover, since the new
prince will want to maintain his state and his glory for a long life and even
after his death, he will find that founding a republic is the best way to do so.
He might first think of establishing a hereditary principality, in which he
would be succeeded by others of his bloodline. But enemies may eliminate
not only him but also his bloodline, precisely so that they will not be
menaced by the memory of his name. Republics do the same thing, and for
good measure they also wipe out all hereditary nobility as hostile to the
republic. But they revere their own founders. “In republics there is greater
life, greater hatred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient
liberty does not and cannot let them rest” (P 5). Therefore, to avoid the

17

pitfalls clearly brought into view, The Prince implicitly advises princes to
found republics to perpetuate their states and their glory.

Just as The Prince is more republican than it first appears and than it is
reputed to be according to the common opinion that the two books are
opposed, so the Discourses is more princely or even tyrannical than it first
appears and is reputed to be.

First of all, we should note that the Discourses is not addressed to peoples.
It is addressed “above all” (that is to say, not only) to Machiavelli’s friends
Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai; and Machiavelli’s dedicatory
letter to the Discourses contrasts this choice of addressee with “the common
usage of those who write, who are accustomed [the first word of the
dedicatory letter to The Prince ] always to address their works to some
prince” and to flatter him. So as not to run into this error, Machiavelli
chooses to address “not those who are princes but those who for their
infinite good parts deserve to be.” Thus Machiavelli seems in the dedicatory
letter to the Discourses to attack The Prince , or at least the dedicatory letter
to The Prince addressed to Lorenzo de’ Medici, or at least the view that The
Prince is simply dedicated or addressed to Lorenzo. Speaking to “those who
know,” he seems in the mode of the classical political philosophers to prefer
knowers to rulers and to regard those knowers as deserving to be rulers. But
contrary to the classical mode, he addresses not merely knowers who
deserve to be princes but knowers who may actually rise like Hiero to
become princes and replace such incompetent rulers as Perseus or possibly
Lorenzo. And Hiero, we should recall, is placed by Machiavelli in The
Prince with the greatest examples of the founders Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,
and Theseus (.P 6).

One of the early discourses is entitled “That It Is Necessary to Be Alone
If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside
Its Ancient Orders” (D 19). By “being alone” Machiavelli means that it is
necessary for any ordering to depend on a single mind. In consequence he
excuses the extraordinary actions of a founder or reformer, such as
Romulus’s murder of his brother, as necessary to achieve sole authority.
Thus Machiavelli insists that precisely so as to order a republic, it is
necessary to have recourse to violent, one-man rule; too bad if others call it
tyranny. He indeed warns that such a founder should take care not to leave
his sole authority as an inheritance to another, to whom it might be a bad
example. His republic will last long only “if it remains in the care of many
and its maintenance stays with many” (D I 9.2). Thus even and precisely
one who is concerned with his own ambition should seek to perpetuate his

18

state and his glory not through inheritance by single heirs who rule alone as
he does but through a republic entrusted to the care of the many: one to
order, many to maintain. Republics need to be founded by something like
tyrants to be well ordered; tyrants need to found something like republics to
maintain their states and names.

The need of republics for something like tyranny is clarified later in book
I when Machiavelli makes clear that his special interest is not in founding a
new people but in liberating and keeping free a corrupt people. Such is the
task relevant to his own historical situation, in which a new prince must
remake, rather than make, everything anew. Part of the problem of
perpetuating republics is that they have as partisan enemies those who
benefit from tyranny but they do not have partisan friends (D I 16.3). The
reasons are, first, that free republics give honors and rewards for merit, but
those who receive what they deserve feel no obligation to those who reward
them. And, second, the benefits of free life do not give rise to any sense of
obligation: “For no one ever confesses that he has an obligation to one who
does not offend him.” Neither those eager for rewards nor those desiring to
be left alone will be partisan friends of a republic.

The problem with republics, in short, is that they are just. People do not
appreciate being treated justly because that is something they think they
deserve. The solution—and there is a solution—is for republics to behave
less justly, more tyrannically, so that the benefits they confer and the
security they provide will be more appreciated and better defended. In
particular, to maintain its freedom, a newly free people must “kill the sons
of Brutus”—that is, engage in acts of violence that make examples out of
the enemies of freedom. Ensuring that the violence sets an example is more
important than doing it legally. Indeed, illegal violence is all the more
impressive. Machiavelli informs us of the tyrannical character of this
solution in the digression immediately following, in which he gives similar
advice to “princes who have become tyrants of their fatherlands” ( D I 16.5).

Machiavelli knows that readers like ourselves who believe in justice will
find this advice difficult to accept. He sometimes prepares us to accept the
ordinarily unacceptable means he recommends by saying that a desired goal
is impossible, then that it is very difficult, and finally that this is the means
to achieve it. So he says, “One should presuppose as a thing very true that a
corrupt city that lives under a prince, can never be turned into a free one,
even if that prince is eliminated along with all his line” (D I 17.1). Almost
immediately he adds, “unless indeed the goodness of one individual,
together with virtue, keeps it free,” only apparently to retract that offer by

19

warning that such freedom will last only as long as the life of that individual.
It would be impossible to have “one man of such long life as to have enough
time to inure to good a city that has been inured to bad for a long time.” Yet
Machiavelli again opens up a way to the cure of corruption arising from
inequality. That is to create equality by using “the greatest extraordinary
means, which few know how or wish to use.”

Finally, in the next chapter, Machiavelli explains that it is very difficult to
maintain a free state in corrupt cities and “almost impossible to give a rule
for it” (D I 18.1). Even Rome eventually succumbed to corruption because
once the Romans had subdued their enemies, the Roman people no longer
had regard for virtue. To have maintained Rome free it would have been
necessary to change not only its laws but its orders—that is, its fundamental
institutions or constitution. Such fundamental reordering, Machiavelli says,
is “almost impossible.” It must be done “little by little” by “someone
prudent” before the problem is recognized by everyone, in which case he
will never be able to persuade anyone else of what he understands. Or it
must be done “at a stroke,” when the problem is easily recognized but
difficult to correct. For to do this, Machiavelli argues, it is not enough to use
ordinary or legal means, “since the ordinary modes are bad; but it is
necessary to go to the extraordinary, such as violence and arms, and before
everything else become prince of that city, able to dispose it in one’s own
mode” (D I 18.4). This is difficult or impossible, and Machiavelli tells us
why with wonderful clarity:

Because the reordering of a city for a political way of life presupposes a good man, and becoming
prince of a republic by violence presupposes a bad man, one will find that it very rarely happens
that someone good wishes to become prince by bad ways, even though his end be good, and that
someone wicked, having become prince, wishes to work well, and that it will ever occur to his
mind to use well the authority that he has acquired badly.

No one could put better the moral contradiction at the heart of
Machiavelli’s marriage of tyranny and republicanism. Nonetheless, he
concludes that to create or maintain a republic in a corrupt city, it is
necessary to turn it more toward a kingly state than toward a popular one.

The discussion in the Discourses of ordering and maintaining liberty in a
corrupt city (D I 16-18) makes clear the dependence of republican ends on
tyrannical means. It also reveals Machiavelli’s apparent indifference to
whether these good ends achieved through bad means result from good men
willing to use bad means or from bad men willing to seek good ends, as if
there were no effectual difference between them. It indicates that the need
for such means and for such men arises not only once at the founding or

20

beginning but repeatedly for maintaining, reforming, or refounding.
Machiavelli takes the point further when he argues that in Rome new causes
cropped up every day for which it had to make new orders or new provisions
to maintain freedom (Z) I 49.1; III 49.1).

In a famous chapter, he says that if a republic is to be maintained, it must
often be led back toward its beginnings (D III 1). Leading it back toward
the beginnings, Machiavelli explains, means restoring esteem for virtue
through some terrifying external danger, through the virtue of a citizen who
carries out “excessive and notable” executions that remind men of
punishment and renew fear in their spirits, or alternatively through “the
simple virtue of one man” who acts outside the law. Nor is it only at the
beginning that one man may need to be alone; recall that Machiavelli
earlier declared that it is necessary to be alone if one wants either “to order
a republic anew or to reform it altogether outside its ancient orders” (D 19
T). For one citizen to be alone it is necessary first to eliminate the envy of
those who might get in his way (D III 30). This can be done either through
some “strong and difficult accident” that makes everyone run voluntarily to
cooperate—that is, obey—or through the deaths of the envious. The one
citizen may be so lucky as to have the envious die naturally, or he may have
to think of a way of removing them. And Machiavelli adds that whoever
reads the Bible judiciously will see that Moses took the latter option: he
“was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy,
were opposed to his plans” (D III 30.1). The need for continual refounding
involves republics in a continual dependence on princely or tyrannical men
and princely or tyrannical means.

Machiavelli’s mixture of republicanism and tyranny in the Discourses
refutes the decent, republican opinion that the Discourses is a decent,
republican book as opposed to the wicked, tyrannical Prince. On the
contrary, Machiavelli’s critique of classical and biblical morality and
religion appears in the Discourses as well as in The Prince , and it is meant to
liberate not only the rulers of principalities but also republics or their
leaders, whom Machiavelli frequently and disconcertingly refers to as
princes.

Even Machiavelli’s endorsement of republics over principalities in the
Discourses reveals the princely or tyrannical elements in his republicanism.
While he declares that two virtuous princes in succession are sufficient to
acquire the world, he adds that a republic should do more, since it has
through election not only two but infinite virtuous princes who succeed one
another (D I 20). The advantage of a republic is not that it takes government

21

out of the hands of princes but precisely that election provides “infinite
most virtuous princes.” And in the place where Machiavelli says that a
republic has greater life and more lasting good fortune than a principality,
he claims that this is because republics can accommodate themselves to the
times by choosing which of those citizens they employ as princely leaders
(.D II 9). Where he says that “a people is more prudent, more stable, and of
better judgment than a prince,” he also refers to republics as “cities where
peoples are princes” and ends up repeating the formula of one to order,
many to maintain (D I 58.3). In the chapter in which he explains the
affection of peoples for the free or republican way of life, he relies on the
fact that “it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded
either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom” ( D II 2.1).
And the argument there that the “common good is not observed if not in
republics” depends on the view that the common good is the good of the
many, which may “turn out to harm this or that private individual” and go
“against the disposition of the few crushed by it.” The common good of
republics is not the “common benefit to everyone” (D I pr.l) to which
Machiavelli himself claims to be devoted. In the same discourse we learn
that an important part of the reason why people love republics more than
principalities is that all those who dwell in them can believe that their
children can grow up to be princes through their virtue.

In sum, just as The Prince is more republican than it seems, so the
Discourses is more princely, and through its mixture of tyranny and
republicanism it is also more critical of classical and biblical morality and
thereby more original than it seems.

Republicanism Ancient and Modern

The tyranny in Machiavelli’s republicanism gives it an original character
and new features that catch the eye of every reader. The change in character
comes out in a comparison with the classical republicanism of the ancient
philosophers, of whom we may choose Aristotle as a representative.
Aristotle was the dominant figure—in either the foreground or the
background—of the political science of Machiavelli’s time. His notions are
behind the humanist republicanism of Machiavelli’s predecessors in the
office of Florentine secretary, Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni, whose
works set the republican norm for the Italian Renaissance. But the contrast
will be more clear if we look at Aristotle himself.

22

Aristotle’s republic is the politeia, a word that can also be translated
“constitution” or “regime.” The regime is the rule of the whole city ( polis)
by a part, and it can be by one, few, or many (though rule by one is hardly a
fixed regime). Thus there are several regimes but typically two that are
always in competition: those of the few and of the many. These parts rule or
want to rule on the basis of claims they advance or professions they avow
about contributions they make to the whole—for example, the outstanding
competence of the few versus the freedom and collective judgment of the
many. Aristotle as political scientist judges these claims and finds them only
partially true, hence partisan. He sets up a discussion between the parties
(especially in books III and IV of his Politics ), of which the intended or
hoped for result is a mixed regime that combines the partisan virtues and
persuades each party to recognize that it gains from the other. Although the
argument refers to power and self-interest, it consists essentially in
persuading political men to act their best. Hence Aristotle’s mixed regime is
very unlikely or impossible; it exists so as to be realized only in part or by
degrees and to serve as a model for the end and manner of reform or
progress in politics. Since the truly nonpartisan mixed regime does not exist
and cannot be brought into being, every actual regime remains partisan and
retains a measure of tyranny.

In Aristotle, the tyrannical element in a republic stands for its lapses from
perfection, but in Machiavelli, tyranny is used precisely to the contrary—to
make a republic perfect. Machiavelli praises the Roman republic for being
among those republics that, although not perfectly ordered at the beginning,
had a good enough beginning so that through the occurrence of accidents
they might become “perfect” (D I 2.1). These eventually perfect republics—
numerous enough that the Roman appears to be only one example—are
contrasted with others, such as the Spartan, whose laws and orders are given
all at once, “at a stroke,” by one alone. Machiavelli speaks freely of
perfection not so much, perhaps, to make it seem common as to make it
seem attainable. And in giving preference to Rome’s accidental perfection
because it is more flexible than that of Sparta’s one-time classical legislator
Lycurgus, he shows again that tyranny—the rule of uno solo —works well, or
best, in the context of a republic.

Machiavelli, like Aristotle, begins from the few and the many, but he
treats them very differently. For him they are not two parties making
characteristically contrasting claims to rule (oligarchy versus democracy)
but “two diverse humors,” also called “desires,” that are not sufficiently
rational to be called claims or opinions (D I 4-5). The great or the nobles

23

have a “great desire to dominate,” and the people or the ignoble have “only
desire not to be dominated” ( D I 5.2). In reinterpreting the popular claim to
rule as the desire not to be dominated, Machiavelli prepares the way for
democracy and even republicanism to become liberal. “Don’t tread on me!”
is the theme of popular feeling that he underscores. From this description
we see that for Machiavelli, contrary to Aristotle, only one side wants to
rule. Each side sees only its own necessity—to rule or not to be ruled—and
does not understand, respectively, those who do not care to rule or those
whose natures insist on it. Those who want glory despise those who want
security, and the latter fear and hate the former.

Because of their fundamental difference of desire and inevitable mutual
misunderstanding, conflict between the two humors cannot be mediated by
words. The clash between them is “tumult,” a word Machiavelli uses
repeatedly to underscore the irrational noisiness of politics (D I 4-6). The
first of the new features of Machiavelli’s political science is his rejection of
the traditional condemnation of the tumults between the nobles and the
plebs in Rome (a tradition that included Livy, Machiavelli’s supposed
mentor in things Roman). Those who condemn that disunion blame the
very thing that was the first cause of keeping Rome free (D I 4.1).
Machiavelli was the first political philosopher to endorse party conflict as
useful and good, even if partisan tactics are often not respectable. In doing
so he accepts both the “tyrannical” desire to dominate and the “republican”
desire not to be dominated and shows how they can be made to cooperate.

Machiavelli approves of the Roman law on “accusation,” another novelty
of his political science (D I 7-8). That law permitted any citizen to accuse
another of ambition and the accused to defend himself, with both
accusation and defense to be made before the people. The advantage of
such a law, or “order,” is in allowing the people to vent the ill humor it
harbors toward the whole government or toward the class of nobles against
one individual, whose punishment satisfies the people and excuses everyone
else. Machiavelli does not worry about the possible injustice of the
procedure, as did Aristotle in his qualified defense of ostracism, the
democratic practice in his day of exiling outstanding, and possibly
dangerous, individuals from the city. Machiavelli will cheerfully sacrifice
one of the princely types in order to save the rest. He does not waste time
deploring the personal abuse characteristic of popular government at its
worst; he turns it to account. The business of republics is not so much
positive legislation to benefit the people as the negative exchange of
accusations that entertains the people. While making use of ambitious

24

princes, republics must take care to appease the popular fear and dislike of
ambition.

A principal use of princely types by republics is as dictators in
emergencies (D I 33.1). So Machiavelli approves of the Roman practice of
giving power to one man to act in such situations without consultation and
without appeal. His endorsement contrasts sharply with the discomfort of
ancient writers, who regard it as an embarrassment to the Roman republic
and who play it down (Livy), assimilate it to kingship (Cicero), denounce it
as deceit of the Senate against the poor (Dionysius of Halicarnassus), or
pass it over in silence (Polybius). 3 Machiavelli thus begins the willing
acceptance of dictatorship that is shared by later modern philosophers such
as Jean Bodin and Karl Marx, not to mention the republican Rousseau. He
does not oppose the dictators to the democracies, as was done in
democratic rhetoric during the Second World War, but regards them as
compatible and mutually useful, provided that the dictatorship is limited in
tenure (D I 34). The dictator answers to the defects in whatever is
customary or “ordinary” in useful republican procedures; he serves as a
reminder of both the danger and the necessity of “extraordinary modes.”
When unforeseen accidents occur, republics need a regular way to act
irregularly. The dictatorship allows the republic to benefit from “this kingly
power” without having a king. Or is the dictator a tyrant? Machiavelli
struggles to sustain the difference between dictator and tyrant, but it is not
clear that he succeeds or even wants to succeed ( D I 34).

The need for tyranny in republics brings Machiavelli to question the
value and viability of constitutions. Constitutions give visible order to
political arrangements so as to make clear what is done in public as distinct
from private activities. For a prince who dominates his state, public and
private are virtually the same; but for a republic, the distinction is crucial. If
the people are to govern or at least control the government, they must be
able to see, through formal and regular institutions, what the government is
doing in their name. So, as Machiavelli indicates, founding a republic
centers on its ordering (D I 2, 9). But he also stresses that political orders
are not enough and do not last. Orders must be accompanied by “modes” of
political activity that give effect to the orders, interpret them, manipulate
them. The Discourses is full of examples to illustrate how institutions (as we
may speak of Machiavelli’s “orders”) are actually made use of; one of the
best is the story of Pacuvius’s manipulation of the people (D I 47.2). The
book is far from a treatise on the constitutional structure of republics, since
such a work would easily acquire a normative character and would come to

25

resemble a study of an imaginary republic (P 15). Machiavelli promises to
bring “new modes and orders” in the plural (D I pr.l), not a single new
“constitution.” Although he occasionally uses the word costituzione, his use
is not in a comprehensive sense; in the Discourses he does not use the word
regime , which would call to mind politeia, the Greek word for “constitution”
that was extensively defined by Aristotle.

Here again Machiavelli is hostile to Aristotle’s republicanism, and he also
seems to offer a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, to the regime of
modern liberty as opposed to ancient virtue, with which we live today. In
his complex presentation he says that the regular orders of a republic, which
give rise to “ordinary modes” of behavior, need to be distinguished from
“extraordinary modes” that go beyond ordinary bounds, lest the republic
succumb to a tyrant. Yet at the same time, because of unforeseen accidents
or the motion of human things ( D I 6.4), as we have seen, the orders need to
be revived by extraordinary modes—above all, by sensational executions.
What is ordinary is defined against the extraordinary and yet depends on it.
And this is simply to restate the paradox, for Machiavelli, that a republic
must be both opposed and receptive to tyranny. To preserve its liberty it
must stand by its laws and its constitution; to survive, it must be willing to
forego them. Thus the distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary,
public and private, republic and tyranny, must be simultaneously defended
and surrendered.

The chief of the extraordinary modes is, as noted, the sensational
execution. The law must be visibly, and therefore impressively, executed.
An impressive execution is not necessarily a legal one. In fact, an execution
draws more attention if it is illegal, and illegality also shows more spirit in
the one who executes. For Machiavelli specifies that executions should be
seen to be done by one individual, as opposed to Aristotle’s preference for a
committee that would dissipate the responsibility. 4 Machiavelli’s emphasis
on execution—in the double sense of “carrying out” and “punishing
capitally”—could be said to make him the author of modern executive
power. A strong executive is a vital feature of modern republics today,
distinguishing them from ancient republics in which such a power would
have been considered too monarchical. The toleration for so much one-man
rule in regimes so proud to be democracies may owe something to
Machiavelli’s argument in the Discourses , however far it may seem from us.

Another new element in Machiavelli’s political science is his
recommendation of fraud and conspiracy. His chapter on conspiracy (D III
6), by far the longest in the Discourses and a veritable book within the book,

26

is a definite four-star attraction. For the first time in the history of political
philosophy, one finds a discussion not of the justice of conspiracy but of the
ways and means. Instead of disputing whether it is just to conspire against a
tyrant, Machiavelli shows how to conduct a conspiracy against either a
republic or a tyranny; and, as if this were not enough, he shows governments
how to conspire against peoples. Conspiracy, of course, requires fraud, and
Machiavelli is not embarrassed to praise those who excel in fraud and to
promote them as models for republics as well as princes (Z) II 13; III 41).
The necessity of fraud, one can see, is contained in Machiavelli’s
description of the two humors in all states, one desiring to dominate and the
other not to be dominated. Since government is domination, those who do
not desire it must necessarily be fooled into accepting it—which is fraud.
Election is one principal method: while the people are choosing who is to
govern them, they forget their desire not to be governed at all; for injuries
one chooses for oneself hurt less than those imposed by someone else (D I
34.4).

The last item deserving notice in our survey of Machiavelli’s
republicanism is the discussion of corruption that runs through the
Discourses. He seems to praise traditional republican virtue by noting that
when public spirit is absent, republics become corrupt and fall victim to
tyrants. That conclusion would imply a connection between moral virtue
and political success. It would suggest that republican peoples will be
rewarded for their self-sacrifice by the survival and prosperity of their
republics (D I 55) and that the most efficacious means to success is
education in virtue. But in fact, when examined closely, Machiavelli’s
discussion of corruption proves to be another novelty of his political
science, and not in accord with the fond hope of moral people that morality
brings success.

A quick look at what Machiavelli has to say about Julius Caesar, the
tyrant who put an end to the Roman republic, will make the point. It will
also illustrate the turns of Machiavelli’s rhetoric and the necessity of finding
his opinion by comparing all his statements rather than accepting just one
or following only one tendency of his argument. We first encounter Caesar
in a chapter that contrasts the founders of a republic or kingdom, who are
praiseworthy, with the blameworthy founders of a tyranny (D I 10). In that
contrast there is said to be a “choice between the two qualities of men”: the
detestable Caesar, who desired to possess a corrupt city in order to spoil it,
and Romulus, who founded or reordered it. Then Machiavelli establishes
that the Rome of the early republic, even of the Tarquins, was not corrupt,

27

although it was very corrupt under Caesar (D I 17.1). But in a discussion of
ingratitude in a republic, he says that Caesar “took for himself by force what
ingratitude denied him,” implying that Caesar’s services deserved to be
rewarded by tyranny and that the Roman people in their corruption denied
it to him (D I 29.3)! Caesar is pronounced to be the “first tyrant in Rome”
(.D I 37.2), and in the chapter on conspiracies he is cited as one who
conspired against his fatherland (D III 6.18-19). At last, however, in a
chapter on how Rome made itself a slave by prolonging military commands,
Caesar is presented as a beneficiary of a chain of necessary consequences (D
III 24). As Rome expanded, its armies went further afield and its captains
needed a longer tenure of command, which gave them the opportunity of
gaining the army over to themselves. Such an opportunity is bound to be
seized, sooner or later, by an ambitious prince. And we have already learned
that the Roman republic had no choice but to expand, because the motion
of human things requires that a state either expand or decline (D I 6.4). A
Caesar waits in the future of every successful republic.

Thus, corruption is not a moral failing but, in a people, the necessary
consequence of republican virtue and, in a prince, the necessity of his
nature. Machiavelli reiterates that one must judge in politics and morals
“according to the times.” He inaugurates what is today called “situational
ethics,” a mode of moral judgment more convenient than his high-minded
speech of “corruption” first promises. If this quick study of Caesar is not the
whole view of Machiavelli on corruption, it is at least a part often
unremarked, and the reverse of what one expects from a republican
partisan. It is surely not a whole view of Machiavelli’s Caesar, the man who
both furthered Rome and brought it to an end.

Machiavelli’s treatment of corruption is of a piece with the other
disturbing novelties of his republicanism—the praise and promotion of
tumult, imperialism, dictatorship, fear, fraud, and conspiracy. His talk of
“corruption” is more an excuse for tyranny than an accusation against it,
and it signifies rather a surrender to necessity than moral resistance to its
apparent dictates. Machiavelli does not abandon moral language; he speaks
confidently of both “virtue” and “corruption.” Characteristically, he does
not depart from the common speech of political actors; he does not try to
teach us new terms—such as “power,” “legitimacy,” and “decision
making”—with a scientifically neutral, amoral content. To this extent he
stays with the method of Aristotle and with the ancient philosophers of
ancient virtue. But he interprets common speech in a new way and uses the
good old words in disconcerting and thought-provoking ways of his own. He

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tries to show that to understand political situations correctly, one must not
listen to the intent of the words people use but rather look at the necessities
they face. The prince must adjust his words to his deeds, not the other way
around. Most people do not or cannot accept that necessity—a failing that
is their necessity. They will continue in their moralizing habits because they
are too weak to face a world in which necessity decides. Machiavelli’s use
of “corruption” reflects both the permanence of the moral attitude he
rejects and his way of getting around it.

Machiavellps Criticism of Christianity

What moved Machiavelli to take the grave step of recommending the
mutual accommodation of tyranny and republics, thus changing both
republican morality and republican politics? The answer is in Machiavelli’s
view of his own time: the moderns are weak, the ancients were strong. The
moderns are so called by Machiavelli because they are formed by
Christianity—just the opposite of our usage, for which modernity is a
departure from, or at least a secular modification of, Christianity. But
Machiavelli is not ready to praise modernity until it is ready to follow him.
At the beginning of the Discourses he criticizes “the weakness into which
the present religion has led the world” and the evil that “ambitious idleness”
has done to Christian countries (D I pr.2). Somehow the Christian church
and religion stand in the way of the recovery of ancient virtue and ancient
republicanism, but it is unclear why their presence compels the
comprehensive innovations we have noted in the Discourses, as opposed to a
mere reassertion of the ancient ways in the manner of the humanists, a
sincere Renaissance. What precisely are the evils of Christianity, and what
is Machiavelli’s remedy?

The amazingly bold criticisms of Christianity in three of the Discourses
(.D I 12; II 2.2; III 1.4) surely count among the sites in this work not to be
missed by the conscientious tourist. The criticisms do not seem to be made
from a single point of view, however, and despite their boldness they are as
difficult to interpret as the more hidden treasures of the Discourses. At first
it appears that Machiavelli’s objection is only to the church, because it has
kept Italy weak and disunited (D I 12). The church is not strong enough by
itself to unify Italy, but it is too strong to let any other power do so (see also
FH I 9). If one combines this passage with Machiavelli’s ferocious
suggestion to kill the pope and “all the cardinals” (D I 27), he seems to be
an anticlerical critic aiming at a kind of Protestant reform, or possibly even

29

a partisan of original Christianity. His objection applies in Italy, not in
France or Spain, where unified states have been attained despite the church.

The picture changes when we encounter a direct attack on Christianity,
not just on corruption in the church. “Our religion” is said to esteem less the
honor of the world than does the religion of the Gentiles; it glorifies humble
and contemplative men more than active ones, an attitude that has made the
world “effeminate” and “disarmed” heaven (D II 2). Returning to the
possibility of reform, Machiavelli concludes by saying that the present
religion needs to be interpreted according to virtue, not idleness, but the
preceding discussion has made clear that Machiavelli’s preferred kinds of
worldly glory and virtue were incompatible with Christianity, however
interpreted.

In the third passage on Christianity, Machiavelli considers it as a “sect,” a
collectivity made by human beings that needs to be renewed periodically by
being drawn back toward its beginning, as was done by Saint Francis and
Saint Dominick (Z) III 1.4). Here original Christianity is apparently
accepted by Machiavelli as the true Christianity but still found wanting
because it becomes corrupt in time and needs renewal. Elsewhere
Machiavelli, speaking explicitly of the “Christian sect,” gives it a variable
life span of between 1666 and 3000 years and attributes to it a human
rather than a heavenly origin; and he adopts the opinion of the philosophers,
opposed by the Bible, that the world is eternal (D II 5.1). But to understand
Christianity as a sect like any other sect is to deny its divinity, together with
that of the other sects, so here Machiavelli comes out an atheist. If one
looks also at his discourses on the religion of the Romans, Machiavelli
shows an appreciation for the political utility, if not the truth, of the pagan
religion. He allows that the orderers of religions are praised above founders
of states (D I 9.1, 10.1, 11.2), and he says that after Romulus founded
Rome, the heavens inspired Numa Pompilius to make it religious (Z) I
12.1). Religion enabled the Senate to manipulate the people in carrying out
its enterprises, a function implying that the nobles or princes who
manipulate religion do not believe, unlike the people who are manipulated
(D I 14). Nor does Machiavelli express a consistent opinion on the
importance of religion. After praising Numa’s religion as “altogether
necessary” for keeping Rome quiet and civilized (D I 11.1), he soon after
drastically demotes both Numa and religion, saying that Numa himself was
“quiet and religious” while lacking in virtue, dependent on that of his
predecessor Romulus ( D I 19.1).

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However all this adds up, we should note that Machiavelli’s view of
Christianity is not so negative as the boldness of his criticism suggests. After
all, the supposedly strong ancients were spiritually overcome by the
supposedly weak moderns. He certainly says, despite his apparent atheism,
that Christianity shows “the truth and the true way” (D II 2.2). But
Christianity might show the truth without being itself that truth. By
imitating the life of Christ, Christian priests gain credit with the people
and, says Machiavelli in memorable words, “give them to understand that it
is evil to say evil of evil” (D III 1.4). So priests do evil and “do not fear the
punishment that they do not see and do not believe.” But there seems to be
admiration in this denunciation. Machiavelli, who does not blink at
Romulus’s act of killing his brother in order to be alone, can hardly be
objecting to the rule of priests as the rule of evil. Precisely if Machiavelli,
like the priests, does not fear punishment in the afterlife, he must have been
interested in the modes of manipulating those who do fear it, or who
believe they do. It is no accident that the mode of renewing republics by the
sensational execution (D III 1.3) bears a strange resemblance to the central
mystery of the “Christian sect.”

And this is perhaps not the only mode of political maneuver that
Machiavelli learned from the priests and the church as exemplars of
spiritual warfare. Machiavelli quotes the Bible only once in the Discourses
(D I 26), and when he does, he makes a manifest blunder (see D III 48),
attributing to David an action of God’s (thus also mistaking a very familiar
passage from the New Testament for one from the Old). It was God, not
David, “who filled the poor with good things and sent the rich away empty”
(Luke 1:53), the action of a new prince who makes everything anew in his
state. It is God, then, who in this instance serves as Machiavelli’s model of a
new prince, or of what authors call a “tyrant” (D I 25), who may also be the
founder of a tyrannical republic, or the bringer of the new modes and orders
that make such republics possible. Just when Machiavelli by implication
calls the Christian God a tyrant, he also indicates that he is paying his
greatest compliment. His blasphemy discloses his appreciation, for it
amounts to an appropriation of Christianity to the benefit of mankind.

To answer the question of why Machiavelli felt it necessary to change
ancient virtue, we return to the criticism of Christianity in which he blames
it for creating “ambitious idleness” (D I pr.2) and for being interpreted
according to leisure and not virtue (D II 2.2). Idleness, or leisure (as ozio
can also be translated), is the contrary of virtue in Machiavelli’s view. For
Aristotle, leisure ( schole ) was the very condition of the virtuous.

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Machiavelli directs his venomous criticism of idleness against not only the
priests but also the gentlemen (D I 55.4), who were the bearers of worldly
honor according to the ancients. Thus, it is not enough to recover the honor
of this world against Christian humility if honor is still to be found in high-
minded leisure. Leisure makes republics either effeminate or divided, or
both (D I 6.4; II 20, 25.1); the idle or the leisurely are included among the
enemies of the human race (D I 10.1). Machiavelli puts necessity over
leisure as the concern of the legislator (D I 1.4-5). He wants men to seek
that worldly honor—or, better to say, glory—that is consistent with vigorous
devotion to answering one’s necessities. However much ancient virtue and
Christian virtue are divided over worldly honor, they are together in their
high-minded rejection of motives arising from necessity and, in general, of
the acquisitive life. Both find the highest type—philosopher or saint—in one
who puts the contemplative life over politics and who thus could not be
described as a “new prince,” Machiavelli’s highest type.

To conclude the point: in order to oppose Christian weakness,
Machiavelli felt he had to transform ancient virtue. His studious
concentration on necessity compelled him to turn his back on classical
nobility because it was involved with, and perhaps inevitably gave way to,
its apparent opposite, Christian humility. After human excellence has been
elevated to divine perfection, honoring the best is easily translated into
humbling oneself before the divine. From his rejection of nobility follow
both the democratic and the manipulative policies Machiavelli recommends
to republics. Since he opposes both nobles and noble scruples, he can
indulge popular resentment against gentlemen, and he can do so with
fraudulent strategems.

Machiavelli the Philosopher?

Machiavelli does not appear to be a philosopher, and there are some
scholars bold enough to assure us that he was not. His books are devoted to
“worldly things”—that is, human things—and they do not sustain
philosophic themes, if “philosophic” is understood to mean supraworldly
interests. Machiavelli speaks explicitly of philosophers only three times in
the Discourses ( D I 56; II 5.1; III 12.1), and he mentions Plato and Aristotle
only once each (D III 6.16, 26.2). Among philosophers he prefers the more
political. He speaks much more often of “writers” and “historians,” and in
the Discourses, next to Livy, he mentions Xenophon the most often. At the
beginning of the Discourses he blames the weakness of the modern world

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not on bad philosophy but on “not having a true knowledge of histories” (D
I pr.2).

Nonetheless—to borrow Machiavelli’s frequent expression for turning
back on his argument—philosophy lurks everywhere in his work behind the
scenes in which politics plays out its lessons. Although Machiavelli may
look like a disorderly essayist, he gained the attention of the greatest
modern philosophers from Bacon on. They recognized that a philosopher
cannot reflect on the highest themes without thinking about the conditions
of his thought, which are, broadly speaking, political. So it is not
unphilosophical for a philosopher to take note of the politics of his time and
therewith the politics of any time, the nature of politics. Political
philosophy is a necessary, not an accidental, interest of the philosopher. At
times of grave emergency, his interest in politics might have to become a
preoccupation. In such circumstances he might have to narrow his focus
from the nonhuman to the human, particularly if the emergency consists in
too much concern for the superhuman. Philosophy, in this picture of
Machiavelli’s view, might then with reason cease to be the theme of the
philosopher. For Machiavelli, the philosophy of his time—whether it was
lingering medieval Aristotelianism or Renaissance Platonism—was on more
or less friendly terms with Christianity, and it was so involved in
compromise with a difficult partner that it could not keep the distance
necessary for attack or for reform.

Yet if philosophers are preoccupied with politics, they must also of
course be concerned with what is beyond politics. This is all the more true
with a thinker such as Machiavelli, who expects such great results from the
“remedies” he proposes. In the same place at the beginning of the
Discourses where he criticizes the lack of true knowledge of histories, he
says that people judge it impossible to imitate the ancients, as if heaven, the
sun, the elements, and men themselves had changed from what they were in
antiquity (D I pr.2). But according to the Bible, human beings and their
relation to heaven were changed by the coming of God into the world. The
natural world is subject to supernatural supervision and intervention: such
was the dominant opinion in Machiavelli’s time, which he had to confront.
The authority of Christianity stood in the way of his political project of
reviving ancient virtue. So, like every philosopher, but in his own way and
with fierce determination, he found it necessary to reassert the integrity of
nature against those who provide authoritative opinions reassuring to the
people and convenient for their own domination. “It is good to reason about

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everything,” Machiavelli says inconspicuously in a dependent clause (D I
18.1). But reasoning about everything is the mark of a philosopher.

For Machiavelli, the assertion of nature required the defense of this
world against the claims of the next world. His defense in turn required a
rediscovery of nature, a reformulation of the classical view. Despite his
concentration on politics, he was led after all into the themes of nature,
fortune, and necessity for which he is famous. These are the nonpolitical
considerations necessary to his politics because they concern the limits of
what politics can attain. They also represent the humanly or politically
relevant aspect of what is nonhuman in appearance or origin. Machiavelli is
not so much interested in nature itself as in how “nature” appears to most
people; similarly, he cares little for God but much for religion, the human
view of God. The reason for his politicized treatment is not difficult to find.
Machiavelli attempts to show that human beings can control what previous
philosophers thought uncontrollable and what religion leaves in the hands of
God.

The question of the limits of politics comes up in the very first chapter, in
which Machiavelli debates how much a legislator can choose and how much
is determined by necessity. The answer proves to be that the legislator can
expand his choice by choosing what he will sooner or later find to be
necessary; he must anticipate necessity. Any other policy leaves him
dependent on good fortune, which he cannot count on. Then Machiavelli
turns to the cycle of regimes, a theme of classical but not of modern
political science (D I 2.2-4). Here is another much-visited site in the
Discourses. According to the classical cycle of regimes, they do not develop
progressively (as is assumed in what we call “political development”) but
rather revolve in a circle in which bad regimes succeed good, and good
succeed bad. The cycle implies that politics cannot achieve any permanent
or irreversible benefit; human nature, subject to corruption, will sooner or
later corrupt even the best regime and bring it down.

Machiavelli repeats the account of the cycle given by the Roman
historian Polybius, although without mentioning his name and with
significant differences. Above all, the changes in regimes that Polybius
attributes to nature Machiavelli accords to chance. Machiavelli does not
accept or reject the classical analysis, but at the end he brusquely remarks
that a state undergoing these changes would fall victim to a stronger
neighbor before it could have time to complete the cycle. The classical cycle
unrealistically presupposes that a state runs its course of domestic change
undisturbed by changes imposed from abroad. Machiavelli challenges the

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classical presupposition indirectly, for he goes on to praise expansionist
Rome, the very kind of regime that could take advantage of other republics
devoted to domestic justice and insufficiently prepared to expand. He leaves
the cycle of regimes, never again to return, since its presupposition is not
his. His appropriation of the classical notion proves to be temporary and
provisional, apparently serving a tactical purpose: it enables him to discuss
the beginning of Rome without admitting any role for divinity, whether
pagan or Christian. Thus he can focus on human necessity as the original
motive of politics, while putting aside human piety. When he does come to
discuss religion (D I 9), it is as an aid to a regime already established on
grounds of necessity.

Machiavelli does discuss later the cycle of civilizations, different from
that of regimes (D II 5). This is the motion by which not merely regimes in
one province but entire civilizations—or, to use his term, “sects”—are
initiated and destroyed by heavenly or human causes. In considering the
causes that come from heaven—plague, famine, and flood—Machiavelli
remarks that a flood survivor with knowledge of the preceding sect might be
able to pervert it in his own mode and leave to posterity what he alone
wished. Here is a dream of glory, for someone not in Machiavelli’s
situation, which raises the possibility of human control to an unprecedented
degree. It is one thing for a philosopher to contemplate changes of sect; it is
another to go about changing one. Machiavelli presents the possibility
without having recourse to Bacon’s modern idea of the conquest of nature;
he remains tied to a simplified Aristotelian belief that nature is a living
body purging itself in a way that humans—or one individual human—can
take advantage of.

Machiavelli’s portrayal of Fortune as a willing being with control over
humans is consistent with this politicized Aristotelianism. Aristotle himself
distinguishes nature from chance, the order and regularity of things from
irregular, unforeseeable accidents. He notes that the realm of chance is
identical to the realm of human choice, since what happens by chance could
have been intended. 5 Machiavelli, always politicizing, looks at the matter
from the standpoint of ordinary people who worry about what will happen
to themselves. They postulate a providential God who will take care of
them. But while adopting the human concern for providence, Machiavelli
does not endorse the belief that God will take care of us, and he sets aside
the goodness or perfection of God except insofar as it touches human
necessity. The good people may believe that their goodness guarantees
success, or at least protection; but “goodness is not enough” (D III 30.1).

35

Instead of relying on providence, he postulates a deity called Fortune, who
is said to watch over our actions and sometimes to intervene on our behalf,
but also to have its own plans (D II 29). Or, rather than Fortune, it may be
that there are intelligences in the air with compassion for human beings (D
I 56). But in either case the lesson Machiavelli draws is that human beings
should never abandon themselves, or yield to the superior power of the
superhuman (Z) II 29.3).

Although fortune can never be conquered, human beings can learn to go
along with it, picking up experience and making its plans their own, thus
finally reducing its influence over human affairs. Fortune personified is a
half-way station between a truly pious conception of providence mysterious
to human beings and a scientific or atheist view of fortune as mere chance.
Machiavelli’s personification yields something to wishful thinking—to
human weakness—but in such a way as to encourage human virtue and
reject passive piety. It is doubtful that Machiavelli would have wanted to
conquer fortune even if he could, because of his concern for virtue: virtue is
overcoming risk and so depends on risk; and risk requires chance so that we
do not know what is going to happen. Machiavelli has to hope that the
anticipation of fortune that he counsels will never finally succeed in making
human life predictable.

Machiavelli initiates the modern campaign to conquer nature that Bacon
was to proclaim and carry further. Nature and chance are made less distinct
by Machiavelli than they were for Aristotle. In a comment on Pope Julius II
parallel to one in The Prince, Machiavelli says that he succeeded in the
adventures of his pontificate because his impetuosity was suited to stormy
times, but in quiet times he would have failed because he could not adapt to
them (D III 9.3; P 25). Why not? Because “we are unable to oppose that to
which nature inclines us,” and because success in acting one way becomes a
habit from which you cannot be dissuaded. But Machiavelli shows how to
get around the two difficulties, which may indeed be reduced to one. Earlier
he said that nature “forces you”; then he says that it merely inclines us; then
he suggests that it may only be a stupid habit. In the only chapter of the
Discourses whose title includes the word, “nature” is similarly equated with
custom (D III 43). Machiavelli makes it clear that opposite qualities, such
as the harshness of Manlius and the kindness of Valerius (D III 22), are
useful in different times. Virtue in general is, and must be practiced,
“according to the times,” and republics are superior to principalities
because they are capable of calling upon diverse abilities to find the right
man for the time (D III 9.2).

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Machiavelli’s stance toward nature is complicated. In the first place he
insists on the fixity of nature in order to repel the Christian claim that
nature is subordinate to God. Thus he can conclude that, in view of the
sameness of things, nothing prevents the moderns from imitating the
ancients. But when it develops that it is not enough to imitate the ancients
—one must improve upon them—Machiavelli changes his tune, and the
fixity of nature yields to the flexibility of human virtue and the need for
human mastery. Politically, he knows that most princes have diverse natures
or habits (it matters little which), and princes and peoples have different
humors. These cannot be changed, but they can be manipulated so that a
state does not depend on nature’s provision for its good fortune.
Machiavelli’s republic, unlike Plato’s, is not a coincidence of wisdom and
power, based on the good luck that rulers with the best natures will happen
to gain power. One can see that Machiavelli, a prince above the princes he
advises, has a certain freedom from nature’s limitations that they lack (P
ded. let.). But he, too, has a “natural desire” to work for the benefit of
everyone (D I pr.l).

Machiavellfs Perpetual Republic

Although Machiavelli discourages the image or dream of perfection in our
lives, he does speak, as we have seen, of a perfect republic. He prefers
Rome, the republic that eventually became perfect by innovating through
“accidents,” to Sparta, which was perfectly ordered all at once at its
beginning but proved unable, despite this seeming advantage, to answer the
necessities imposed from without in foreign affairs (Z) 1 2.6-7, 6.4). By
looking to its actual working, Machiavelli rejects a classical model of
perfection in favor of his own idea of accidental perfection not planned
from the beginning. Accidental perfection has to be shown not in a
philosopher’s model but in an actual example, and Machiavelli’s example is
Rome. Clearly his Rome is neither the historical Rome nor Livy’s Rome.
For all his deference to Livy, he announces his definite disagreement on an
important point and substitutes his own authority (D I 58.1). In a sense,
Machiavelli’s Rome is planned from the beginning, but it depends on being
unpredictably completed by others, by the princes he is instructing (D I
pr.l). His constant use of examples does not signify an unphilosophical
inability to formulate universal propositions or to think systematically. He
refuses to cater to the human weakness that craves universal rules and the
assurance that success results from conforming to them. In fact, he provides

37

many universals but qualifies or contradicts them, partly with other
universal and especially with examples. His universals must always be read
and revised in light of his examples. He too has a system, but the system
includes his examples. To make philosophy pay more regard to things as
they are, he wants to teach it to speak through examples, just as political
rulers govern through examples and not only through laws (D III 1.3).

Machiavelli’s seeming lack of system derives from his political intent and
can be seen as deliberate. More hostile to Christianity than the humanists,
he sought to replace its authority either with a new interpretation
“according to virtue” (D II 2.2) or with a new sect based on reason and
necessity. To this end he presents Rome in the Discourses as an alternative
exemplar of human virtue to the “Rome” of the Christian church. His Rome
comes to us from the books of Titus Livy, an authority comparable, as it
were, to the authoritative book of the church, the Bible. If one looks
carefully, Machiavelli’s attitude to Livy can be seen to move from reverence
to acceptance to departure to disagreement to rejection—in sum, his
attitude is in fact an appropriation to his purpose. For the Discourses is not
really a commentary but an original work, as indeed it is commonly treated.
Yet its originality is both trumpeted to the world (its “new modes and
orders”) and concealed behind the example—that is, the authority—of
Rome. Machiavelli’s appropriation of Livy’s Rome may also suggest to us
his appropriation of Christian Rome, insofar as the two Romes are parallel
as well as opposed. As we have noted, Machiavelli is not simply hostile to
Christianity; on the contrary, he has great respect for its political acumen,
for the ability of the church to rule the world without seeming to. Perhaps
he has in mind the appropriation of Christian techniques of rule to the
pagan end of worldly honor.

Yet Machiavelli promises a perfect republic far beyond the ambition of
pagans and the sober reflections of the ancient philosophers. He dangles
before us the dazzling idea of a “perpetual republic,” once denying its
possibility, once affirming it (D III 17, 22.3). A perpetual republic would
have a remedy for every danger and would represent a perfect conquest of
the fortune that sooner or later brings down every human institution except
one: the church. Machiavelli claims for his revised Rome the success for
which the church has to depend on God’s providence. No doubt any
particular republic, such as Florence or Italy, will come to grief; in this
sense a perpetual republic is impossible. But the whole civilization or sect—
the republic in the sense of the “Christian republic” comprising all Christian
states, now transformed into Machiavellian principalities and republics—

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will survive the ups and downs in particular provinces. To effect this
irreversible change may be Machiavelli’s amazing ambition.

Composition and Structure of the Discourses

Nothing is known directly from Machiavelli about the composition of the
Discourses, so those who want to know about it have been reduced to
making inferences. We know that he was expelled from his office as
Florentine secretary in 1512 by the Medici and that in his famous letter of
13 December 1513 he remarks with becoming but unbelievable modesty
that he has completed a “little work,” a “whimsy,” on principalities. And in
The Prince we find a reference to a lengthier “reasoning on republics” that
must be the Discourses (P 2). But the Discourses cannot have been finished
by 1513 because we find in it reference to events that occurred as late as
1517. One of the two young friends to whom Machiavelli dedicated the
work, Cosimo Rucellai, was apparently dead by 1519.

We are left, then, with the period 1513-17, or perhaps 1513-19, as the
time of composition, though of course he might have begun the work while
in office, and the scholars who have studied this matter have been unable to
establish anything more precise. The Discourses was not published until
1531, four years after Machiavelli’s death on 21 June 1527. As far as we
know, he could have changed anything in the manuscript until his death;
and if he did not, it was perhaps by choice. Any attempt to connect the time
of writing with the content of his thought is complicated by the fact that he
seems to have had the opportunity, not open to those who publish in their
lifetimes, to leave his thought as he wanted it up to his last gasp. And in
what respects did Machiavelli’s thought change or develop? We have
already dealt with the question of the consistency of the Discourses and The
Prince, and despite first appearances, we did not find any notable
discrepancy. As one discovers references to The Prince in the Discourses (D
II 1.3; III 42), making their recognition mutual, it seems safest to regard
them as a pair of works, not much different—if at all—in time of
composition, each said by Machiavelli to contain everything he knows, and
offered separately by intent and not by the accident of an author’s
development.

Coming to the structure of the Discourses, we have much less aid from
the Machiavelli scholars who have shown so much interest in the time of
the composition. We do have more aid from Machiavelli himself, who tells
us the plan of the work. But his statements seem both inaccurate and

39

inadequate. To begin with his full title, Discourses on the First Decade of
Titus Livy , one discovers that Machiavelli does not confine himself to Livy’s
first ten books but comments on many more. In addition to the dedicatory
letter there are two prefaces: one to the first book, another to the second,
but none to the third. The two prefaces differ markedly. In the first
Machiavelli urges his contemporaries to imitate the ancients, as the
Renaissance calls for, but in all things and therefore in politics, as the
Renaissance has neglected to do. In the second preface, however, he says
that men often praise ancient times unreasonably. Readers are expected to
have made progress in their thinking from imitating to improving on the
ancients. The need to make progress derives from the resistance that
readers, like human beings in general, feel toward one who finds “new
modes and orders” or who makes himself the head in advising some new
enterprise (D I pr.l; III 35.1). Machiavelli’s two prefaces, which actually
address the reason for prefaces, alert us to the movement of the Discourses,
to the stages of argument and the presence of rhetoric. Rather than speaking
abstractly, Machiavelli is trying to persuade an audience (which may, of
course, have diverse parts more and less attracted to what is said).

At the end of the first chapter Machiavelli describes his plan in the
Discourses. He distinguishes things done by Rome through either public or
private counsel and either inside or outside the city, and he begins the first
book with things occurring inside by public counsel. This is our preparation
for the chapters on the regime contrasting Rome and Sparta, as we have
noted. With the ninth chapter on founding, Machiavelli begins a series of
groups of chapters devoted alternately to the two “humors” among human
beings, princes and peoples. The nature of princes can be seen in how they
govern, but the nature of peoples has to be seen in how they are governed,
since peoples are incapable of governing without a head (D I 44). Princes
and peoples both have a universal character irrespective of, and more
important than, particular regimes. But Rome in particular excelled above
all other republics because it allowed discord between princes and peoples
and thus encouraged each party to reveal its character without attempting a
false harmony. In considering princes, Machiavelli discusses founding and
“being alone” (D I 9-10), corruption and how to overcome it (D I 16-18),
the new prince ( D I 25-27), and dictatorship and extraordinary remedies (D
I 33-45). To explain peoples, he considers the use of religion (D I 11-15),
overcoming weakness (D I 19-24), gratitude shown to princes ( D I 28-32),
and the relationship between fear and glory (D I 46-59).

40

Machiavelli tells us that the second book is about how Rome became an
empire (D II pr.3)—in other words, foreign policy by public counsel,
according to the earlier announcement. This includes a study of the military
in Rome and a comparison of ancient and modern warfare. In book II
Rome comes in for more criticism than before: at the start, Rome is said to
have owed its empire to virtue rather than to fortune, but near the end of
the book the judgment is reversed (D II I, 29.1-2). And in precisely the
chapter in which republics are praised for their domestic policy—the
“common good is not observed if not in republics”—the foreign policy of
the Roman republic is said to have imposed servitude on neighboring
republics.

From these discrepancies it appears that “public counsel” is not enough,
and Machiavelli must turn to private counsel to coordinate domestic and
foreign policy. So book III addresses individual actions in both of these
areas instead of separating them on the model of the first two books. Book I
showed that the public counsel of the Roman republic was in fact a hidden
government making use of private motives (above all, the desire to be
alone), and book II did the same for public counsel on “things outside”
Rome. The stage is set for hidden government by a private individual—the
founder-captain, or the captain who has the double glory of instructing his
army before leading it (D III 13.3). Such a captain will have to be very
capable in management by fraud (D II 13, 41) and skilled in conspiracy (D
III 6). The problem he must face is how to overcome the classical cycle of
good regimes and bad, by which virtue in the good leads eventually, but
inevitably, to corruption in the bad. And he must contrive to extend his
influence beyond his own time to successors who have been made
complacent by his very virtue. It is a problem worthy of Machiavelli
himself.

41

Suggested Readings

Aron, Raymond. Machiavel et les tyrannies modemes. Paris: Fallois, 1993.

Ascoli, A. R., and Victoria Kahn. Machiavelli and the Discourses of Literature. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993.

Baron, Hans. The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

-. “Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen and the Author of The Prince” English Historical Review

76 (1961): 217-53.

Berlin, Isaiah. “The Originality of Machiavelli.” In Against the Current, edited by Isaiah Berlin, 25-
79. New York: Viking Press, 1980.

Bock, Gisela, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli. Machiavelli and Republicanism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Buck, August. Machiavelli. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985.

Burckhardt, Jacob. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.

Chabod, Federico. Machiavelli and the Renaissance. London: Bowes and Bowes, 1958.

Chiappelli, Fredi. Studi sul linguaggio del Machiax>elli. Florence: Le Monnier, 1952.

Colish, Marcia. “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli.” Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971): 323-
51.

DeGrazia, Sebastian. Machiavelli in Hell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Donaldson, Peter S. Machiavelli and Mystery of State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Esposito, Roberto. La politico e la storia: Machiavelli e Vico Naples: Liguori, 1980.

Fleisher, Martin, ed. Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought. New York: Atheneum, 1972.

Garver, Eugene. Machiavelli and the History of Prudence. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1987.

Gilbert, Felix. History: Choice and Commitment Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

-. Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1965.

Guicciardini, Francesco. Considerazioni intorno at Discorsi del Machiax’elli. In Niccolo Machiavelli,
Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, edited by C. Vivanti, 519-84. Turin: Einaudi, 1983.

Hale, J. R. Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy. London: English Universities Press, 1961.

Hulliung, Mark. Citizen Machiavelli Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Kahn, Victoria. Machiax’ellian rhetoric: from the Counter-Reformation to Milton. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994.

Larivaille, Paul. La pensee politique de Machiavel: les Discours sur la premiere decade de Tite-Live
Nancy: Presses Universitaries de Nancy, 1982.

Lefort, Claude. Le travail de l’oeuvre Machiavel. Paris: Gallimard, 1972.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio Edited by G. Inglese. Milan: Rizzoli,
1984.

-. Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio Edited by C. Vivanti. Turin: Einaudi, 1983.

-. The Discourses of Niccold Machiavelli. 2 vols. Edited by L. J. Walker. London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul, 1950.

-. Opere politiche. Edited by M. Puppo. Florence: Le Monnier, 1969.

-. II principe e discorsi. Edited by S. Bertelli. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1960.

-. Tutte le opere. Edited by M. Martelli. Florence: Sansoni, 1971.

-. Tutte le opere storiche e letterrarie di Niccold Machiavelli Edited by Guido Mazzoni and Mario

Casella. Florence: Barbera, 1929.

42

Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr. Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979.

-. Machiavelli’s Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Newell, W. R. “How Original Is Machiavelli?” Political Theory 15 (1987): 612-34.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. “The Ferocious Wisdom of Machiavelli.” In The Suspecting Glance, edited by
Conor Cruise O'Brien. London: Faber and Faber, 1972.

Orwin, Clifford. “Machiavelli's Unchristian Charity.” American Political Science Review 72 (1978):
1217-28.

Parel, Anthony. The Machiavellian Cosmos New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

-. The Political Calculus Essays on Machiavelli’s Philosophy Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1972.

Pincin, Carlo. “Osservazioni sul modo di procedere di Machiavelli nei Discorsi.” In Renaissance
Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, edited by Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi, 385-408.
DeKalb, II.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971.

-. “Le prefazione la dedicatoria dei Discorsi di Machiavelli.” Giomale storico della letteratura

italiana 143 (1966): 72-83.

Pitkin, Hanna. Fortune Is a Woman Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccold Machiavelli Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984.

Pocock, J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Price, Russell. “The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli.” Renaissance Quarterly 30 (1977): 588-631.

Rebhorn, Wayne A. Foxes and Fions Machiavelli’s Confidence Men. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988.

Ridolfi, Roberto. The Fife of Niccold Machiavelli Translated by Cecil Grayson. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963.

Sasso, Gennaro. Machiavelli e gli antichi e altri saggi. 3 vols. Milano: R. Ricciardi, 1987.

- . Niccold Machiavelli. Storia del suopensiero politico. Bologna: II Mulino, 1980.

Saxonhouse, Arlene. Women in the History of Political Thought, Ancient Greece to Machiavelli. New
York: Praeger, 1985.

Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modem Political Thought. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978.

-. Machiavelli. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.

Strauss, Leo. “Machiavelli and Classical Literature.” Review of National Fiteratures I (1970): 7-25.

-. “Niccolo Machiavelli.” In History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph

Cropsey, 296-317. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

-. Thoughts on Machiavelli. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958.

Sullivan, Vickie B. Machiavelli’s Three Romes: Religion, Human Fiberty, and Politics Reformed. De-
Kalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.

Tarcov, Nathan. “Quentin Skinner’s Method and Machiavelli’s Prince. ’’Ethics 92 (1982): 692-709.

Whitfield, J. H. Discourses on Machiavelli. Cambridge: Heffer, 1969.

-. Machiavelli. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.

43

A Note on the Translation

Our purpose has been to translate Machiavelli’s text as literally and
consistently as is compatible with readable English. By “readable” we mean
what can readily be understood now, not necessarily the phrases and idioms
we might use now. We believe that giving currency to Machiavelli requires
us to convey as much as we can of his words, his terms, and his phrasing,
because we wish to be sure that we are not putting our words in his mouth,
thus putting our ideas in his head.

We aspire to the ideal that, despite the difficulties, it is possible to
understand Machiavelli’s thought as he understood it. Thus, perhaps naively,
we consider our translation to be not an interpretation but the basis for a
variety of responsible interpretations aiming at the ideal. We conceive the
office of translator to be strictly confined by the duties of modesty, caution,
and fidelity and not to require, or permit, the freedom of self-expression.
We have added notes to explain allusions or difficulties in the text, not to
advance any interpretation. In the notes we make Machiavelli’s sources
available to readers, insofar as we have been able to identify them, and we
note discrepancies between the original and Machiavelli’s quotation. We
also provide brief descriptions of modern events referred to by Machiavelli
for which he needed no textual source.

Precise cross-references are provided to clarify Machiavelli’s own
references to previous or later discussions in the Discourses or to his other
works. We have not tried to compile lists of mutually relevant passages for
this wonderfully involved or intricate book. These would amount to a
subject index. To provide such a thing would give false security because
passages that need to be compared with one another are many more than
appear at first. We leave the task of putting things together to the
discernment and interpretation of the reader.

We do offer a glossary enabling the reader to trace Machiavelli’s use of
important words and to see how we have translated them, and enabling us to
vary the equivalents we use while still informing the reader of Machiavelli’s
terms. To discover what Machiavelli means by “corruption” in the
Discourses, for example, it is necessary to make a survey of his usage of the
word, which the glossary facilitates. Machiavelli does not define his terms
otherwise than by his usage. Only by experience, indeed, does one learn

44

what his “terms” are. That fact gives special emphasis to the general duty
imposed on translators to translate consistently, an obligation that cannot
fully be met even when it is keenly felt because words in these two—or any
two—languages do not have the same extent of meaning. For example,
ordine does not always mean “order.” But since it is important to
understand the meaning of “order” in the work of a writer who says he is
bringing “new modes and orders,” we try to translate ordine as “order” as
consistently as we can. (We had much less success translating modo
consistently as “mode,” since Machiavelli frequently uses it in phrases that
must be rendered “so that” rather than “in a mode that” to be readable
English.) We try to induce the reader to move toward Machiavelli rather
than pulling Machiavelli toward the reader. This is certainly our choice; if it
is also an interpretation, so be it. The inevitable imperfection of translation
reminds one of life, except that a remedy exists: learn Italian and do your
own translation so as not to depend on the arms of others.

Other difficulties of Machiavelli’s prose should be mentioned. His
pronouns often do not have a clear referent, and we have tried, at some cost
to clarity in English, not to resolve his ambiguity by repeating the noun and
thus making a choice he left open. Where gender clarifies the reference in
Italian more than an English pronoun would, we have occasionally repeated
the noun in brackets. Machiavelli also switches easily from singular to plural
or the reverse, sometimes within the same sentence (making it clear that
collective entities, such as “people,” “nobility,” “plebs,” and “army” operate
sometimes as wholes and sometimes as individuals); and occasionally he
changes from the third person to the second, addressing the reader in the
familiar as “you.” We have kept the change of person but not always the
change of number when it is too confusing. Uno standing by itself, which
occurs frequently, we translate as “one individual” so as to distinguish it
from the many uses of “one” necessary in idiomatic English. Uno prudente
or uno buono is “someone prudent” or “someone good.” Uno solo is “one
alone.”

In accord with the usage of his time Machiavelli says universitd and
universale in cases in which we would expect “general,” since apparently not
everyone is included; so we translate them as “generality” or “collectivity.”
Universitd is derived from the medieval Latin universitas, which means both
a legal body or corporation and (sometimes) the community on which such
bodies depend. But Machiavelli’s usage lacks the legalism of medieval
usage. Machiavelli does not use one word for “power,” such as potere in
modern Italian; rather, he uses two words, potestd and potenza. In this he

45

follows the Latin usage of Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius, as well as the
Italian of Dante. In their writings, potesta and potestas appear to mean a
power (sometimes legal) that may be exercised, as opposed to potenza and
potentia for a power that must be exercised. We have used notes to identify
the less frequent potesta in that case in which it cannot be distinguished
through the glossary.

Machiavelli calls the ancient Etruscans and Gauls “Tuscans” and
“French,” and we have not altered this anachronism (for an explanation, see
D III 43). We have followed Machiavelli’s use of “infinite” (for example,
“infinite other examples”) rather than correct it to “countless.” But he uses
“offend” with such a wide range of meanings that we have been compelled
to use a variety of English terms (“attack,” “hurt,” “offend,” “take the
offensive”). We have preserved every reference to Machiavelli’s writing
(“the examples written above”), whether apparently casual or emphatically
self-conscious. His use of cosa and cose cannot be captured by the English
“thing/s,” so we have sometimes had recourse to “affair/s” or omitted the
term altogether. Machiavelli’s busy families of words for bad, evil, and
wicked and for advantage, convenience, usefulness, and utility defied any
consistent translation; see the glossary. We have rendered servo as “servile”
when it refers to a political community rather than an individual slave:
“enslaved” would be too strong, “subordinate” too weak. The Italian
disarmato means both “unarmed” and “disarmed,” as if everyone were
naturally armed; we have been compelled to choose by the context.
Machiavelli uses “matter” to mean both the subject matter he discusses and
the people as that on which an ambitious man can “impress the form of his
ambition” (D III 8.2); he also uses “subject” in this latter sense. We have not
attempted to streamline or vary his striking duplications and repetitions (“to
order orders” or “reputed for a reputation”). While we have altered the
sentence structure and word order of the Italian to render it English, we
have attempted to be faithful to its surprising shifts of direction and changes
of tone. In short, we have tried to let his readers taste the charm of
Machiavelli’s style:

presenting the most serious matters in a boisterous allegrissimo, perhaps not without a malicious

artistic sense of the contrast he risks—long, difficult, hard dangerous thoughts and the tempo of the

gallop and the very best, most capricious humor. ^

For the Italian text we have followed the Casella edition, adopting
variants where they seem appropriate and noting them where they affect the
meaning. We have profited from the scholarship of Walker’s translation and

46

of Italian editions by Bertelli, Puppo, Inglese, and Vivanti. Allan Gilbert’s
translation has also been useful. We have numbered the paragraphs for ease
of reference but make no claim they originate with Machiavelli.

47

Translators’ Acknowledgments

Parts of the manuscript were word processed by Terese Denov, Marian
Felgenhauer, and Anne Gamboa. The notes (other than the references to
Livy) were checked by Mark Holler and Elyssa Donner. The index of proper
names was prepared by Mark Holler and ably brought to completion by Tim
Cashion, who also assisted in many other ways. The glossary was well
launched by Christopher Lynch and brought safely to port by Joseph
Macfarland, who used it to suggest numerous improvements of the
translation. They were assisted by Daniel Arenas-Vives, Adam Breindel,
Todd Breyfogle, Robert Guay, Nathalie Hester, Samuel Lester, Paul
Ludwig, Daniella Reinhard, and Michael Zeoli. Improvements of the
translation were suggested by Fernando Calvo, Tim Cashion, Markus
Fischer, Steven J. Lenzner, Paul Ludwig, Christopher Lynch, Vickie
Sullivan, Marianne Tarcov, and Susan Tarcov, who was consulted constantly
on editorial questions. Olivia Tarcov transcribed corrections. Jonathan
Marks proofread and transcribed corrections at various stages. Evan
Charney checked the Latin translations. Mary Laur did a conscientious and
highly intelligent job of copyediting the manuscript under the contrary
pressures to improve the English of the translators and reflect the Italian of
a long-dead author. Ana Bugan, Timothy Cashion, Matthew Crawford,
Angela Doll, Daniel Doneson, Michael Freeman, Paul Ludwig, Christopher
Lynch, Joseph Macfarland, David McNeill, Jonathan Marks, Reeghan
Raffels, Daniella Reinhard, Miriam Tai, and Ivy Turkington helped check
the page proofs. The translators take full responsibility for the remaining
errors and infelicities in all parts of the work.

Judy Chernick and later Stephen Gregory, administrative coordinators of
the University of Chicago’s John M. Olin Center, coordinated and
facilitated this enterprise in countless (NM would say infinite) ways. The
project was generously supported by the John M. Olin Foundation through
its grants to the Olin Center. John Tryneski’s encouragement was
indispensable. Allan Bloom was responsible for bringing the translators
together, both in this project and originally.

48

Niccolo Machiavelli to Zanobi Buondelmonti and
Cosimo Rucellai, Greetings:

I send you a present that, if it does not correspond to the obligations I have to
you, is without doubt the greatest Niccold Machiavelli has been able to send
you. For in it I have expressed as much as I know and have learned through a
long practice and a continual reading in worldly things. And since neither you
nor others can desire more of me, you cannot complain if I have not given you
more. You can well regret the poverty of my talent, if these narrations of mine
are poor; and the fallaciousness of my judgment, if in many parts I deceive
myself while discoursing. That being so, I do not know which of us has to be
less obligated to the other: whether I to you, who have forced me to write what
I would never have written for myself; or you to me, if in writing I have not
satisfied you. So take this in the mode 2 that all things from friends are taken,
where one always considers the intention of the sender more than the qualities
of the thing sent. And believe that in this my only satisfaction is that I think that
even if I have deceived myself in many of its circumstances, in this one only I
know that I have not made an error, in choosing you above all others to
address these discourses to: whether because in doing this it appears to me I
have shown some gratitude for benefits received, or because it appears to me I
have gone outside the common usage of those who write, who are accustomed
always to address their works to some prince and, blinded by ambition and
avarice, praise him for all virtuous qualities when they should blame him for
every part worthy of reproach. Hence, so as not to incur this error, I have
chosen not those who are princes but those who for their infinite good parts
deserve to be; not those who could load me with ranks, honors, and riches but
those who, though unable, would wish to do so. For men wishing to judge
rightly have to esteem those who are liberal, not those who can be; and likewise
those who know, not those who can govern a kingdom without knowing.
Writers praise Hiero the Syracusan 3 when he was a private individual more
than Perseus the Macedonian 4 when he was king, for Hiero lacked nothing
other than the principality to be a prince while the other had no part of a king
other than the kingdom. Enjoy, therefore, the good or the ill that you yourselves
have wished for; and if you persist in the error that these opinions of mine

51

gratify you, I shall not fail to follow with the rest of the history, as I promised
you in the beginning. Farewell.

52

First Book

Preface

[1] Although the envious nature of men has always made it no less
dangerous to find new modes and orders than to seek unknown waters and
lands, 1 because men are more ready to blame than to praise the actions of
others, nonetheless, driven by that natural desire that has always been in me
to work, without any respect, for those things I believe will bring common
benefit to everyone, I have decided to take a path as yet untrodden by
anyone, and if it brings me trouble and difficulty, it could also bring me
reward through those who consider humanely the end of these labors of
mine. If poor talent, little experience of present things, and weak
knowledge of ancient things make this attempt of mine defective and not of
much utility, it will at least show the path to someone who with more
virtue, more discourse and judgment, will be able to fulfill this intention of
mine, which, if it will not bring me praise, ought not to incur blame. 2

[2] Considering thus how much honor is awarded to antiquity, and how
many times—letting pass infinite other examples—a fragment of an ancient
statue has been bought at a high price because someone wants to have it
near oneself, to honor his house with it, and to be able to have it imitated by
those who delight in that art, and how the latter then strive with all industry
to represent it in all their works; and seeing, on the other hand, that the
most virtuous works the histories show us, which have been done 3 by
ancient kingdoms and republics, by kings, captains, citizens, legislators, 4
and others who have labored for their fatherland, are rather admired than
imitated—indeed they are so much shunned by everyone in every least thing
that no sign of that ancient virtue remains with us—I can do no other than
marvel and grieve. And so much the more when I see that in the differences
that arise between citizens in civil affairs or in the sicknesses that men
incur, they always have recourse to those judgments or those remedies that
were judged or ordered by the ancients. For the civil laws are nothing other
than verdicts given by ancient jurists, which, reduced to order, teach our
present jurists to judge. Nor is medicine other than the experiments
performed by ancient physicians, on which present physicians found their
judgments. Nonetheless, in ordering republics, maintaining states,
governing kingdoms, ordering the military and administering war, judging
subjects, and increasing empire, neither prince nor republic 5 may be found

54

that has recourse to the examples of the ancients. This arises, I believe, not
so much from the weakness into which the present religion 6 has led the
world, or from the evil that an ambitious idleness has done to many
Christian provinces and cities, as from not having a true knowledge of
histories, through not getting from reading them that sense nor tasting that
flavor that they have in themselves. From this it arises that the infinite
number who read them take pleasure in hearing of the variety of accidents 7
contained in them without thinking of imitating them, judging that
imitation is not only difficult but impossible—as if heaven, sun, elements,
men had varied in motion, order, and power from what they were in
antiquity. Wishing, therefore, to turn men from this error, I have judged it
necessary to write on all those books of Titus Livy that have not been
intercepted by the malignity of the times 8 whatever I shall judge necessary
for their greater understanding, according to knowledge of ancient and
modern things, so that those who read these statements of mine can more
easily draw from them that utility for which one should seek knowledge of
histories. Although this enterprise may be difficult, nonetheless, aided by
those who have encouraged me to accept this burden, I believe I can carry it
far enough so that a short road will remain for another to bring it to the
destined place.

55

What Have Been Universally the
Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and
What Was That of Rome

[1] Those who read what the beginning was of the city of Rome and by
what legislators 1 and how it was ordered will not marvel that so much virtue
was maintained for many centuries in that city, and that afterward the
empire that the republic attained arose there. Wishing first to discourse of
its birth, I say that all cities are built either by men native to the place where
they are built or by foreigners. The first case 2 occurs when it does not
appear, to inhabitants dispersed in many small parts, that they live securely,
since each part by itself, both because of the site and because of the small
number, cannot resist the thrust of whoever assaults it; and when the enemy
comes, they do not have time to unite for their defense. Or if they did, they
would be required to leave many of their strongholds abandoned; and so
they would come at once to be the prey of their enemies. So to flee these
dangers, moved either by themselves or by someone among them of greater
authority, they are restrained to inhabit together a place elected by them,
more advantageous to live in and easier to defend.

[2] Of these, among many others, were Athens and Venice. The first was
built for like causes by the dispersed inhabitants under the authority of
Theseus. 3 The other consisted of many peoples reduced to certain small
islands at the tip of the Adriatic Sea, who began among themselves, without
any other particular prince who might order them, to five under the laws
that appeared to them most apt to maintain them, so as to flee the wars that
arose every day in Italy because of the coming of new barbarians after the
decline of the Roman Empire. 4 It turned out happily for them because of
the long idleness that the site gave them, since the sea had no exit and the
peoples who were afflicting Italy had no ships to be able to plague them: so
any small beginning would have enabled them to come to the greatness they
have.

56

[3] The second case is that of a city built by foreign races, whether free men
or those depending on others, who are sent out as colonies either by a
republic or by a prince so as to relieve their lands of inhabitants or for the
defense of a country newly acquired that they wish to maintain securely and
without expense. Of such cities the Roman people built very many
throughout its empire. Or truly they are built by a prince, not to inhabit but
for his glory, like the city of Alexandria by Alexander. Because these cities
do not have a free origin, it rarely occurs that they make great strides and
can be numbered among the capitals 5 of kingdoms. The building of
Florence was like these, because—whether built by soldiers of Sulla or
perchance by inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesole, who, trusting in the
long peace that was born in the world under Octavian, came down to
inhabit the plain by the Arno—it was built under the Roman Empire. Nor,
in its beginnings, could it make any gains other than those conceded to it by
courtesy of the prince. 6

[4] The builders of cities are free when peoples, either under a prince or by
themselves, are constrained by disease, hunger, or war to abandon the
ancestral country and to seek for themselves a new seat. Such peoples either
inhabit the cities they find in the countries they acquire, as did Moses, or
they build anew in them, as did Aeneas. In this case one can recognize the
virtue of the builder and the fortune of what is built, which is more or less
marvelous as the one who was the beginning of it was more or less virtuous.
His virtue can be recognized in two modes: the first is in the choice of site,
the other in the ordering of laws. Because men work either by necessity or
by choice, and because there is greater virtue to be seen where choice has
less authority, it should be considered whether it is better to choose sterile
places for the building of cities so that men, constrained to be industrious
and less seized by idleness, live more united, having less cause for discord,
because of the poverty of the site, as happened in Ragusa 7 and in many
other cities built in similar places. This choice would without doubt be
wiser and more useful if men were content to live off their own and did not
wish to seek to command others. Therefore, since men cannot secure
themselves except with power, it is necessary to avoid this sterility in a
country and to settle in the most fertile places, where, since [the city] can
expand because of the abundance of the site, it can both defend itself from
whoever might assault it and crush anyone who might oppose its greatness.
As to the idleness that the site might bring, the laws should be ordered to
constrain it by imposing such necessities as the site does not provide. Those

57

should be imitated who have inhabited very agreeable and very fertile
countries, apt to produce men who are idle and unfit for any virtuous
exercise, and who have had the wisdom to prevent the harms that the
agreeableness of the country would have caused through idleness by
imposing a necessity to exercise on those who had to be soldiers, so that
through such an order they became better soldiers there than in countries
that have naturally been harsh and sterile. Among them was the kingdom of
the Egyptians, in which the necessity ordered by the laws was able to do so
much that most excellent men arose there, notwithstanding that the country
is very agreeable. If their names had not been eliminated by antiquity, they
would be seen to merit more praise than Alexander the Great and many
others whose memory is still fresh. Whoever had considered the kingdom of
the sultan, and the order of the Mamelukes and of their military before they
were eliminated by Selim the Grand Turk, 8 would have seen many exercises
concerning soldiers in it, and would in fact have recognized how much they
feared the idleness to which the kindness of the country could lead them if
they had not been prevented with very strong laws.

[5] I say, thus, that it is a more prudent choice to settle in a fertile place, if
that fertility is restrained within proper limits by laws. When Alexander the
Great wished to build a city for his glory, Deinocrates the architect came
and showed him that he could build it on top of Mount Athos, which place,
besides being strong, could be adapted to give that city a human form,
which would be a marvelous and rare thing, worthy of his greatness. When
Alexander asked him what the inhabitants would live on, he replied he had
not thought of that. At this the former laughed and, setting aside that
mountain, built Alexandria, where the inhabitants would have to stay
willingly because of the fatness of the country and the advantages of the sea
and the Nile. 9 So if whoever examines the building of Rome takes Aeneas
for its first progenitor, 10 it will be of those cities built by foreigners, while if
he takes Romulus 11 it will be of those built by men native to the place; and
in whichever mode, he will see that it had a free beginning, without
depending on anyone. He will also see, as will be said below, how many
necessities the laws made by Romulus, Numa, 12 and the others imposed, so
that the fertility of the site, the advantages of the sea, the frequent victories,
and the greatness of its empire could not corrupt it for many centuries, and
that they maintained it full of as much virtue as has ever adorned any other
city or republic.

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[6] Because the things worked by it, which are celebrated by Titus Livy,
ensued either through public or through private counsel, and either inside or
outside the city, I shall begin to discourse of things occurring inside and by
public counsel that I shall judge worthy of greater notice, adding to them
everything that might depend on them, to which discourses this first book,
or in truth this first part, will be limited.

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*$2

Of How Many Species Are Republics, and
Which Was the Roman Republic

[1] I wish to put aside reasoning on cities that have had their beginning
subject to another; and I shall speak of those that had a beginning far from
all external servitude and were at once governed by their own will, either as
a republic or as a principality. These have had diverse laws and orders, as
they have had diverse beginnings. For some were given laws by one alone
and at a stroke, either in their beginning or after not much time, like those
that were given by Lycurgus to the Spartans; 1 some had them by chance and
at many different times, and according to accidents, as had Rome. So that
republic can be called happy whose lot is to get one man so prudent that he
gives it laws ordered so that it can live securely under them without needing
to correct them. One sees that Sparta observed them for more than eight
hundred years without corrupting them or without any dangerous tumult. 2
On the contrary, that city has some degree of unhappiness that, by not
having fallen upon one prudent orderer, is forced of necessity to reorder
itself. Of these still more unhappy is that which is the farthest from order,
and that one is farthest from it that by its orders is altogether off the right
road that might lead it to the perfect and true end. It is almost impossible
for those in this degree to repair themselves by any accident whatever; the
others that, if they do not have perfect order, have taken a beginning that is
good and capable of becoming better, can by the occurrence of accidents
become perfect. But it is indeed true that they will never order themselves
without danger, because enough men never agree to a new law that looks to
a new order in a city unless they are shown by a necessity that they need to
do it. Since this necessity cannot come without danger, it is an easy thing
for the republic to be ruined before it can be led to a perfection of order.
This is vouched for fully by the republic of Florence, which was reordered
by the accident in Arezzo in ’02 and disordered by the one in Prato in T2. 3

[2] Wishing thus to discourse of what were the orders of the city of Rome
and what accidents led it to its perfection, 4 I say that some who have

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written on republics say that in them is one of three states 5 —called by them
principality, aristocrats, and popular—and that those who order a city
should turn to one of these according as it appears to them more to the
purpose. Some others, wiser according to the opinion of many, have the
opinion that there are six types of government, of which three are the worst;
that three others are good in themselves but so easily corrupted that they too
come to be pernicious. 6 Those that are good are the three written above;
those that are bad are three others that depend on these three; and each one
of them is similar to the one next to it so that they easily leap from one to
the other. For the principality easily becomes tyrannical; the aristocrats
with ease become a state of the few; the popular is without difficulty
converted into the licentious. So if an orderer of a republic orders one of
those three states in a city, he orders it there for a short time; for no remedy
can be applied there to prevent it from slipping into its contrary because of
the likeness that the virtue and the vice have in this case.

[3] These variations of governments arise by chance among men. For since
the inhabitants were sparse in the beginning of the world, they lived
dispersed for a time like beasts; then, as generations multiplied, they
gathered together, and to be able to defend themselves better, they began to
look to whoever among them was more robust and of greater heart, and they
made him a head, as it were, and obeyed him. From this arose the
knowledge of things honest and good, differing from the pernicious and bad.
For, seeing that if one individual hurt his benefactor, hatred and
compassion among men came from it, and as they blamed the ungrateful
and honored those who were grateful, and thought too that those same
injuries could be done to them, to escape like evil they were reduced to
making laws and ordering punishments for whoever acted against them:
hence came the knowledge of justice. That thing made them go after not
the most hardy but the one who would be more prudent and more just when
they next had to choose a prince. But then as the prince began to be made
by succession, and not by choice, at once the heirs began to degenerate from
their ancestors; and leaving aside virtuous works, they thought that princes
have nothing else to do but surpass others in sumptuousness and
lasciviousness and every other kind of license. So as the prince began to be
hated and, because of such hatred, began to fear, and as he soon passed
from fear to offenses, from it a tyranny quickly arose. From this arose next
the beginnings of ruin and of plots and conspiracies 7 against princes, done
not by those who were either timid or weak but by those who were in

61

advance of others in generosity, greatness of spirit, 8 riches, and nobility;
who were unable to endure the dishonest life of that prince. The multitude,
thus following the authority of the powerful, armed itself against the prince
and obeyed them as its liberators when he was eliminated. And holding in
hatred the name of a sole head, they constituted a government of
themselves; and in the beginning, with respect to the past tyranny, they
governed themselves according to the laws ordered by them, placing the
common utility before their own advantage; and they governed and
preserved both private and public things with the highest diligence. This
administration came next to their sons, who, not knowing the variation of
fortune, never having encountered evil, and unwilling to rest content with
civil equality, but turning to avarice, to ambition, to usurpation of women,
made a government of aristocrats become a government of few, without
respect for any civility. So in a short time the same thing happened to them
as to the tyrant; for disgusted by their government, the multitude made for
itself a minister of whoever might plan in any mode to offend those
governors; and so someone quickly rose up who, with the aid of the
multitude, eliminated them. Since the memory of the prince and of the
injuries received from him was still fresh, and since they had unmade the
state of the few and did not wish to remake that of the prince, they turned to
the popular state. They ordered it so that neither the powerful few nor one
prince might have any authority in it. Because all states have some
reverence in the beginning, this popular state was maintained for a little
while, but not much, especially once the generation that had ordered it was
eliminated; for it came at once to license, where neither private men nor
public were in fear, and each living in his own mode, a thousand injuries
were done every day. So, constrained by necessity, or by the suggestion of
some good man, or to escape such license, they returned anew to the
principality; and from that, degree by degree, they came back toward
license, in the modes and for the causes said.

[4] It is while revolving in this cycle that all republics are governed and
govern themselves. But rarely do they return to the same governments, for
almost no republic can have so long a life as to be able to pass many times
through these changes and remain on its feet. But indeed it happens that in
its travails, a republic always lacking in counsel and forces becomes subject
to a neighboring state that is ordered better than it; assuming that this were
not so, however, a republic would be capable of revolving for an infinite
time in these governments.

62

[5] I say thus that all the said modes are pestiferous because of the brevity
of life in the three good ones and because of the malignity in the three bad.
So those who prudently order laws having recognized this defect, avoiding
each of these modes by itself, chose one that shared in all, judging it firmer
and more stable; for the one guards the other, since in one and the same city
there are the principality, the aristocrats, and the popular government.

[6] Among those who have deserved most praise for such constitutions is
Lycurgus, who in Sparta ordered his laws so as to give their roles to the
kings, the aristocrats, and the people and made a state that lasted more than
eight hundred years, achieving the highest praise for himself and quiet in

that city. 9 The contrary happened to Solon, who ordered the laws in Athens:
by ordering only the popular state there, he made it of such short life that
before he died he saw the tyranny of Pisistratus born there. 10 His heirs were
expelled after forty years and Athens returned to freedom, yet because it
took up the popular state again, according to the orders of Solon, it lasted
no more than a hundred years. To maintain it, [Athens] made many
constitutions that had not been considered by Solon, by which the insolence
of the great and the license of the collectivity 11 were repressed.
Nonetheless, because it did not mix them with the power of the principality
and with that of the aristocrats, Athens lived a very short time in respect to
Sparta.

[7] But let us come to Rome. Notwithstanding that it did not have a
Lycurgus to order it in the beginning in a mode that would enable it to live
free a long time, nonetheless so many accidents arose in it through the
disunion between the plebs and the Senate that what an orderer had not
done, chance did. For if the first fortune did not fall to Rome, the second
fell to it; for if its first orders were defective, nonetheless they did not
deviate from the right way that could lead them to perfection. For Romulus
and all the other kings made many and good laws conforming also to a free
way of life; but because their end was to found a kingdom and not a
republic, when that city was left free, many things that were necessary to
order in favor of freedom were lacking, not having been ordered by those
kings. Even though its kings lost their empire by the causes and modes
discoursed of, nonetheless those who expelled them expelled from Rome
the name and not the kingly power, having at once ordered two consuls
there who stood in the place of the kings; so, since there were the consuls
and the Senate in that republic, it came to be mixed only of two qualities
out of the three written of above—that is, the principality and the

63

aristocrats. It remained only to give a place to the popular government;
hence, when the Roman nobility became insolent for the causes that will be
told below, the people rose up against it; so as not to lose the whole, it was
constrained to yield to the people its part, and on the other side the Senate
and the consuls remained with so much authority that they could keep their
rank in that republic. Thus arose the creation of the tribunes of the plebs,
after which the state of that republic came to be more stabilized, since all
three kinds of government there had their part. Fortune was so favorable to
it that although it passed from the government of kings and of aristocrats to
that of the people, by the same degrees and for the same causes that have
been discoursed of above, nonetheless it never took away all authority from
kingly qualities so as to give authority to the aristocrats, nor did it diminish
the authority of the aristocrats altogether so as to give it to the people. But,
remaining mixed, it made a perfect republic, to which perfection it came
through the disunion of the plebs and the Senate, as will be demonstrated at
length in the next two chapters.

t$3

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#?3 a

What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the
Plebs Be Created in Rome, Which Made
the Republic More Perfect

[1] As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every
history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and
orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always
have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free
opportunity for it. When any malignity remains hidden for a time, this
proceeds from a hidden cause, which is not recognized because no contrary
experience has been seen. But time, which they say is the father of every
truth, exposes it later.

[2] It appeared that in Rome there was a very great union between the plebs
and the Senate after the Tarquins were expelled, 1 and that the nobles had
put away that pride of theirs, had taken on a popular spirit, and were
tolerable to anyone, however mean. 2 This deception remained concealed,
nor did one see the cause of it while the Tarquins lived. Fearing them, and
having fear that if the plebs were treated badly it would not take their side,
the nobility behaved humanely toward them; but as soon as the Tarquins
were dead and fear fled from the nobles, they began to spit out that poison
against the plebs that they had held in their breasts, and they offended it in
all the modes they could. 3 Such a thing is testimony to what I said above,
that men never work any good unless through necessity, but where choice
abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of
confusion and disorder. Therefore it is said that hunger and poverty make
men industrious, and the laws make them good. Where a thing works well
on its own without the law, the law is not necessary; but when some good
custom is lacking, at once the law is necessary. Therefore when the
Tarquins, who had kept the nobility in check with fear of themselves, were
missing, it was fitting to think of a new order that would have the same
effect as the Tarquins had had when they were alive. Therefore, after many

65

confusions, noises, and dangers of scandals that arose between the plebs and
the nobility, they arrived at the creation of the tribunes for the security of
the plebs. 4 They ordered them with so much eminence and reputation that
they could ever after be intermediaries between the plebs and the Senate
and prevent the insolence of the nobles.

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#?4 n

That the Disunion of the Plebs and the
Roman Senate Made That Republic Free

and Powerful

[1] I do not wish to fail to discourse of the tumults in Rome from the death
of the Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes, 1 and then upon some things
contrary to the opinion of many who say that Rome was a tumultuous
republic and full of such confusion that if good fortune and military virtue
had not made up for its defects, it would have been inferior to every other
republic. 2 I cannot deny that fortune and the military were causes of the
Roman Empire; but it quite appears to me they are not aware that where
the military is good, there must be good order; and too, it rarely occurs that
good fortune will not be there. But let us come to other details of that city. I
say that to me it appears that those who damn the tumults between the
nobles and the plebs blame those things that were the first cause of keeping
Rome free, and that they consider the noises and the cries that would arise
in such tumults more than the good effects that they engendered. They do
not consider that in every republic are two diverse humors, 3 that of the
people and that of the great, and that all the laws that are made in favor of
freedom arise from their disunion, as can easily be seen to have occurred in
Rome. For from the Tarquins to the Gracchi, which was more than three
hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely engendered exile and very rarely
blood. Neither can these tumults, therefore, be judged harmful nor a
republic divided that in so much time sent no more than eight or ten
citizens into exile because of its differences, and killed very few of them,
and condemned not many more to fines of money. Nor can one in any
mode, with reason, call a republic disordered where there are so many
examples of virtue; for good examples arise from good education, good
education from good laws, and good laws from those tumults that many
inconsiderately damn. For whoever examines their end well will find that
they have engendered not any exile or violence unfavorable to the common

67

good but laws and orders in benefit of public freedom. If anyone said the
modes were extraordinary and almost wild, to see the people together
crying out against the Senate, the Senate against the people, running
tumultuously through the streets, closing shops, the whole plebs leaving
Rome—all of which things frighten whoever does no other than read of
them—I say that every city ought to have its modes with which the people
can vent its ambition, and especially those cities that wish to avail
themselves of the people in important things. Among these the city of
Rome had this mode: that when the people wished to obtain a law, either
they did one of the things said above or they refused to enroll their names to
go to war, so that to placate them there was need to satisfy them in some
part. The desires of free peoples are rarely pernicious to freedom because
they arise either from being oppressed or from suspicion that they may be
oppressed. If these opinions are false, there is for them the remedy of
assemblies, where some good man 4 gets up who in orating demonstrates to
them how they deceive themselves; and though peoples, as Tully says, are
ignorant, they are capable of truth and easily yield when the truth is told
them by a man worthy of faith. 5

[2] Thus one should blame the Roman government more sparingly and
consider that so many good effects would not have emerged from that
republic if not caused by the best causes. And if the tumults were the cause
of the creation of the tribunes, they deserve highest praise; for besides
giving popular administration its part, they were constituted as a guard of
Roman freedom, as will be shown in the following chapter.

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«5 M

Where the Guard of Freedom May Be
Settled More Securely, in the People or in
the Great; and Which Has Greater Cause
for Tumult, He Who Wishes to Acquire or
He Who Wishes to Maintain

[1] For those who have prudently constituted a republic, among the most
necessary things ordered by them has been to constitute a guard for
freedom, and according as this is well placed, that free way of life lasts
more or less. Because in every republic there are great and popular men, it
has been doubted in which hands it is better to place the said guard. With
the Lacedemonians, and in our times with the Venetians, it has been put in
the hands of the nobles; but with the Romans it was put in the hands of the
plebs.

[2] Therefore it is necessary to examine which of these republics made the
better choice. If one goes back to the reasons, there is something to say on
every side; but if one examines their end, one takes the side of the nobles
because the freedom of Sparta and Venice had a longer life than that of
Rome. Coming to reasons, taking first the side of the Romans, I say that one
should put on guard over a thing those who have less appetite for usurping
it. Without doubt, if one considers the end of the nobles and of the ignobles,
one will see great desire to dominate in the former, and in the latter only
desire not to be dominated; and, in consequence, a greater will to live free,
being less able to hope to usurp it than are the great. So when those who are
popular are posted as the guard of freedom, it is reasonable that they have
more care for it, and since they are not able to seize it, they do not permit
others to seize it. On the other side, he who defends the Spartan and
Venetian order says that those who put the guard in the hands of the
powerful do two good works: one is that they satisfy their ambition more,
and, having more part in the republic through having this stick in hand, they

69

have cause to be more content; the other is that they take away a quality of
authority from the restless spirits of the plebs that is the cause of infinite
dissensions and scandals in a republic and is apt to reduce the nobility to a
certain desperation that with time produces bad effects. They give as an
example of this the same Rome, where because the tribunes of the plebs
had this authority in their hands it was not enough for them to have one
plebeian consul, but they wished to have both. From this, they wished for
the censorship, the praetor, and all the other ranks of command of the city;
nor was this enough for them, since, taken by the same fury, they later began
to adore those men who they saw were apt to beat down the nobility, from
which came the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome. 1 And truly, he who
discourses well on the one thing and the other could remain doubtful as to
which should be chosen by him as guard of such freedom, not knowing
which humor of men is more hurtful in a republic, that which desires to
maintain honor already acquired or that which desires to acquire what it
does not have.

[3] In the end, he who subtly examines the whole will draw this conclusion
from it: you are reasoning either about a republic that wishes to make an
empire, such as Rome, or about one for whom it is enough to maintain
itself. In the first case, it is necessary for it to do everything as did Rome; in
the second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for the causes that will be told
in the following chapter.

[4] But, so as to return to discoursing on which men in a republic are more
hurtful, those who desire to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have
acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius was created dictator and
Marcus Fulvius master of the horse, both of them plebeians, so as to look
into certain conspiracies that had been made in Capua against Rome,
authority was also given to them by the people to be able to look into
whoever in Rome, through ambition and extraordinary modes, might be
contriving to come to the consulate and to the other honors of the city. As it
appeared to the nobility that such authority was given to the dictator against
them, they spread it through Rome that the nobles were not the ones
seeking honors through ambition and extraordinary modes but rather that
the ignobles, who, not trusting in their blood and virtue, were seeking by
extraordinary paths to come to those ranks; and they accused the dictator
particularly. So powerful was the accusation that after holding an assembly
and complaining of the calumnies put on him by the nobles, Menenius laid
down the dictatorship and submitted himself to the judgment that might be

70

made of him by the people; and then, after his case had been aired, he was
absolved. 2 There it was much disputed which is the more ambitious, he
who wishes to maintain or he who wishes to acquire; for either one appetite
or the other can be the cause of very great tumults. Yet nonetheless they are
most often caused by him who possesses, because the fear of losing
generates in him the same wishes that are in those who desire to acquire;
for it does not appear to men that they possess securely what a man has
unless he acquires something else new. There is this besides: that since they
possess much, they are able to make an alteration with greater power and
greater motion. And there is still this besides: that their incorrect and
ambitious behavior inflames in the breasts of whoever does not possess the
wish to possess so as to avenge themselves against them by despoiling them
or to be able also themselves to enter into those riches and those honors that
they see being used badly by others.

71

Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered
in Rome That Would Have Taken Away the
Enmities between the People and the

Senate

[1] We have discoursed above on the effects produced by the controversies
between the people and the Senate. Now since they continued until the time
of the Gracchi, 1 when they were the cause of the ruin of a free way of life,
one might desire that Rome had produced the great effects that it produced
without having such enmities in it. So it has appeared to me a thing worthy
of consideration to see whether a state could have been ordered in Rome
that would have removed the aforesaid controversies. For him who wishes
to examine this it is necessary to have recourse to those republics that have
been free for a long while without such enmities and tumults and to see
what state they had and whether it could be introduced in Rome. For an
example among the ancients there is Sparta, among the moderns Venice,
named by me above. 2 Sparta made a king, with a small Senate, who
governed it; Venice did not divide the government by names, but under one
appellation all those who can hold administration are called gentlemen. This
mode was given it by chance more than by the prudence of him who gave
them laws; for since many inhabitants retired onto the shores where that
city is now, for the causes said above, 3 and as they grew to such a number
that if they wished to live together they needed to make laws, they ordered a
form of government. 4 And as they joined together often in councils to
decide about the city, when it appeared to them that there were as many as
would be sufficient for a political way of life, they closed to all others who
might come newly to inhabit there the way enabling them to join in the
government. In time, when enough inhabitants found themselves in that
place outside the government so as to give reputation to those who
governed, they called [the latter] gentlemen and the others the populace.

72

This mode could arise and be maintained without tumult because when it
arose whoever then inhabited Venice was put in the government, so that
nobody could complain; those who came later to inhabit it, finding the state
steady and closed off, had neither cause nor occasion to make a tumult. The
cause was not there because nothing had been taken from them; the
occasion was not there because whoever ruled held them in check and did
not put them to work in things in which they could seize authority. Besides
this, those who came later to inhabit Venice were not many, nor of such
number that there was a disproportion between whoever governed them and
those who were governed; for the number of gentlemen is either equal or
superior to them. So for these causes Venice could order that state and
maintain it united.

[2] Sparta, as I said, was governed by a king and by a narrow Senate. It
could maintain itself for so long a time because they could live united a long
time: there were few inhabitants in Sparta, for they blocked the way to those
who might come to inhabit it, and the laws of Lycurgus were held in repute.
(Since they were observed, they removed all causes of tumult). For Lycurgus
with his laws made more equality of belongings 5 in Sparta and less equality
of rank; for there was an equal poverty and the plebeians were less
ambitious because the ranks of the city were spread among few citizens and
were kept at a distance from the plebs; nor did the nobles, by treating them
badly, ever give them the desire to hold rank. This was because the Spartan
kings, placed in that principality and set down in the middle of the nobility,
had no greater remedy for upholding their dignity than to keep the plebs
defended from every injury, which made the plebs not fear and not desire
rule. 6 Since the plebs neither had nor feared rule, the rivalry that it could
have had with the nobility was taken away, as well as the cause of tumults;
and they could live united a long time. But two principal things caused this
union: one, that there were few inhabitants in Sparta, and because of this
they could be governed by few; the other, that since they did not accept
foreigners in their republic they had opportunity neither to be corrupted nor
to grow so much that it was unendurable by the few who governed it. 7

[3] Considering thus all these things, one sees that it was necessary for the
legislators of Rome to do one of two things if they wished Rome to stay
quiet like the above-mentioned republics: either not employ the plebs in
war, as did the Venetians, or not open the way to foreigners, as did the
Spartans. They did both, which gave the plebs strength and increase and
infinite opportunities for tumult. But if the Roman state had come to be

73

quieter, this inconvenience would have followed: that it would also have
been weaker because it cut off the way by which it could come to the
greatness it achieved, so that if Rome wished to remove the causes of
tumults, it removed too the causes of expansion. In all human things he who
examines well sees this: that one inconvenience can never be suppressed
without another’s cropping up. Therefore, if you wish to make a people
numerous and armed so as to be able to make a great empire, you make it
of such a quality that you cannot then manage it in your mode; if you
maintain it either small or unarmed so as to be able to manage it, then if
you acquire dominion you cannot hold it or it becomes so cowardly that you
are the prey of whoever assaults you. And so, in every decision of ours, we
should consider where are the fewer inconveniences and take that for the
best policy, because nothing entirely clean and entirely without suspicion is
ever found. So Rome in similarity to Sparta could have made a prince for
life and made a small Senate; but it could not, like Sparta, refuse to increase
the number of its citizens if it wished to make a great empire; that would
have made the king for life and the small number of the Senate serve for
little as far as union was concerned.

[4] If someone wished, therefore, to order a republic anew, he would have
to examine whether he wished it to expand like Rome in dominion and in
power or truly to remain within narrow limits. In the first case it is
necessary to order it like Rome and make a place for tumults and universal
dissensions, as best one can; for without a great number of men, and well
armed, a republic can never grow, or, if it grows, maintain itself. In the
second case, you can order it like Sparta and like Venice, but because
expansion is poison for such republics, he who orders them should, in all the
modes he can, prohibit them from acquiring, because such acquisitions,
founded on a weak republic, are its ruin altogether. So it happened to
Sparta and to Venice. The first of these, after it had subjected almost all
Greece to itself, showed its weak foundation upon one slightest accident; for
when other cities rebelled, following the rebellion of Thebes, caused by
Pelipodas, that republic was altogether ruined. 8 Similarly, having seized a
great part of Italy—and the greater part not with war but with money and
astuteness—when it had to put its forces to the proof, Venice lost everything
in one day. 9 I would well believe that to make a republic that would last a
long time, the mode would be to order it within like Sparta or like Venice;
to settle it in a strong place of such power that nobody would believe he
could crush it at once. On the other hand, it would not be so great as to be

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formidable to its neighbors; and so it could enjoy its state at length. For war
is made on a republic for two causes: one, to become master of it; the other,
for fear lest it seize you. These two causes the mode said above takes away
almost altogether; for if it is difficult to capture it, as I presuppose, since it
is well ordered for defense, it will happen rarely, or never, that one 10 can
make a plan to acquire it. If it stays within its limits, and it is seen by
experience that there is no ambition in it, it will never occur that one 11 will
make war for fear of it; and so much the more would this be if there were in
it a constitution and laws to prohibit it from expanding. Without doubt I
believe that if the thing could be held balanced in this mode, it would be the
true political way of fife and the true quiet of a city. But since all things of
men are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall; 12
and to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you. So
when a republic that has been ordered so as to be capable of maintaining
itself does not expand, and necessity leads it to expand, this would come to
take away its foundations and make it come to ruin sooner. So, on the other
hand, if heaven were so kind that it did not have to make war, from that
would arise the idleness to make it either effeminate or divided; these two
things together, or each by itself, would be the cause of its ruin. Therefore,
since one cannot, as I believe, balance this thing, nor maintain this middle
way exactly, in ordering a republic there is need to think of the more
honorable part and to order it so that if indeed necessity brings it to expand,
it can conserve what it has seized. To return to the first reasoning, I believe
that it is necessary to follow the Roman order and not that of the other
republics—for I do not believe one can find a mode between the one and
the other—and to tolerate the enmities that arise between the people and
the Senate, taking them as an inconvenience necessary to arrive at Roman
greatness. For besides the other reasons cited, in which the tribunate
authority was demonstrated to have been necessary for the guard of
freedom, the benefit produced in republics by the authority to accuse, which
was among others committed to the tribunes, can easily be appreciated, as
will be discoursed of in the following chapter.

in-.-**

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How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in
a Republic to Maintain It in Freedom

[1] To those who are posted in a city as guard of its freedom one cannot
give a more useful and necessary authority than that of being able to accuse
citizens to the people, or to some magistrate or council, when they sin in
anything against the free state. This order produces two very useful effects
for a republic. The first is that for fear of being accused citizens do not
attempt things against the state; and when attempting them, they are
crushed instantly and without respect. The other is that an outlet is given by
which to vent, in some mode against some citizen, those humors that grow
up in cities; and when these humors do not have an outlet by which they
may be vented ordinarily, they have recourse to extraordinary modes that
bring a whole republic to ruin. So there is nothing that makes a republic so
stable and steady as to order it in a mode so that those alternating humors
that agitate it can be vented in a way ordered by the laws. This can be
demonstrated by many examples, and especially by that of Coriolanus,
which Titus Livy brings up. 1 There he says that the Roman nobility had
become angered against the plebs because the plebs appeared to it to have
too much authority through the creation of the tribunes, who defended it.
Meanwhile Rome, as it happened, had come into a great scarcity of
provisions and the Senate had sent for grain in Sicily. Coriolanus, enemy of
the popular faction, counseled that the time had come when, by keeping it
famished and not distributing the grain, they could punish the plebs and take
from it the authority that it had taken to the prejudice of the nobility. When
that judgment came to the ears of the people, it aroused such indignation
against Coriolanus that as he emerged from the Senate they would have
killed him in a tumult, had the tribunes not summoned him to appear to
defend his cause. On this incident one notes what is said above, how far it
may be useful and necessary that republics give an outlet with their laws to
vent the anger that the collectivity conceives against one citizen; for when

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these ordinary modes are not there, one has recourse to extraordinary ones,
and without doubt these produce much worse effects than the former.

[2] For if a citizen is crushed ordinarily, there follows little or no disorder in
the republic, even though he has been done a wrong. For the execution is
done without private forces and without foreign forces, which are the ones
that ruin a free way of life; but it is done with public forces and orders,
which have their particular limits and do not lead beyond 2 to something
that may ruin the republic. As to corroborating this opinion, I wish this
example of Coriolanus to suffice among the ancient ones, concerning which
everyone may consider how much ill would have resulted to the Roman
republic if he had been killed in a tumult; for from that arises offense by
private individuals against private individuals, which offense generates fear;
fear seeks for defense; for defense they procure partisans; from partisans
arise the parties in cities; from parties their ruin. But since the affair was
governed through whoever had authority for it, all those ills came to be
taken away that could have arisen if it were governed with private authority.

[3] We have seen in our times what innovation has done to the republic of
Florence because the multitude was unable to vent its animus ordinarily
against one of its citizens, as happened in the times when Francesco Valori
was like a prince of the city. He was judged by many to be ambitious and a
man who with his audacity and spiritedness wished to pass beyond 3 a civil
way of fife; and there being no way in the republic to resist him except with
a sect contrary to his, it came about that since he had no fear except of
extraordinary modes, he began to get supporters to defend him. On the
other side, since those who opposed him had no ordinary way to repress
him, they thought of extraordinary ways until they came to arms. If one had
been able to oppose him ordinarily, his authority would have been
eliminated with harm to him alone; but since he had to be eliminated
extraordinarily, there followed harm not only to him but to many other
noble citizens.

[4] One could also cite in support of the conclusion written above the
incident that also occurred in Florence regarding Piero Soderini, which
occurred entirely because in that republic there was no mode of accusation
against the ambition of powerful citizens. 4 For to accuse one powerful
individual before eight judges 5 in a republic is not enough; the judges need
to be very many because the few always behave in the mode of the few. So
if such modes had been there, either the citizens would have accused him,

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if he were living badly, and by such means they would have vented their
animus without having the Spanish army come; or, if he were not living
badly, they would not have dared to work against him for fear of being
accused themselves. And so from each side the appetite that was the cause
of the scandal would have ceased.

[5] So one can conclude this: Whenever one sees that alien forces are called
in by a party of men living in a city, one can believe it arises from its bad
orders, because inside that wall there is no order able, without
extraordinary modes, to vent the malignant humors that arise in men—for
which one fully provides by ordering accusations there before very many
judges and giving reputation to them. These modes were so well ordered in
Rome that in so many dissensions of the plebs and the Senate, never did the
Senate or the plebs or any particular citizen plan to avail themselves of
external forces; for having the remedy at home, they were not compelled of
necessity to go outside for it. Although the examples written above are very
sufficient to prove it, nonetheless I wish to bring up another, recited by Titus
Livy in his history. He refers to how in Chiusi, a very noble city in Tuscany
in those times, a sister of Arruns was violated by one Lucumo, and since
Arruns could not avenge himself because of the power of the violator, he
went to the French, who were then reigning in that place today called
Lombardy. He urged them to come with arms in hand to Chiusi, showing
them that they could avenge the injury received usefully to themselves. 7 If
Arruns had seen that he could avenge himself with the modes of the city, he
would not have sought out barbarian forces. But as these accusations are
useful in a republic, so calumnies are useless and harmful, as we shall
discourse of in the following chapter.

i&J

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#?8 a

As Much As Accusations Are Useful to
Republics, So Much Are Calumnies

Pernicious

[1] Notwithstanding that the virtue of Furius Camillus, after he had freed
Rome from the oppression of the French, had made all Roman citizens
yield to him without its appearing to them that reputation or rank were
taken away from them, 1 nonetheless Manlius Capitolinus could not endure
having so much honor and so much glory attributed to him, since it
appeared to Manlius that he had done as much for the safety 2 of Rome; for
having saved the Capitol he deserved as much as Camillus and as for other
martial praise he was not inferior. So, loaded with envy, since he could not
remain quiet because of the other’s glory and saw that he could not sow
discord among the Fathers, he turned to the plebs, sowing various sinister
opinions within it. Among other things he said was that the treasure
gathered together to give to the French and then not given to them had been
usurped by private citizens; and if it were taken back it could be converted
to public utility, relieving the plebs of taxes or of some private debt. These
words were able to do very much among the plebs; so it began to make a
crowd and to make many tumults to its own purpose in the city. Since this
thing displeased the Senate, and appeared to it momentous and dangerous,
it created a dictator to inquire into the case and to check the impetuosity of
Manlius. Then the dictator at once had him summoned, and the two came
out in public confronting fronting each other, the dictator in the midst of
the nobles and Manlius in the midst of the plebs. Manlius was asked to say
who held this treasure he told of, because the Senate was as desirous of
learning it as the plebs. To this Manlius did not respond specifically but kept
evading, and said it was not necessary to tell them what they knew; so the
dictator had him put in prison. 3

[2] It is to be noted by this text how detestable calumnies are in free cities
and in every other mode of life, and that to repress them one should not

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spare any order that may suit the purpose. Nor can there be a better order
for taking them away than to open up very many places for accusations; for
as much as accusations help republics, so much do calumnies hurt. Between
one side and the other there is the difference that calumnies have need
neither of witnesses nor of any other specific corroboration to prove them,
so that everyone can be calumniated by everyone; but everyone cannot of
course be accused, since accusations have need of true corroborations and
of circumstances that show the truth of the accusation. Men are accused to
magistrates, to peoples, to councils; they are calumniated in piazzas and in
loggias. Calumny is used more where accusation is used less and where
cities are less ordered to receive them. So an orderer of a republic should
order that every citizen in it can accuse without any fear or without any
respect; and having done this and observed it well, he should punish
calumniators harshly. They cannot complain if they are punished since they
have places open for hearing the accusations of him whom one has
calumniated in the loggias. Where this part is not well ordered, great
disorders always follow; for calumnies anger and do not punish citizens, and
those angered think of getting even, hating rather than fearing the things
said against them.

[3] This part, as was said, was well ordered in Rome; and it has always been
badly ordered in our city of Florence. As in Rome this order did much
good, in Florence this disorder did much evil. Whoever reads the histories
of this city will see how many calumnies were given out in every time
against citizens who have been put to work in important affairs for it. Of
one individual they said that he had stolen money from the common; of
another, that he had not won a campaign because he had been corrupted;
and that this other had done something so inconvenient because of his
ambition. From this it arose that on every side hatred surged; whence they
went to division; from division to sects; from sects to ruin. If there had been
an order in Florence for accusing citizens and punishing calumniators, the
infinite scandals that occurred would not have occurred. For those citizens,
whether they were condemned or absolved, would not have been able to
hurt the city, and very many fewer would have been accused than were
calumniated, since one could not, as I said, accuse as one could calumniate
everyone. Among other things a citizen could avail himself of to arrive at
greatness have been these calumnies. They do very much for him against
powerful citizens who are opposed to his appetite; for taking the side of the
people, and confirming it in the bad opinion it has of them, he makes it a

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friend. Although one could bring up very many examples, I wish to be
content with only one. The Florentine army was in the field at Lucca,
commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, its commissioner. Either his
bad governance or his bad fortune willed for the capture of that city not to
occur; yet, however the case stood, Messer Giovanni was faulted, as it was
said he had been corrupted by the Lucchese. When that calumny was
favored by his enemies, it brought Messer Giovanni almost to ultimate
despair. Although to justify himself he wished to be put in the hands of the
captain, 4 nonetheless he could never justify himself because there were no
modes in that republic to enable him to do it. On account of this there was
great indignation among Messer Giovanni’s friends, who were the larger
part of the great men, and among those who desired to bring innovation to
Florence. 5 For this and other like causes, this affair grew so much that the
ruin of the republic followed from it.

[4] Thus Manlius Capitolinus was a calumniator, and not an accuser; and
the Romans showed precisely in this case how calumniators should be
punished. For one should make them become accusers, and when the
accusation is corroborated as true, either reward them or not punish them;
but when it is not corroborated as true, punish them as Manlius was
punished.

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That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One
Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to
Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient

Orders

[1] It will perhaps appear to someone that I have run too far into Roman
history without having made any mention of the orderers of that republic or
of the orders that concern religion or the military. So, not wishing to hold
longer in suspense the minds of those who wish to understand some things
regarding this part, I say that many will perhaps judge it a bad example that
a founder of a civil way of life, as was Romulus, should first have killed his
brother, 1 then consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, 2 chosen by
him as partner in the kingdom—judging because of this that its citizens
might, with the authority of their prince, through ambition and desire to
command, be able to offend those who might be opposed to their authority.
That opinion would be true if one did not consider what end had induced
him to commit such a homicide.

[2] This should be taken as a general rule: that it never or rarely happens
that 2 any republic or kingdom is ordered well from the beginning or
reformed altogether anew outside its old orders unless it is ordered by one
individual. Indeed it is necessary that one alone give the mode and that any
such ordering depend on his mind. So a prudent orderer of a republic, who
has the intent to wish to help not himself but the common good, not for his
own succession but for the common fatherland, should contrive to have
authority alone; nor will a wise understanding 3 ever reprove anyone for any
extraordinary action that he uses to order a kingdom or constitute a
republic. It is very suitable that when the deed accuses him, the effect
excuses him; and when the effect is good, as was that of Romulus, it will
always excuse the deed; for he who is violent to spoil, not he who is violent
to mend, should be reproved. He should indeed be so prudent and virtuous

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that he does not leave the authority he took as an inheritance to another; for
since men are more prone to evil than to good, his successor could use
ambitiously that which had been used virtuously by him. Besides this, if one
individual is capable of ordering, the thing itself is ordered to last long not
if it remains on the shoulders of one individual but rather if it remains in
the care of many and its maintenance stays with many. For as many are not
capable of ordering a thing because they do not know its good, which is
because of the diverse opinions among them, so when they have come to
know it, they do not agree to abandon it. That Romulus was of those, that he
deserves excuse in the deaths of his brother and of his partner, and that
what he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition, is
demonstrated by his having at once ordered a Senate with which he took
counsel and by whose opinion he decided. 4 He who considers well the
authority that Romulus reserved for himself will see that none other was
reserved except that of commanding the armies when war was decided on
and that of convoking the Senate. That may be seen later, when Rome
became free through the expulsion of the Tarquins; then no ancient order
was innovated by the Romans, except that in place of a perpetual king there
were two annual consuls. 5 This testifies that all the first orders of that city
were more conformable to a civil and free way of life than to an absolute
and tyrannical one.

[3] One could give infinite examples to sustain the things written above,
such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and
republics who were able to form laws for the purpose of the common good
because they had one authority attributed to them; but I wish to omit them
as a thing known.

[4] I shall bring up only one of them, not so celebrated, but to be considered
by those who desire to be orderers of good laws. When Agis, king of Sparta,
desired to return the Spartans to the limits within which the laws of
Lycurgus had enclosed them, it appeared to him that, because it had in
some part deviated, his city had lost very much of its ancient virtue, and, in
consequence, its strength and empire. He was killed in his first beginnings
by the Spartan ephors as a man who wished to seize the tyranny. 6 When
Cleomenes succeeded to the kingdom, the same desire arose in him because
of the records and writings he had found of Agis, in which his mind and
intention were seen. But he knew that he could not do this good for his
fatherland unless he alone were in authority since it appeared to him that
because of the ambition of men, he could not do something useful to many

83

against the wish of the few. He took a convenient opportunity, had all the
ephors and anyone else who might be able to stand against him killed, and
then renewed altogether the laws of Lycurgus. That decision was apt for
making Sparta rise again and for giving to Cleomenes the reputation that
Lycurgus had, if it had not been for the power of the Macedonians and the
weakness of the other Greek republics. For after such an order, when he
was assaulted by the Macedonians, found himself alone and inferior in
strength, and had no one with whom to seek refuge, he was conquered; and
his plan, however just and praiseworthy, remained imperfect. 7

[5] Thus having considered all these things, I conclude that to order a
republic it is necessary to be alone; and for the death of Remus and Titus
Tatius, Romulus deserves excuse and not blame.

C$3

84

As Much As the Founders of a Republic
and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So
Much Those of a Tyranny Are Worthy of

Reproach

[1] Among all men praised, the most praised are those who have been heads
and orderers of religions. Next, then, are those who have founded either
republics or kingdoms. After them are celebrated those who, placed over
armies, have expanded either their kingdom or that of the fatherland. To
these literary men are added; and because these are of many types, they are
each of them celebrated according to his rank. To any other man, the
number of which is infinite, some share of praise is attributed that his art or
occupation brings him. On the contrary, men are infamous and detestable
who are destroyers of religions, squanderers of kingdoms and republics, and
enemies of the virtues, of letters, and of every other art that brings utility
and honor to the human race, as are the impious, the violent, the ignorant,
the worthless, the idle, the cowardly. And no one will ever be so crazy or so
wise, so wicked or so good, who will not praise what is to be praised and
blame what is to be blamed, when the choice between the two qualities of
men is placed before him. Nonetheless, afterward, deceived by a false good
and a false glory, almost all let themselves go, either voluntarily or
ignorantly, into the ranks of those who deserve more blame than praise; and
though, to their perpetual honor, they are able to make a republic or a
kingdom, they turn to tyranny. Nor do they perceive how much fame, how
much glory, how much honor, security, quiet, with satisfaction of mind,
they flee from by this policy; and how much infamy, reproach, blame,
danger, and disquiet they run into.

[2] It is impossible for those who live in a private state in a republic or who
either by fortune or by virtue become princes of it, if they read the histories
and make capital of the memories of ancient things, not to wish to live in
their fatherlands rather as Scipios than Caesars if they are private persons

85

and rather as Agesilauses, Timoleons, and Dions than Nabises, Phalarises,
and Dionysiuses if they are princes. For they would see that the latter are
reproached to the utmost and the former exceedingly praised. They would
also see that Timoleon and the others did not have less authority in their
fatherlands than Dionysius and Phalaris, but they would see they had more
security by far.

[3] Nor should anyone deceive himself because of the glory of Caesar,
hearing him especially celebrated by the writers; for those who praise him
are corrupted by his fortune and awed by the duration of the empire that,
ruling under that name, did not permit writers to speak freely of him. 1 But
whoever wishes to know what the writers would say of him if they were free
should see what they say of Catiline. 2 Caesar is so much more detestable 3 as
he who has done an evil is more to blame than he who has wished to do one.
He should also see with how much praise they celebrate Brutus, 4 as though,
unable to blame Caesar because of his power, they celebrate his enemy.

[4] He who has become a prince in a republic should also consider, when
Rome became an empire, how much more praise those emperors deserved
who lived under the laws and as good princes than those who lived to the
contrary. He will see that praetorian soldiers were not necessary to Titus,
Nervus, Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius, and Marcus, nor the multitude of
legions to defend them, because their customs, the benevolence of the
people, and the love of the Senate defended them. He will see also that the
eastern and western armies were not enough to save Caligula, Nero,
Vitellius, and so many other criminal emperors from the enemies whom
their wicked customs and their malevolent life had generated for them. If
their history were well considered, it would be very much a lesson for any
prince, to show him the way of glory or of blame and of his own security or
fear. For of the twenty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus, sixteen
were killed, ten died ordinarily. 5 If any of those who were killed were good,
such as Galba and Pertinax, he was killed by the corruption that his
predecessor had left in the soldiers. And if there was any criminal among
those who died ordinarily, such as Severus, it arose from his very great
fortune and virtue, two things that accompany few men. He will also see by
the reading of this history how a good kingdom can be ordered; for all the
emperors who succeeded to the empire by inheritance, except Titus, were
bad. Those who succeeded by adoption were all good, as were the five from
Nerva to Marcus; and as the empire fell to heirs, it returned to its ruin.

86

[5] Thus, let a prince put before himself the times from Nerva to Marcus,
and compare them with those that came before and that came later; and
then let him choose in which he would wish to be born or over which he
would wish to be placed. For in those governed by the good he will see a
secure prince in the midst of his secure citizens, and the world full of peace
and justice; he will see the Senate with its authority, the magistrates with
their honors, the rich citizens enjoying their riches, nobility and virtue
exalted; he will see all quiet and all good, and, on the other side, all rancor,
all license, corruption, and ambition eliminated. He will see golden times
when each can hold and defend the opinion he wishes. He will see, in sum,
the world in triumph, the prince full of reverence and glory, the peoples full
of love and security. If he then considers minutely the times of the other
emperors, he will see them atrocious because of wars, discordant because of
seditions, cruel in peace and in war; so many princes killed with steel, so
many civil wars, so many external ones; Italy afflicted and full of new
misfortunes, its cities ruined and sacked. He will see Rome burning, the
Capitol taken down by its own citizens, the ancient temples desolate,
ceremonies corrupt, the cities full of adulterers. He will see the sea full of
exiles, the shores full of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties follow in
Rome, and nobility, riches, past honors, and, above all, virtue imputed as
capital sins. He will see calumniators rewarded, slaves corrupted against
their master, freedmen against their patron, and those who lacked enemies
oppressed by friends. 6 And he will then know very well how many
obligations Rome, Italy, and the world owe to Caesar.

[6] Without doubt, if he is born of man, he will be terrified away from every
imitation of wicked times and will be inflamed with an immense desire to
follow the good. And truly, if a prince seeks the glory of the world, he ought
to desire to possess a corrupt city—not to spoil it entirely as did Caesar but
to reorder it as did Romulus. And truly the heavens cannot give to men a
greater opportunity for glory, nor can men desire any greater. If one who
wishes to order a city well had of necessity to lay down the principate, 7 he
would deserve some excuse if he did not order it so as not to fall from that
rank; but if he is able to hold the principate and order it, he does not merit
any excuse. In sum, those to whom the heavens give such an opportunity
may consider that two ways have been placed before them: one that makes
them live secure and after death renders them glorious; the other that makes
them live in continual anxieties and after death leaves them a sempiternal
infamy.

87

88

#?11 ft

Of the Religion of the Romans

[1] Although Rome had Romulus as its first orderer and has to acknowledge,
as daughter, its birth and education as from him, 1 nonetheless, since the
heavens judged that the orders of Romulus would not suffice for such an
empire, they inspired in the breast of the Roman Senate the choosing of
Numa Pompilius as successor to Romulus so that those things omitted by
him might be ordered by Numa. As he found a very ferocious people and
wished to reduce it to civil obedience with the arts of peace, he turned to
religion as a thing altogether necessary if he wished to maintain a
civilization; and he constituted it so that for many centuries there was never
so much fear of God as in that republic, which made easier whatever
enterprise the Senate or the great men of Rome might plan to make. 2
Whoever reviews 3 infinite actions, both of the people of Rome all together
and of many Romans by themselves, will see that the citizens feared to
break an oath much more than the laws, like those who esteemed the power
of God more than that of men, as is seen manifestly by the examples of
Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus. 4 For after the defeat that Hannibal had
given to the Romans at Cannae, many citizens gathered together and,
terrified for their fatherland, agreed to abandon Italy and move to Sicily.
Hearing this, Scipio went to meet them and with naked steel in hand
constrained them to swear they would not abandon the fatherland. 5 Lucius
Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called Torquatus, had been
accused by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the plebs; before the day of the
judgment came, Titus went to meet Marcus, and, threatening to kill him if
he did not swear to drop the accusation against his father, he constrained
him to take the oath; and Marcus, having sworn through fear, dropped the
accusation. So those citizens whom the love of fatherland and its laws did
not keep in Italy were kept there by an oath that they were forced to take;
and the tribune put aside the hatred he had for the father, the injury that the
son had done him, and his own honor to obey the oath he had taken. 6 This

89

arose from nothing other than that religion Numa had introduced in that
city.

[2] Whoever considers well the Roman histories sees how much religion
served to command armies, to animate the plebs, to keep men good, to
bring shame to the wicked. So if one had to dispute over which prince
Rome was more obligated to, Romulus or Numa, I believe rather that Numa
would obtain the first rank; for where there is religion, arms can easily be
introduced, and where there are arms and not religion, the latter can be
introduced only with difficulty. One sees that for Romulus to order the
Senate and to make other civil and military orders, the authority of God was
not necessary; 7 but it was quite necessary to Numa, who pretended to be
intimate with a nymph who counseled him on what he had to counsel the
people. 8 It all arose because he wished to put new and unaccustomed orders
in the city and doubted that his authority would suffice.

[3] And truly there was never any orderer of extraordinary laws for a people
who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise they would not have
been accepted. For a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have
in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others. Thus
wise men who wish to take away this difficulty have recourse to God. So did
Lycurgus; 9 so did Solon; 10 so did many others who have had the same end
as they. Marveling, thus, at his goodness and prudence, the Roman people
yielded to his every decision. Indeed it is true that since those times were
full of religion and the men with whom he had to labor were crude, they
made much easier the carrying out of his plans, since he could easily
impress any new form whatever on them. Without doubt, whoever wished
to make a republic in the present times would find it easier among
mountain men, where there is no civilization, than among those who are
used to living in cities, where civilization is corrupt; and a sculptor will get a
beautiful statue more easily from coarse marble than from one badly
blocked out by another.

[4] Everything considered, thus, I conclude that the religion introduced by
Numa was among the first causes of the happiness of that city. For it caused
good orders; good orders make good fortune; and from good fortune arose
the happy successes of enterprises. As the observance of the divine cult is
the cause of the greatness of republics, so disdain for it is the cause of their
ruin. For where the fear of God fails, it must be either that the kingdom
comes to ruin or that it is sustained by the fear of a prince, which supplies

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the defects of religion. Because princes are of short life, it must be that the
kingdom will fail soon, as his virtue fails. Hence it arises that kingdoms that
depend solely on the virtue of one man are hardly durable, because that
virtue fails with the life of that one; and it rarely happens that it is restored
by succession, as Dante prudently says:

Rarely does human probity descend by the branches;

and this He wills who gives it,

that it be called for from him.' '

[5] Thus it is the safety of a republic or a kingdom to have not one prince
who governs prudently while he lives, but one individual who orders it so
that it is also maintained when he dies. Although coarse men may be more
easily persuaded to a new order or opinion, this does make it impossible
also to persuade to it civilized men who presume they are not coarse. To the
people of Florence it does not appear that they are either ignorant or coarse;
nonetheless, they were persuaded by Friar Girolamo Savonarola that he
spoke with God. 12 I do not wish to judge whether it is true or not, because
one should speak with reverence of such a man; but I do say that an infinite
number believed him without having seen anything extraordinary to make
them believe him. For his life, learning, and the subject he took up were
sufficient to make them lend faith. No one, therefore, should be terrified
that he cannot carry out what has been carried out by others, for as was said
in our preface, men are born, live, and die always in one and the same
order.

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12 ft

Of How Much Importance It Is to Take
Account of Religion, and How Italy, for
Lacking It by Means of the Roman
Church, Has Been Ruined

[1] Those princes or those republics that wish to maintain themselves
uncorrupt have above everything else to maintain the ceremonies of their
religion uncorrupt and hold them always in veneration; for one can have no
greater indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine cult
disdained. This is easy to understand once it is known what the religion
where a man is born is founded on, for every religion has the foundation of
its life on some principal order of its own. The life of the Gentile religion
was founded on the responses of the oracles and on the sect of the diviners
and augurs. All their other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on
them; for they easily believed that that god who could predict your future
good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you. From these arose
the temples, from these the sacrifices, from these the supplications and
every other ceremony to venerate them; through these the oracle of Delos,
the temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated oracles who filled the
world with admiration and devotion. As these later began to speak in the
mode of the powerful, and as that falsity was exposed among peoples, men
became incredulous and apt to disturb every good order. Thus, princes of a
republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion
they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain
their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united. All things
that arise in favor of that religion they should favor and magnify, even
though they judge them false; and they should do it so much the more as
they are more prudent and more knowing of natural things. Because this
mode has been observed by wise men, the belief 1 has arisen in miracles,
which are celebrated even in false religions; for the prudent enlarge upon
them from whatever beginning they arise, and their authority then gives

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them credit 2 with anyone whatever. There were very many of these
miracles at Rome; among them was that when Roman soldiers were sacking
the city of the Veientes, some of them entered the temple of Juno and,
drawing near her image, said to it, “Do you want to come to Rome?” 3 It
appeared to someone that he saw her nod and to someone else that she said
yes. For, being men full of religion (which Titus Livy demonstrates, for in
entering the temple they entered without tumult, all devoted and full of
reverence), it appeared to them they heard the response to their question
that they had perhaps presupposed. That opinion and credulity were
altogether favored and magnified by Camillus and by the other princes of
the city. If such religion had been maintained by the princes of the
Christian republic as was ordered by its giver, the Christian states and
republics would be more united, much happier than they are. Nor can one
make any better conjecture as to its decline than to see that those peoples
who are closest to the Roman church, the head of our religion, have less
religion. Whoever might consider its foundations and see how much present
usage is different from them might judge, without doubt, that either its ruin
or its scourging is near.

[2] Because many are of the opinion that the well-being of the cities of
Italy arises from the Roman church, I wish to discourse of those reasons
that occur to me against it. I will cite two very powerful reasons that,
according to me, are incontrovertible. The first is that because of the wicked
examples of that court, this province has lost all devotion and all religion—
which brings with it infinite inconveniences and infinite disorders; for as
where there is religion one presupposes every good, so where it is missing
one presupposes the contrary. Thus we Italians have this first obligation to
the church and to the priests that we have become without religion and
wicked; but we have yet a greater one to them that is the second cause of
our ruin. This is that the church has kept and keeps this province divided.
And truly no province has ever been united or happy unless it has all come
under obedience to one republic or to one prince, as happened to France
and to Spain. The cause that Italy is not in the same condition and does not
also have one republic or one prince to govern it is solely the church. For
although it has inhabited and held a temporal empire there, it has not been
so powerful nor of such virtue as to be able to seize the tyranny of Italy 4 and
make itself prince of it. On the other hand, it has not been so weak that it
has been unable to call in a power to defend it against one that had become
too powerful in Italy, for fear of losing dominion over its temporal things.

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This has been seen formerly in very many experiences: when, by means of
Charlemagne, it expelled the Longobards, who were then almost king of all
Italy, 5 and when in our times it took away power from the Venetians with
the aid of France, 6 then expelled the French with the aid of the Swiss. 7
Thus, since the church has not been powerful enough to be able to seize
Italy, nor permitted another to seize it, it has been the cause that [Italy] has
not been able to come under one head but has been under many princes and
lords, from whom so much disunion and so much weakness have arisen that
it has been led to be the prey not only of barbarian powers but of whoever
assaults it. For this we other Italians have an obligation to the church and
not to others. Whoever wished to see the truth more readily by certain
experience would need to be of such power as to send the Roman court,
with all the authority it has in Italy, to inhabit the towns of the Swiss. They
are today the only peoples who live according to the ancients as regards
both religion and military orders; and one would see that in little time the
bad customs of that court would make more disorder in that province than
any other accident that could arise there at any time.

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« 13 ?*

How the Romans Made Religion Serve to
Reorder the City and to Carry Out Their
Enterprises and to Stop Tumults

[1] It does not appear to me beside the point to bring up some example
when the Romans made religion serve to reorder the city and to carry out
their enterprises; and although there are many in Titus Livy, nonetheless I
wish to be content with these. After the Roman people had created tribunes
with consular power and they were all plebeians except for one, and when
plague and famine occurred that year and certain prodigies came, the nobles
used the opportunity in the next 1 creation of tribunes to say that the gods
were angry because Rome had used the majesty of its empire badly, and
that there was no remedy for placating the gods other than to return the
election of tribunes to its place. From this it arose that the plebs, terrified by
this religion, created as tribunes all nobles. 2 One also sees in the capture of
the city of the Veientes how the captains of armies availed themselves of
religion to keep them disposed to an enterprise. For when Lake Albanus
rose wonderfully that year and the Roman soldiers were annoyed because of
the long siege and wished to return to Rome, the Romans found that Apollo
and certain other responses said that the city of the Veientes would be
captured the year that Lake Albanus overflowed. This thing made the
soldiers endure the vexations of the siege, held by this hope of capturing the
town; and they stayed, content to carry out the enterprise, so that Camillus,
having been made dictator, captured that city after ten years during which it
had been besieged. 3 So, used well, religion helped both for the capture of
that city and for the restitution of the tribunate to the nobility; for without
the said means, both one and the other would have been conducted with
difficulty.

[2] I do not wish to fail to bring up another example to this purpose. Very
many tumults had arisen in Rome caused by the tribune Terentillus when he
wished to propose a certain law, for the causes that will be told of below in

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its place. 4 Among the first remedies that the nobility used against him was
religion, which they made serve in two modes. In the first, they had the
Sybilline books seen and made to respond that through civil sedition,
dangers of losing its freedom hung over the city that year—a thing that,
though exposed by the tribunes, nonetheless put such terror in the breasts of
the plebs that it was cooled off in following them. 5 The other mode was
when one Appius Erdonius, with a multitude of exiles and slaves to a
number of four thousand men, seized the Capitol by night, so that one could
fear that if the Aequi and the Volsci, perpetual enemies to the Roman
name, had come to Rome, they would have captured it. 6 The tribunes did
not because of this cease their persistence in proposing the Terentillan law,
saying that the onslaught was pretended and not true; one Publius
Ruberius, 7 a citizen grave and of authority, came outside the Senate with
words, part loving, part threatening, showing the dangers to the city and the
untimeliness of their demand. So he constrained the plebs to swear it would
not depart from the wish of the consul, so that the plebs, obeying, recovered
the Capitol by force. But as Publius Valerius the consul was killed in the
capture, at once Titus Quintius was remade consul. 8 So as not to let the
plebs rest or give it room to think about the Terentillan law, he commanded
it to go out of Rome to go against the Volsci, saying that because of the oath
it had made not to abandon the consul, it was obligated to follow him—
which the tribunes opposed, saying that that oath had been given to the dead
consul, not to him. Nonetheless, Titus Livy shows that for fear of religion
the plebs wished rather to obey the consul than to believe the tribunes,
saying these words in favor of the ancient religion: “This negligence of the
gods that now possesses the age had not yet come, nor did each make oath
and laws suitable by interpreting for himself.” 9 The tribunes, fearing
because of this thing lest they lose all their dignity, agreed with the consul
that they would remain in obedience to him and that for one year they
would not discuss 10 the Terentillan law and the consuls could not, for a year,
take the plebs out to war. So religion made the Senate overcome the
difficulties that would never have been overcome without it.

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« 14 ?*

The Romans Interpreted the Auspices
according to Necessity, and with Prudence
Made a Show of Observing Religion When
Forced Not to Observe It; and If Anyone
Rashly Disdained It, They Punished Him

[1] Not only were the auguries the foundation, in good part, of the ancient
religion of the Gentiles, as was discoursed of above, but also they were the
cause of the well-being of the Roman republic. Hence the Romans took
more care of them than of any other order in it and used them in consular
assemblies, in beginning enterprises, in leading out armies, in making
battles, and in every important action of theirs, civil or military; nor would
they ever go on an expedition unless they had persuaded the soldiers that the
gods promised them victory. Among the other auspices, they had in their
armies certain orders of augurs whom they called chicken-men; and
whenever they were ordered to do battle with the enemy, they wished the
chicken-men to take their auspices. If the chickens ate, they engaged in
combat with a good augury; if they did not eat, they abstained from the
fight. Nonetheless, when reason showed them a thing they ought to do—
notwithstanding that the auspices had been adverse—they did it in any
mode. But they turned it around with means and modes so aptly that it did
not appear that they had done it with disdain for religion.

[2] One such means was used by the consul Papirius in a most important
fight he had with the Samnites, after which they remained weak and
afflicted in everything. For when Papirius was in his camp in front of the
Samnites and wished to do battle because it appeared to him that victory in
the fight was certain, he commanded the chicken-men to take their
auspices. But when the chickens did not eat, the prince of the chicken-men,
seeing the army’s great disposition to engage in combat and the opinion in
the captain and in all the soldiers that they would win, related to the consul

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that the auspices went well, so as not to deprive the army of the opportunity
of working well. So while Papirius was ordering the squadrons, some of the
chicken-men said to certain soldiers that the chickens had not eaten; they
told it to Spurius Papirius, nephew of the consul. When he related it to the
consul, the latter responded at once that he should try to do his duty well;
that as for him and the army, the auspices were good; and if the chicken-
man had told lies, they would return to his prejudice. So that the effect
would correspond to the prognostication, he commanded the legates to
place the chicken-men in the front of the fight. Then it happened that when
going against the enemy, a javelin thrown by a Roman soldier by chance
killed the prince of the chicken-men. When the consul heard this, he said
that everything was going well and with the favor of the gods, for by the
death of that liar the army had been purged of every fault and of all the
anger that they had assumed against it. And so, by knowing well how to
accommodate his plans to the auspices, he took up the policy of fighting
without the army’s perceiving that he had neglected in any part the orders of
their religion. 1

[3] Appius Pulcher 2 did the contrary in Sicily during the first Punic War.
For when he wished to fight with the Carthaginian army, he had the
chicken-men take the auspices; and when they related that the chickens had
not eaten, he said, “Let’s see if they wish to drink!”—and had them thrown
in the ocean. Then, fighting, he lost the battle. For this he was condemned at
Rome and Papirius honored, not so much because one had won and the
other lost as because one had acted against the auspices prudently and the
other rashly. 3 Nor did this mode of taking auspices tend toward any end
other than to make the soldiers go confidently into the fight, from which
confidence victory almost always arose. This was used not only by the
Romans but also by foreigners, of which it appears to me I ought to bring up
an example in the following chapter.

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«15?n

The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for
the Things Afflicting Them, Had Recourse

to Religion

[1] After the Samnites had had many defeats from the Romans and had
been destroyed in Tuscany by the last one, with their armies and captains
killed, and after their partners, like the Tuscans, the French, and the
Umbrians, had been conquered, “they could no longer stand either by their
own or by external forces; nonetheless they did not abstain from war, so far
they were from tiring even of freedom they had unsuccessfully defended;
and they would rather be conquered than not attempt victory.” 1 Hence they
decided to make the last try. Because they knew that if they wished to win it
was necessary to induce obstinacy in the spirits of the soldiers, and that to
induce it there was no better means than religion, they thought of repeating
an ancient sacrifice of theirs through Ovius Paccius, their priest. 2 He
ordered it in this form: when the solemn sacrifice had been made, and,
among the dead victims and the flaming altars, the heads of the army had all
been made to swear never to abandon the fight, they called up the soldiers
one by one; and among the altars, in the midst of many centurions with
naked swords in hand, they made them swear, first, that they would never
retell anything they had seen or heard. Then, with words of execration and
verses full of fright, they made them promise to the gods to be quick to go
where the commanders sent them, and never to flee from the fight, and to
kill anyone they saw fleeing. If one did not observe this, it would return
upon the head of his family and his line. When some of them, terrified, did
not wish to swear, they were at once killed by their centurions, so that all
the others who came after them swore, made fearful by the ferocity of the
spectacle. To make their assemblage more magnificent, there being forty
thousand men, they dressed half in white with crests and feathers on top of
their helmets; and, so ordered, they were posted near Aquilonia. Against
them came Papirius, who to encourage his soldiers said, “Crests do not

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make wounds, and the Roman javelin goes through painted and gilded
shields.” 3 To weaken the opinion his soldiers had of the enemy, he said the
oath [the Samnites] had taken represented their fear and not their strength,
for they had to have fear of citizens, gods, and enemies at the same time.
When they came to conflict, the Samnites were overcome, because Roman
virtue and the fear conceived out of past defeats overcame whatever
obstinacy they were able to assume by virtue of religion and of the oath they
had taken. 4 Nonetheless, one sees that to them it did not appear they could
have any other refuge, nor try any other remedy from which they could take
hope of recovering lost virtue. This testifies in full how much confidence can
be had through religion well used. Although this part might perhaps require
to be placed rather among foreign 5 things, since it nonetheless depends on
one of the most important orders of the republic of Rome, it appeared to
me [good] to connect it in this place, so as not to divide this matter and to
have to return to it several times.

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« 16 ?*

A People Used to Living under a Prince
Maintains Its Freedom with Difficulty, If
by Some Accident It Becomes Free

[1] Infinite examples read in the remembrances of ancient histories
demonstrate how much difficulty there is for a people used to living under a
prince to preserve its freedom afterward, if by some accident it acquires it,
as Rome acquired it after the expulsion of the Tarquins. Such difficulty is
reasonable; for that people is nothing other than a brute animal that,
although of a ferocious and feral nature, has always been nourished in
prison and in servitude. Then, if it is left free in a field to its fate, it becomes
the prey of the first one who seeks to rechain it, not being used to feed itself
and not knowing places where it may have to take refuge.

[2] The same happens to a people: since it is used to living under the
government of others, not knowing how to reason about either public
defense or public offense, neither knowing princes nor known by them, it
quickly returns beneath a yoke that is most often heavier than the one it had
removed from its neck a little before. It finds itself in these difficulties
whenever the matter is corrupt. For a people into which corruption has
entered in everything cannot live free, not for a short time or at all, as will
be discoursed of below. So our reasonings are about those peoples among
whom corruption has not expanded very much and there is more of the
good than of the spoiled.

[3] To that written above another difficulty is joined, which is that the state
that becomes free makes partisan enemies and not partisan friends. All
those become its partisan enemies who were prevailing under the tyrannical
state, feeding off the riches of the prince; and when the ability to prevail is
taken away from them, they cannot live content and are forced, each one, to
attempt to take up the tyranny again so as to return to their authority. One
does not acquire partisan friends, as I said, because a free way of life
proffers honors and rewards through certain honest and determinate causes,

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and outside these it neither rewards nor honors anyone; and when one has
those honors and those useful things that it appears to him he merits, he
does not confess that he has an obligation to those who reward him. Besides
this, the common utility that is drawn from a free way of life is not
recognized by anyone while it is possessed: this is being able to enjoy one’s
things freely, without any suspicion, not fearing for the honor of wives and
that of children, not to be afraid for oneself. For no one ever confesses that
he has an obligation to one who does not offend him.

[4] So, as is said above, a state that is free and that newly emerges comes to
have partisan enemies and not partisan friends. If one wishes to remedy
these inconveniences and the disorders that the difficulties written above
might bring with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid,
more secure, and more necessary, than to kill the sons of Brutus. As the
history shows, they were induced to conspire with other young Romans
against the fatherland because of nothing other than that they could not take
advantage extraordinarily under the consuls as under the king, so that the
freedom of that people appeared to have become their servitude. 1 Whoever
takes up the governing of a multitude, either by the way of freedom or by
the way of principality, and does not secure himself against those who are
enemies to that new order makes a state of short life. It is true that I judge
unhappy those princes who have to hold to extraordinary ways to secure
their states, since they have the multitude as enemies. For the one who has
the few as enemies secures himself easily and without many scandals, but he
who has the collectivity as enemy never secures himself; and the more
cruelty he uses, the weaker his principality becomes. So the greatest remedy
he has is to seek to make the people friendly to himself.

[5] Although this discourse does not conform to the heading, 2 since it
speaks here of a prince and there of a republic, nonetheless, so as not to
have to return to this matter, I wish to speak of it briefly. Therefore, if a
prince wishes to win over a people that has been an enemy to him—
speaking of those princes who have become tyrants over their fatherlands—
I say that he should examine first what the people desires; and he will
always find that it desires two things: one, to be avenged against those who
are the cause that it is servile; the other, to recover its freedom. The first
desire the prince can satisfy entirely, the second in part. As to the first, there
is an example to the point. When Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, was in
exile, it happened that in the course of a controversy that came up between
the people and the aristocrats of Heraclea, the aristocrats, seeing they were

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inferior, turned to favoring Clearchus and, having conspired with him,
brought him to Heraclea against the popular disposition; and they took
freedom away from the people. 3 So, finding himself between the insolence
of the aristocrats, whom he could not in any mode either make content or
correct, and the rage of the people, 4 who could not endure having lost their
freedom, Clearchus decided to free himself at one stroke from the vexation
of the great and to win over the people to himself. Having taken a
convenient opportunity for this, he cut to pieces all the aristocrats, to the
extreme satisfaction of the people. 5 So in this way he satisfied one of the
wishes that peoples have—that is, to be avenged. But as to the other popular
desire, to recover freedom, since the prince cannot satisfy it, he should
examine what causes are those that make [peoples] desire to be free. He
will find that a small part of them desires to be free so as to command, but
all the others, who are infinite, desire freedom so as to live secure. For in all
republics, ordered in whatever mode, never do even forty or fifty citizens
reach the ranks of command; and because this is a small number, it is an
easy thing to secure oneself against them, either by getting rid of them or by
having them share in so many honors, according to their situations, that
they have to be in good part content. The others, to whom it is enough to
live secure, are easily satisfied by making orders and laws in which universal
security is included, together with one’s own power. If a prince does this,
and the people see that he does not break such laws because of any
accident, in a short time he will begin to live secure and content. As an
example there is the kingdom of France, which lives secure because of
nothing other than that the kings are obligated by infinite laws in which the
security of all its peoples is included. And he who ordered that state wished
those kings to act in their own mode as to arms and money, but in every
other thing they should not be able to dispose except as the laws order. That
prince, then, or that republic that does not secure itself at the beginning of
its state must secure itself at the first opportunity, as did the Romans.
Whoever lets that pass repents later for not having done what he should have
done.

[6] Since, therefore, the Roman people was not yet corrupt when it
recovered its freedom—the sons of Brutus having been killed and the
Tarquins eliminated—it could maintain it with all those modes and orders
that have been discoursed of another time. But if that people had been
corrupt, neither in Rome nor elsewhere does one find sound remedies for
maintaining it, as will be shown in the following chapter.

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104

«17 n

Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt
People Can with the Greatest Difficulty
Maintain Itself Free

[1] I judge that it was necessary either that the kings be extinguished in
Rome or that Rome in a very short time become weak and of no value. For
considering how much corruption those kings had come to, if two or three
such had followed in succession, and the corruption that was in them had
begun to spread through the members, as soon as the members had been
corrupted it would have been impossible ever to reform it. But since they
lost the head when the trunk was sound, they could easily be brought to live
free and ordered. One should presuppose as a thing very true that a corrupt
city that lives under a prince can never be turned into a free one, even if that
prince is eliminated along with all his line. On the contrary, one prince
must eliminate the other; and without the creation of a new lord it never
settles down, unless indeed the goodness of one individual, together with
virtue, keeps it free. But such freedom will last as long as the life of that
one, as happened in Syracuse with Dion and Timoleon, whose virtue in
diverse times kept that city free while each lived; when they were dead, it
returned to its former tyranny. But one sees no stronger example than that
of Rome. When the Tarquins were expelled, Rome could at once take and
maintain its freedom, but after Caesar died, after Gaius Caligula died, after
Nero died, when the whole line of Caesar was eliminated, not only could it
never maintain but it could not even give a beginning to freedom. So great a
difference of results in one and the same city arose from nothing other than
that in the times of the Tarquins the Roman people was not yet corrupt, and
in these last times it was very corrupt. For then to maintain it steadfast and
disposed to avoid kings it was enough only to make it swear that it would
never consent that someone should reign in Rome, but in other times the
authority and severity of Brutus, 1 together with all the eastern legions, were
not enough to hold it so disposed as to wish to maintain that freedom that

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he, in likeness to the first Brutus, 2 had restored to it. This arose from the
corruption that the Marian parties had put in the people; Caesar, as their
head, could so blind the multitude that it did not recognize the yoke that it
was putting on its own neck.

[2] Although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example
whatever, nonetheless I wish to bring up peoples known in our times.
Therefore I say that no accident, even though grave and violent, could ever
make Milan or Naples free because their members are all corrupt. This one
may see after the death of Filippo Visconti, for although Milan wished to
turn to freedom, it could not and did not know how to maintain it. 3 So it
was to Rome’s great happiness that those kings became corrupt quickly, so
that they were driven out before their corruption passed into the bowels of
that city. This lack of corruption—men having a good end—was the cause
that the infinite tumults in Rome did not hurt and indeed helped the
republic.

[3] One can draw this conclusion: that where the matter is not corrupt,
tumults and other scandals do not hurt; where it is corrupt, well-ordered
laws do not help unless indeed they have been put in motion by one
individual who with an extreme force ensures their observance so that the
matter becomes good. I do not know whether this has ever occurred or
whether it is possible; for it is seen, as I said a little above, that if a city that
has fallen into decline through corruption of matter ever happens to rise, it
happens through the virtue of one man who is alive then, not through the
virtue of the collectivity that sustains good orders. As soon as such a one is
dead, it returns to its early habit, as occurred in Thebes, which could hold
the forms of a republic and its empire through the virtue of Epaminondas
while he lived, but returned to its first disorders when he was dead. 4 The
cause is that there cannot be one man of such long life as to have enough
time to inure to good a city that has been inured to bad for a long time. If
one individual of very long life or two virtuous ones continued in succession
do not arrange it, when they are lacking—as was said above—it is ruined,
unless indeed he makes it be reborn with many dangers and much blood.
For such corruption and slight aptitude for free life arise from an inequality
that is in that city; and if one wishes to make it equal, it is necessary to use
the greatest extraordinary means, which few know how or wish to use, as
will be told in another place more particularly. 5

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« 18 ?*

In What Mode a Free State, If There Is
One, Can Be Maintained in Corrupt
Cities; or, If There Is Not, in What Mode

to Order It

[1] I believe it is not beyond the purpose of nor does it fail to conform to
the discourse written above to consider whether in a corrupt city one can
maintain a free state, if there is one, or, if it has not been there, whether
one can order it. On this thing I say that it is very difficult to do either the
one or the other; and although it is almost impossible to give a rule for it,
because it would be necessary to proceed according to the degrees of
corruption, nonetheless, since it is good to reason about everything, I do not
wish to omit this. I shall presuppose a very corrupt city, by which I shall the
more increase such a difficulty, for neither laws nor orders can be found that
are enough to check a universal corruption. For as good customs have need
of laws to maintain themselves, so laws have need of good customs so as to
be observed. Besides this, orders and laws made in a republic at its birth,
when men were good, are no longer to the purpose later, when they have
become wicked. If laws vary according to the accidents in a city, its orders
never vary, or rarely; this makes new laws insufficient because the orders,
which remain fixed, corrupt them.

[2] To make this part better understood, I say that in Rome there was the
order of the government, or truly of the state, and afterward the laws, which
together with the magistrates checked the citizens. The order of the state
was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the tribunes, of the
consuls; the mode of soliciting and creating the magistrates; and the mode
of making the laws. These orders varied hardly or not at all in accidents.
The laws that checked the citizens varied—such as the law on adulteries, 1
the sumptuary [law], 2 that on ambition, 3 and many others—as the citizens
little by little became corrupt. But by holding steady the orders of the state,

107

which in corruption were no longer good, the laws that were renewed were
no longer enough to keep men good; but they would indeed have helped if
the orders had been changed together with the innovation in laws.

[3] That it is true that such orders in the corrupt city were not good one sees
plainly under two principal heads: creating the magistrates and the laws.
The Roman people did not give the consulate and the other first ranks of the
city except to those who asked for it. This order was good in the beginning
because only those citizens who judged themselves worthy asked for them,
and to suffer rejection was ignominious; so, to be judged worthy, each one
worked well. This mode later became very pernicious in the corrupt city
because not those who had more virtue but those who had more power
asked for the magistracies, and the impotent, even though virtuous,
abstained from asking for them out of fear. They came to this
inconvenience not at a stroke but by degrees, as happens with all other
inconveniences; for after the Romans had subdued Africa and Asia and had
reduced almost all Greece to obedience, they became secure in their
freedom, as it did not appear to them that they had any more enemies who
ought to give them fear. This security and this weakness of their enemies
made the Roman people no longer regard virtue but favor in bestowing the
consulate, lifting to that rank those who knew better how to entertain men
rather than those who knew better how to conquer enemies. Afterward,
from those who had more favor, they descended to giving it to those who
had more power; so, through the defect in such an order, the good remained
altogether excluded. A tribune, or any other citizen whatever, could propose
a law to the people, on which every citizen was able to speak, either in favor
or against, before it was decided. This was a good order when the citizens
were good, because it was always good that each one who intended a good
for the public could propose it; and it is good that each can speak his
opinion on it so that the people can then choose the best after each one has
been heard. But when the citizens have become bad, such an order becomes
the worst, for only the powerful propose laws, not for the common freedom
but for their own power; and for fear of them nobody can speak against
them. So the people came to be either deceived or forced to decide its own
ruin.

[4] If Rome wished to maintain itself free in corruption, therefore, it was
necessary that it should have made new orders, as in the course of its life it
had made new laws. For one should order different orders and modes of life
in a bad subject and in a good one; nor can there be a similar form in a

108

matter altogether contrary. But because these orders have to be renewed
either all at a stroke, when they are discovered to be no longer good, or little
by little, before they are recognized by everyone, I say that both of these two
things are almost impossible. For if one wishes to renew them little by little,
the cause of it must be someone prudent who sees this inconvenience from
very far away and when it arises. It is a very easy thing for not one of these
[men] ever to emerge in a city, and if indeed one does emerge, that he never
be able to persuade anyone else of what he himself understands. For men
used to living in one mode do not wish to vary it, and so much the more
when they do not look the evil in its face but have to have it shown to them
by conjecture. As to innovating these orders at a stroke, when everyone
knows that they are not good, I say that the uselessness, which is easily
recognized, is difficult to correct. For to do this, it is not enough to use
ordinary terms, since the ordinary modes are bad; but it is necessary to go
to the extraordinary, such as violence and arms, and before everything else
become prince of that city, able to dispose it in one’s own mode. Because
the reordering of a city for a political way of life presupposes a good man,
and becoming prince of a republic by violence presupposes a bad man, one
will find that it very rarely happens that someone good wishes to become
prince by bad ways, even though his end be good, and that someone wicked,
having become prince, wishes to work well, and that it will ever occur to his
mind to use well the authority that he has acquired badly.

[5] From all the things written above arises the difficulty, or the
impossibility, of maintaining a republic in corrupt cities or of creating it
anew. If indeed one had to create or maintain one there, it would be
necessary to turn it more toward a kingly state than toward a popular state,
so that the men who cannot be corrected by the laws because of their
insolence should be checked in some mode by an almost kingly power. To
wish to make them become good by other ways would be either a very cruel
enterprise or altogether impossible, such as I said above that Cleomenes
did. 4 If he killed the ephors so as to be alone, and if Romulus for the same
causes killed his brother and Titus Tatius the Sabine and then used their
authority well, nonetheless one should take note that neither one of them
had a subject stained with the corruption that we have been reasoning about
in this chapter, and so they were able to wish, and, in wishing, to give color
to their plan.

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tfl9 ft

After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince
Can Maintain Himself, but after a Weak
One No Kingdom Can Be Maintained by

Another Weak One

[1] Having considered the virtue and the mode of proceeding of Romulus,
Numa, and Tullus, the first three Roman kings, one sees that Rome chanced
upon very great fortune when it had the first king very fierce and bellicose,
the next quiet and religious, the third similar in ferocity to Romulus and
more a lover of war than of peace. For in Rome it was necessary that in its
first beginnings an orderer of a civil way of life emerge, but it was indeed
then necessary that the other kings take up again the virtue of Romulus;
otherwise that city would have become effeminate and the prey of its
neighbors. Hence one can note that a successor of not so much virtue as the
first can maintain a state through the virtue of him who set it straight and
can enjoy the labors of the first. But if it happens either that he has a long
life or that after him another does not emerge to resume the virtue of the
first, the kingdom of necessity comes to ruin. So, on the contrary, if two,
one after the other, are of great virtue, one often sees that they do very great
things and that with fame they rise up to heaven.

[2] David was without doubt a man very excellent in arms, in learning, in
judgment; and so much was his virtue that when he had conquered and
beaten all his neighbors, he left to his son Solomon a peaceful kingdom,
which he was able to preserve with the art of peace and not with war; and
he was able to enjoy happily the virtue of his father. But indeed he could
not leave it to his son Rehoboam, who had to labor to be heir to a sixth part
of the kingdom, since he was not like his grandfather in virtue nor like his
father in fortune. 1 As he was more a lover of peace than of war, Bajazet,
sultan of the Turks, was able to enjoy the labors of his father Mahomet,
who, having like David beaten his neighbors, left him a steady kingdom and

no

one that he could easily preserve with the art of peace. If his son Selim, the
present lord, had been like his father and not his grandfather, that kingdom
would be ruined; but one sees that he is about to surpass the glory of his
grandfather. I say, therefore, with these examples that after an excellent
prince, a weak prince can maintain himself; but after a weak one, no
kingdom can be maintained with another weak one, unless indeed it is like
that of France, which its ancient orders maintain. Those princes are weak
who do not rely on war.

[3] I conclude, therefore, with this discourse: that the virtue of Romulus
was so much that it could give space to Numa Pompilius to enable him to
rule Rome for many years with the art of peace. But after him succeeded
Tullus, 2 who by his ferocity regained the reputation of Romulus, and after
whom came Ancus, 3 gifted by nature in a mode that enabled him to use
peace and endure war. First he set out wanting to hold to the way of peace,
but at once he recognized that his neighbors esteemed him little, judging
him effeminate. So he thought that if he wished to maintain Rome, he
needed to turn to war and be like Romulus, not Numa.

[4] From this all princes who hold a state may find an example. For he who
is like Numa will hold it or not hold it as the times or fortune turn under
him, but he who is like Romulus, and like him comes armed with prudence
and with arms, will hold it in every mode unless it is taken from him by an
obstinate and excessive force. And surely one can estimate that if Rome had
chanced upon a man for its third king who did not know how to give it back
its reputation with arms, it would never, or only with the greatest difficulty,
have been able to stand on its feet later or to produce the effects it
produced. So while it lived under the kings, it bore the dangers of being
ruined under a king either weak or malevolent.

ill

#?20 n

Two Virtuous Princes in Succession
Produce Great Effects; and That Well-
Ordered Republics Have of Necessity
Virtuous Successions, and So Their
Acquisitions and Increases Are Great

[1] After Rome had expelled the kings, 1 it lacked those dangers that, as was
said above, 2 it must endure if either a weak or a bad king should succeed.
For the highest command 3 was brought to the consuls, who came to that
command not by inheritance or by deception or by violent ambition but by
free votes, and were always most excellent men. Since Rome enjoyed their
virtue and their fortune in one time and another, it could come to its
ultimate greatness in as many years as it was under the kings. For it is seen
that two virtuous princes in succession are sufficient to acquire the world, as
were Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. A republic should do so
much more, as through the mode of electing it has not only two in
succession but infinite most virtuous princes who are successors to one
another. This virtuous succession will always exist in every well-ordered
republic.

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#?21 ft

How Much Blame That Prince and That
Republic Merit That Lack Their Own

Arms

[1] Present princes and modern republics that lack their own soldiers for
defense and offense ought to be ashamed of themselves and to think as in
the example of Tullus, 1 that such a defect is not through a lack of men apt
for the military but through their own fault, that they have not known how
to make their men military. For when he succeeded to the kingdom, Tullus
did not find a man who had ever been in war, since Rome had been at peace
for forty years; nonetheless, when he planned to make war, he did not think
to avail himself of either the Samnites or the Tuscans or others who were
accustomed to being in arms. But as a very prudent man, he decided to
avail himself of his own. So much was his virtue that in a stroke, under his
government, he was able to make very excellent soldiers. It is more true
than any other truth that if where there are men there are no soldiers, it
arises through a defect of the prince and not through any other defect,
either of the site or of nature.

[2] Of this there is a very fresh example. For everyone knows that in the
most recent times the king of England assaulted the kingdom of France, nor
did he take soldiers other than his own people; and because that kingdom
had gone more than thirty years without making war, he had neither
soldiers nor captain who had ever served in the military. 2 Nonetheless he
did not hesitate to assault with these a kingdom full of captains and good
armies that had been continually under arms in the wars in Italy. It all arose
from that king’s being a prudent man and that kingdom well ordered, which
did not interrupt the orders of war in time of peace.

[3] After the Thebans Pelopidas and Epaminondas had freed Thebes and
had brought it out of the servitude of the Spartan empire, though they found
themselves in a city used to serving and in the midst of effeminate peoples,
they did not hesitate—so much was their virtue—to put them under arms,

113

and to go with them to meet the Spartan armies in the field, and to conquer
them. He who writes of it 3 says that in a short time these two showed that
men of war are born not only in Lacedemon but in every other place where
men are born, provided that there may be found one who knows how to
direct them to the military, as one sees that Tullus knew how to direct the
Romans. Virgil could not have expressed this opinion better, nor shown
with other words that he took its side, than when he says:

And Tullus will move indolent men to arms. 4

114

#?22 n

What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the
Three Roman Horatii and the Three Alban

Curiatii

[1] Tullus, king of Rome, and Mettius, king of Alba, agreed that that people
would be the lord over the other whose three men, written above, should
win. All the Alban Curiatii were killed, one of the Roman Horatii was left
alive; and because of this Mettius, the Alban king, with his people, was left
subject to the Romans. When that Horatius was returning the victor to
Rome, he met a sister of his who had been betrothed to one of the three
dead Curiatii, and as she wept for the death of her betrothed, he killed her.
Hence that Horatius was put under judgment for the fault and after many
disputes was freed, more because of his father’s prayers than for his own
merits. 1 Three things are to be noted here: one, that one should never risk
all one’s fortune with part of one’s forces; the next, that in a well-ordered
city, faults are never paid for with merits; third, that policies are never wise
if one should or can doubt their observance. For being servile is so
important to a city that one ought never to believe that any of those kings or
those peoples would be content that three of their citizens had put them
into subjection, as may be seen in what Mettius wished to do. Although he
at once confessed himself conquered after the victory of the Romans and
promised obedience to Tullus, nonetheless in the first expedition that they
had to gather against the Veientes, it may be seen how he sought to deceive
him, as one who had become aware late of the rashness of the policy he had
taken up. 2 Because enough has been spoken about this third notable thing,
we shall speak only of the other two in the following two chapters.

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«23 ft

That One Should Not Put All One’s
Fortune in Danger, and Not All One’s
Forces; and Because of This, the Guarding
of Passes Is Often Harmful

[1] It has never been judged a wise policy to put all your fortune in danger
and not all your forces. This is done in many modes. One is doing as Tullus
and Mettius did when they committed all the fortune of their fatherland and
the virtue of as many men as both of them had in their armies to the virtue
and fortune of three of their citizens, who amounted to a minimal part of
the forces of each of them. Nor were they aware that by this policy all the
labor that their predecessors had endured in ordering the republic, to make
it live free for a long while and to make its citizens defenders of their
freedom, was almost as if in vain, since it was in the power of so few to lose
it. This affair could not have been worse considered by those kings.

[2] This inconvenience is also brought on almost always through those who,
when they see the enemy, plan to hold difficult places and to guard passes.
For almost always this decision will be harmful unless indeed you can
conveniently keep all your forces in that difficult place. In this case such a
policy is to be taken, but if the place is harsh and one cannot keep all the
forces there, the policy is harmful. This makes me judge thus the example
of those who, having been assaulted by a powerful enemy, and having their
country surrounded by mountains and mountainous places, have never
attempted to fight the enemy in the passes and in the mountains but have
gone to meet it on the other side; or, when they have not wished to do this,
they have waited on the inner side of the mountains in benign, not
mountainous, places. The cause has been the one cited before: one cannot
lead many men to the guarding of mountainous places, whether because
they cannot live there a long time or because the places are so narrow and
have capacity for so few that it is not possible to withstand an enemy who
comes in a mass to strike you. It is easy for the enemy to come in a mass

116

because his intention is to pass through and not to stop; and it is impossible
for him who waits to wait for it in a mass since one has to encamp for a
long time, not knowing when the enemy wishes to pass through places that
are, as I said, narrow and barren. Thus when you lose the pass that you had
presupposed you would hold, and in which your people and your army
trusted, most often such terror enters into the people and the remainder of
your troops that you are left a loser without being able to try out their
virtue. So you have come to lose all your fortune with part of your forces.

[3] Everyone knows with how much difficulty Hannibal crossed the
mountains that divide Lombardy from France 1 and with how much
difficulty he crossed those that divide Lombardy from Tuscany; 2
nonetheless, the Romans waited for him first on the Ticino 3 and then on the
plain of Arezzo. 4 They preferred that their army be eaten up by the enemy
in places where it was able to win rather than leading it into the mountains
to be destroyed by the malignity of the site.

[4] He who reads all the histories judiciously will find very few virtuous
captains who have tried to hold such passes, both for the reasons given and
because they cannot all be closed, since the mountains are like the
countryside and have not only customary and frequented ways but many
others that, if they are not known to foreigners, are known to the peasants
with whose aid you will always be led to any place whatever against the
wish of whoever opposes you. One can bring up a very fresh example of this
in 1515. When Francis, king of France, planned to come into Italy for the
recovery of the state of Lombardy, the greatest foundation that those who
were contrary to his enterprise relied on was that the Swiss would hold him
at the passes on the mountains. As was seen later by experience, that
foundation of theirs was in vain; for leaving aside two or three places
guarded by them, the king came over by another, unknown way and was in
Italy and upon them before they had a presentiment of him. So they retired,
terrified, into Milan, and all the peoples of Lombardy took the side of the
French troops, having been disappointed in the opinion they had that the
French were to be held back in the mountains. 5

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«24 M

Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards
and Punishments for Their Citizens and
Never Counterbalance One with the Other

[1] The merits of Horatius were very great, since with his virtue he had
conquered the Curiatii; his fault was atrocious, since he had killed his sister.
Nonetheless, such a homicide so greatly displeased the Romans that they
brought him to trial 1 for his life, notwithstanding that his merits were so
great and so fresh. To whoever considers it superficially, such a thing would
appear an example of popular ingratitude; nonetheless, whoever examines it
better and inquires with better consideration what the orders of republics
should be will blame that people rather for having absolved him than for
having wished to condemn him. The reason is this: that no well-ordered
republic ever cancels the demerits with the merits of its citizens; but, having
ordered rewards for a good work and punishments for a bad one, and having
rewarded one for having worked well, if that same one later works badly, it
punishes him without any regard for his good works. When these orders are
well observed, a city lives free for a long time; otherwise it will always come
to ruin soon. For if a citizen has done some outstanding work for the city,
and on top of the reputation that this thing brings him, he has an audacity
and confidence that he can do some work that is not good without fearing
punishment, in a short time he will become so insolent that any civility will
be dissolved.

[2] If one wishes the punishment for malevolent works to be kept up, it is
indeed 2 necessary to observe the giving of rewards for good ones, as it was
seen Rome did. Although a republic may be poor and able to give little, it
should not abstain from that little; for every small gift given to anyone, in
recompense for a good however great, will always be esteemed by him who
receives it as honorable and very great. The history of Horatius Coclus is
very well known, 2 and that of Mucius Scaevola: 3 as the one held back the
enemy at the bridge until it was cut, the other burned his own hand that had

118

erred when it tried to kill Porsenna, king of the Tuscans. For these two such
outstanding works, two staiora of land were given by the public to each of
them. 4 The history of Manlius Capitolinus is also known. For having saved
the Capitol from the French who were encamped there, he was given a
small measure of flour by those who were besieged inside with him. 5 That
reward was great, according to the fortune then current in Rome, and of
such quality that when Manlius was moved later by his envy or by his
wicked nature to arouse sedition in Rome, and sought to gain the people for
himself, he was without any respect for his merits thrown headlong from the

Capitol that before, with so much glory for himself, he had saved. 6

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«25 M

He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated
State in a Free City May Retain at Least
the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes

[1] If someone who desires or who wishes to reform a state in a city wishes
it to be accepted and capable of being maintained to the satisfaction of
everyone, he is under the necessity of retaining at least the shadow of its
ancient modes so that it may not appear to the peoples to have changed its
order even if in fact the new orders are altogether alien to the past ones. For
the generality of men feed on what appears as much as on what is; indeed,
many times they are moved more by things that appear than by things that
are. For this cause, recognizing this necessity at the beginning of their free
way of life and having created two consuls in exchange for one king, the
Romans did not wish to have more than twelve lictors, so as not to surpass
the number of those who ministered to the kings. 1 Besides this, since an
annual sacrifice was offered in Rome that could not be done except by the
king in person, and since the Romans wished the people not to have to
desire anything ancient because of the absence of the kings, they created a
head of said sacrifice, whom they called the sacrificing king, and
subordinated him to the highest priest, so that by this way the people came
to be satisfied with the sacrifice and never to have cause, for lack of it, to
desire the return of the kings. 2 This should be observed by all those who
wish to suppress an ancient way of life in a city and to turn it to a new and
free way of life, for since the new things alter the minds of men, you should
contrive that those alterations retain as much of the ancient as possible. If
the magistrates vary from the ancient ones in number and authority and
time, they should at least retain the name. This, as I said, he should observe
who wishes to order a political way of life by the way either of republic or
of kingdom; but he who wishes to make an absolute power, which is called
tyranny by the authors, 3 should renew everything, as will be told in the
following chapter.

120

121

«26

A New Prince Should Make Everything
New in a City or Province Taken by Him

[1] The best remedy whoever becomes prince of either a city or a state has
for holding that principality is to make everything in that state anew, since
he is a new prince, and so much the more when his foundations are weak
and he may not turn to civil life by way either of kingdom or of republic:
that is, to make in cities new governments with new names, new authorities,
new men; to make the rich poor, the poor rich, as did David when he
became king—’’who filled the hungry with good things and sent the rich
away empty”; 1 besides this, to build new cities, to take down those built, to
exchange the inhabitants from one place to another; and, in sum, not to
leave anything untouched in that province, so that there is no rank, no
order, no state, no wealth there that he who holds it does not know it as
from you; and to take as one’s model Philip of Macedon, father of
Alexander, who from a small king became prince of Greece with these
modes. He who writes of him says that he transferred men from province to
province as herdsmen transfer their herds. 2 These modes are very cruel, and
enemies to every way of life, not only Christian but human; and any man
whatever should flee them and wish to live in private rather than as king
with so much ruin to men. Nonetheless, he who does not wish to take this
first way of the good must enter into this evil one if he wishes to maintain
himself. But men take certain middle ways that are very harmful, for they
do not know how to be either altogether wicked or altogether good, as will
be shown by example in the following chapter.

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«27 M

Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be
Altogether Wicked or Altogether Good

[1] When Pope Julius II went to Bologna in 1505 to expel from that state
the house of Bentivogli, which had held the principate 1 of the city for a
hundred years, he also wished—as one who had taken an oath 2 against all
the tyrants who seized towns of the church—to remove Giovampagolo
Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. Having arrived near Perugia, with this intent
and decision known to everyone, he did not wait to enter that city with his
army, which was guarding him, but entered it unarmed, notwithstanding
that Giovampagolo was inside with many troops that he had gathered for
defense of himself. So, carried along by that fury with which he governed all
things, he put himself with a single guard in the hands of his enemy, whom
he then led away with him, leaving a governor in the city who would render
justice 3 for the church. The rashness of the pope and the cowardice of
Giovampagolo were noted by the prudent men who were with the pope, 4
and they were unable to guess whence it came that he did not, to his
perpetual fame, crush his enemy at a stroke and enrich himself with booty,
since with the pope were all the cardinals with all their delights. Nor could
one believe that he had abstained either through goodness or through
conscience that held him back; for into the breast of a villainous man, who
was taking his sister for himself, who had killed his cousins and nephews so
as to reign, no pious respect could descend. But it was concluded that it
arose from men’s not knowing how to be honorably wicked or perfectly
good; and when malice has greatness in itself or is generous in some part,
they do not know how to enter into it.

[2] So Giovampagolo, who did not mind being incestuous and a public
parricide, did not know how—or, to say better, did not dare, when he had
just the opportunity for it—to engage in an enterprise in which everyone
would have admired his spirit and that would have left an eternal memory
of himself as being the first who had demonstrated to the prelates how little
is to be esteemed whoever lives and reigns as they do; and he would have

123

done a thing whose greatness would have surpassed all infamy, every danger,
that could have proceeded from it.

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*$28

For What Cause the Romans Were Less
Ungrateful toward Their Citizens Than the

Athenians

[1] Whoever reads of the things done by republics will find in all of them
some species of ingratitude toward their citizens; but he will find less of it
in Rome than in Athens, and perhaps than in any other republic. 1 Searching
for the cause of this, speaking of Rome and Athens, I believe it happened
because the Romans had less cause than the Athenians for suspecting their
citizens. For in Rome, as one reasons about it from the expulsion of the
kings until Sulla and Marius, freedom was never taken away by any of its
citizens, so that there was no great cause for suspecting them and, in
consequence, for offending them inconsiderately. The very contrary
happened in Athens when freedom had been taken away from it by
Pisistratus in its most flourishing time and under a deception of goodness,
for as soon as it became free and recalled the injuries received and its past
servitude, it became a very prompt avenger not only of the errors but of the
shadow of errors in its citizens. Hence arose the exiles and the deaths of so
many excellent men; hence the order of ostracism and every other violence
that was done against its aristocrats in various times by that city. What these
writers on civility say is very true: that peoples bite more fiercely after they
have recovered their freedom than after they have saved it. 2 Whoever
considers, then, how much has been said will neither blame Athens in this
nor praise Rome, but will accuse only necessity because of the diversity of
accidents that arose in these cities. For whoever considers things subtly will
see for himself that if freedom had been taken away in Rome as in Athens,
Rome would not have been more merciful toward its citizens than the latter
was. One can make a very true conjecture about this because of what
happened to Collatinus 3 and Publius Valerius 4 after the expulsion of the
kings. The first of them was sent into exile for no cause other than that he
bore the name of the Tarquins, even though he had been found to have freed

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Rome; the other was also on the point of being made an exile only for
having given suspicion of himself by building a house on the Caelian Hill.
So, seeing how far Rome was suspicious and severe with these two, one can
reckon that it would have made use of ingratitude as had Athens if, like the
latter, it had been injured by its citizens in early times and before its
increase. So as not to have to return to this matter of ingratitude, I shall say
what will be needed about it in the following chapter.

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«29 M

Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a

Prince

[1] It appears to me, with regard to the matter written about above, that one
should discourse on which practices this ingratitude in greater examples, a
people or a prince. To dispute the case better, I say that this vice of
ingratitude arises either from avarice or from suspicion. 1 For when either a
people or a prince has sent out one of its captains on an important
expedition, from which that captain will have acquired very much glory if
he should win, that prince or that people is held to the bargain of rewarding
him. If, instead of rewards, he either dishonors or offends him, moved by
avarice and not wishing to satisfy him since he is held back by this greed, he
makes an error that has no excuse but rather brings with it an eternal
infamy. Yet one finds many princes who sin in this way. And Cornelius
Tacitus tells the cause in this sentence: “One is more inclined to make
return for an injury than for a benefit, because gratitude is held to be a
burden and revenge a gain.” 2 But when he does not reward him—or, to say
better, offends him—moved not by avarice but by suspicion, then he merits
—both the people and the prince—some excuse. Of these acts of
ingratitude, used for such a cause, one reads very much: for the captain who
has virtuously acquired an empire for his lord, overcoming enemies and
filling himself with glory and his soldiers with riches, of necessity acquires
such reputation with his soldiers, with enemies, and with the subjects
belonging to that prince that the victory cannot taste good to the lord who
has sent him. Because the nature of men is ambitious and suspicious and
does not know how to set a limit 3 to any fortune it may have, it is
impossible for the suspicion suddenly arising in the prince after the victory
of his captain not to be increased by that same one because of some mode
or term of his used insolently. So the prince cannot but think of securing
himself against him; and to do this, he thinks either of having him killed or
of taking away the reputation that he has gained for himself in his army or
in his peoples, and with all industry shows that the victory arose not through

127

the virtue of that one but through fortune, or through the cowardice of the
enemies, or through the prudence of the other heads that had been with him
in such a struggle.

[2] After Vespasian, then in Judea, was declared emperor by his army,
Antonius Primus, who was in Illyria with another army, took his part and
came into Italy against Vitellius, who was reigning in Rome, and most
virtuously destroyed two armies of Vitellius and seized Rome. So Mucianus,
sent by Vespasian, found that through the virtue of Antonius, all had been
acquired and every difficulty conquered. The reward that Antonius received
for it was that Mucianus at once took away the obedience of the army and
little by little reduced him to being without any authority in Rome. So
Antonius went to meet Vespasian, still in Asia, by whom he was so received
that in a brief time, reduced to no rank, he died almost in despair. 4
Histories are full of these examples. In our times, everyone who lives at
present knows with how much industry and virtue Gonsalvo Ferrante,
serving in the military against the French in the kingdom of Naples for
Ferdinand, king of Aragon, conquered and overcame that kingdom; and
how, as a reward for victory, what he got was that Ferdinand left Aragon
and, having come to Naples, first deprived him of the obedience of the
men-at-arms, then took the fortresses away from him, and next brought him
back with him to Spain, where he died, dishonored, a short time later. 5
Thus, so natural is this suspicion in princes that they cannot defend
themselves against it; and it is impossible that they use gratitude to those
who have made great acquisitions through victory under their banners.

[3] It is not a miracle, nor a thing worthy of the greatest memory, if a
people does not defend itself from what a prince does not defend himself.
For since a city that lives free has two ends—one to acquire, the other to
maintain itself free—it must be that in one thing or the other it errs through
too much love. As to errors in acquiring, they will be told in their place. 6 As
to errors in maintaining itself free, there are these among others: to offend
those citizens whom it ought to reward; to have suspicion of those in whom
it ought to have confidence. Although these modes are the cause of great
evils in a republic that has come into corruption, and often it comes all the
sooner to tyranny—as happened to the Rome of Caesar, 7 who took for
himself by force what ingratitude denied him—nonetheless in a republic
that is not corrupt they are the cause of great goods and make it live free,
since men are kept better and less ambitious longer through fear of
punishment. It is true that among all the peoples that ever had empire, for

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the causes discoursed of above,' Rome was the least ungrateful. For one can
say of its ingratitude that there was no example other than that of Scipio, 9
because Coriolanus 10 and Camillus 11 were made exiles for the injuries that
both had done to the plebs. The one was not pardoned because he had
always reserved a hostile spirit against the people; the other was not only
recalled but at all times of his life adored as a prince. But the ingratitude
used to Scipio arose from a suspicion that the citizens were beginning to
have of him that had not been held of the others, which arose from the
greatness of the enemy that Scipio had overcome, 12 from the reputation
that victory in so long and dangerous a war had given him, from its rapidity,
and from the favor that his youth, prudence, and other memorable virtues
acquired for him. These things were so great that none other than the
magistrates of Rome feared his authority, a thing that displeased wise men
as something unaccustomed in Rome. His way of life appeared so
extraordinary that Cato Priscus, reputed holy, was the first to act against
him and to say that a city could not call itself free where there was a citizen
who was feared by the magistrates. So if the people of Rome followed the
opinion of Cato in this case, it merits the excuse that, as I said above, those
peoples and those princes merit who are ungrateful through suspicion. Thus
concluding this discourse, I say that since this vice of ingratitude is used
through avarice or through suspicion, one will see that peoples never make
use of it through avarice, and very much less through suspicion than
princes, having less cause to suspect, as will be said below.

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«30 ft

Which Modes a Prince or a Republic
Should Use So As to Avoid the Vice of
Ingratitude; and Which a Captain or a
Citizen Should Use So As Not to Be

Crushed by It

[1] So as to avoid the necessity either of having to live with suspicion, or of
being ungrateful, a prince should go personally on expeditions, as the
Roman emperors did in the beginning, as the Turk does in our times, and as
those who are virtuous have done and do. For if they win, the glory and the
acquisition are all theirs; and when they are not present, since the glory is
someone else’s, it does not appear to them that they can make use of the
acquisition unless they eliminate in someone else the glory that they have
not known how to gain for themselves. They become ungrateful and unjust,
and without doubt their loss is greater than the gain. But when through
either negligence or lack of prudence they remain idly at home and send a
captain, I have no precept to give them other than the one they know for
themselves. But I do say to that captain, since I judge that he cannot avoid
the bites of ingratitude, that he may do one of two things: either leave the
army at once after the victory and put himself in the hands of his prince,
guarding himself against every insolent or ambitious act, so that the latter,
deprived of every suspicion, may have cause either to reward him or not to
offend him; or, when this does not appear to him proper to do, he may
spiritedly take the contrary part and hold to all those modes through which
he believes that that acquisition may be his own and not his prince’s,
making the soldiers and the subjects well disposed to him. He may make
new friendships with neighbors, seize fortresses with his men, corrupt the
princes of his army, and secure himself against those he cannot corrupt; and
through these modes seek to punish his lord for the ingratitude that he
would have used to him. There are no other ways, but, as was said above,

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men do not know how to be either altogether bad or altogether good. 1 It
always happens that they do not wish to leave the army at once after victory,
that they are unable to behave modestly, that they do not know how to use
violent measures that have something honorable in them. So, remaining
ambiguous, they are crushed between their delay and ambiguity.

[2] To a republic wishing to avoid this vice of the ungrateful, one cannot
give the same remedy as to the prince—that is, to go and not send someone
else on his expeditions—since it is under a necessity to send one of its
citizens. It is fitting, therefore, that I propose as remedy that it follow the
same modes the Roman republic followed so as to be less ungrateful than
the others. This arose from the modes of its government. For since the
whole city—both the nobles and the ignobles—was put to work in war, so
many virtuous men emerged in every age, decorated from various victories,
that the people did not have cause to fear any one of them, since they were
very many and guarded one another. They kept themselves so upright, and
so hesitant to cast a shadow of any ambition or give cause to the people to
offend them for being ambitious, that when one came to the dictatorship he
carried away from it the greater glory the sooner he laid it down. And so,
since modes such as these could not generate suspicion, they did not
generate ingratitude. So a republic that does not wish to have cause to be
ungrateful should govern itself as did Rome; and a citizen who wishes to
avoid its bites should observe the limits observed by Roman citizens.

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«31 ft

That the Roman Captains Were Never
Extraordinarily Punished for an Error
Committed; nor Were They Ever Punished
When Harm Resulted to the Republic
through Their Ignorance or through Bad
Policies Adopted by Them

[1] The Romans, as we have discoursed of above, not only were less
ungrateful than other republics but also were more merciful and more
hesitant in the punishment of the captains of their armies than any other. 1
For if his error had been made through malice, they punished him
humanely; if it was through ignorance, not only did they not punish him,
they rewarded and honored him. This mode of proceeding was well
considered by them; for they judged that it was of such importance to those
who governed their armies that they have a free and ready spirit, without
other extrinsic hesitations in making policies, that they did not wish to add
new difficulties and dangers to a thing in itself difficult and dangerous, since
they thought that if they added them, no one could ever work virtuously.
They might be, for instance, sending an army into Greece against Philip of
Macedon, or into Italy against Hannibal, or against those peoples whom
they had conquered before. The captain who had been put in charge of such
an expedition was worried by all the cares that go along with these affairs,
which are grave and most important. Now if to such cares had been added
many Roman examples of having crucified or otherwise killed those who
had lost battles, it would have been impossible for the captain to be able to
decide strenuously among so many suspicions. 2 Therefore, since they
judged that for such ones the ignominy of having lost was penalty enough,
they did not wish to terrify them with another, greater penalty.

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[2] As to an error committed not through ignorance, here is one example.
Sergius and Virginius were in the field at Veii, each one in charge of one
part of the army. 3 Of the two, Sergius was facing where the Tuscans could
come, Virginius on the other side. It happened that when Sergius was
assaulted by the Faliscians and by other peoples, he endured being defeated
and put to flight before sending to Virginius for aid. On the other side,
expecting him to be humiliated, Virginius preferred to see the dishonor of
his fatherland and the ruin of the army than to help him—a case truly
malevolent and worthy of being noted, and from which to draw not a good
conjecture concerning the Roman republic if both had not been punished. It
is true that whereas another republic would have punished them with the
capital penalty, this one punished them with fines of money. This came
about not because their sins did not merit greater punishment but because,
for the reasons already given, the Romans in this case wished to maintain
their ancient customs. As to errors through ignorance, there is no example
more beautiful than that of Varro. 4 Because of his rashness the Romans
were defeated at Cannae by Hannibal, and that republic was in danger of
losing its freedom; nonetheless, because it was ignorance and not malice,
not only did they not punish him but they honored him, and at his return to
Rome the whole senatorial order went to meet him. Since they could not
thank him for the fight, they thanked him because he returned to Rome and
had not despaired of Roman affairs. When Papirius Cursor wished to have
Fabius killed for having engaged in combat with the Samnites contrary to
his command, among other reasons that were advanced by the father of
Fabius against the obstinacy of the dictator was that the Roman people had
never done in any loss by its captains what Papirius wished to do in their
victories. 5

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«32 M

A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer
Benefiting Men in Their Necessities

[1] The Romans did succeed happily in being liberal to the people as danger
came up when Porsenna came to assault Rome so as to restore the Tarquins.
Then, fearing that the plebs would rather accept kings than sustain the war,
the Senate relieved it of the salt tax and of every imposition so as to secure
itself with it, saying that the poor worked well enough for the public benefit
if they raised their children, and for this benefit the people exposed itself to
enduring siege, hunger, and war. 1 Yet no one, trusting in this example,
should defer winning over the people until times of danger, for what
succeeded for the Romans will never succeed for him. For the collectivity
will judge that it has that good not from you but from your adversaries; and
since it ought to fear that when the necessity has passed, you will take back
from them what you had been forced to give them, it will not have any
obligation to you. The cause why this policy turned out well for the Romans
was that the state was new and not yet solid; and that people had seen that
laws had been made for its benefit, such as the one on appealing to the
plebs, so that it could be persuaded that the good that was done was caused
not so much by the coming of enemies as by the disposition of the Senate to
benefit them. Besides this, the memory of the kings, by whom they had been
vilified and injured in many modes, was fresh. Because like causes happen
rarely, it will also occur rarely that like remedies help. So whoever holds a
state, whether republic or prince, should consider beforehand what times
can come up against him, and which men he can have need of in adverse
times; and then live with them in the mode that he judges to be necessary to
live, should any case whatever come up. The one who governs himself
otherwise—whether prince or republic, and especially a prince—and then
believes in the fact that, when danger comes up, he can regain men with
benefits, deceives himself; for not only does he not secure himself with them
but he hastens his own ruin.

CQ}

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*$33 ft

When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either
in a State or against a State, the More
Salutary Policy Is to Temporize with It
Rather Than to Strike at It

[1] As the Roman republic was growing in reputation, strength, and empire,
its neighbors, who at first had not thought of how much harm that new
republic could bring them, began—but late—to recognize their error; and
wishing to remedy what they had not remedied at first, a good forty peoples
conspired against Rome. Hence, among the other usual remedies they made
for themselves in urgent dangers, the Romans turned to creating the dictator
—that is, to giving power to one man who could decide without any
consultation and execute his decisions without any appeal. 1 As that remedy
was useful then and was the cause that they overcame the impending
dangers, so it was always most useful in all those accidents that arose at any
time against the republic in the increasing of the empire.

[2] First to be discussed in regard to that accident is that when an
inconvenience that arises either in a republic or against a republic, caused
by an intrinsic or extrinsic cause, has become so great that it begins to bring
fear to everyone, it is a much more secure policy to temporize with it than
to attempt to extinguish it. For almost always those who attempt to allay it
make its strength greater and accelerate the evil that they suspected from it
for themselves. And accidents such as these arise in a republic more often
through an intrinsic than an extrinsic cause. Many times a citizen is allowed
to gather more strength than is reasonable, or one begins to corrupt a law
that is the nerve and the life of a free way of life; and the error is allowed to
run on so far that it is a more harmful policy to wish to remedy it than to
allow it to continue. It is so much the more difficult to recognize these
inconveniences when they arise as it appears more natural to men always to
favor the beginnings of things; and more than for anything else, such favor

135

can be for works that appear to have some virtue in them and have been
done 2 by youths. For if in a republic one sees a noble youth arise who has an
extraordinary virtue in him, all eyes of the citizens begin to turn toward him
and agree in honoring him without any hesitation, so that if there is a bit of
ambition in him, mixed with the favor that nature gives him and with this
accident, he comes at once to a place where the citizens, when they become
aware of their error, have few remedies to avoid it. If they try to work as
many as they have, they do nothing but accelerate his power.

[3] One could bring up very many examples of this, but I wish to give only
one of them from our city. Cosimo de’ Medici, from whom the house of
Medici had the beginning of its greatness in our city, came to such
reputation with the favor that his prudence and the ignorance of the other
citizens gave him that he began to bring fear to the state, so that the other
citizens judged it dangerous to offend him and very dangerous to allow him
to remain thus. But living in those times was Niccolo da Uzzano, a man
held to be very expert in civil affairs, who had made the first error of not
recognizing the dangers that could arise from the reputation of Cosimo.
While he lived, he did not ever permit the second to be made—that is, of
attempting to eliminate him—since he judged that such an attempt would
be the entire ruin of their state, as one sees it was after his death. For as the
citizens who were left did not observe his counsel, they made themselves
strong against Cosimo and expelled him from Florence. Hence it came
about that his party, resentful because of this injury, recalled him soon after
and made him prince of the republic, to which rank he would never have
been able to climb without that manifest opposition. 3

[4] The same happened in Rome with Caesar; for although that virtue of his
was favored by Pompey and by others, the favor soon after was converted to
fear. Cicero bears witness to this in saying that Pompey had begun to fear
Caesar late. 4 That fear made them think about remedies; and the remedies
they made accelerated the ruin of their republic.

[5] I say, thus, that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when they
arise - the difficulty being caused by the fact that things are apt to deceive
you in the beginning—it is a wiser policy to temporize with them after they
are recognized than to oppose them; for if one temporizes with them, either
they are eliminated by themselves or at least the evil is deferred for a longer
time. In all things, princes who plan to cancel them or oppose their strength
and thrust should open their eyes, so as not to give them increase instead of

136

decrease, believing that they are pushing a thing back while pulling it along,
or indeed that they are drowning a plant by watering it. But they should
consider well the strength of the malady, and if you see you have enough to
cure it, set yourself at it without hesitation; otherwise let it be and do not
attempt it in any mode. For, as was discoursed of above, it will happen as it
happened to Rome’s neighbors, for whom, since Rome had grown to so
much power, it was more salutary to seek to appease it and to hold it back
with the modes of peace than to make them think about new orders and
new defenses with the modes of war. For that conspiracy of theirs did
nothing but make [the Romans] more united, more vigorous, and make
them think about new modes, through which they expanded their power in a
briefer time. Among them was the creation of the dictator, a new order
through which they not only overcame impending dangers but that was the
cause of avoiding infinite evils that the republic would have incurred
without that remedy.

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«34 M

The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and
Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and
That the Authorities Citizens Take for
Themselves, Not Those Given Them by
Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life

[1] The Romans who invented in that city the mode of creating the
dictator 1 have been condemned by some writer 2 for a thing that was the
cause, in time, of the tyranny of Rome. He cites the fact that the first tyrant 3
in that city commanded it under the dictatorial title; he says that if it had
not been for this, Caesar would not have been able to put an honest face on
his tyranny under any public title. This thing was not well examined by the
one who holds the opinion, and it was believed against all reason. For it was
neither the name nor the rank of dictator that made Rome servile, but it
was the authority taken by citizens because of the length of command. If the
dictatorial name had been lacking in Rome, they would have taken another;
for it is forces that easily acquire names, not names forces. One sees that
while the dictator was appointed according to public orders, and not by his
own authority, he always did good to the city. For magistrates that are made
and authorities that are given through extraordinary ways, not those that
come through ordinary ways, hurt republics; so one sees that in Rome the
result was that in so much course of time no dictator ever did anything but
good to the republic.

[2] There are very evident reasons for this. First, if a citizen wishes to be
able to offend and to seize extraordinary authority for himself, he must have
many qualities that in a noncorrupt republic he can never have. For he
needs to be very rich and to have very many adherents and partisans, which
he cannot have where the laws are observed; and even if he had them, men
like these are so formidable that free votes do not concur in them. Besides
this, the dictator was appointed for a time, and not perpetually, and so as to

138

obviate only the cause by means of which he was created; and his authority
extended to being able to decide by himself regarding remedies for that
urgent danger, and to do everything without consultation, and to punish
everyone without appeal. 4 But he could not do anything that might diminish
the state, as taking away authority from the Senate or from the people,
undoing the old orders of the city and making new ones, would have been.
So, when the brief time of his dictatorship, the limited authorities he had,
and the noncorrupt Roman people are added up, it was impossible for him
to escape his limits and to hurt the city; and one sees by experience that he
always helped.

[3] And truly, among the other Roman orders, this is one that deserves to be
considered and numbered among those that were the cause of the greatness
of so great an empire, for without such an order cities escape from
extraordinary accidents with difficulty. Because the customary orders in
republics have a slow motion (since no council and no magistrate can work
anything by itself, but in many things one has need of another, and because
it takes time to add these wills together), their remedies are very dangerous
when they have to remedy a thing that time does not wait for. So republics
should have a like mode among their orders; and the Venetian republic,
which is excellent among modern republics, has reserved authority to a few
citizens who in urgent needs can decide, all in accord, without further
consultation. 5 For when a like mode is lacking in a republic, it is necessary
either that it be ruined by observing the orders or that it break them so as
not to be ruined. In a republic, one would not wish anything ever to happen
that has to be governed with extraordinary modes. For although the
extraordinary mode may do good then, nonetheless the example does ill; for
if one sets up a habit of breaking the orders for the sake of good, then later,
under that coloring, they are broken for ill. So a republic will never be
perfect unless it has provided for everything with its laws and has
established a remedy for every accident and given the mode to govern it. So,
concluding, I say that those republics that in urgent dangers do not take
refuge either in the dictator or in similar authorities will always come to
ruin in grave accidents.

[4] In this new order the mode of electing is to be noted, as it was wisely
provided by the Romans. For since the creation of the dictator brought
some shame for the consuls, who as heads of the city had to come under
obedience like others, and since they supposed that disdain among the
citizens had to arise from this, they wished the authority of electing him to

139

be in the consuls. They thought that if an accident came in which Rome
might have need of this kingly power, they would have to make him
voluntarily; and in making him themselves, it would pain them less. For
wounds and every other ill that a man does to himself spontaneously and by
choice hurt much less than those that are done to you by someone else.
Indeed, in the last times the Romans used to give such authority to the
consul instead of to the dictator with these words: “Let the consul see that
the republic comes to no harm.” 6 To return to our matter, I conclude that by
seeking to crush them, Rome’s neighbors made them order themselves not
only to be able to defend themselves but able to attack them with more
force, more counsel, and more authority.

«35 ft

The Cause Why the Creation of the
Decemvirate in Rome Was Hurtful to the
Freedom of That Republic,
Notwithstanding That It Was Created by
Public and Free Votes

[1] The election of the ten citizens created by the Roman people to make
the laws in Rome 1 appears contrary to what was discoursed of above, that
the authority that is seized by violence, not that given by votes, harms
republics. 2 In time they became tyrants of Rome and without any hesitation
seized its freedom. Hence one should consider the modes of giving authority
and the time for which it is given. If a free authority is given for a long time
—calling a long time one year or more—it will always be dangerous and
will have either good or bad effects according as those to whom it is given
are bad or good. If one considers the authority that the Ten had, and that
which the dictators used to have, one will see that that of the Ten was
greater beyond comparison. For when the dictator was created, the tribunes,
consuls, and Senate remained with their authority; nor was the dictator able
to take it away from them. If he had been able to deprive one of them of the
consulate, one of the Senate, he could not annul the senatorial order and
make new laws. So the Senate, the consuls, the tribunes, remaining in their
authority, came to be like a guard on him to make him not depart from the
right way. But in the creation of the Ten it happened all the contrary; for
they annulled the consuls and the tribunes; they gave them authority to make
laws and do any other thing, like the Roman people. So finding themselves
alone, without consuls, without tribunes, without appeal to the people, and
because of this not having anyone to observe them, they were able to
become insolent in the second year, moved by the ambition of Appius.
Because of this, one should note that when it is said that an authority given
by free votes never hurts 3 any republic, one presupposes that a people is

141

never led to give it except in the proper circumstances and for the proper
times. But if—either because it was deceived or for some other cause that
blinded it—it is led to give it imprudently, and in the mode that the Roman
people gave it to the Ten, it always happens as it did. One easily proves this
by considering what causes kept the dictators good and what made the Ten
wicked, and also by considering how those republics have fared that have
been kept well ordered in giving authority for a long time, as the Spartans
gave to their kings and the Venetians to their dukes. For one will see that in
both modes guards were posted who made them unable to use their
authority badly. Nor does it help, in this case, that the matter be incorrupt;
for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time and makes
friends and partisans for itself. Nor is it hurt either by being poor or by not
having relatives; for riches and every other favor run after it at once, as we
shall discourse of in detail concerning the creation of the said Ten.

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#?36 ft

Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors
Should Not Disdain Lesser Ones

[1] The Romans had made Marcus Fabius and G. Manilius consuls and had
won a very glorious battle against the Veientes and the Etruscans in which
Quintus Fabius, the consul’s brother, who had been consul the year before,
was killed. 1 Here one should consider how the orders of that city were
suited to making it great; and how much other republics that are distant
from its modes deceive themselves. For although the Romans were great
lovers of glory, nonetheless they did not esteem it a dishonorable thing to
obey now one whom they had commanded at another time, and to find
themselves serving in the army of which they had been princes. Such a
custom is contrary to the opinion, orders, and modes of citizens in our
times. In Venice there is still the error that a citizen who has had a great
rank is ashamed to accept a lesser one; and the city consents to his being
able to keep his distance from it. Though such a thing may be honorable for
the private individual, it is altogether useless for the public. For a republic
should have more hope and should trust more in a citizen who descends
from a great rank to govern in a lesser one than in one who rises from a
lesser to govern in a greater. For one cannot reasonably believe in the latter
unless one sees men around him who are of so much reverence or so much
virtue that his newness can be moderated with their counsel and authority.
And if in Rome there had been such a custom as is in Venice and in other
modern republics and kingdoms—that he who had been consul once would
never again wish to go in the armies unless he were consul—infinite things
unfavorable to a free way of fife would have arisen, both through the errors
the new men would have made and through the ambition they would have
been able to use better if they had had men around them in the sight of
whom they feared to err. So they would have come to be more unshackled,
which would have turned out wholly to the public detriment.

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«37 M

What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave
Birth to in Rome; and That to Make a Law
in a Republic That Looks Very Far Back
and Is against an Ancient Custom of the
City Is Most Scandalous

[1] It is the verdict of the ancient writers that men are wont to worry in evil
and to become bored with good, and that from both of these two passions
the same effects arise. 1 For whenever engaging in combat through necessity
is taken from men they engage in combat through ambition, which is so
powerful in human breasts that it never abandons them at whatever rank
they rise to. The cause is that nature has created men so that they are able to
desire everything and are unable to attain everything. So, since the desire is
always greater than the power of acquiring, the result is discontent with
what one possesses and a lack of satisfaction with it. From this arises the
variability of their fortune; for since some men desire to have more, and
some fear to lose what has been acquired, they come to enmities and to war,
from which arise the ruin of one province and the exaltation of another. I
have made this discourse because it was not enough for the Roman plebs to
secure itself against the nobles by the creation of the tribunes, to which
desire it was constrained by necessity; for having obtained that, it began at
once to engage in combat through ambition, and to wish to share honors
and belongings 2 with the nobility as the thing esteemed most by men. From
this arose the disease that gave birth to contention over the Agrarian law, 3
which in the end was the cause of the destruction of the republic. Because
well-ordered republics have to keep the public rich and their citizens poor,
it must be that in the city of Rome there was a defect in this law. Either it
was not made at the beginning so that it did not have to be treated again
every day; or they delayed so much in making it because looking back might
be scandalous; 4 or if it was well ordered at first, it had been corrupted later

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by use. So in whatever mode it might have been, one never spoke of this law
in Rome without turning the city upside down. 5

[2] This law had two principal heads. In the one it set forth that no citizen
could possess more than so many jugera of land; 6 in the other, that fields
taken from enemies should be divided among the Roman people. 7 It
therefore brought on offenses of two sorts to the nobles: for those who
possessed more goods than the law permitted (who were the greater part of
the nobles) had to be deprived of them, and dividing the goods of enemies
among the plebs took away from them the way to get rich. So since these
offenses came to bear against powerful men who, as it appeared to them,
were defending the public in opposing it, whenever one was reminded of it,
as was said, the whole city was turned upside down. With patience and
industry the nobles temporized with it, either by leading an army out, or by
having the tribune who proposed it opposed by another tribune, or by
sometimes yielding to a part of it, or indeed by sending a colony to the
place that had to be distributed. This happened in the countryside around
Anzio: when the dispute over the law resurged, a colony drawn from Rome,
to which the said countryside was assigned, was sent to the place. Here
Titus Livy uses a notable phrase, saying that only with difficulty was anyone
found in Rome to give his name to go to that colony, 8 so much was the
plebs more willing to desire things in Rome than to possess them in Anzio. 9
The temper 10 of this law went operating on thus for a time until the
Romans began to take their arms to the farthest parts of Italy or outside
Italy, after which it appears that it ceased. This came about because the
fields the enemies of Rome possessed, being distant from the eyes of the
plebs and in places where it was not easy to cultivate them, came to be less
desired by them; and also the Romans were less punitive to their enemies in
a like mode, and when they despoiled any town of its countryside, they
distributed colonies there. So for such causes this law lay as though asleep
until the Gracchi; when it was aroused by them, it altogether ruined Roman
freedom. 11 For it found the power of its adversaries redoubled, and because
of this it inflamed so much hatred between the plebs and the Senate that
they came to arms and to bloodshed, beyond every civil mode and custom.
So, since the public magistrates could not remedy it, and none of the
factions could put hope in them, they had recourse to private remedies, and
each one of the parties was thinking of how to make itself a head to defend
it. In this scandal and disorder the plebs came first and gave reputation to

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Marius, so that it made him consul four times; and he continued in his
consulate, with a few intervals, so long that he was able to make himself
consul three other times. As the nobility had no remedy against such a
plague, it turned to favoring Sulla; and when he had been made head of its
party, they came to civil wars. After much bloodshed and changing of
fortune, the nobility was left on top. 12 Later these humors were revived at
the time of Caesar and Pompey; for after Caesar had made himself head of
Marius’s party, and Pompey that of Sulla, in coming to grips Caesar was left
on top. He was the first tyrant in Rome, such that never again was that city
free. 13

[3] Such, thus, were the beginning and the end of the Agrarian law. And
although we have shown elsewhere that the enmities in Rome between the
Senate and the plebs kept Rome free by giving rise to laws in favor of
freedom, 14 and although the end of this Agrarian law appears not to
conform to such a conclusion, I say that I do not, because of this, abandon
such an opinion. For so great is the ambition of the great that it soon brings
that city to its ruin if it is not beaten down in a city by various ways and
various modes. So, if the contention over the Agrarian law took three
hundred years to make Rome servile, it would perhaps have been led into
servitude much sooner if the plebs had not always checked the ambition of
the nobles, both with this law and with its other appetites. One also sees
through this how much more men esteem property than honors. For the
Roman nobility always yielded honors to the plebs without extraordinary
scandals, but when it came to property, so great was its obstinacy in
defending it that the plebs had recourse to the extraordinary [means] that
were discoursed of above to vent its appetite. 15 The motors of this disorder
were the Gracchi, whose intention one should praise more than their
prudence. For to try to take away a disorder that has grown in a republic,
and because of this to make a law that looks very far back, is an ill-
considered policy. As was discoursed of above at length, 16 one does nothing
but accelerate the evil to which the disorder is leading you; but by
temporizing with it, either the evil comes later or it eliminates itself on its
own with time, before it reaches its end.

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«38

Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and
Do Not Know How to Decide; and If They
Ever Take Up Any Policy, It Arises More
from Necessity Than from Choice

[1] Since in Rome there was a very grave pestilence, and because of this it
appeared to the Volsci and the Aequi that the time had come when they
could crush Rome, these two peoples, having made a very large army,
assaulted the Latins and the Hernici. 1 And as their countries were being
despoiled, the Latins and the Hernici were constrained to make it
understood in Rome and to beg that they be defended by the Romans. Since
the Romans were burdened by disease, they replied to them that they should
take up the policy of defending themselves on their own and with their
arms, because they could not defend them. Here one recognizes the
generosity and prudence of the Senate and how in every fortune it always
wished to be the one that was prince over the decisions that its subjects 2
would have to make. Nor was it ever ashamed to decide a thing that was
contrary to its mode of life or to other decisions it had made when necessity
commanded them to.

[2] I say this because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said
peoples to arm and defend themselves, 3 so that to a Senate less prudent than
this one it would have appeared to be falling from its rank to concede such
defense to them. But this one always judged things as they should be judged,
and always took the less bad policy for the better. 4 For not being able to
defend its subjects tasted bad to it, and that they should arm themselves
without them tasted bad, for the said reasons and for many others that are
understood. Nonetheless, recognizing that they would arm themselves by
necessity in any mode, since the enemy was upon them, it took the
honorable part and willed that what they had to do they would do with
license from it, so that having disobeyed by necessity, they should not

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become inured to disobeying by choice. Although this may appear to be the
policy that should be adopted by every republic, nonetheless weak and badly
counseled republics do not know how to take it up, nor do they know how to
honor themselves in like necessities. Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and
had made Bologna bow to his terms. 5 Then, wishing to return to Rome
through Tuscany, he sent his man to Florence to ask passage for himself and
his army. In Florence they consulted one another as to how one might have
to govern this affair, and it was never counseled by anyone to concede it to
him. In this, one did not follow the Roman mode, for since the duke was
very well armed and the Florentines so unarmed that they could not prevent
him from passing through, it was much more to their honor that he should
appear to pass by their will rather than by force, because, while it was
altogether their reproach, it would have been less so in part if they had
conducted it otherwise. But the worst part that weak republics take is to be
irresolute, so that all the policies they take up are taken up by force; and if
any good comes to be done by them, they do it forced and not by their
prudence.

[3] I wish to give two other examples of this that occurred in our times in
the state of our city. In 1500, when King Louis XII of France had retaken
Milan, he was desirous of turning over Pisa to Florence so as to have the
fifty thousand ducats that had been promised to him by the Florentines after
the restitution. He sent his armies toward Pisa, captained by Monsieur de
Beaumont, who, though French, was nonetheless a man whom the
Florentines trusted very much. This army and this captain took themselves
between Cascina and Pisa so as to go into combat against the walls. As they
waited there for some days so as to order themselves for the storming, Pisan
spokesmen came to Beaumont and offered to give the city to the French
army with this pact: that he promise by the faith of the king not to put it in
the hands of the Florentines before the end of four months. This policy was
altogether rejected by the Florentines, with the result that they took the field
and left it in shame. Nor was the policy rejected for any other cause than
that they distrusted the faith of the king, as those who through the weakness
of their counsel had put themselves by force into his hands. On the other
hand, they did not trust him, nor did they see how much better it was for the
king to be able to turn Pisa over to them when he was inside it—and, if he
did not turn it over, to uncover his intent—than for him to be able to
promise it to them when he did not have it, and for them to be forced to
buy those promises. So they would have acted much more profitably if they

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had consented that Beaumont take it under any promise whatever—as
experience showed later, in 1502, when Monsieur Imbault was sent by the
king of France with French troops to aid the Florentines after Arezzo had
rebelled. 6 When he arrived near Arezzo, after a short time he began to
negotiate an accord with the Aretines, who wished to give over the town
under a certain pledge, 7 as had the Pisans. The policy was rejected in
Florence; seeing this, Monsieur Imbault began to hold negotiations for an
accord by himself, without the participation of the commissioners, since it
was apparent to him that the Florentines understood little of this. So he
concluded it in his own mode and under it entered Arezzo with his troops,
giving the Florentines to understand that they were mad and did not
understand worldly things; for if they wished for Arezzo, they should have
made it understood to the king, who could give it to them much better if he
had his troops inside the city than outside. In Florence they did not stop
tearing up and blaming the said Imbault; nor did they ever stop until at last
it was recognized that if Beaumont had been like Imbault, they would have
had Pisa as well as Arezzo.

[4] So, to return to our point, irresolute republics never take up good
policies unless by force, because their weakness never allows them to decide
where there is any doubt; and if that doubt is not suppressed by violence
that drives them on, they always remain in suspense.

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«39 M

In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents
May Often Be Seen

[1] Whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that in all
cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the same humors,
and there always have been. So it is an easy thing for whoever examines
past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take
the remedies for them that were used by the ancients, or, if they do not find
any that were used, to think up new ones through the similarity of
accidents. But because these considerations are neglected or not understood
by whoever reads, or, if they are understood, they are not known to whoever
governs, it follows that there are always the same scandals in every time.

[2] After ’94, when the city of Florence had lost part of its empire, such as
Pisa and other towns, it was compelled of necessity to make war on those
who had seized them. 1 And because he who seized them was powerful, it
followed that [the Florentines] spent very much in the war, fruitlessly; from
very much spending came very heavy taxes; from the taxes, infinite quarrels
among the people. And because this war was administered by a magistracy
of ten citizens, who were called the Ten of War, the collectivity began to
bear spite against them, as the cause both of the war and of its expenses;
and it began to persuade itself that if the said magistracy were taken away,
the war would be taken away. So when it had to be remade, replacements
were not made for it; it was allowed to expire and its functions transferred
to the Signoria. That decision was so pernicious that not only did it not
remove the war, as the collectivity had persuaded itself, but, since those
men who were administering it with prudence were taken away, such
disorder followed that, besides Pisa, Arezzo and many other places were
lost, so that when the people saw better its error, and that the cause of the ill
was the fever and not the physician, it remade the magistracy of the Ten.
This same humor was raised in Rome against the name of the consuls. For
when the people saw one war after another arise, and that they could never
rest, whereas they should have thought that it arose from the ambition of

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neighbors who wished to crush them, they thought it arose from the
ambition of the nobles, who, since they were unable to punish the plebs
when defended by the tribunate power 2 inside Rome, wished to lead it
outside Rome under the consuls so as to crush it where it did not have any
aid. They thought, because of this, that it might be necessary either to
remove the consuls or to regulate their power 3 so that they did not have
authority over the people either outside or at home. The first who attempted
this law was one Terentillus, a tribune, who proposed that five men ought to
be created to consider the power of the consuls and to limit it. 4 This very
much upset the nobility, since the majesty of the empire appeared to it to
have altogether declined, so that there no longer remained any rank for the
nobility in that republic. The obstinacy of the tribunes was nonetheless so
great that the consular name was eliminated; 5 and in the end they were
content, after some other ordering, to create tribunes with consular power 6
rather than consuls—so much more was the name held in hatred than their
authority. 7 So they continued a long time until their error was recognized,
and as the Florentines returned to the Ten, so they recreated consuls.

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#$40 ft

The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome,
and What Is to Be Noted in It; Where It Is
Considered, among Many Other Things,
How through Such an Accident One Can
Either Save or Crush a Republic

[1] Since I wish to discourse in detail of the accidents that arose in Rome
through the creation of the Decemvirate, it does not appear to me
superfluous first to narrate all that followed from that creation and then to
dispute those parts that are notable in their actions. These are many and of
great importance, as well for those who wish to maintain a free republic as
for those who plan to subject it. For in such a discourse one will see many
errors made by the Senate and by the plebs unfavorable to freedom, and
many errors made by Appius, head of the Decemvirate, unfavorable to the
tyranny that he had supposed he would stabilize in Rome.

[2] After many disputes and contentions that continued between the people
and the nobility, so as to confirm new laws in Rome through which the
freedom of that state would be more stabilized, by agreement they sent
Spurius Postumius with two other citizens to Athens for examples of the
laws that Solon gave to that city so that they could found the Roman laws on
them. When these had gone and returned, they came to the creation of men
who would have to examine and confirm the said laws, and they created ten
citizens for a year, among whom was Appius Claudius, a sagacious and
restless man. And so that they could create such laws without any hesitation,
they removed all the other magistrates from Rome, and in particular the
tribunes and the consuls, and removed the appeal to the people, so that that
magistracy came to be altogether prince of Rome. All the authority of his
partners was turned over to Appius because of the favor that he had with the
plebs, for with demonstrations he had made himself so popular that it
appeared marvelous that he had taken on a new nature and a new genius so

152

quickly, since before this time he had been held a cruel persecutor of the
plebs. 1

[3] These Ten conducted themselves very civilly, keeping not more than
twelve lictors, who went before the one who was put ahead among them. 2
Although they had absolute authority, nonetheless, when they had to punish
a Roman citizen for homicide, they summoned him into the presence of the
people and had him judged by it. They wrote their laws on ten tables, and
before they confirmed them, they put them out in public so that everyone
could read them and dispute them, so that it might be known if there was
any defect in them so as to be able to amend them before their
confirmation. In this regard Appius had a rumor raised throughout Rome
that if to these ten tables two others were added, they would be brought to
their perfection; so this opinion gave opportunity to the people to remake
the Ten for another year, to which the people agreed willingly, both so as
not to remake the consuls and because it appeared to them they could do
without tribunes, since they were judges of cases, as was said above. Thus,
since the policy of remaking them had been adopted, the whole nobility
moved to seek these honors, and among the first was Appius. He used so
much humanity toward the plebs in asking for [the honor] that it began to
be suspect to his partners, “for they hardly believed that in such great
arrogance friendship would be spontaneous.” 3 Hesitating to oppose him
openly, they decided to do it with art; and although he was the most junior
in age of all, they gave him authority to propose the future Ten to the
people, believing that he would observe the limits of others in not proposing
himself, since that was an uncustomary and ignominious thing in Rome.
“He indeed seized on this obstacle as an opportunity” 4 and named himself
among the first, to the astonishment and displeasure of all the nobles; then
he named nine others to his purpose. That new creation, made for another
year, began to show its error to the people and the nobility. For at once
“Appius put an end to playing an alien persona,” 5 began to show his inborn
pride, and in a few days permeated his partners with his customs. To terrify
the people and the Senate, they made one hundred twenty lictors instead of
twelve.

[4] The fear remained equal for some days; but then they began to entertain
the Senate and to beat down the plebs. If someone who was beaten by one
appealed to another, he was treated worse in the appeal than in the first
sentence. So, when the plebs had recognized its error, it began, full of

153

affliction, to look the nobles in the face “and to try to breathe in the air of
freedom where, by fearing servitude, they had brought the republic to its
present state.” 6 To the nobility their affliction was gratifying, “as they
themselves, disgusted with the present, desired consuls.” 7 The days that
ended the year came: two tables of laws were produced but not made
public. From this the Ten took the opportunity to continue in the
magistracy; and they began to hold the state with violence and to make
satellites for themselves of the noble youths, to whom they gave the goods of
those they condemned. “The youths were corrupted by these goods, and they
preferred their own license to the freedom of all.” 8 In this time it came to
pass that the Sabines and the Volsci 9 started a war against the Romans, in
fear of which the Ten began to see the weakness of their state, because
without the Senate they could not order for the war, and if the Senate met,
it appeared to them they would lose the state. Yet, compelled by necessity,
they adopted this last policy; and when the senators met together, many of
the senators spoke against the pride of the Ten, and in particular Valerius
and Horatius. Their authority would have been entirely eliminated if the
Senate through envy of the plebs had not been unwilling to show its
authority, thinking that if the Ten laid down the magistracy voluntarily, the
tribunes of the plebs might not be remade. Thus they decided on war and
they went out with two armies led in part by the said Ten; Appius remained
to govern the city. Hence it arose that he fell in love with Virginia and that,
since he wished to take her by force, her father Virginius killed her to free
her. Hence followed tumults in Rome and in the armies, which, retiring
together with the rest of the Roman plebs, went off to the Sacred Mount,
where they stayed until the Ten laid down the magistracy. Tribunes and
consuls were created, and Rome was brought back to the form of its ancient
freedom. 10

[5] Thus through this text one notes, first, that in Rome the inconvenience
of creating this tyranny arose for those same causes that the greater part of
tyrannies in cities arises; and this is from too great a desire of the people to
be free and from too great a desire of the nobles to command. When they
do not agree to make a law in favor of freedom, but one of the parties
jumps to favor one individual, then it is that tyranny emerges at once. The
nobles and the people of Rome agreed to create the Ten, and to create them
with so much authority because of the desire that each of the parties had—
the one to eliminate the consular name, the other the tribunate. Once they
were created, when it appeared to the plebs that Appius had become

154

popular and was beating down the nobility, the people turned to favoring
him. When a people brings itself to make this error of giving reputation to
one individual because he beats down those it holds in hatred, and if that
individual is wise, it will always happen that he will become tyrant of the
city. For he will wait to eliminate the nobility with the favor of the people;
and he will never turn to the oppression of the people until he has
eliminated them, at which time, when the people recognizes it is servile, it
has nowhere to take refuge. All those who have founded tyrannies in
republics have held to this mode. If Appius had held to this mode, his
tyranny would have taken on more life and would not have failed so quickly;
but he did quite the contrary, and he could not have conducted himself
more imprudently. For to hold the tyranny he made himself the enemy of
those who had given it to him and could maintain it for him, and the
enemy 11 of those who had not concurred in giving it to him and would not
have been able to maintain it for him; and he lost those who were friends to
him and sought to have as friends those who could not be friends to him.
For although nobles may desire to tyrannize, that part of the nobility that
finds itself outside the tyranny is always an enemy to the tyrant; nor can he
ever win over all of it, because of the great ambition and great avarice that
are in it, since the tyrant cannot have either so much wealth or so many
honors that he may satisfy all of it. And so, by leaving the people and taking
the side of the nobles, Appius made a most evident error, both for the
reasons given above and because, if one wishes to hold a thing with
violence, whoever forces needs to be more powerful than whoever is forced.

[6] Hence it arises that those tyrants who have the collectivity as a friend
and the great as an enemy are more secure, because their violence is
sustained by greater force than that of those who have the people for an
enemy and the nobility for a friend. For with the favor of the former,
internal 12 forces are enough to preserve oneself, as they were enough for
Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when all Greece and the Roman people assaulted
him. 13 After he had secured himself against a few nobles, having the people
as a friend, he defended himself with it, which he would not have been able
to do if he had it as an enemy. In that other condition, because one has few
friends inside, internal 14 forces are not enough and he must seek them
outside. And [outside forces] have to be of three sorts: one, foreign satellites
to guard your person; another, arm the countryside to do the duty that the
plebs ought to have done; third, get close to neighboring powers to defend
you. Whoever holds to these modes and observes them well could save

155

himself in some mode, even though he had the people for an enemy. But
Appius could not accomplish the [mode] of gaining over the countryside to
himself since the countryside and Rome were one and the same thing; and
that which he could have done he did not know how to do, so that he was
ruined in his first beginnings.

[7] The Senate and the people made very great errors in the creation of the
Decemvirate; for even though it was said above, in the discourse that was
made on the dictator, 15 that those magistrates who make themselves by
themselves—not those whom the people makes—are hurtful to freedom,
nonetheless when the people orders magistrates, it should make them so that
they have to have some hesitation about becoming criminals. Whereas [the
people] ought to post a guard for itself over [the magistrates] to keep them
good, the Romans took it away, making [the Ten] the only magistracy in
Rome and annulling all others because of the excessive wish (as we said
above) that the Senate had to eliminate the tribunes and the plebs to
eliminate the consuls. This blinded them in such a mode that they agreed to
such disorder. For as King Ferdinand used to say, men often act like certain
lesser birds of prey, in whom there is such desire to catch their prey, to
which nature urges them, that they do not sense another larger bird that is
above them so as to kill them. 16 Thus one may know through this discourse,
as I put it at the beginning, the error of the Roman people if they wished to
save their freedom, and the errors of Appius if he wished to seize a tyranny.

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«41 ft

To Leap from Humility to Pride, from
Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is
Something Imprudent and Useless

[1] Among the other means badly used by Appius to maintain his tyranny, it
was of no little moment to leap too quickly from one quality to another. For
his astuteness in deceiving the plebs, pretending to be a man of the people,
was well used; also well used were the means he adopted so that the Ten
would have to be remade; also well used was the audacity of creating
himself against the opinion of the nobility; creating partners to his purposes
was well used. But it was not at all well used, when he had done this, as I
say above, to change nature of a sudden and from a friend of the plebs show
himself an enemy; from humane, proud; from agreeable, difficult; 1 and to
do it so quickly that without any excuse every man had to know the falsity
of his spirit. For whoever has appeared good for a time and wishes for his
purposes to become wicked ought to do it by due degrees and to conduct
himself with opportunities, so that before your different nature takes away
old favor from you, it has given you so much new that you do not come to
diminish your authority; otherwise, finding yourself uncovered and without
friends, you are ruined.

C$J

157

*>42 n

How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted

[1] One also notes in the matter of the Decemvirate how easily men are
corrupted and make themselves assume a contrary nature, 1 however good
and well brought up, considering how much the youths that Appius had
chosen around him began to be friendly to the tyranny for the little utility
that came to them from it, and how Quintus Fabius, one in the number of
the second Ten—though a very good man—blinded by a little ambition and
persuaded by the malignity of Appius, changed his good customs to the
worst and became like him. 2 If this is well examined, it will make
legislators of republics and kingdoms more ready to check human appetites
and to take away from them all hope of being able to err with impunity.

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«43 M

Those Who Engage in Combat for Their
Own Glory Are Good and Faithful Soldiers

[1] One also considers, from the treatment written above, how much
difference there is between an army that is content and engages in combat
for its own glory and one that is ill disposed and engages in combat for the
ambition of someone else. For whereas under the consuls Roman armies
were always accustomed to be victorious, under the decemvirs they always
lost. 1 From this example one can know in part the causes of the uselessness
of mercenary soldiers, which do not have cause to hold them firm other
than a little stipend that you give them. That cause is not and cannot be
enough to make them faithful and so much your friends that they wish to die
for you. 2 For in those armies in which there is no affection toward him for
whom they engage in combat that makes them become his partisans, there
can never be enough virtue to resist an enemy who is a little virtuous.
Because neither this love nor this rivalry arises except from your subjects, it
is necessary to arm one’s subjects for oneself, if one wishes to hold a state—
if one wishes to maintain a republic or a kingdom—as one sees those have
done who have made great profit with armies. The Roman armies under the
Ten had the same virtue; but because there was not the same disposition,
they did not have the customary effects. But as soon as the magistracy of the
Ten was eliminated, and they began to serve in the military as free persons,
the same spirit returned to them, and, in consequence, their enterprises had
the same happy end as by their former custom. 3

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*$44 ft

A Multitude without a Head Is Useless;
and That One Should Not First Threaten
and Then Request Authority

[1] Because of the incident of Virginia, the Roman plebs had repaired,
armed, to the Sacred Mount. 1 The Senate sent its ambassadors to ask with
what authority they had abandoned their captains and repaired to the
Mount. So much was the authority of the Senate esteemed that no one
dared to respond, since the plebs had no heads among them. Titus Livy says
that they did not lack matter to respond but they lacked one who would
make the response. Such a thing demonstrates precisely the uselessness of a
multitude without a head. The disorder was recognized by Virginius, and by
his order twenty military tribunes were created to be their heads and to
respond to and meet with the Senate. When they requested that Valerius
and Horatius be sent to them, to whom they would say their wish, the two
did not wish to go there if the Ten did not first lay down the magistracy.
When they arrived on the Mount where the plebs was, they were asked by it
to create tribunes of the plebs, and to have appeal to the people from every
magistracy, and to give over all the Ten to them, because they wished to
burn them alive.

[2] Valerius and Horatius praised their first demands; they blamed the last as
impious, saying, “You damn cruelty, you rush into cruelty.” 2 They counseled
them that they ought to omit making mention of the Ten and that they
should wait until they had retaken their authority and their power; then they
would not lack their mode of satisfying themselves. Here one knows openly
how much stupidity and how little prudence there is to ask for a thing and to
say first: I wish to do such and such evil with it. For one should not show
one’s intent but try to seek to obtain one’s desire in any mode. For it is
enough to ask someone 3 for his arms without saying, “I wish to kill you with
them,” since you are able to satisfy your appetite after you have the arms in
hand.

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161

45 m

Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been
Made, and Especially by Its Author, Is a
Thing That Sets a Bad Example; and to
Freshen New Injuries Every Day in a City
Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It

[1] When the accord had been accomplished and Rome had been returned
to its former form, Virginius summoned Appius before the people to defend
his cause. The latter appeared accompanied by many nobles; Virginius
commanded that he be put in prison. Appius began to cry out and to appeal
to the people. Virginius said that he was not worthy of having the appeal
that he had destroyed, and to have as defender the people that he had
offended. Appius replied that they did not have to violate the appeal that
with so much desire they had ordered. Thereupon he was incarcerated, and
before the day of the judgment he killed himself. ! Although the criminal
life of Appius merited every punishment, nonetheless it was hardly a civil
thing to violate the laws, and so much the more one that had been made
then. For I do not believe there is a thing that sets a more wicked example
in a republic than to make a law and not observe it, and so much the more
as it is not observed by him who made it.

[2] Florence, after ’94, had been reordered in its state by the aid of Friar
Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings show the learning, the prudence, and
the virtue of his spirit. 2 Among the other institutions to secure the citizens,
he had had a law made so that one could appeal to the people from
sentences that the Eight and the Signoria gave in state cases. He urged this
law for a long time and obtained it with the greatest difficulty. Soon after its
confirmation, it happened that five citizens were condemned to death by the
Signoria on the state’s account; and when they wished to appeal, they were
not allowed to and the law was not observed. 3 That took away more

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reputation from the friar than any other accident: for if the appeal was
useful, it ought to have been observed; if it was not useful, he ought not to
have had it passed. This accident was noted so much the more since, in so
many sermons he made after the law was broken, the friar never either
condemned 4 whoever had broken it or excused him, as one whom he did
not wish to condemn, since it was a thing that was turned to his purpose and
that he could not excuse. This exposure of his ambitious and partisan spirit
took away reputation from him and brought him very much disapproval.

[3] A state also offends very much when it freshens new humors every day
in the spirits of your citizens through new injuries that are done to this one
and that, as happened in Rome after the Decemvirate. For all the Ten, and
other citizens at different times, were accused and condemned so that there
was a very great fright in all the nobility, since it judged that no end would
ever be put to like condemnations until all the nobility had been destroyed.
It would have generated great inconvenience in that city if Marcus Duellius,
the tribune, had not provided against it. He made an edict that for one year
it would not be permitted for anyone to summon or accuse any Roman
citizen—which reassured all the nobility. 5 There one sees how much it is
harmful to a republic or to a prince to hold the spirits of subjects in
suspense and fearful with continual penalties and offenses. Without doubt
one could not hold to a more pernicious order, because men who begin to
suspect they have to suffer evil secure themselves by every mode in their
dangers and become more audacious and less hesitant to try new things.
Thus it is necessary either not to offend anyone ever or to do the offenses at
a stroke, and then to reassure men and give them cause to quiet and steady
their spirits. 6

t$j

163

#?46 n

Men Ascend from One Ambition to
Another; First One Seeks Not to Be
Offended, and Then One Offends Others

[1] When the Roman people had recovered its freedom and returned to its
former rank—and so much the greater since many new laws had been made
in confirmation of its power—it appeared reasonable that Rome would
quiet down for some time. 1 Nonetheless by experience one may see the
contrary, for every day new tumults and new discords rose up there. Because
Titus Livy very prudently supplies the reason why these arose, it does not
appear to me inapposite to refer precisely to his words, where he says that
either the people or the nobility always became proud when the other
humbled itself. 2 When the plebs stayed quiet within its bounds, the young
nobles began to injure it; and the tribunes could find few remedies for it
because they too were violated. Though it appeared to the nobility on the
other side, that its youth had been too ferocious, it preferred that if the
bounds 3 had to be overstepped, its own should overstep and not the plebs.
So the desire to defend freedom made each one try to prevail so much that
he oppressed the other. The order of these accidents is that when men seek
not to fear, they begin to make others fear; and the injury that they dispel
from themselves they put upon another, as if it were necessary to offend or
to be offended. One sees by this in what mode, among others, republics
break down, and in what mode men ascend from one ambition to another,
and how that Sallustian sentence, put in the mouth of Caesar, is very true:
that “all bad examples have arisen from good beginnings.” 4 Those citizens
who live ambitiously in a republic, as was said above, seek as the first thing
to be able not to be offended, not only by private individuals but also by the
magistrates. They seek friendships so as to be able to do this; and they
acquire them in ways honest in appearance, either by helping with money or
by defending them from the powerful. Because this appears virtuous, it
easily deceives everyone, and because of this they offer no remedies against

164

it, so that he, persevering without hindrance, becomes of such quality that
private citizens have fear of him and the magistrates have respect for him.
When he has ascended to this rank, and he has not already been prevented
from greatness, he comes to be in a position where to try to strike him is
most dangerous, for the reasons that I gave above 5 of the danger there is in
striking at an inconvenience that has already gained much increase in a city.
So the affair comes down to a point at which one needs either to seek to
eliminate him with danger of sudden ruin or, by allowing him to act, to
enter into a manifest servitude, unless death or some accident frees you
from it. For having come to the positions written above, where the citizens
and magistrates have fear of offending him and his friends, he does not have
much trouble getting them to judge and to offend in his mode. Hence a
republic must have among its orders this one, of watching out that its
citizens cannot do evil under shadow of good, and that they have that
reputation that helps and does not hurt freedom, as will be disputed by us in
its place. 6

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«47 M

However Deceived in Generalities, Men
Are Not Deceived in Particulars

[1] When the Roman people, as was said above, 1 was disgusted with the
consular name and wished for plebeian men to be able to be made consuls
or for their authority to be diminished, the nobility, so as not to blemish the
consular authority either with one thing or with the other, took a middle
way and was content that four tribunes with consular power, who could be
plebeians as well as nobles, be created. 2 The plebs was content with this, as
it appeared to it to eliminate the consulate and to get its part in this highest
rank. From this arose a notable case, for coming to the creation of these
tribunes and being able to create all plebeians, the Roman people created all
nobles. Hence Titus Livy says these words: “The outcome of these elections
taught that there is one spirit in contention over freedom and honor,
another after conflict has been put aside and when their judgment is
uncorrupt.” 3 Examining what this could proceed from, I believe it proceeds
from men’s being very much deceived in general things, not so much in
particulars. It appeared generally to the Roman plebs that it deserved the
consulate because it had more part in the city, because it carried more
danger in wars, because it was that which with its arms 4 kept Rome free
and made it powerful. Since to the plebs its desire appeared reasonable, as
was said, it turned to obtaining this authority in any mode. But as it had to
pass judgment on its men particularly, it recognized their weakness and
judged that no one of them deserved that which the whole together
appeared to it to deserve. So, ashamed of them, it had recourse to those
who deserved it. Titus Livy, deservedly marveling at this decision, says these
words: “This modesty, equity, and elevation of spirit—where will you now
find in one what then was in the people universally?” 5

[2] In confirmation of this, one can bring up another notable example that
occurred in Capua after Hannibal defeated the Romans at Cannae. 6
Although all Italy was stirred up because of this defeat, Capua was still in

166

tumult because of the hatred there was between the people and the Senate.
Pacuvius Calanus, 7 finding himself at that time in the supreme magistracy,
and recognizing the danger that being in tumult was bringing to the city,
planned through his rank to reconcile the plebs with the nobility. After he
had this thought, he had the Senate convened and narrated to them the
hatred the people had against them and the dangers they bore of being killed
by it, and the city given to Hannibal, the Romans’ affairs being in distress.
Then he added that if they wished to let this affair be governed by him, he
would do it so that they would unite together; but he wished to shut them
inside the palace and, by giving the people the power to punish them, save
them. The senators yielded to his opinion, and he called the people to a
meeting, having closed up the senate in the palace. He said that the time
had come that they could tame the pride of the nobility and avenge
themselves for the injuries received from it, since he had closed them all in
under his custody. But because he believed that they did not wish for their
city to remain without government, if they wished to kill the old senators, it
was necessary to create new ones. Therefore he had all the names of the
senators put in a bag and would begin to draw them out in their presence,
and he would have those drawn killed one by one as soon as they had found
the successor. As he began to draw out one of them, a very great noise was
raised at his name, calling him a proud, cruel, and arrogant man; and when
Pacuvius requested them to make the exchange, the whole meeting was
quiet. After a while one of the plebs was named, at whose name someone
began to whistle, someone to laugh, someone to speak ill of him in one
mode, and someone in another. So continuing one by one, all those who
were named they judged unworthy of senatorial rank. So, taking this
opportunity, Pacuvius said: “Since you judge that this city is badly off
without the Senate and you do not agree on making exchanges for the old
senators, I think it is good that you reconcile yourselves together; for the
fear that the senators have been in will have made them so humble that the
humanity that you are seeking elsewhere you will find in them.” 8 When this
was agreed to, the union of this order followed, and the deception they were
under was exposed when they were constrained to come to particulars.
Besides this, peoples are deceived generally in judging things and their
accidents about which, after they know them particularly, they lack such
deception.

[3] After 1494, when the princes of the city had been expelled from
Florence and no ordered government was there, 9 but rather a certain

167

ambitious license, and public things were going from bad to worse, many
popular men, seeing the ruin of their city and not understanding any other
cause for it, accused the ambition of someone powerful who was nourishing
the disorders so as to be able to make a state to his purpose and take
freedom away from them. This sort stood around the loggias and piazzas
speaking ill of many citizens, threatening that if they ever became signors,
they would uncover their deception and would punish them. It often
happened that persons like these ascended to the supreme magistracy, and
as he had risen to that place and had seen things more closely, he recognized
where the disorders arose from, and the dangers that impended, and the
difficulty in remedying them. Since he saw that the times and not the men
caused the disorder, he suddenly became of another mind and of another
sort, because the knowledge of particular things took away from him the
deception that had been presupposed in considering them generally. So
those who had first heard him speak when he was a private individual and
later seen him become quiet in the supreme magistracy believed that this
arose not through a truer knowledge of things but because he had been got
around and corrupted by the great. Since this befalls many men, and many
times, a proverb arises among them that says: They have one mind in the
piazza and another in the palazzo. Thus, considering all that has been
discoursed of, one sees how, seeing that a generality deceives them, one can
soon open the eyes of peoples by finding a mode by which they have to
descend to particulars, as did Pacuvius in Capua and the Senate in Rome. I
also believe that one may be able to conclude that a prudent man should
never flee the popular judgment in particular things concerning
distributions of ranks and dignities, for only in this does the people not
deceive itself; and if it deceives itself at some time, it is so rare that a few
men who have to make such distributions will deceive themselves more
often. Nor does it appear to me superfluous to show, in the following
chapter, the order that the Senate held to so as to deceive the people in its
distributions.

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«48 M

He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be
Given to Someone Vile or Someone Wicked
Should Have It Asked for Either by
Someone Too Vile and Too Wicked or by
Someone Too Noble and Too Good

[1] When the Senate feared that tribunes with consular power would be
made of plebeian men, it held to one of two modes: either it had [the
position] asked for by the most reputed men in Rome; or truly, through due
degrees, it corrupted some vile and very ignoble plebeian who, mixed with
the plebeians of better quality who ordinarily asked for it, also asked them
for it. 1 This last mode made the plebs ashamed to give it; the first made it
ashamed to take it. All of this returns to the purpose of the preceding
discourse, in which it is shown that the people does not deceive itself in
particulars, even if it deceives itself in generalities.

169

49 n

If Those Cities That Have Had a Free
Beginning, Such as Rome, Have Difficulty
in Finding Laws That Will Maintain Them,
Those That Have Had One Immediately
Servile Have Almost an Impossibility

[1] The course of the Roman republic demonstrates extremely well how
difficult it is, in ordering a republic, to provide for all the laws that maintain
it free. Notwithstanding the many laws that were ordered there by Romulus
first, then by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and last by the ten
citizens created for like work, nonetheless new necessities in managing that
city were always discovered, and it was necessary to create new orders, as
happened when they created the censors, 1 which were one of those
provisions that helped keep Rome free for the time that it lived in freedom.
For when they had become arbiters of the customs of Rome, they were a
very powerful cause why the Romans delayed more in corrupting
themselves. They did indeed make an error in the beginning of the creation
of such a magistracy, creating it for five years; but after not much time, it
was corrected by the prudence of Mamercus the dictator, who by a new law
reduced the said magistracy to eighteen months. This the censors who were
on watch took so ill that they denied Mamercus [membership in] the
Senate, which was very much blamed both by the plebs and by the Fathers.
Because the history does not show that Mamercus was able to defend
himself against it, 2 it must be either that the historian is defective or that
the orders of Rome in this aspect are not good, for it is not good for a
republic to be ordered so that one citizen, by promulgating a law
conforming to a free way of life, can be offended for it without any remedy.

[2] But, returning to the beginning of this discourse, I say that the creation
of this new magistracy should make one consider that if those cities that
have had their beginning free and that have been corrected by themselves,

170

like Rome, have great difficulty in finding good laws for maintaining
themselves free, it is not marvelous that the cities that have had their
beginnings immediately servile have not difficulty but an impossibility in
ever ordering themselves so that they may be able to live civilly and quietly.
As one sees in what happened to the city of Florence: having had its
beginning subordinate to the Roman Empire, and having always lived under
the government of another, it remained abject for a time, without thinking
about itself. Then, when the opportunity came for taking a breath, it began
to make its own orders, which could not have been good, since they were
mixed with the ancient that were bad. So it has gone on managing itself, for
the two hundred years of true memory that it has without ever having had a
state for which it could truly be called a republic. The difficulties that have
been in it have always been in all those cities that have had similar
beginnings. Although many times, through public and free votes, expansive
authority has been given to a few citizens to enable them to reform it, they
have not therefore ever ordered it for the common utility but always for the
purpose of their party, which has made not order but greater disorder in
that city.

[3] To come to some particular example, I say that among the other things
that have to be considered by an orderer of a republic is to examine in
which men’s hands he puts the authority to shed blood against its own
citizens. This was well ordered in Rome because one could appeal to the
people ordinarily; and if indeed an important thing did occur in which it
was dangerous to defer the execution during the appeal, they had the refuge
of the dictator, who executed immediately—in which remedy they never
took refuge unless for necessity. But Florence and the other cities born in its
mode, being servile, had this authority invested in a foreigner, who, sent by
the prince, filled such an office. When later they came into freedom, they
maintained this authority in a foreigner whom they called the captain. 3
Because he could easily be corrupted by powerful citizens, this was a very
pernicious thing. But later, changing this order for themselves because of
the change of states, they created eight citizens who would fill the office of
the captain. 4 Such an order went from bad to worst, for the reasons that
have been said at other times: that the few were always ministers of the few
and of the most powerful. The city of Venice, which had ten citizens who
could punish any citizen without appeal, guarded itself from this. 5 Because
they might not be enough to punish the powerful, although they had
authority for it, they had constituted there the Forty; and more, they willed

171

that the Council of the Pregai, which is the largest council, be able to
punish them so that if an accuser is not lacking, a judge is not lacking to
hold powerful men in check. Thus, seeing that in Rome, ordered by itself
and by so many prudent men, every day new causes emerged for which it
had to make new orders in favor of a free way of life, it is not marvelous if
in other cities that have a more disordered beginning so many difficulties
emerge that they are never able to reorder themselves.

C#J

172

«50 ft

One Council or One Magistrate Should
Not Be Able to Stop the Actions of Cities

[1] Titus Quintius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mentus were consuls in
Rome who, since they were disunited, had stopped all the actions of that
republic. The Senate, seeing this, urged them to create the dictator to do
that which they were unable to do because of their discords. But the
consuls, in discord in every other thing, were in accord only in not wishing
to create the dictator. So, not having any other remedy, the Senate had
recourse to the aid of the tribunes, who with the authority of the Senate
forced the consuls to obey. 1 Here it has to be noted, first, the utility of the
tribunate, which was useful in checking not only the ambition that the
powerful used against the plebs, but that too that they used among
themselves; the other, that it should never be ordered in a city that the few
can hold up any of those decisions that ordinarily are necessary to maintain
the republic. For instance, if you give an authority to a council to make a
distribution of honors and of useful things, or to a magistrate to administer
a business, one must either impose a necessity on him so that he has to act
in any mode, or order that another can and should act if he does not wish to
act. Otherwise this order would be defective and dangerous, as was seen in
Rome had the authority of the tribunes not been able to oppose the
obstinacy of those consuls. In the Venetian republic the Great Council
distributes the honors and profits. It used to happen sometimes that through
indignation or some false persuasion, the collectivity did not create
successors to the magistrates of the city and to those who administered the
empire outside. That was a very great disorder, because in a stroke both the
subject lands and the city itself lacked its own legitimate judges; nor could
anything be obtained unless the collectivity of that council were either
satisfied or undeceived. That inconvenience would have reduced the city to
a bad condition if it had not been provided for by the prudent citizens, who,
taking a convenient opportunity, made a law that all the magistracies that
are or may be inside and outside of the city may never be vacated except

173

when substitutes and successors have been made. So the occasion for being
able to stop public actions with danger to the republic was taken away from
that council.

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«51 ft

A Republic or a Prince Should Make a
Show of Doing through Liberality What
Necessity Constrains Him to Do

[1] Prudent men gain favor for themselves out of affairs, always and in their
every action even though necessity constrains them to do them in any case.
This prudence was well used by the Roman Senate when it decided that a
public wage should be given to men serving in the military, who were
accustomed to serve in the military on their own. But since the Senate saw
that it could not make war for long in that mode, and because of this it was
unable either to besiege towns or to lead armies far away, and since it
judged that it was necessary to do both the one and the other, it decided
that the said stipends should be given out. But it did it so that it gained favor
for itself out of what necessity constrained it to do. This present was so
acceptable to the plebs that Rome went upside down with joy, as it
appeared to them a great benefit that they never hoped to have and they
would never have sought by themselves. Although the tribunes did their best
to suppress this favor, showing that it was a thing that burdened—not
relieved—the plebs, since it was necessary to lay taxes to pay for this wage,
nonetheless they could not do so much that the plebs did not accept it. That
was increased too by the Senate through the mode in which they distributed
the taxes, for the heaviest and greatest were those they laid on the nobility,
and they were the first that were paid. 1

-v-**

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«52 M

To Repress the Insolence of One Individual
Who Rises Up in a Powerful Republic,
There Is No More Secure and Less
Scandalous Mode Than to Anticipate the
Ways by Which He Conies to That Power

[1] One sees by the discourse written above how much credit the nobility
acquired with the plebs by the demonstrations read of, which were to its
benefit both from the wage it had ordered and also from the mode of laying
the taxes. 1 If the nobility had been maintained in this order, every tumult in
that city would have been removed and the credit that the tribunes had with
the plebs would have been taken from them and, by consequence, their
authority. And truly, in a republic, and especially in those that are corrupt,
the ambition of any citizen cannot be opposed with a better, less
scandalous, and easier mode than to anticipate the ways that he is seen to
tread to arrive at the rank that he plans. If that mode had been used against
Cosimo de’ Medici, it would have been a very much better policy for his
adversaries than to drive him out of Florence. For if those citizens who vied
with him had taken his style of favoring the people, they would have come
without tumult and without violence to take out of his hands those arms of
which he most availed himself. 2

[2] Piero Soderini had made a reputation for himself in the city of Florence
with this only: favoring the collectivity. That gave him a reputation in the
collectivity as a lover of the freedom of the city. And truly, to the citizens
who bore envy for his greatness, it was much easier, and was a thing much
more honest, less dangerous, and less harmful for the republic, to anticipate
him in the ways with which he made himself great than to wish to put
themselves up against him so that all the rest of the republic was ruined
with his ruin. For if they had removed from his hands the arms with which
he made himself mighty (which they could easily have done), they would

176

have been able to oppose him without suspicion and without any hesitation
in all councils and in all public decisions. If someone replied that if the
citizens who hated Piero made an error by not anticipating him in the ways
with which he gained reputation for himself among the people, Piero too
came to make an error by not anticipating the ways by which those
adversaries of his made him fear, for which Piero merits an excuse, whether
because it was difficult for him to do so or because they were not honest to
him, yet the ways with which he was hurt were the favoring of the Medici,
with which favors they beat him down and in the end ruined him. Piero,
therefore, could not honestly take this part because he could not with good
fame destroy the freedom for which he had been posted guard. Then, since
these favors could not be done in secret and at a stroke, they were very
dangerous for Piero, for if he had been exposed as a friend to the Medici,
he would have become suspect and hateful to the people. Hence his enemies
would have had much more occasion for crushing him than they had at first.

[3] Therefore, in every policy men should consider its defects and dangers
and not adopt it if there is more of the dangerous than the useful in it,
notwithstanding that a judgment had been given of it that conforms to their
decision. For when they do otherwise, it would happen to them in this case
as it happened to Tully, 3 who in wishing to take away favor from Mark
Antony increased it for him. For when Mark Antony had been judged an
enemy of the Senate, and had gathered together that great army in good
part from the soldiers who had followed the party of Caesar, Tully, so as to
take those soldiers from him, urged the Senate to give reputation to
Octavian and to send him with Hirtius and Pansa, the consuls, against Mark
Antony, alleging that as soon as the soldiers who were following Mark
Antony heard the name of Octavian, nephew of Caesar, and that he was
calling himself Caesar, they would leave him and would take the side of the
latter; so when Mark Antony was left stripped of favor, it would be easy to
crush him. This affair came out all to the contrary, for Mark Antony gained
Octavian to himself; and he, having left Tully and the Senate, sided with
him. This affair was the destruction of the party of the aristocrats. That was
easy to conjecture; nor should that of which Tully persuaded himself have
been believed, but that name that with so much glory had eliminated its
enemies and acquired for itself the principate in Rome should have always
been taken into account; nor should it have been believed that, either from
his heirs or from his agents, anything could ever be had that would conform
to the name of freedom. 4

177

178

*$53 ft

Many Times the People Desires Its Own

Ruin, Deceived by a False Appearance 1 of
Good; and That Great Hopes and Mighty
Promises Easily Move It

[1] After the city of the Veientes was captured, an opinion entered into the
Roman people that it would be a useful thing for the city of Rome that half
the Romans go to inhabit Veii. It was argued that because that city was rich
in its countryside, full of buildings, and close to Rome, half of the Roman
citizens could be enriched and not disturb any civil action because of the
nearness of the site. This thing appeared to the Senate and to the wisest
Romans so useless and harmful that they freely said they would rather suffer
death than consent to such a decision. So, as this thing came into dispute,
the plebs was so much inflamed against the Senate that it would have come
to arms and blood if the Senate had not made itself a shield of some old and
esteemed citizens, reverence for whom checked the plebs, which did not
proceed further with its insolence. 2 Here two things have to be noted. The
first is that many times, deceived by a false image of good, the people
desires its own ruin; and if it is not made aware that that is bad and what
the good is, by someone in whom it has faith, infinite dangers and harms are
brought into republics. When fate makes the people not have faith in
someone, as happens at some time after it has been deceived in the past
either by things or by men, it of necessity comes to ruin. Dante says to this
purpose in the discourse he makes On Monarchy that many times the people
cries: “Life!” to its death and “Death!” to its life. 3 From this lack of belief it
arises that sometimes in republics good policies are not taken up, as was
said above 4 of the Venetians when, assaulted by so many enemies, they were
unable to adopt the policy of gaining someone to themselves with the
restitution of the things they had taken from others (because of which the

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war on them had been started and the league 5 of princes made against
them) before ruin came. 6

[2] Therefore, considering what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a
people of, this distinction can be made: what you have to persuade
represents first on its face either gain or loss, or truly it appears to be a
spirited or cowardly policy. And when gain is seen in the things that are put
before the people, even though there is loss concealed underneath, and when
it appears spirited, even though there is the ruin of the republic concealed
underneath, it will always be easy to persuade the multitude of it; and
likewise it may always be difficult to persuade it of these policies if either
cowardice or loss might appear, even though safety and gain might be
concealed underneath. What I have said is confirmed by infinite examples,
Roman and foreign, modern and ancient. For from this arose the malevolent
opinion that emerged in Rome about Fabius Maximus, who was unable to
persuade the Roman people that it would be useful to that republic to
proceed slowly in that war and to sustain the thrust of Hannibal without
fighting. For the people judged this policy cowardly and did not see inside it
the utility that was there, nor did Fabius have reasons enough to
demonstrate it to them. So much are peoples blinded in these mighty
opinions that although the Roman people had made the error of giving
authority to Fabius’s master of the horse to enable it to fight, even though
Fabius did not wish it, and although because of such authority the Roman
camp was on the point of being defeated had Fabius not remedied it with
his prudence, 7 this experience was not enough for it, because it later made
Varro consul through no merits of his other than to have promised, in all the
piazzas and all the public places in Rome, to break Hannibal whenever
authority might be given to him. 8 From this arose the fight and the defeat at
Cannae, and nearly the ruin of Rome. 9

[3] I wish to bring up yet another Roman example for this purpose.
Hannibal had been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled all this province with
slaughter of Romans, when into the Senate came Marcus Centenius Penula,
a very vile man (nonetheless he had held some rank in the military), who
offered that if they gave him authority to enable him to make an army of
voluntary men wherever he wished in Italy, he would in a very brief time
give them Hannibal, taken or killed. To the Senate his request appeared
rash; nonetheless, thinking that if it were denied to him and his asking later
became known among the people, there might arise from it some tumult,

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envy, and disfavor toward the senatorial order, they conceded it to him,
wishing rather to put in danger all those who followed him than to make
new indignation rise up in the people, since they knew how such a policy
was on the point of being accepted and how difficult it would be to dissuade
from it. Thus he went to meet Hannibal with a disordered and unseemly
multitude, and no sooner did he reach the encounter than he was defeated
and killed with all those who followed him. 10

[4] In Greece, in the city of Athens, Nicias, a very grave and prudent man,
was never able to persuade that people that it might not be good to go to
assault Sicily; so when that decision was taken against the wish of the wise,
the entire ruin of Athens followed from it. 11 When Scipio was made consul
and desired the province of Africa, promising the entire ruin of Carthage—
to which the Senate did not agree because of the judgment of Fabius
Maximus—he threatened to propose it to the people, as one who knew very
well how much such decisions please peoples. 12

[5] Examples from our city could be given to this purpose: as it was when
Messer Ercole Bentivoglio, governor of the Florentine troops, went together
with Antonio Giacomini to camp at Pisa after they had defeated
Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenzo. This enterprise was decided by
the people on the mighty promises of Messer Ercole, even though many
wise citizens blamed it; nonetheless, they did not have a remedy for it, as
they were driven by the universal will that was founded upon the mighty
promises of the governor. 13 I say, thus, that there is no easier way to make a
republic where the people has authority come to ruin than to put it into
mighty enterprises, for where the people is of any moment, they are always
accepted; nor will there be any remedy for whoever is of another opinion.
But if the ruin of the city arises from this, there arises also, and more often,
the particular ruin of citizens who are posted to such enterprises, for since
the people had presupposed victory, when loss comes it accuses neither
fortune nor the impotence of whoever has governed but his malevolence and
ignorance; and most often it kills or imprisons or confines him, as happened
to infinite Carthaginian captains and to many Athenians. Nor does any
victory that they have had in the past help them, because the present loss
cancels everything, as happened to our Antonio Giacomini: not having
captured Pisa as the people had presupposed for itself and he had promised,
he came to such popular disgrace that notwithstanding his infinite past good
works, he survived more by the humanity of those who had authority over
him than by any other cause that would defend him among the people.

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«54 M

How Much Authority a Grave Man May
Have to Check an Excited Multitude

[1] The second notable point on the text cited in the above chapter is that
nothing is so apt to check an excited multitude as is the reverence for some
grave man of authority who puts himself against it. Nor does Virgil say
without cause: “Then if they happen to look on some man grave with piety
and merits, they are silent and stand by with open ears.” 1 Therefore he who
is posted to an army or who finds himself in a city where tumult arises
should represent himself before it with the greatest grace and as honorably
as he can, putting around himself the ensigns of the rank he holds so as to
make himself more reverend. A few years ago Florence was divided into
two factions, Fratesca and Arrabbiata as they were called. 2 And coming to
arms, the Frateschi were overcome, among whom was Pagolantonio
Soderini, a very highly reputed citizen in those times. As the armed people
in those tumults were going to him at his home to sack it, Messer
Francesco, his brother, then bishop of Volterra and today cardinal, by fate
found himself at home. Having heard the noise and seen the disturbance, he
at once put on his most honorable clothes and over them the episcopal
rochet, put himself against those who were armed, and with presence and
with words stopped them. That affair was noted and celebrated through all
the city for many days. I conclude, thus, that there is no more steady nor
more necessary remedy for checking an excited multitude than the presence
of one man who because of his presence appears and is reverend. Thus, to
return to the text cited before, one sees with how much obstinacy the
Roman plebs accepted the policy of going to Veii because it judged it
useful; nor did it recognize the harm that was there underneath; and since
very many tumults were arising from it, scandals would have arisen if the
Senate with its grave men full of reverence had not checked their fury. 3

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«55 M

How Easily Things May Be Conducted in
Those Cities in Which the Multitude Is Not
Corrupt; and That Where There Is
Equality, a Principality Cannot Be Made,
and Where There Is Not, a Republic
Cannot Be Made

[1] Though it has been very much discussed above 1 what is to be feared and
hoped from corrupt cities, nonetheless it does not appear to me outside the
purpose to consider a decision of the Senate regarding the vow that
Camillus had made to give the tenth part of the booty of the Veientes to
Apollo. Since that booty had come into the hands of the Roman plebs and
they could not otherwise supervise the account of it, the Senate made an
edict that each should present in public the tenth part of what he had taken
as booty. Although that decision did not take place, since the Senate later
took another mode, and by other ways satisfied Apollo to the satisfaction of
the plebs, 2 nonetheless by such a decision one sees how much the Senate
trusted in the goodness [of the plebs] and that it judged that no one would
not present exactly all that had been commanded of him by such an edict.
On the other side, one sees that the plebs thought not of defrauding the
edict in any part by giving less than it owed, but of freeing itself from it by
showing open indignation. This example, with many others that have been
brought up above, shows how much goodness and how much religion were
in that people, and how much good was to be hoped from it.

[2] And truly, where there is not this goodness, nothing good can be hoped
for, as it cannot be hoped for in the provinces that in these times are seen to
be corrupt, as is Italy above all others; and France and Spain also retain part
of such corruption. If as many disorders as arise in Italy are not seen every
day in those provinces, it derives not so much from the goodness of the

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peoples, which is in good part lacking, as from having one king that
maintains them united not only through his virtue but through the order of
those kingdoms, which is not yet spoiled. In the province of Germany this
goodness and this religion are still seen to be great in those peoples, which
makes many republics there live free, and they observe their laws so that no
one from outside or inside dares to seize them. 3 To show that it is true that
a good part of that ancient goodness reigns in them, I wish to give an
example such as that given above of the Senate and the Roman plebs. When
it occurs to those republics that they need to spend some quantity of money
for the public account, they are used to having those magistrates or councils
that have authority for it assess on all the inhabitants of the city one percent
or two of what each has of value. When such a decision has been made,
each presents himself before the collectors of such a duty according to the
order of the town; and having first taken an oath to pay the fitting amount,
he throws into a chest so designated what according to his conscience it
appears to him he ought to pay. Of this payment there is no witness except
him who pays. Hence it can be conjectured how much goodness and how
much religion are yet in those men. It should be reckoned that each pays the
true amount, for if it were not paid, that impost would not bring in the
quantity that they planned on according to the former ones that they had
been accustomed to collect. When it was not brought in, the fraud would be
recognized, and when recognized, another mode than this would have been
taken. Such goodness is so much more to be admired in these times as it is
rarer; indeed one sees it remaining only in that province.

[3] This arises from two things: one, not having had great intercourse 4 with
neighbors, for neither have the latter gone to their home nor have they gone
to someone else’s home, because they have been content with those goods,
to live by those foods, to dress with those woolens that the country provides.
Hence the cause of every intercourse 5 and the beginning of every corruption
has been taken away, for they have not been able to pick up either French or
Spanish or Italian customs, which nations all together are the corruption of
the world. 6 The other cause is that those republics in which a political and
uncorrupt way of life is maintained do not endure that any citizen of theirs
either be or live in the usage of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among
themselves an even equality, and to the lords and gentlemen who are in that
province they are very hostile. If by chance some fall into their hands, they
kill them as the beginnings of corruption and the cause of every scandal.

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[4] To clarify this name of gentlemen such as it may be, I say that those are
called gentlemen who live idly in abundance from the returns of their
possessions without having any care either for cultivation or for other
necessary trouble in living. Such as these are pernicious in every republic
and in every province, but more pernicious are those who, beyond the
aforesaid fortunes, command from a castle and have subjects who obey
them. Of these two species of men the kingdom of Naples, the town of
Rome, the Romagna, and Lombardy are full. From this it arises that in these
provinces no republic or political way of life has ever emerged, for such
kinds of men are altogether hostile to every civilization. To wish to
introduce a republic into provinces made in a like mode would not be
possible; but if anyone were arbiter of them and wished to reorder them,
there would be no other way than to make a kingdom there. The reason is
this: that where there is so much corrupt matter that the laws are not
enough to check it, together with them greater force is needed to give order
there—a kingly hand that with absolute and excessive power puts a check
on the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This reason is
verified with the example of Tuscany, where one sees three republics—
Florence, Siena, and Lucca—have long been in a small space of territory;
and the other cities of that province are seen to be servile in such a mode
that one sees that with spirit and with order they would maintain or would
like to maintain their freedom. All has arisen because in that province there
is no lord of a castle and no or very few gentlemen, but there is so much
equality that a civil way of life would easily be introduced there by a
prudent man having knowledge of the ancient civilizations. But its
misfortune has been so great that up to these times it has not run into 7 any
man who has been able or known how to do it.

[5] Thus this conclusion may be drawn from this discourse: that he who
wishes to make a republic where there are very many gentlemen cannot do
it unless he first eliminates all of them; and that he who is where there is
very much equality and wishes to make a kingdom or a principality will
never be able to make it unless he draws from that equality many of
ambitious and unquiet spirit and makes them gentlemen in fact, and not in
name, granting them castles and possessions and giving them favor in
belongings and men. 8 So, placed in the midst of them, through them he
maintains his power; and they, through him, maintain their ambition. The
others are constrained to endure the yoke that force, and never anything
else, can make them endure. Since there is proportion by this way from

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whoever forces to whoever is forced, men stand firm, each in his orders.
Because the making of a republic from a province suited to be a kingdom,
and the making of a kingdom from one suited to be a republic, is matter for
a man who is rare in brain and authority, there have been many who have
wished to do it and few who have known how to conduct it. For the
greatness of the thing partly terrifies men, partly impedes them so that they
fail in the first beginnings.

[6] I believe that the experience of the Venetian republic, in which none
can have any rank except those who are gentlemen, will appear contrary to
this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen a republic cannot be
ordered. To which it may be replied that this example does not impugn it
because in that republic they are gentlemen more in name than in fact. For
they do not have great incomes from possessions, since their great riches are
founded in trade and movable things; and besides, none of them holds a
castle or has any jurisdiction over men. But that name of gentlemen among
them is a name of dignity and reputation, without being founded upon any
of those things that make them be called gentlemen in other cities. As the
other republics have all their divisions under various names, so Venice is

divided into the gentlemen and the people, 9 and they wish that the former
have, or are able to have, all the honors; the others are altogether excluded
from them. That does not produce disorder in that town for the reasons
given another time. 10 Thus he constitutes a republic where a great equality
exists or has been made, and on the contrary orders a principality where
there is great inequality; otherwise he will produce a thing without
proportion and hardly lasting.

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«56

Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or
in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast

Them, or Men Who Predict Them

[1] Whence it arises I do not know, but one sees by ancient and by modern
examples that no grave accident in a city or in a province ever comes unless
it has been foretold either by diviners or by revelations or by prodigies or by
other heavenly signs. So as not to go far from my home to prove this,
everyone knows how much had been foretold by Friar Girolamo Savonarola
before the coming of King Charles VIII of France into Italy, 2 and that,
beyond this, it was said throughout Tuscany there were men-at-arms heard
in the air and seen above Arezzo, who were fighting together. 3 Everyone
knows, beyond this, that before the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici the Elder,
the cathedral was struck in its highest part by a heavenly dart, with very
great destruction for that building. 4 Everyone knows too that soon before
Piero Soderini, who had been made gonfalonier for life by the Florentine
people, was expelled and deprived of his rank, the very palace itself was
struck by a thunderbolt. 5 Beyond this, more examples could be brought up
that to escape tedium I shall leave out. I shall narrate only what Titus Livy
says before the coming of the French to Rome; that is, that one Marcus
Cedicius, a plebeian, reported to the Senate that in the middle of the night
as he was passing through the Via Nuova he had heard a voice greater than
human that admonished him that he should report to the magistrates that
the French were coming to Rome. 6 The cause of this I believe is to be
discoursed of and interpreted by a man who has knowledge of things natural
and supernatural, which we do not have. Yet it could be, as some
philosopher would have it, 7 that since this air is full of intelligences that
foresee future things by their natural virtues, and they have compassion for
men, they warn them with like signs so that they can prepare themselves for
defense. Yet however this may be, one sees it thus to be the truth, and that

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always after such accidents extraordinary and new things supervene in
provinces.

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«57 M

The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself

Weak

[1] When the ruin of their fatherland occurred because of the passage of the
French, many Romans had gone to inhabit Veii against the institution and
order of the Senate. So as to remedy their disorder, it commanded by its
public edicts that everyone return to inhabit Rome by a certain time and
under certain penalties. At first jokes were made of such edicts by those
against whom they applied; then, when the time to obey drew near, all
obeyed. Titus Livy says these words: “From being ferocious together, when
isolated, each with his own fear, they became obedient.” 1 And truly, the
nature of a multitude in this part cannot be shown better than is
demonstrated in this text. For the multitude is often bold in speaking
against the decisions of their prince; then, when they look the penalty in the
face, not trusting one another, they run to obey. So one sees certainly that
no great account should be taken of what a people says about its good or
bad disposition if you are ordered so as to be able to maintain it if it is well
disposed, and to provide that it should not hurt you if it is badly disposed.
This is to be understood for those bad dispositions that peoples have, arising
from some cause other than that either they have lost their freedom or their
prince is loved by them and is still alive. For the bad dispositions that arise
from these causes are formidable above everything and have need of great
remedies to check them; [the people’s] other bad dispositions are easy if it
does not have heads with whom to seek refuge. For on one side there is
nothing more formidable than an unshackled multitude without a head, and,
on the other side, there is nothing weaker; for even though it has arms in
hand, it is easy to put it down provided that you have a stronghold that
enables you to escape the first thrust. For when the spirits of men are cooled
a little and each sees he has to return to his home, they begin to doubt
themselves and to think of their safety, either by taking flight or by coming
to accord. Therefore a multitude so excited, wishing to escape these
dangers, has at once to make from among itself a head to correct it, to hold

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it united, and to think about its defense, as did the Roman plebs when it left
Rome after the death of Virginia and made twenty tribunes among them to
save themselves. 2 If it does not do this, what Titus Livy says in the words
written above always happens to them: that all together are mighty, and
when each begins later to think of his own danger, he becomes cowardly
and weak.

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#?58 n

The Multitude Is Wiser and More
Constant Than a Prince

[1] That nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude so our
Titus Livy, like all other historians, affirms. 1 For in narrating the actions of
men, it often occurs that the multitude is seen to have condemned someone
to death, and then has wept for the same and greatly desired him, as the
Roman people is seen to have done for Manlius Capitolinus, whom it had
condemned to death, then greatly desired. The words of the author are
these: “After there was no danger from him, desire for him soon took hold
of the people.” 2 Elsewhere, when he shows the incidents that arose in
Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, 3 he says: “This
is the nature of the multitude: either it serves humbly or it dominates
proudly.” 4 I do not know if I shall take upon myself a hard task 1 full of so
much difficulty that it may suit me either to abandon it with shame or
continue it with disapproval, since I wish to defend a thing that, as I said,
has been accused by all the writers. But however it may be, I do not judge
nor shall I ever judge it to be a defect to defend any opinion with reasons,
without wishing to use either authority or force for it.

[2] I say, thus, that all men particularly, and especially princes, can be
accused of that defect of which the writers accuse the multitude; for
everyone who is not regulated by laws would make the same errors as the
unshackled multitude. This can easily be known, because there are and have
been very many princes, and the good and wise among them have been few.
I speak of princes who have been able to break the bridle that can correct
them, among whom are not those kings who arose in Egypt when, in that
most ancient antiquity, the province was governed with laws; 6 nor those
who arose in Sparta; nor those who in our times arise in France, a kingdom
that is moderated more by laws than any other kingdom of which
knowledge is had in our times. These kings who arose under such
constitutions are not to be put in that number of which the nature of every

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man by himself has to be considered to see if he is like the multitude. For
one should put in the comparison a multitude regulated by laws as they are;
and the same goodness that we see to be in them will be found to be in it,
and it will be seen neither to dominate proudly nor to serve humbly—as was
the Roman people, which never served humbly nor dominated proudly
while the republic lasted uncorrupt; indeed, with its orders and magistrates,
it held its rank honorably. When it was necessary to move against someone
powerful, it did so, as may be seen in Manlius, in the Ten, and in others who
sought to crush it; and when it was necessary to obey the dictators and the
consuls for the public safety, it did so. If the Roman people desired Manlius
Capitolinus after he was dead, it is no marvel; for it desired his virtues,
which had been such that the memory of them brought compassion to
everyone. They would have had force to produce the same effect in a prince,
because it is the verdict of all the writers that virtue is praised and admired
also in one’s enemies; and if Manlius had been resuscitated among so much
desire, the people of Rome would have given the same judgment on him as
it did when it condemned him to death soon after it had dragged him from
prison. 7 Notwithstanding that, some princes may be seen who, held to be
wise, have had some person killed and then very highly desired him, as
Alexander did Clitus 8 and other friends of his and Herod did Marianne. 9
But what our historian says of the nature of the multitude he does not say of
that which is regulated by laws, as was the Roman, but of the unshackled, as
was the Syracusan, which made those errors that infuriated and unshackled
men make, as Alexander the Great and Herod made in the given cases.
Therefore the nature of the multitude is no more to be faulted than that of
princes, because all err equally when all can err without respect. Beyond
what I have said, there are very many examples of this, both among the
Roman emperors and among the other tyrants and princes, where so much
inconstancy and so much variation of life are seen as may ever be found in
any multitude.

[3] I conclude, thus, against the common opinion that says that peoples,
when they are princes, are varying, mutable, and ungrateful, as I affirm that
these sins are not otherwise in them than in particular princes. Someone
accusing peoples and princes together might be able to say the truth, but in
excepting princes, he would be deceived; for a people that commands and is
well ordered will be stable, prudent, and grateful no otherwise than a prince,
or better than a prince, even one esteemed wise. On the other side, a prince
unshackled from the laws will be more ungrateful, varying, and imprudent

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than a people. The variation in their proceeding arises not from a diverse
nature—because it is in one mode in all, and if there is advantage of good,
it is in the people—but from having more or less respect for the laws within
which both live. Whoever considers the Roman people will see it to have
been hostile for four hundred years to the kingly name and a lover of the
glory and common good of its fatherland; he will see so many examples of it
that testify to both one thing and the other. If anyone cites to me the
ingratitude that it used against Scipio, I answer with what was discoursed
on this matter above at length, 10 where it was shown that peoples are less
ungrateful than princes. But as to prudence and stability, I say that a people
is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince. Not
without cause may the voice of a people be likened to that of God; for one
sees a universal opinion produce marvelous effects in its forecasts, so that it
appears to foresee its ill and its good by a hidden virtue. As to judging
things, if a people hears two orators who incline to different sides, when
they are of equal virtue, very few times does one see it not take up the better
opinion, and not persuaded of the truth that it hears. If it errs in mighty
things or those that appear useful, as is said above, 11 often a prince errs too
in his own passions, which are many more than those of peoples. It is also
seen in its choices of magistrates to make a better choice by far than a
prince; nor will a people ever be persuaded that it is good to put up for
dignities an infamous man of corrupt customs—of which a prince is
persuaded easily and by a thousand ways. A people is seen to begin to hold a
thing in horror and to stay with that opinion for many centuries, which is
not seen in a prince. Of both these two things I wish the Roman people by
its testimony to suffice for me; in so many hundreds of years, in so many
choices of consuls and tribunes, it did not make four choices of which it
might have to repent. As I said, it held the kingly name so much in hatred
that no obligation to any of its citizens who might try for that name could
enable him to escape the proper penalties. Beyond this, one sees that cities
in which peoples are princes make exceeding increases in a very brief time,
and much greater than those that have always been made under a prince, as
did Rome after the expulsion of the kings and Athens after it was freed from
Pisistratus. That cannot arise from anything other than that governments of
peoples are better than those of princes. Nor do I wish my opinion to be
opposed by all that our historian says of it in the text cited before and in any
other whatever; for if all the disorders of peoples are reviewed, 12 all the
disorders of princes, all the glories of peoples, and all those of princes, the

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people will be seen to be by far superior in goodness and in glory. If princes
are superior to peoples in ordering laws, forming civil lives, and ordering
new statutes and orders, peoples are so much superior in maintaining things
ordered that without doubt they attain the glory of those who order them.

[4] In sum, to conclude this matter, I say that the states of princes have
lasted very long, the states of republics have lasted very long, and both have
had need of being regulated by the laws. For a prince who can do what he
wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it wishes is not wise. If, thus, one
is reasoning about a prince obligated to the laws and about a people fettered
by them, more virtue will always be seen in the people than in the prince; if
one reasons about both as unshackled, fewer errors will be seen in the
people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies.
For a licentious and tumultuous people can be spoken to by a good man, and
it can easily be returned to the good way; there is no one who can speak to a
wicked prince, nor is there any remedy other than steel. From that can be
made a conjecture of the importance of the illness of the one and the other:
that if to cure the illness of the people words are enough, and for the
prince’s steel is needed, there will never be anyone who will not judge that
where a greater cure is needed there are greater errors. When a people is
quite unshackled, the craziness it does is not feared, nor is present evil
feared, but what can arise from it, since in the midst of such confusion a
tyrant can arise. But with wicked princes the contrary happens: the present
evil is feared and the future is hoped for, since men persuade themselves
that his wicked life can make freedom emerge. So you 3 see the difference
between the one and the other, which is as much as between things that are
and things that have to be. The cruelties of the multitude are against
whoever they fear will seize the common good; those of a prince are against
whoever he fears will seize his own good. But the opinion against peoples
arises because everyone speaks ill of peoples without fear and freely, even
while they reign; princes are always spoken of with a thousand fears and a
thousand hesitations. Nor does it appear to me outside the purpose, since
this matter draws it from me, to dispute in the following chapter about
which confederations can be trusted more: those made with a republic or
those made with a prince.

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«59 M

Which Confederation or Other League
Can Be More Trusted, That Made with a
Republic or That Made with a Prince

[1] Because it occurs every day that one prince makes a league and a
friendship together with another, or one republic with another, and
similarly too confederation and accord are contracted between a republic
and a prince, it appears to me to be examined which faith is more stable,
and of which more account should be taken: that of a republic or that of a
prince. Examining everything, I believe that in many cases they are similar,
and in some there is some lack of conformity. I believe, therefore, that
accords made with you by force will not be observed either by a prince or by
a republic; I believe that if fear for the state comes, both will break faith
with you so as not to lose it, and will practice ingratitude to you. Demetrius,
who was called the capturer of cities, had conferred infinite benefits on the
Athenians; then it occurred that after he was defeated by his enemies and
was taking refuge in Athens as in a friendly city obligated to him, he was not
received by it, which grieved him very much more than the loss of his
troops and army had done. 1 Pompey, defeated as he was by Caesar in
Thessaly, took refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy, who in the past had been put
back in his kingdom by him; and he was killed by him. 2 Such things are
seen to have had the same cause; nonetheless, more humanity was used and
less injury done by the republic than by the prince. Where there is fear,
therefore, will be found the same faith in fact. If either a republic or a
prince will be found that expects to be ruined so as to observe faith with
you, this too can arise from similar causes. As to the prince, it can very well
occur that he is friendly with a powerful prince who he can hope with time
may restore him in his principality, if indeed he does not have opportunity
then to defend him; or truly that, having followed him as a partisan, he does
not believe he will find either faith or accord with that one’s enemy. Those
princes of the realm of Naples who have followed the French party 3 have

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had this fate. 4 As to republics, Saguntum in Spain, which expected ruin for
having followed the Roman party, had this fate; 5 and so did Florence, for
having followed the French party in 1512. 6 When everything has been
computed, I believe that in cases in which there is urgent danger, some
stability will be found more in republics than in princes. For although
republics have the same intent and the same wish as a prince, their slow
motion will make them always have more trouble in resolving than the
prince, and because of this have more trouble in breaking faith than he.
Confederations are broken for utility. In this, republics are by far more
observant of accords than are princes. Examples could be brought up in
which the least utility 7 has made a prince break faith and a great utility has
not made a republic break faith. Such was the policy that Themistocles
proposed to the Athenians, to whom he said in the assembly that he had a
counsel that would be of great utility to their fatherland, but he could not
tell it because he could not disclose it, for by disclosing it the opportunity to
act upon it would be taken away. Hence the people of Athens chose
Aristides, to whom the affair might be communicated, and then it would
decide about it according as it appeared to him. Themistocles showed him
that the fleet 8 of all Greece, though it remained under their faith, was in a
spot where it could easily be gained or destroyed, which would make the
Athenians wholly arbiters of that province. Hence Aristides reported to the
people that the policy of Themistocles was very useful but very dishonest,
for which the people wholly refused it. 9 Philip the Macedonian would not
have done that nor the other princes who have sought and gained more
utility 10 by breaking faith than with any other mode. I do not speak of
breaking pacts for some cause of nonobservance, an ordinary thing; but I do
speak of those that are broken for extraordinary causes, in which I believe,
because of the things said, the people makes lesser errors than the prince,
and because of this can be trusted more than the prince.

Vlv

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«60 ft

That the Consulate and Any Other
Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was Given
without Respect to Age

[1] One sees through the order of the history that after the consulate came
to the plebs, the Roman republic conceded it to its citizens without respect
to age or to blood, and even that respect to age was never in Rome; but it
always went out to find virtue, whether it was in the young or in the old.
That is seen through the testimony of Valerius Corvinus, who was made
consul at twenty-three years; 1 and the said Valerius, speaking to his soldiers,
said that the consulate was “the reward of virtue, not of blood.” 2 Whether
that thing was well considered or not would be very much to be disputed.
As to blood, this was conceded through necessity; and the necessity that was
in Rome would be in every city that wished to produce the effects that
Rome produced, as has been said another time; 3 for men cannot be given
trouble without a reward, nor can the hope of attaining the reward be taken
away from them without danger. Therefore it was fitting at an early hour
that the plebs have hope of gaining the consulate, and it was fed a bit with
this hope without having it; then the hope was not enough, and it was fitting
that it come to the effect. But the city that does not put its plebs to work in
any glorious affair can treat it in its own mode, as is disputed elsewhere; 4
the one that wishes to do what Rome did does not have to make this
distinction. Given that it is thus, there is no reply to that [lack of respect]
for time. It is even necessary, for in choosing a youth for a rank that has
need of the prudence of the old, it must be that some very notable action
makes him reach that rank, since the multitude has to choose him for it.
When a youth is of so much virtue that he makes himself known in some
notable thing, it would be a very harmful thing for the city not to be able to
avail itself of him then, and for it to have to wait until that vigor of spirit
and that readiness grow old with him, which his fatherland could have

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availed itself of at that age, as Rome availed itself of Valerius Corvinus,
Scipioy Pompey , 6 and many others who triumphed very young.

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Second Book

Preface

[1] Men always praise ancient times—but not always reasonably—and
accuse the present; they are partisans of past things in such a mode that they
celebrate not only those ages known to them through the memory that
writers have left of them, but also those that once they are old they
remember having seen in their youth. When this opinion of theirs is false,
as it most often is, I am persuaded that the causes that lead them to this
deception are various. The first I believe to be that the truth of ancient
things is not altogether understood and that most often the things that would
bring infamy to those times are concealed and others that could bring forth
their glory are rendered magnificent and very expansive. For most writers
obey the fortune of the victors, so that, to make their victories glorious, they
not only increase what has been virtuously worked by them but also render
illustrious the actions of their enemies. They do it so that whoever is born
later in whichever of the two provinces, the victorious or the defeated, has
cause to marvel at those men and those times and is forced to praise and
love them most highly. Besides this, as men hate things either from fear or
from envy, two very powerful causes of hatred come to be eliminated in
past things since they cannot offend you and do not give you cause to envy
them. But the contrary happens with those things that are managed and
seen. Since the entire knowledge of them is not in any part concealed from
you, and, together with the good, you know many other things in them that
displease you, you are forced to judge them much inferior to ancient things,
even though the present may in truth deserve much more glory and fame
than they. I am not reasoning about things pertaining to the arts, which have
so much clarity in themselves that the times can take away or give them
little more glory than they may deserve in themselves, but am speaking of
those pertaining to the life and customs of men, of which such clear
testimonies are not seen.

[2] I reply, therefore, that the custom written about above of praising and
blaming is true, but it is not at all always true that to do so is to err. For it is
necessary that they sometimes judge the truth, for since human things are
always in motion, either they ascend or they descend. A city or a province is
seen to be ordered for the political way of life by some excellent man and to
go on for a time, always increasing toward the best by the virtue of that
orderer. He who is born then, in such a state, and praises ancient times

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more than modern deceives himself; and his deception is caused by the
things that were said above. But they who are born later in that city or
province, when the time has come for it to descend toward the worse side,
do not deceive themselves then. And, in thinking about how these things
proceed, I judge the world always to have been in the same mode and there
to have been as much good as wicked in it. But the wicked and the good
vary from province to province, as is seen by one who has knowledge of
those ancient kingdoms, which varied from one to another because of the
variation of customs, though the world remained the same. There was this
difference only: that where it had first placed its virtue in Assyria, it put it in
Media, then in Persia, until it came to be in Italy and Rome. 1 And if no
empire followed after the Roman Empire that might have endured and in
which the world might have kept its virtue together, it is seen nonetheless to
be scattered in many nations where they lived virtuously, such as was the
kingdom of the Franks, the kingdom of the Turks, that of the sultan, and the
peoples of Germany today—and that Saracen sect earlier, which did so
many great things and seized so much of the world after it destroyed the
eastern Roman Empire. The virtue that is desired and is praised with true
praise has thus been in all these provinces after the Romans were ruined,
and in all these sects, and still is in some part of them. And one who is born
there and praises past times more than the present could be deceived. But
whoever is born in Italy and in Greece and has not become either an
ultramontane 2 in Italy or a Turk in Greece has reason to blame his times
and to praise the others, for in the latter there are very many things that
make them marvelous and in the former there is nothing that recompenses
them for every extreme misery, infamy, and reproach—there is no
observance of religion, of laws, and of the military but they are stained with
every type of filth. 3 And these vices are so much more detestable as they are
in those who sit as tribunals, command everyone, and wish to be adored.

[3] But returning to our reasoning, I say that if the judgment of men is
corrupt in judging which is better—the present epoch or the ancient—in
those things of which, because of their antiquity, it could not have perfect
knowledge as it has of its own times, it should not be corrupted among the
old in judging the times of their youth and old age, since they have known
and seen the former and the latter equally. This would be true if men were
of the same judgment and had the same appetites through all the times of
their life; but since these vary even if the times do not vary, they cannot
appear the same to men, who have other appetites, other delights, and other

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considerations in old age than in youth. Since men when they get old lack
force and grow in judgment and prudence, it is necessary that those things
that appear to them endurable and good during youth turn out unendurable
and bad when they get old; and whereas for this they should accuse their
judgment, they accuse the times. Besides this, human appetites are
insatiable, for since from nature they have the ability and the wish to desire
all things and from fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there
continually results from this a discontent in human minds and a disgust with
the things they possess. This makes them blame the present times, praise the
past, and desire the future, even if they are not moved to do this by any
reasonable cause. I do not know thus if I deserve to be numbered among
those who deceive themselves, if in these discourses of mine I praise too
much the times of the ancient Romans and blame ours. And truly, if the
virtue that then used to reign and the vice that now reigns were not clearer
than the sun, I would go on speaking with more restraint, fearing falling into
this deception of which I accuse some. But since the thing is so manifest
that everyone sees it, I will be spirited in saying manifestly that which I may
understand of the former and of the latter times, so that the spirits of youths
who may read these writings of mine can flee the latter and prepare
themselves to imitate the former at whatever time fortune may give them
opportunity for it. For it is the duty of a good man to teach others the good
that you could not work because of the malignity of the times and of
fortune, so that when many are capable of it, someone of them more loved
by heaven may be able to work it. And having spoken in the discourses of
the book above of decisions made by the Romans pertaining to the inside of
the city, in this [book] we will speak of those that the Roman people made
pertaining to the increase of its empire.

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Which Was More the Cause of the Empire
the Romans Acquired, Virtue or Fortune

[1] Many have had the opinion—and among them Plutarch, a very grave
writer—that the Roman people in acquiring the empire was favored more
by fortune than by virtue. Among the other reasons he brings up for it, he
says that the confession of that people demonstrates that it acknowledged all
its victories came from fortune, since it built more temples to Fortune than
to any other god. 1 And Livy seems to come close to this opinion, for it is
rare that he makes any Roman speak where he tells of virtue and does not
add fortune to it. I do not wish to confess this thing in any mode, nor do I
believe even that it can be sustained. For if there has never been a republic
that has made the profits that Rome did, this arose from there never having
been a republic that has been ordered so as to be able to acquire as did
Rome. For the armies’ virtue made them acquire the empire; and the order
of proceeding and its own mode found by its first lawgiver 2 made them
maintain what was acquired, as will be narrated extensively below in several
discourses. They say that never having two very powerful wars combined at
the same time was the fortune and not the virtue of the Roman people. 3 For
they did not have war with the Latins until they had so beaten the Samnites
that that war was made by the Romans in defense of them; 4 they did not
combat the Tuscans before they had subjugated the Latins and almost
entirely worn out the Samnites with frequent defeats. 5 For, if two of these
powers, when they were fresh, had been combined together intact, one can
easily conjecture without doubt that the ruin of the Roman republic would
have followed from it. 6 But however this thing arose, it never happened that
they had two very powerful wars at the same time; rather it always appeared
either that when one arose the other was eliminated or that when one was
eliminated the other arose. This can easily be seen from the order of the
wars made by them: for, leaving aside those that they made before Rome
was taken by the French, never while they combated the Aequi and the
Volsci and while these peoples were powerful were other races seen to rise

204

up against them. 7 When they were subdued, war arose against the
Samnites; 8 and although the Latin people rebelled against the Romans
before that war finished, nonetheless when that rebellion occurred the
Samnites were in league with Rome and with their armies helped the
Romans to subdue Latin insolence. 9 When these were subdued, the war of
Samnium rose again. 10 When because of the many defeats given to the
Samnites their forces were beaten, the war of the Tuscans arose. When that
was settled, the Samnites rose up anew during the coming of Pyrrhus into
Italy. 11 As soon as he was repelled and sent back into Greece, they started
the first war with the Carthaginians. 12 Not before that war was finished did
all the French, both on that and on this side of the Alps, conspire against the
Romans, until between Popolonia and Pisa, where the tower of San
Vincenzo is today, they were overcome with the greatest slaughter. 13 When
this war was finished, 14 for a space of twenty years they had wars of not
much importance, for they did not combat others besides the Ligurians and
the remnant of the French that was in Lombardy. 13 And thus they stayed
until the second Carthaginian war arose, which kept Italy occupied for
sixteen years. 16 When this was finished with the greatest glory, the
Macedonian War arose; when this was finished, there came that of
Antiochus and of Asia. 17 After that victory, in all the world there remained
neither prince nor republic that by itself or together with all could oppose
the Roman forces.

[2] But before that last victory, whoever considers well the order of these
wars and the mode of their proceeding will see inside them a very great
virtue and prudence mixed with fortune. Therefore, whoever may examine
the cause of such fortune will easily recover it. For it is a very certain thing
that as soon as a prince and a people come into so much reputation that
every neighboring prince and people is afraid for itself to assault it, and
fears it, it always happens that none of them will ever assault it if not
necessitated to do so. So it will be almost in the choice of that power to
make war with whichever of its neighbors it likes, and to quiet the others
with its devices. And, partly out of respect for its power, partly deceived by
those modes that it used to put them to sleep, those are easily quieted.
Those other powers that are distant and do not have business with it care for
the thing as a distant affair that does not belong to them. They stay in that
error until this fire comes near them; when it has come, they have no
remedy to eliminate it unless with their own forces, which then are not

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enough, since it has become very powerful. I wish to omit how the Samnites
stood by to see the Volsci and the Aequi be conquered by the Roman
people; and, not to be too prolix, I will make do with the Carthaginians,
who were of great power and great estimation when the Romans combated
the Samnites and the Tuscans. For they already held all Africa, they held
Sardinia and Sicily, and they had dominion in part of Spain. Their power,
together with the distance between their borders and the Roman people,
made them never think of assaulting the latter or of succoring the Samnites
and the Tuscans; instead they acted rather in their favor, as is done with
things that grow, linking up with them and seeking their friendship. Nor did
they perceive the error they made before the Romans, having subdued all
the peoples between them and the Carthaginians, began to combat them
over the empire of Sicily and of Spain. The same happened with the French
as with the Carthaginians, and thus with Philip, king of the Macedonians, 18
and with Antiochus; and while the Roman people was occupied with the
other, each of them believed that the other would overcome it and there
would be time to defend itself from it either by peace or by war. So, I
believe that all those princes who proceeded as did the Romans and were of
the same virtue as they would have the fortune that the Romans had in this
aspect.

[3] The mode taken by the Roman people in entering into the provinces of
others would have to be shown for this purpose if we had not spoken of it at
length in our treatise of principalities, 19 for in it this matter is disputed
thoroughly. I will say only this, lightly, that in new provinces they always
tried to have some friend who should be a step or a gate to ascend there or
enter there, or a means to hold it. So they were seen to enter by means of
the Capuans into Samnium, 20 of the Camertines into Tuscany, 21 of the
Mamertines into Sicily, 22 of the Saguntines into Spain, 23 of Massinissa into
Africa, 24 of the Aetolians into Greece, 23 of Eumenes 26 and other princes
into Asia, and of the Massilians and the Aedui into France. 2 And thus they
never lacked similar supports to make their enterprises easier, both in
acquiring provinces and in holding them. Those peoples who observe this
will see they have less need of fortune than those who are not good
observers of it. And so that everyone can know better how much more
virtue could do than their fortune in acquiring that empire, in the following
chapter we shall discourse about the quality of those peoples they had to
combat, and how obstinate they were in defending their freedom.

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207

A - ; 2 -K

What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat,
and That They Obstinately Defended Their

Freedom

[1] Nothing made it more laborious for the Romans to overcome the
peoples nearby and parts of the distant provinces than the love that many
peoples in those times had for freedom; they defended it so obstinately that
they would never have been subjugated if not by an excessive virtue. For
what dangers they put themselves in to maintain or recover it and what
revenges they took against those who had seized it are known through many
examples. The harms that peoples and cities receive through servitude are
also known from reading histories. And whereas in these times there is only
one province that can be said to have free cities in it, 1 in ancient times
there were very many very free peoples in all provinces. One sees that in
Italy, in those times of which we speak at present, from the mountains 2 that
now divide Tuscany from Lombardy to the point of Italy, 3 all were free
peoples, such as were the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and many
other peoples who inhabited the rest of Italy. Nor is it ever reported 4 that
there was any king there outside of those who reigned in Rome and
Porsenna, king of Tuscany. 5 How his line was extinguished history does not
tell. But one sees quite well that in those times, when the Romans took the
field at Veii, Tuscany was free and enjoyed its freedom so much and hated
the name of prince so much that when the Veientes, having made a king in
Veii for their defense, and asked for aid from the Tuscans against the
Romans, they decided after many consultations not to give aid to the
Veientes so long as they lived under the king. For they judged it not to be
good to defend the fatherland of those who had already submitted to
another. 6 It is an easy thing to know whence arises among peoples this
affection for the free way of life, for it is seen through experience that cities
have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been
in freedom. And truly it is a marvelous thing to consider how much

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greatness Athens arrived at in the space of a hundred years after it was freed
from the tyranny of Pisistratus. 7 But above all it is very marvelous to
consider how much greatness Rome arrived at after it was freed from its
kings. 8 The reason is easy to understand, for it is not the particular good but
the common good that makes cities great. And without doubt this common
good is not observed if not in republics, since all that is for that purpose is
executed, and although it may turn out to harm this or that private
individual, those for whom the aforesaid does good are so many that they
can go ahead with it against the disposition of the few crushed by it. The
contrary happens when there is a prince, in which case what suits him
usually offends the city and what suits the city offends him. In this mode, as
soon as a tyranny arises after a free way of life, the least evil that results for
those cities is not to go ahead further nor to grow more in power or riches,
but usually—or rather always—it happens that they go backward. And if
fate should make emerge there a virtuous tyrant, who by spirit and by virtue
of arms expands his dominion, the result is of no utility to that republic, but
is his own. For he cannot honor any of the citizens he tyrannizes over who
are able and good since he does not wish to have to have suspicion of them.
He also cannot make the cities he acquires submit or pay tribute to the city
of which he is tyrant, for making it powerful does not suit him. But it does
suit him to keep the state disunited and have each town and each province
acknowledge him. So he alone, and not his fatherland, profits from his
acquisitions. Whoever wishes to confirm this opinion with infinite other
reasons should read the treatise Xenophon makes Of Tyranny . 9 It is thus not
marvelous that the ancient peoples persecuted tyrants with so much hatred
and loved the free way of life, and that the name of freedom was so much
esteemed by them. Thus it happened that when Hieronymus, grandson of
Hiero the Syracusan, was killed in Syracuse and the news of his death came
to his army, which was not very far from Syracuse, it began first to raise a
tumult and take up arms against his slayers; but when it heard that freedom
was being cried out in Syracuse, being attracted by that name, it became
entirely quiet, put down its anger against the tyrannicides, and took thought
of how a free way of life could be ordered in that city. 10 It is also not
marvelous that peoples take extraordinary revenges against those who have
seized their freedom. There have been very many examples of that, of
which I intend to refer to one alone that occurred in Corcyra, a city in
Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian War. 11 Since that province was
divided into two parties, of which one followed the Athenians and the other

209

the Spartans, it arose from this, in many cities that were divided among
themselves, that one party took up friendship with Sparta, the other with
Athens. When it occurred in the said city that the nobles prevailed and took
freedom away from the people, the popular [party] regained their strength
by means of the Athenians, laid hands on all the nobility and shut them up
in a prison capable of holding them all. They drew them out of there eight
or ten at a turn under pretense of sending them into exile in diverse places
and had them killed with many examples of cruelty. When those who
remained became aware of this, they decided to escape this ignominious
death as much as was possible for them. Having armed themselves with
whatever they could, they engaged in combat with those who wished to
enter there and defended the entrance of the prison. So that, at this noise,
the people made a crowd, uncovered the upper part of that place, and
suffocated them with the ruins. Many other similarly horrible and notable
cases also occurred in the said province, so that one sees it to be true that
freedom that is taken away from you is avenged with greater vehemence
than that which is wished to be taken away.

[2] Thinking then whence it can arise that in those ancient times peoples
were more lovers of freedom than in these, I believe it arises from the same
cause that makes men less strong now, which I believe is the difference
between our education and the ancient, founded on the difference between
our religion and the ancient. For our religion, having shown the truth and

the true way, 12 makes us esteem less the honor of the world, whereas the
Gentiles, esteeming it very much and having placed the highest good in it,
were more ferocious in their actions. This can be inferred from many of
their institutions, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices as
against the humility of ours, where there is some pomp more delicate than
magnificent but no ferocious or vigorous action. Neither pomp nor
magnificence of ceremony was lacking there, but the action of the sacrifice,
full of blood and ferocity, was added, with a multitude of animals being
killed there. This sight, being terrible, rendered men similar to itself.
Besides this, the ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of
worldly glory, as were captains of armies and princes of republics. Our
religion has glorified humble and contemplative more than active men. It
has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of
things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body,
and all other things capable of making men very strong. And if our religion
asks that you have strength in yourself, it wishes you to be capable more of

210

suffering than of doing something strong. This mode of life thus seems to
have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can
manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to
paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them. And
although the world appears to be made effeminate and heaven disarmed, it
arises without doubt more from the cowardice of the men who have
interpreted our religion according to idleness and not according to virtue.
For if they considered how it permits us the exaltation and defense of the
fatherland, they would see that it wishes us to love and honor it and to
prepare ourselves to be such that we can defend it. These educations and
false interpretations thus bring it about that not as many republics are seen
in the world as were seen in antiquity; nor, as a consequence, is as much
love of freedom seen in peoples as was then. Still, I believe the cause of this
to be rather that the Roman Empire, with its arms and its greatness,
eliminated all republics and all civil ways of life. And although that empire
was dissolved, the cities still have not been able to put themselves back
together or reorder themselves for civil life except in very few places of that
empire. However that may be, in every least part of the world the Romans
found a conspiracy of republics very armed and very obstinate in defense of
their freedom. This shows that without a rare and extreme virtue the
Roman people would never have been able to overcome them.

[3] To give an example of some part of this, I wish the example of the
Samnites to be enough for me. It seems a wonderful thing—and Titus Livy
confesses it—that they were so powerful and their arms so sound that they
could resist the Romans up to the time of the consul Papirius Cursor, son of
the first Papirius (which was a space of forty-six years), 13 after so many
defeats, minings of towns, and so many slaughters received in their country,
especially when that country, where there were so many cities and so many
men, is now seen to be almost uninhabited. So much order and so much
force were there then that it was impossible to overcome were it not
assaulted by a Roman virtue. It is an easy thing to consider whence that
order arose and whence this disorder proceeds; for it all comes from the
free way of life then and the servile way of life now. For all towns and
provinces that live freely in every part (as was said above) 14 make very great
profits. For larger peoples are seen there, because marriages are freer and
more desirable to men since each willingly procreates those children he
believes he can nourish. He does not fear that his patrimony will be taken
away, and he knows not only that they are born free and not slaves, but that

211

they can, through their virtue, become princes. Riches are seen to multiply
there in larger number, both those that come from agriculture and those
that come from the arts. For each willingly multiplies that thing and seeks
to acquire those goods he believes he can enjoy once acquired. From which
it arises that men in rivalry think of private and public advantages, and both
the one and the other come to grow marvelously.

[4] The contrary of all these things occurs in those countries that live
servilely; and the more they decline from the accustomed good, the harder
is their servitude. And of all hard servitudes, that is hardest that submits you
to a republic. First, because it is more lasting and there can be less hope to
escape from it; second, because the end of the republic is to enervate and to
weaken all other bodies so as to increase its own body. A prince who makes
you submit does not do this, if that prince is not some barbarian prince, a
destroyer of countries and waster of all the civilizations of men, such as are
the oriental princes. But if he has within himself human and ordinary
orders, he usually loves his subject cities equally and leaves them all their
arts and almost all their ancient orders. So if they cannot grow like the free,
still they are not ruined like the slaves (understanding the servitude into
which the cities come as serving a foreigner, for I have spoken above of that
to a citizen of their own). 15 Whoever will thus consider all that was said will
not marvel at the power the Samnites had when they were free and at the
weakness into which they came when they were serving [others]. Titus Livy
vouches 16 for this in several places, especially in the war of Hannibal, in
which he shows that when the Samnites were crushed by a legion of men
who were in Nola, they sent spokesmen to Hannibal to beg 17 him to succor
them. They said in their speech that for a hundred years they had combated
the Romans with their own soldiers and their own captains, and many times
had stood up against two consular armies and two consuls, and that then
they had sunk so low that they could hardly defend themselves against one
small Roman legion that was in Nola. 18

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«3 ft

Rome Became a Great City through
Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Easily
Admitting Foreigners to Its Honors

[1] Meanwhile Rome grew from the ruin of Alba.” 1 Those who plan for a
city to make a great empire should contrive with all industry to make it full
of inhabitants, for without this abundance of men one will never succeed in
making a city great. This is done in two modes: by love and by force. By
love through keeping the ways open and secure for foreigners who plan to
come to inhabit it so that everyone may inhabit it willingly; by force
through undoing the neighboring cities and sending their inhabitants to
inhabit your city. This was observed by Rome so much that in the time of
the sixth king 2 eighty thousand men able to bear arms inhabited Rome. For
the Romans wished to act according to the usage of the good cultivator
who, for a plant to thicken and be able to produce and mature its fruits, cuts
off the first branches it puts forth, so that they can with time arise there
greener and more fruitful, since the virtue remains in the stem of the plant.
The example of Sparta and of Athens demonstrates that this mode taken to
expand and make an empire was necessary and good. Though they were two
republics very armed and ordered with very good laws, nonetheless they
were not led to the greatness of the Roman Empire; and Rome seemed
more tumultuous and not so well ordered as they. No other cause of this can
be brought up than that cited before: that through having thickened the
body of its city by those two ways, Rome could already put in arms two
hundred eighty thousand 3 men, and Sparta and Athens never passed beyond
twenty thousand each. This arose not from Rome’s site’s being more benign
than theirs, but only from its different mode of proceeding. For since
Lycurgus, founder of the Spartan republic, considered that nothing could
dissolve his laws more easily than the mixture of new inhabitants, he did
everything so that foreigners should not have to deal 4 there. Besides not
admitting them into marriages, into citizenship, and into the other dealings 5

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that make men come together, he ordered that leather money should be
spent in his republic to take away from everyone the desire to come there,
to bring merchandise there, or to bring some art there, so the city never
could thicken with inhabitants. 6 And since all our actions imitate nature, it
is neither possible nor natural for a thin trunk to support a thick branch. So
a small republic cannot seize cities or kingdoms that are sounder or thicker
than it. If, however, it seizes one, what happens is as with a tree that has a
branch thicker than the stem: it supports it with labor, and every small wind
breaks it. Thus it was seen to happen to Sparta, which had seized all the
cities of Greece. No sooner did Thebes rebel than all the other cities
rebelled, and the trunk alone remained without branches. 7 This could not
happen to Rome since its stem was so thick it could easily support any
branch whatever. Thus this mode of proceeding, together with the others
that will be said below, made Rome great and very powerful. Titus Livy
demonstrates this in two words when he says, “Meanwhile Rome grew from
the ruin of Alba.” 8

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Republics Have Taken Three Modes of

Expanding

[1] Whoever has observed the ancient histories finds that republics have
taken three modes of expanding. One has been that which the ancient
Tuscans observed, being a league of several republics together, in which
none was before another in either authority or rank; in acquiring other
cities they made them partners, in a like mode to what the Swiss do in this
time and what the Achaeans and the Aetolians did in Greece in ancient
times. Since the Romans made war with the Tuscans very often, I will
expatiate in giving knowledge of them particularly to show better the
qualities of this first mode. In Italy, before the Roman Empire, the Tuscans
were very powerful by sea and by land. 1 Although there is no particular
history of their affairs, there is, however, some little memory and some sign
of their greatness. It is known that they sent a colony, which they called
Adria, on the upper sea, which was so noble that it gave the name to that
sea the Latins still call Adriatic. It is also understood that their arms were
obeyed from the Tiber as far as the foot of the mountains 2 that encircle the
thick part of Italy. Notwithstanding this, two hundred years before the
Romans grew into much strength, the said Tuscans lost the empire of the
country called Lombardy today. That province was seized by the Lrench,
who, moved either by necessity or by the sweetness of the fruit and
especially of the wine, came into Italy under their duke Bellovesus. Having
defeated and expelled those living in the province, they set themselves up in
that place, where they built many cities. Lrom the name they held then, they
called that province Gaul and held it until they were subdued by the
Romans. The Tuscans lived thus with that equality and proceeded in
expanding in that first mode said above. There were twelve cities—among
which were Chiusi, Veii, Arezzo, Liesole, Volterra, and the like—that
governed their empire by way of a league. 3 They could not go beyond Italy
with their acquisitions, and even a great part of [Italy] remained intact for
the causes that will be said below. Another mode is to get partners but not

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so much that the rank of command, the seat of empire, and the title of the
enterprises do not remain with you, which mode was observed by the
Romans. The third mode is to get not partners but direct subjects, as did the
Spartans and the Athenians. Of these three modes, the last is entirely
useless, as was seen in the two republics written about above, which were
not ruined otherwise than by having acquired dominion they could not keep.
For taking care of governing cities by violence, especially those accustomed
to living freely, is a difficult and laborious thing. If you are not armed and
massive with arms, you can neither command nor rule them. To be like that
it is necessary to get partners who aid you and make your city massive with
people. Since these two cities did neither the one nor the other, their mode
of proceeding was useless. Since Rome, which is in the example of the
second mode, did the one and the other, it therefore rose to such excessive
power. Since it was alone in living thus, it was also alone in becoming so
powerful. For it got many partners throughout all Italy who in many things
lived with it under equal laws, and, on the other side, as was said above, it
always reserved for itself the seat of empire and the title of command. So
its partners came to subjugate themselves by their own labors and blood
without perceiving it. For they began to go out of Italy with their armies, to
reduce kingdoms to provinces, and to get subjects who did not care about
being subjects since they were accustomed to living under kings and who
did not acknowledge a superior other than Rome since they had Roman
governors and had been conquered by armies with the Roman title. In this
mode the partners of Rome who were in Italy found themselves in a stroke
encircled by Roman subjects and crushed by a very big city, such as Rome
was. And when they perceived the deception under which they had lived,
they were not in time to remedy it, so much authority had Rome taken with
its external provinces and so much force had it found within its breast since
it had its city very big and very armed. Although its partners conspired
against it to avenge their injuries, in a little time they were losers of the war
and worsened their condition, since from partners they too became subjects.
This mode of proceeding, as was said, has been observed by the Romans
alone; nor can a republic that wishes to expand take another mode, for
experience has not shown us any more certain or more true.

[2] The previously cited mode of leagues (which the Tuscans, the Achaeans,
and the Aetolians lived in, and the Swiss live in today) is the best mode after
that of the Romans. Since you cannot expand very much with it, two goods
follow: one, that you do not easily take a war on your back; the other, that

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you easily keep as much as you take. The cause of its inability to expand is
its being a republic that is disunited and placed in various seats, which
enables them to consult and decide only with difficulty. It also makes them
not be desirous of dominating; for since there are many communities to
participate in dominion, they do not esteem such acquisition as much as
one republic alone that hopes to enjoy it entirely. Besides this, they govern
themselves through a council, and they must be slower in every decision
than those who inhabit within one and the same wall. 4 The like mode of
proceeding is also seen by experience to have a fixed limit, of which we
have no example that shows it may be passed. It is to reach twelve or
fourteen communities and then not to seek to go further. For having arrived
at a rank that seems to enable them to defend themselves from everyone,
they do not seek larger dominion, both because necessity does not constrain
them to have more power and because they do not see any usefulness in
acquisitions, for the causes said above. For they would have to do one of
two things: either they go on getting partners, and this multitude would
make for confusion; or they would have to get subjects, and since they see
difficulty in this and not much usefulness in holding them, they do not
esteem it. Therefore, when they have come to such a number that they seem
to live securely, they turn to two things. One is to receive clients and take
protectorates, and by these means to obtain money from every part, which
they can easily distribute among themselves. The other is to serve in the
military for others and take pay from this and that prince who pays them for
his campaigns, as the Swiss are seen to do today and as those cited before
are read to have done. Titus Livy is a witness of this where he says that
Philip, king of Macedon, came to talk with Titus Quintius Flaminius and
discussed 5 an accord in the presence of a praetor of the Aetolians. When
the said praetor came to have words with him, Philip reproved him for
avarice and faithlessness, saying that the Aetolians were not ashamed to
serve in the military with one and then still send their men in the service of
the enemy, so that the insignia of Aetolia were often seen in two opposed
armies. 6 This mode of proceeding by leagues is known therefore to have
always been similar and to have had similar effects. The mode of getting
subjects is also seen to have always been weak and to have made small
profits; and when they have somehow passed beyond the mode, they have
soon been ruined. And if the mode of making subjects is useless in armed
republics, it is very useless in those that are unarmed, as the republics of
Italy have been in our times. That which the Romans took is known

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therefore to be the true mode, which is so much more wonderful inasmuch
as before Rome there is no example of it, and after Rome there was no one
who imitated it. As to leagues, only the Swiss and the League of Swabia are
found to imitate them. As will be said at the end of this matter, so many
orders observed by Rome, pertaining to the things inside as well as to those
outside, are not only not imitated but not held of any account in our present
times, since some are judged not true, some impossible, some not to the
purpose and useless. So much so that, since we are in this ignorance, we are
prey to whoever has wished to overrun this province. And if the imitation of
the Romans seems difficult, that of the ancient Tuscans should not seem so,
especially to the present Tuscans. For if they could not, for the causes said,
make an empire like that of Rome, they could acquire the power in Italy
that their mode of proceeding conceded them. This was secure for a great
time, with the highest glory of empire and of arms and special praise for
customs and religion. This power and glory were first diminished by the
French, then eliminated by the Romans; and were eliminated so much that
although two thousand years ago the power of the Tuscans was great, at
present there is almost no memory of it. This thing has made me think
whence arises this oblivion of things, which will be discoursed of in the
following chapter.

218

«5 M

That the Variation of Sects and Languages,
Together with the Accident of Floods or
Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things

[1] To those philosophers who would have it that the world is eternal, 1 I
believe that one could reply that if so much antiquity were true it would be
reasonable that there be memory of more than five thousand years—if it
were not seen how the memories of times are eliminated by diverse causes,
of which part come from men, part from heaven. 2 Those that come from
men are the variations of sects and of languages. For when a new sect—that
is, a new religion—emerges, its first concern is to extinguish the old to give
itself reputation; and when it occurs that the orderers of the new sect are of
a different language, they easily eliminate it. This thing is known from
considering the modes that the Christian sect took against the Gentile. It
suppressed all its orders and all its ceremonies and eliminated every
memory of that ancient theology. It is true that they did not succeed in
eliminating entirely the knowledge of the things done by its excellent men.
This arose from having maintained the Latin language, which they were
forced to do since they had to write this new law with it. For if they had
been able to write with a new language, considering the other persecutions
they made, we would not have any record of things past. Whoever reads of
the modes taken by Saint Gregory 3 and by the other heads of the Christian
religion will see with how much obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient
memories, burning the works of the poets and the historians, ruining
images, and spoiling every other thing that might convey some sign of
antiquity. So if they had added a new language to this persecution, in a very
brief time everything would be seen to be forgotten. It is therefore to be
believed that what the Christian sect wished to do against the Gentile sect,
the Gentile would have done against that which was prior to it. 4 And
because these sects vary two or three times in five or in six thousand years,
the memory of the things done prior to that time is lost; and if, however,

219

some sign of them remains, it is considered as something fabulous and is
not lent faith to—as happened to the history of Diodorus Siculus, which,
though it renders an account of forty or fifty thousand years, is nonetheless
reputed, as I believe it to be, a mendacious thing.

[2] As to the causes that come from heaven, they are those that eliminate
the human race 5 and reduce the inhabitants of part of the world to a few.
This comes about either through plague or through famine or through an
inundation of waters. 6 The most important is the last, both because it is
more universal and because those who are saved are all mountain men and
coarse, who, since they do not have knowledge of antiquity, cannot leave it
to posterity. And if among them someone is saved who has knowledge of it,
to make a reputation and a name for himself he conceals it and perverts it
in his mode so that what he has wished to write alone, and nothing else,
remains for his successors. That these inundations, plagues, and famines
come about I do not believe is to be doubted, because all the histories are
full of them, because this effect of the oblivion of things is seen, and
because it seems reasonable that it should be so. For as in simple bodies,
when very much superfluous matter has gathered together there, nature
many times moves by itself and produces a purge that is the health of that
body, so it happens in this mixed body of the human race 7 that when all
provinces are filled with inhabitants (so that they can neither live there nor
go elsewhere since all places are occupied and filled) and human astuteness
and malignity have gone as far as they can go, the world must of necessity
be purged by one of the three modes, so that men, through having become
few and beaten, may live more advantageously and become better. Tuscany
was then, as was said above, 8 once powerful, full of religion and of virtue,
and had its customs and ancestral language, all of which were eliminated by
Roman power. So, as was said, the memory of its name alone remains of it.

220

How the Romans Proceeded in Making

War

[1] Having discoursed of how the Romans proceeded in expanding, we shall
now discourse of how they proceeded in making war. In every action of
theirs it will be seen with how much prudence they deviated from the
universal mode of others so as to make easy for themselves the way to arrive
at a supreme greatness. The intention of whoever makes war through choice
—or, in truth, ambition—is to acquire and maintain the acquisition, and to
proceed with it so that it enriches and does not impoverish the country and
his fatherland. It is necessary, then, in acquiring and in maintaining not to
think of spending but instead to do everything for the utility of his public.
Whoever wishes to do all these things must take the Roman style and mode.
This was first to make their wars, as the French say, short and massive; since
they came into the field with big armies, all the wars they had with the
Latins, Samnites, and Tuscans were dispatched in a very brief time. And if
all those that they made from the beginning of Rome up to the siege of the
Veientes are noted, all will be seen to have been dispatched, some in six,
some in ten, some in twenty days. 1 For their usage was this: as soon as the
war was declared, 2 they came outside with their armies opposite the enemy
and at once did battle. Once it was won, the enemy agreed to conditions so
that their countryside would not be quite spoiled. The Romans condemned
them to a loss of land, which land they converted to private advantage or
consigned to a colony that, placed on their frontiers, came to be a guard of
the Roman borders useful to the colonists who had those fields and useful to
the Roman public, who kept that guard without expense. 3 Nor could this
mode be more secure, stronger, or more useful. For while the enemies were
not in the field, that guard was enough; and if they came outside massively
to crush that colony, the Romans also came outside massively and came to a
battle with them. When the battle was done and won, having imposed
heavier conditions on them, they returned home. Thus they gradually 4 came
to acquire reputation over them and force within themselves.

221

[2] They continued to take this mode until they changed their mode of
proceeding in war. This was after the siege of the Veientes, when to be able
to make war at length they ordered the paying of the soldiers, whom they
did not pay before since it was not necessary when the wars were brief. 5
Although the Romans gave that pay and by virtue of this could make their
wars longer, and although necessity kept them more in the field because they
made them at a greater distance, nonetheless they never varied from their
first order of finishing them quickly, according to the place and the time,
nor did they ever vary from sending colonies. For besides their natural
usage, the ambition of the consuls kept them in the first order, that of
making wars brief. Since they had a term of a year to serve, and of that year
six months were in quarters, they wished to finish the war so as to have a
triumph. Its usefulness and the great advantage resulting from the sending of
colonies kept them to it. They varied somewhat about the booty. They were
not as liberal with it as they had been at first, both because it did not seem
to them so necessary since the soldiers had a salary and because they
planned once the booty was larger to fatten the public with it so that they
would not be constrained to carry on campaigns with taxes from the city. In
a little time this order made their treasury very rich. These two modes—
about distributing the booty and about sending colonies—thus made Rome
get rich from war, whereas the other princes and republics, not being wise,
impoverished themselves from it. The thing reached the limit when a consul
did not appear able to have a triumph if with his triumph he did not bring
very much gold and silver and every other sort of booty into the treasury.
Thus the Romans, through the limits written above and through finishing
wars quickly—being able to wear out their enemies at length through
defeats, through raids, and through accords made to their own advantage—
became ever richer and more powerful.

222

How Much Land the Romans Gave per

Colonist

[1] How much land the Romans gave per colonist is, I believe, difficult to
find the truth about since I believe they gave more or less of it according to
the places where they sent colonies. It is judged that in every mode and in
every place the distribution was sparing: first so as to be able to send more
men, since they were deputed as the guard of that country; then, since they
lived poorly at home, it was not reasonable that they should wish their men
to have too much of an abundance outside. And Titus Livy says that when
Veii was taken they sent a colony there and distributed to each three and
seven-twelfths jugera (which is in our mode . . . j; 1 for besides the things
written above, they judged that not very much land but that which was well
cultivated was enough. 2 It is quite necessary that the whole colony should
have public fields where each can feed his cattle, and forests from which to
take firewood to burn, things without which a colony cannot be ordered.

223

The Cause Why Peoples Leave Their
Ancestral Places and Inundate the Country

of Others

[1] Since the mode of proceeding in war observed by the Romans is
reasoned about above, as is how the Tuscans were assaulted by the French, 1
it does not seem to me alien to the matter to discourse of two kinds of wars
that are made. One is made through the ambition of princes or of republics
who seek to propagate empire, such as were the wars Alexander the Great
made and those the Romans made, and those that one power makes with
another every day. These wars are dangerous, but they do not entirely expel
the inhabitants of a province; for the obedience of the peoples alone is
enough for the victor, and he most often lets them live with their laws, and
always with their homes and their goods. The other kind of war is when an
entire people, with all its families, removes from a place, necessitated by
either famine or war, and goes to seek a new seat and a new province, not to
command it like those above but to possess it all individually, 2 and expel or
kill the ancient inhabitants of it. This war is very cruel and very frightful.
Sallust reasons about these wars at the end of the Jugurthine, when he says
that once Jugurtha was conquered the motion of the French who came into
Italy was felt. 3 He says there that the Roman people combated all other
races solely over who would command, but they combated the French
always over the salvation of everyone. For it is enough to a prince or a
republic that assaults a province to eliminate only those who command, but
these populations must eliminate everyone, since they wish to live on what
others were living on. The Romans had three of these very dangerous wars.
The first was when Rome was taken; it was seized by those French who had,
as was said above, 4 taken Lombardy from the Tuscans and made it their
seat, for which Titus Livy cites two causes. 5 The first, as was said above, 6
was that they were attracted by the sweetness of the fruit and the wine of
Italy, which they lacked in France. The second was that since the French

224

kingdom had multiplied in men so much that they could no longer nourish
themselves there, the princes of those places judged that it was necessary
for a part of them to go to seek new land. This decision being made, they
elected Bellovesus and Sigovesus, two kings of the French, as captains of
those who had to leave; Bellovesus came into Italy and Sigovesus passed into
Spain. From the coming of Bellovesus arose the seizure of Lombardy, and
from that the first war the French made on Rome. After this was that which
they made after the first Carthaginian war, when they killed more than two
hundred thousand French between Piombino and Pisa. 7 The third was when
the Germans and Cimbri came into Italy; after conquering several Roman
armies, they were conquered by Marius. 8 The Romans thus won these three
very dangerous wars. Nor was less virtue necessary to win them; for it was
seen that when Roman virtue was lacking and their arms lost their ancient
valor, that empire was destroyed by similar peoples, such as were the Goths,
the Vandals, and the like, who seized the whole Western Empire.

[2] Such peoples go out of their countries, as was said above, expelled by
necessity; the necessity arises either from famine or from a war and
oppression inflicted on them in their own countries such that they are
constrained to seek new lands. When they are a great number, then they
enter with violence into the countries of others, kill the inhabitants, take
possession of their goods, make a new kingdom, and change the province’s
name, as did Moses and the peoples who seized the Roman Empire. For the
new names that are in Italy and in the other provinces do not arise from
anything other than having been thus named by the new occupants: as what
was called Gallia Cisalpina is Lombardy; France was called Gallia
Transalpina and now is named after the Franks, as the peoples who seized it
were thus called; Slavonia was called Illyria; Hungary Pannonia; England
Britannia; and many other provinces that have changed names, which it
would be tedious to tell of. Moses also called that part of Syria seized by
him Judea. And since I have said above that sometimes such peoples are
expelled from their own seat by war, wherefore they are constrained to seek
new lands, I wish to bring up the example of the Maurusians, a people in
Syria in antiquity. Since they heard the Hebrew peoples were coming and
judged that they could not resist them, they thought it was better to save
themselves and leave their own country than to lose themselves also in
trying to save it. They removed with their families and went from there into
Africa, where they placed their seat, expelling the inhabitants they found in
those places. Thus those who had not been able to defend their own country

225

were able to seize that of others. Procopius, who writes of the war that
Belisarius made with the Vandals, who had seized Africa, reports that he
read letters written on certain columns in places these Maurusians inhabited
that said: “We are Maurusians, who fled before the face of Joshua the
robber son of Nun”; 9 whence appears the cause of their departure from
Syria. These peoples therefore are very frightful, since they have been
expelled by an ultimate necessity; and if they do not encounter good arms,
they will never be contained.

[3] But when those who are constrained to abandon their fatherland are not
many, they are not so dangerous as the peoples who were reasoned about,
for they cannot use so much violence but must seize some place with art,
and having seized it maintain themselves there by way of friends and
confederates. Aeneas, Dido, the Massilians, and the like are seen to have
done so, all of whom were able to maintain themselves through the consent
of the neighbors where they settled.

[4] Large peoples come out, and almost all have come out, from the country
of Scythia, cold and poor places. Because there are very many men there
and the country is of a quality that cannot nourish them, they are forced to
come out of there, having many things that expel them and nothing that
retains them. And if it has not happened for five hundred years that any of
these peoples has inundated any country, it has arisen from many causes.
The first is the great evacuation that country made during the decline of the
empire, when more than thirty peoples came out. The second is that
Germany and Hungary, from which these peoples also come out, have now
improved their country so that they can five there comfortably so that they
are not necessitated to change their place. On the other side, since they are
very warlike men, they are like a bastion to hold back the Scythians, who
border them; so they do not presume they can conquer them or pass by
them. Very great movements of the Tartars often occur, which are
contained by the Hungarians and by those of Poland, who often glorify
themselves, saying that if it were not for their arms, Italy and the church
would have often felt the weight of the Tartar armies. I wish this to be
enough as to the previously mentioned peoples.

226

What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise

among Powers

[1] The cause that made war arise between the Romans and the Samnites,
who had been in league for a great time, is a common cause that arises
among all powerful principalities. That cause either comes about by chance
or is made to arise by whoever desires to start the war. That which arose
between the Romans and the Samnites was by chance; for the intention of
the Samnites in starting war against the Sidicini and then against the
Campanians was not to start it against the Romans. 1 But when the
Campanians were crushed and had recourse to the Romans—contrary to the
expectation of the Romans and of the Samnites—since the Campanians
gave themselves to the Romans, they were forced to defend them as a thing
of their own and to take on a war that it seemed to them they could not
escape with honor. For it seemed quite reasonable to the Romans that they
could not defend the Campanians as friends against their friends the
Samnites; but it seemed to them quite a shame not to defend them as
subjects or truly as clients. For they judged that if they did not take on such
a defense it would shut the way to all those who might plan to come under
their power. Since Rome had as its end empire and glory and not quiet, it
could not reject this enterprise. The same cause gave a beginning to the first
war against the Carthaginians through the defense the Romans undertook of
the Messinians in Sicily, which was also by chance. 2 But it was not again by
chance that the second war arose between them. For Hannibal, a
Carthaginian captain, assaulted the Saguntines, friends of the Romans in
Spain, not to offend them but to start up the Roman arms and have an
opportunity to combat them and pass into Italy. 3 This mode of setting off
new wars has always been customary among the powerful, who have some
respect both for faith and for each other. For if I wish to make war with a
prince and solid treaties have been observed between us for a great time, I
will with more justification and more color assault a friend of his than
himself. For I know especially that if I assault his friend, either he will

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resent it and I will have my intention of making war with him, or by not
resenting it he will uncover his weakness or faithlessness in not defending a
client of his. Both the one and the other of these two things are able to take
away his reputation and to make my plans easier. From the surrender of the
Campanians should thus be noted what is said above about starting a war,
and further what remedy a city has that cannot defend itself by itself and
wishes to defend itself by every mode from one who assaults it. That is to
give yourself freely to one who you plan should defend you, as the Capuans
did to the Romans 4 and the Florentines to King Robert of Naples—who,
not wishing to defend them as friends, then defended them as subjects
against the forces of Castruccio of Lucca, who was crushing them. 5

«10?n

Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is
according to the Common Opinion

[1] Since everyone can begin a war at will but not finish it thus, a prince
should measure his forces before he undertakes a campaign and govern
himself according to them. But he should have so much prudence that he
does not deceive himself about his forces; he will always deceive himself if
he measures them by money or by the site or by the benevolence of men
while he lacks his own arms on the other side. For the aforesaid things
increase your forces well, but do not give them to you well, and by
themselves are null and do not help anything without faithful arms. For
without these, very much money is not enough for you, nor does the
strength of the country help you; the faith and benevolence of men do not
last, for they cannot be faithful to you if you cannot defend them. Where
strong defenders are lacking, every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible
place becomes a plain. Money also not only does not defend you but makes
you into prey the sooner. Nor can the common opinion be more false that
says that money is the sinew of war. 1 This sentence was said by Quintus
Curtius in the war that was between Antipater the Macedonian and the
Spartan king, where he narrates that the king of Sparta was necessitated by
want of money to fight and was defeated, and that if he had deferred the
fight for a few days, the news of the death of Alexander would have arrived
in Greece, whereby he would have remained victor without combat. 2 But
since he lacked money and feared that for want of it his army would
abandon him, he was constrained to try the fortune of battle. So from this
cause Quintus Curtius affirms that money is the sinew of war. This sentence
is cited every day and is followed by princes who are not prudent enough.
For having founded themselves on that, they believe that to defend
themselves it is enough to have very much treasure and do not think that if
treasure were enough to conquer, then Darius would have conquered
Alexander, the Greeks would have conquered the Romans, in our times
Duke Charles would have conquered the Swiss, and a few days ago the pope

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and the Florentines together would not have had difficulty in conquering
Francesco Maria, the nephew of Pope Julius II, in the war of Urbino. 3 But
all those named above were conquered by those who esteem not money but
good soldiers to be the sinew of war. Among the other things that Croesus,
king of the Lydians, showed to Solon the Athenian was an innumerable
treasure; when he asked how his power seemed to him, Solon replied to him
that he did not judge him more powerful for that, since war is made with
steel and not with gold, and one who had more steel than he did could come
and take it away. 4 Aside from this, when a multitude of French passed into
Greece and then into Asia after the death of Alexander the Great, and the
French sent spokesmen to the king of Macedon to negotiate a solid accord,
the king showed them very much gold and silver to show his power and to
terrify them. Whereupon the French, who already held the peace as if it
were firm, broke it, so much had desire grown in them to take away that
gold; and thus was that king despoiled for that thing he had accumulated for
his defense. 5 When the Venetians a few years ago had their treasury still full
of treasure, since they could not be defended by that, they lost all their
state. 6

[2] I say therefore that not gold, as the common opinion cries out, but good
soldiers are the sinew of war; for gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers,
but good soldiers are quite sufficient to find gold. For if the Romans had
wished to make war more with money than with steel, all the treasure of the
world would not have been enough, considering the great campaigns that
they waged and the difficulties they had in them. But since they made their
wars with steel, they never suffered a dearth of gold, for it was brought to
them, even to their camps, by those who feared them. And if that Spartan
king had to try the fortune of battle from dearth of money, what happened
to him on account of money has happened often from other causes. For it is
seen that when an army lacks supplies and is necessitated either to die of
hunger or to fight, it always takes up the policy of fighting, for that is more
honorable and is where fortune can favor you in some mode. It has also
happened often that when a captain has seen help coming to the army of his
enemy, it has suited him to fight with them, and to try the fortune of battle,
rather than to wait for them to grow more massive and have to combat them
anyway with a thousand disadvantages for himself. It is also seen that a
captain necessitated either to flee or to engage in combat (as happened to
Hasdrubal when he was assaulted in the Marches by Claudius Nero together
with the other Roman consul) always chooses combat, since although this

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policy is very doubtful, it seems to him that he can win by it, and by the
other he has to lose anyway. There are thus many necessities that make a
captain take the policy of fighting outside of his intention, among which can
sometimes be a dearth of money; but money should not be judged the sinew
of war because of this any more than the other things that induce men to a
like necessity. Thus I repeat anew that not gold but good soldiers are the
sinew of war.

[3] Money is quite necessary in second place, but it is a necessity that good
soldiers win it by themselves; for it is as impossible for money to be lacking
to good soldiers as for money by itself to find good soldiers. Every history
shows in a thousand places that what we are saying is true, notwithstanding
that Pericles counseled the Athenians to make war with all the
Peloponnesus, showing that they could win that war with industry and with
the force of money. 8 And although the Athenians prospered in that war for a
while, they ultimately lost it; and the counsel and good soldiers of Sparta
were worth more than the industry and the money of Athens. But Titus Livy
is a truer witness than any other for this opinion, where, in discoursing of
whether Alexander the Great would have conquered the Romans if he had
come into Italy, he shows that three things are necessary in war: very many
and good soldiers, prudent captains, and good fortune. Examining there
whether the Romans or Alexander would have prevailed in those things, he
then comes to his conclusion without ever mentioning money. 9 The
Capuans must have measured their power by money and not by soldiers
when they were asked by the Sidicini to take up arms for them against the
Samnites; for having taken up the policy of aiding them, they were
constrained after two defeats to make themselves tributaries of the Romans
if they wished to save themselves. 10

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11 ft

It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a
Friendship with a Prince Who Has More
Reputation Than Force

[1] Since Titus Livy wished to show the error of the Sidicini in trusting in
the aid of the Campanians, and the error of the Campanians in believing
they could defend them, he could not speak in more lively words than when
he says, “The Campanians brought to the aid of the Sidicini a name rather
than strength for defense.” 1 It ought to be noted there that leagues that are
made with princes who do not have either the occasion for aiding you
because of the distance of their site, or the force to do it because of his 2
own disorder or some other cause of his own, bring more fame than aid to
those who trust in them. So it happened in our day to the Florentines, when
in 1479 the pope and the king of Naples assaulted them, that while being
friends of the king of France they drew from that friendship 3 “a name rather
than defense.” 4 So it would happen also to that prince who undertakes some
enterprise trusting in Emperor Maximilian, 5 for this is one of those
friendships that brings to him who makes it “a name rather than defense,” as
is said in this text that of the Capuans brought to the Sidicini.

[2] The Capuans thus erred in this part, because they seemed to themselves
to have more forces than they had. And thus sometimes the little prudence
of men, who neither know how nor are able to defend themselves, makes
them wish to undertake the enterprise of defending others. So also did the
Tarentines, who, when the Roman armies went against the Samnite army,
sent ambassadors to the Roman consul to make him understand that they
wished for peace between these two peoples, and that they would make war
against whichever departed from peace. So the consul, laughing at this
proposal, had the call to battle sounded in the presence of said ambassadors
and commanded his army to go to meet 6 the enemy, showing the Tarentines
with work and not with words what reply they were worthy of. 7 Having

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reasoned in the present chapter of the policies to the contrary that princes
take up for the defense of others, I wish in the following to speak of those
that they take up for their own defense.

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*$12 ft

Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It
Is Better to Bring On or Await War

[1] I have heard it sometimes disputed by men very practiced in things of
war: if there are two princes of almost equal forces and the mightier has
declared war against the other, which is the better policy for the other—to
await the enemy inside his own borders or to go to meet him at home and
assault him; and I have heard reasons brought up on each side. He who
defends going to assault others cites for this the counsel that Croesus gave to
Cyrus when the latter arrived at the borders of the Massageti to make war
against them, and their queen Tamyris sent to say that he should choose
which of the two policies he wanted: either to enter into her kingdom
where she awaited him or to let her come to meet him. When the thing
came under debate, Croesus, contrary to the opinion of the others, said he
should go to meet her. He cited [the consideration] that if he should
conquer her at a distance from her kingdom he would not take away the
kingdom, since she would have time to recover; but if he should conquer
her inside her borders, he could follow her in her flight, not giving her space
to recover, and take away her state. 1 He also cites for this the counsel that
Hannibal gave to Antiochus, when that king planned to make war against
the Romans. There he shows that the Romans could not be conquered
except in Italy, for there others could avail themselves of their arms, riches,
and friends; but whoever combated them outside Italy, and left Italy free for
them, left them a source that never lacks life to supply forces where needed;
and he concludes that Rome could be taken away from the Romans sooner
than the empire, and Italy sooner than the other provinces. 2 He also cites
Agathocles, who, though unable to sustain the war at home, assaulted the
Carthaginians who were waging it against him and reduced them to asking
for peace. 3 He cites Scipio, who assaulted Africa to remove the war from
Italy. 4

[2] He who speaks to the contrary says that whoever wishes to make evil
befall an enemy gets him at a distance from home. He cites for this the

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Athenians, who remained superior while they made war advantageously in
their home and lost their freedom when they got at a distance and went with
their armies into Sicily. 5 He cites the poetic fables that show that Antaeus,
king of Libya, when assaulted by Hercules the Egyptian, was unconquerable
while he awaited him inside the borders of his kingdom, but when he got at
a distance from it through the astuteness of Hercules, he lost his state and
his life. This gave rise to the fable that Antaeus, being on the earth, got back
his strength from his mother who was the Earth and that Hercules,
perceiving this, raised him high and got him at a distance from the earth. 6
He also cites modern judgments for this. Everyone knows that Ferdinand,
king of Naples, was held in his times to be a very wise prince; when the
rumor came (two years before his death) that the king of France, Charles
VIII, wished to come to assault him, having made very many preparations,
he fell sick and, approaching death, left among other notes to Alfonso his
son one that he should await his enemy inside his kingdom, and not for
anything in the world draw his forces outside his state, but await him inside
his borders entirely intact. 7 This was not observed by the latter; but he sent
an army into the Romagna and without combat lost it and his state.

[3] Besides the things said, the reasons that are brought up by each side are:
that he who assaults comes with greater spirit than he who awaits, which
makes his army more confident; besides this, he takes away from the enemy
the many advantages of being able to avail himself of his things, since he
cannot avail himself of those subjects who are plundered. And through
having the enemy at home, the lord is constrained to have more hesitation
in drawing money from them and belaboring them, so that he comes to dry
up that source, as Hannibal said, that makes him able to sustain the war.
Besides this, because they find themselves in another’s country, his soldiers
are more necessitated to engage in combat, and this necessity produces
virtue, as we have often said. On the other side it is said that to await the
enemy is to await with great advantage, for without any trouble you can
give him many troubles with supplies and with any other thing an army has
need of. You can better impede his plans because you have more knowledge
of the country than he. You can encounter him with more forces because
you can unite them easily but you cannot get them all at a distance from
home. Being defeated, you can easily recover, both because much of your
army will be saved through having refuges nearby and because the
reinforcement does not have to come from a distance. So you come to risk
all your forces and not all your fortune; getting at a distance, you risk all

235

your fortune and not all your forces. There have been some who, better to
weaken his 8 enemy, let him enter several days into their country and take
many towns, so that by leaving garrisons in all he weakens his army, and
they can then combat him more easily.

[4] But for me to say now what I understand 9 of it, I believe that this
distinction has to be made either I have my country armed, as the Romans
had or as the Swiss have, or I have it unarmed, as the Carthaginians had or
as the king of France and the Italians have. In the latter case the enemy
ought to be held at a distance from home; for, since your virtue is in money
and not in men, whenever your way of getting it is impeded you are done
for; 10 nor does anything impede it for you as much as a war at home.
Examples of this are the Carthaginians, who could make war with the
Romans with their revenues when they had their home free, yet could not
resist Agathocles when they had it assaulted. The Florentines did not have
any remedy against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, for he made war with them
at home, so that they had to give themselves to King Robert of Naples to be
defended. 11 But when Castruccio was dead, these same Florentines had the
spirit to assault the duke of Milan at home and to work 12 to take away his
kingdom; 13 so much virtue did they show in faraway wars and so much
cowardice in those nearby. But when kingdoms are armed, as Rome was
armed and as the Swiss are, they are more difficult to conquer the more you
draw near them, for these bodies can unite more force to resist a thrust than
they can to assault another. Nor does the authority of Hannibal move me in
this case, for passion and his utility made him speak thus to Antiochus. For
if the Romans had had those three defeats in France in such a space of time
that they had in Italy from Hannibal, 14 without doubt they would have been
done for. For they would not have availed themselves of the remnants of
their armies as they availed themselves in Italy; they would not have had the
occasions to recover, nor would they have been able to resist the enemy
with those forces they were able to. They are never found to have sent
armies outside surpassing fifty thousand persons to assault a province, but to
defend their home they put in arms eighteen hundred thousand against the
French after the First Punic War. 15 Nor would they have been able to defeat
the latter in Lombardy as they defeated them in Tuscany; for against such a
number of enemies they would not have been able to lead such forces to
such a distance or to have combated them with such advantage. The Cimbri
defeated a Roman army in Germany, and the Romans had no remedy there.

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But when they arrived in Italy, and they were able to put all their forces
together, they did them in. 16 It is easy to conquer the Swiss outside their
home, where they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men, but
to conquer them at home, where they can gather a hundred thousand, is
very difficult. I thus conclude anew that a prince who has his people armed
and ordered for war should always await a powerful and dangerous war at
home, and not go to encounter it. But he who has his subjects unarmed and
his country unaccustomed to war should always get as much at a distance
from home as he can. And so both the one and the other, each in his rank,
will defend himself best.

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« 13 ?*

That One Comes from Base to Great
Fortune More through Fraud Than

through Force

[1] I esteem it to be a very true thing that it rarely or never happens that
men of small fortune come to great ranks without force and without fraud,
although the rank that another has attained may be given or left by
inheritance to them. Nor do I believe that force alone is ever found to be
enough, but fraud alone will be found to be quite enough; as he will clearly
see who will read the life of Philip of Macedon, 1 that of Agathocles the
Sicilian, 2 and those of many others like them who from obscure or base
fortune attained a kingdom or very great empires. Xenophon in his life of
Cyrus shows this necessity to deceive, considering that the first expedition
that he has Cyrus make against the king of Armenia is full of fraud, and that
he makes him seize his kingdom through deception and not through force.
And he does not conclude otherwise from this action than that it is
necessary for a prince who wishes to do great things to learn to deceive.
Besides this, he makes him deceive Cyaxares, king of the Medes, his
maternal uncle, in several modes; without which fraud he shows that Cyrus
could not have attained that greatness he came to. 3 Nor do I believe that
anyone placed in base fortune is ever found to attain great empire through
open force alone and ingenuously, but it is done quite well through fraud
alone, as Giovan Galeazzo did in taking away the state and empire of
Lombardy from his uncle, Messer Bernabo. 4

[2] What princes are necessitated to do at the beginnings of their increase,
republics also are necessitated to do until they have become powerful and
force alone is enough. And since by fate or by choice Rome on every side
held to all the modes necessary to come to greatness, it did not fail in this
either. Nor could it use a greater deception in the beginning than taking the
mode (discoursed of by us above) 5 of making partners, for under this name
it made them servile, as were the Latins and other peoples round about. For

238

first it availed itself of their arms in subduing the neighboring peoples and
taking the reputation of the state; then, having subdued them, it achieved so
much increase that it could beat everyone. The Latins never perceived that
they were altogether servile until they saw the Samnites given two defeats
and constrained to an accord. As this victory greatly increased the
reputation of the Romans with far-off princes who by means of it heard 6
the Roman name and not their arms, it thus generated envy and suspicion in
those who saw and heard their arms, among whom were the Latins. 7 This
envy and this fear were able to do so much that not the Latins alone but the
colonies they had in Latium, together with the Campanians, who had been
defended a little before, conspired against the Roman name. The Latins
started this war in the mode in which it is said above the greater part of
wars are started, 8 not by assaulting the Romans but by defending the
Sidicini against the Samnites, who were making war on them with license
from the Romans. That it is true that the Latins started it because they
recognized this deception Titus Livy demonstrates in the mouth of Annius
Setinus the Latin praetor, who in their council said these words: “For if
even now under the shadow of an equal league we can endure servitude,
etc.” 9 The Romans therefore are seen in their first increases not to be
lacking even in fraud, which it is always necessary for those who wish to
climb from small beginnings to sublime ranks to use and which is less
worthy of reproach the more it is covert, as was that of the Romans.

V<?}

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« 14 ?*

Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing
That through Humility They Will Conquer

Pride

[1] It is often seen how humility not only does not help but hurts, especially
used with insolent men who, either by envy or by another cause, have
conceived hatred for you. Our historian vouches 1 for this in this cause of
war between the Romans and the Latins. For when the Samnites
complained to the Romans that the Latins had assaulted them, the Romans
did not wish to forbid such a war to the Latins, desiring not to anger them.
This not only did not anger them, but made them become more spirited
against them and uncover themselves as enemies sooner. 2 The words used
by the aforementioned Annius the Latin praetor in the same council vouch
for this, where he says, “You have tried their patience by denying them
soldiers; who doubts that they were enraged? Yet they endured this pain.
They heard that we are preparing an army against the Samnites, their
confederates, and they have not moved from the city. Whence this so great
restraint of theirs, if not from consciousness of our strength and theirs?” 3
How much the patience of the Romans increased the arrogance of the
Latins is therefore very clearly known from this text. And yet a prince
should never wish to fall short of his rank and should never let anything go
by accord, wishing to let it go honorably, except when he can—and it is
believed that he can—hold onto it. For when the thing is brought to such a
point that you cannot let it go in the said mode, it is almost always better to
let it be taken away through force than through fear of force. For if you let
it go through fear, you do it to avoid war, and most often you do not avoid
it. For he to whom you will have conceded this and uncovered your
cowardice will not stand still but will wish to take other things away from
you and will get more inflamed against you since he esteems you less. In the
other party you will find colder defenders in your favor, since it seems to
them that you are weak or cowardly. But if, when the wish of the adversary

240

is uncovered, you prepare forces at once, although they may be inferior to
his, he will begin to esteem you, and since the other princes round about
will esteem you more, the wish to aid you when you are under arms will
come to him who would never aid you when you abandon yourself. This is
understood when you have one enemy, but when you have more of them, to
give some of the things you possess to one of them to win him over,
although war may be already declared, 4 and to detach him from your other
confederated enemies is always a prudent policy.

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«15?n

Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in
Their Resolutions; and Slow Decisions Are

Always Hurtful

[1] In this same matter, and in these same beginnings of war between the
Latins and the Romans, it can be noted how in every consultation it is good
to get to the particular 1 of what has to be decided, and not to stay always in
ambiguity or uncertainty about the thing. This is seen manifestly in the
consultation the Latins held when they were thinking of alienating
themselves from the Romans. Since the Romans had foreseen this bad
humor that had entered into the Latin peoples, so as to make certain of the
affair and see if they could win those peoples over without putting their
hands to arms, they gave them to understand that they should send eight
citizens to Rome, for they had to consult with them. 2 Having understood
this, and being conscious 3 of having done many things against the wish of
the Romans, the Latins held a council to order who should go to Rome and
to give them a commission as to what they had to say. And while Annius,
their praetor, was in the council during this dispute, he said these words: “I
judge it to belong to the highest of our affairs for you to consider more what
we ought to do than what is to be said. Once the counsels are made clear, it
will be easy to accommodate words to things.” 4 Without doubt these words
are very true and should be relished by every prince and by every republic.
For when they are in ambiguity and uncertainty as to what they wish to do,
they do not know how to accommodate their words; but once their spirit is
firm and what is to be executed is decided, it is an easy thing to find the
words. I have noted this part the more willingly inasmuch as I have often
known such ambiguity to have hurt public actions, with harm and with
shame for our republic. It will be verified that among doubtful policies,
where spirit is needed to decide them, this ambiguity will always be there
when weak men have to give counsel about and decide them. Slow and
tardy decisions are not less hurtful than ambiguous ones, especially those

242

that have to be decided in favor of some friend; for with their slowness one
aids no one and hurts oneself. Decisions made thus proceed either from
weakness of spirit and of force or from the malignity of those who have to
decide, who, moved by their own passion to wish to ruin the state or to
fulfill some other desire of theirs, do not let the decision be carried out but
impede it and cross it. For even when they see popular fervor taking a
pernicious part, the good citizens never impede the decision, especially in
things that cannot wait on time.

[2] When Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, was dead, and there was a great
war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, the Syracusans came to
dispute whether they should follow the Roman friendship or the
Carthaginian. 5 The ardor of the parties was such that the thing remained
ambiguous, nor was any policy taken up until Apollonides, one of the first
men in Syracuse, showed with an oration full of prudence that whoever held
the opinion that they should adhere to the Romans was not to be blamed,
nor were those who wished to follow the Carthaginian party, but it was good
to detest ambiguity and tardiness in taking up a policy. For he saw the ruin
of the republic altogether in such ambiguity, but once the policy was taken
up, whatever it might be, some good could be hoped for. Nor could Titus
Livy show the harm drawn from remaining in suspense more than he does
in this regard. He demonstrates it in the case of the Latins also: when the
Lavinians were asked by them for aid against the Romans, they deferred
deciding it so much that when they had gotten right outside the gate with
their troops to give them help, the news came that the Latins were defeated.
Milonius their praetor said of this: “This little way will cost us very much
with the Roman people.” 6 For had they decided at first either to aid or not
to aid the Latins, either by not aiding them they would not have angered the
Romans or by aiding them the aid would have been in time and they could
have made them win with the addition of their forces. But by deferring they
came to lose in any case, as happened to them. If the Florentines had noted
this text, they would not have had so much harm or so much trouble from
the French as they had from the coming into Italy of King Louis XII of
France against Ludovico, duke of Milan. 7 For when the king was
negotiating his coming and sought an accord with the Florentines, the
spokesmen who were with the king came to an accord with him that they
would stay neutral, and that when the king came into Italy he would have to
maintain them in their state and receive them under his protection, and he
gave a month’s time to the city to ratify this. Whoever with little prudence

243

favored the affairs of Ludovico deferred such ratification until the king was
already near victory and the Florentines wished to ratify it, when the
ratification was not accepted. For he knew that the Florentines had come
forcibly and not willingly into his friendship. This cost the city of Florence
very much money, and it was about to lose its state, as happened to it later
for a similar cause. This policy was so much the more to be condemned 8
since it did not serve even Duke Ludovico, who would have shown many
more signs of enmity to the Florentines if he had won than did the king.
Although the evil that arises for republics from this weakness has been
discoursed of above in another chapter, 9 nonetheless, having opportunity for
it anew through a new accident, I wished to repeat it, since it seems to me a
matter that should be especially noted by republics like ours.

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How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do
Not Conform to the Ancient Orders

[1] The most important battle ever waged by the Roman people in any war
with any nation was that which it waged with the Latin peoples in the
consulate of Torquatus and Decius. 1 For every reason agrees 2 that as the
Latins became servile through having lost it, so the Romans would have
become servile if they had not won it. Titus Livy is of this opinion, for he
makes the armies alike in every aspect, in order, virtue, obstinacy, and
number; the only difference he makes is that the heads of the Roman army
were more virtuous than those of the Latin army. One also sees how two
accidents arose in the managing of this battle that had not arisen before and
of which there have been rare examples since: to keep the spirits of the
soldiers firm, obedient to their commands, and decided on combat, one of
the two consuls killed himself and the other his son. The likeness that Titus
Livy says there was between these armies was that from having served in the
military together a long time they were alike in language, order, and arms.
For they kept to the same mode in ordering the battle, and the ranks and
heads of ranks had the same names. It was necessary, then, since they were
of like forces and like virtue, that something extraordinary should arise that
would make the spirits of the one firm and more obstinate than the other;
victory, as was said at other points, 3 consists in such obstinacy, for while it
endures in the breasts of those who engage in combat, armies never turn
back. For it to endure more in the breasts of the Romans than in those of
the Latins, partly fate and partly the virtue of the consuls made it arise that
Torquatus had to kill his son 4 and Decius [had to kill] himself? In showing
this likeness of forces, Titus Livy shows the whole order that the Romans
kept in armies and in fighting. Since he explains it extensively, I will not
repeat it otherwise, but will discourse only of that in it that I judge notable
and the neglect of which by all the captains of these times has produced
many disorders in armies and in fights. I say thus that from the text of Livy
one gathers that the Roman army had three principal divisions, which in

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Tuscan they would call three schiere : 6 they called the first astati, the second
principi? the third triari; and each of these had its own [troop of] horse. In
ordering a battle, they put the astati in front, in the second place right in
back of them they put the principi , and third yet in the same file they placed
the triari. They put the horse of all these ranks on the right and on the left of
these three battalions. The lines of the horse were called alae from their
form and place, for they appeared like two wings of the body. They ordered
the first line, that of the astati, which was in the front, to be locked together
in such a mode that it could contain and stand up against the enemy. Since
the second line, that of the principi, was not the first in combat but was well
suited to relieve the first when beaten or pushed back, they did not make it
tight but kept its ranks sparse and of such a quality that without disordering
itself it could receive the first into itself whenever shoved back by the enemy
and necessitated to withdraw. The third line, that of the triari, had its ranks
still more sparse than the second to be able when needed to receive into
itself the first two lines, those of the principi and the astati. These lines
placed thus in this form joined the fight. If the astati were forced back or
defeated, they withdrew into the spaces between the ranks of the principi,
and all united together made one body from two lines and rejoined the fight.
If these were also repelled and forced back, they all withdrew into the
spaces between the ranks of the triari, and all three lines became one body
and renewed the fight. If they were overcome then, since they were no
longer able to recover, they lost the fight. Since the army was in danger
whenever this last line of the triari was put to work, the proverb arose, “The
affair has been brought back to the triari ,” 8 which in the Tuscan usage
means, “We have played our last stake.”

[2] As the captains of our times have abandoned all the other orders and do
not observe any part of ancient discipline, so they have abandoned this part,
which is of no little importance. For whoever orders himself so that he can
recover three times in battles has to have fortune his enemy three times to
be able to lose, and has to have against him a virtue capable of conquering
him three times. But whoever does not stand except against the first push, as
do all the Christian armies today, can lose easily, for any disorder, any
middling virtue, can take victory away from them. What makes our armies
lack the ability to recover three times is having lost the mode of receiving
one line into another. This arises because at present battles are ordered with
one of these two disorders: either they put their lines shoulder to shoulder
and make their battle array extensive across and thin in depth, which makes

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it weaker because it has little between front and rear; or when instead, to
make it stronger, they shorten the lines in the Roman style. If the first front
is defeated, since there is no order by which it can be received by the
second, they get all tangled together and break themselves. For if the one in
front is shoved back, it pushes the second; if the second wishes to go in
front, it is impeded by the first; with the first pushing the second, and the
second the third, so much confusion arises that often the least accident ruins
an army. The Spanish and French armies in the fighting at Ravenna (where
Monsieur de Foix, captain of the troops of France, died), which was a
battle of very well done combat for our times, were ordered by one of the
modes written above: that is, both the one and the other army came with
their troops ordered shoulder to shoulder, in such a mode that neither the
one nor the other had more than one front, and they were much wider
across than deep. This always happens to them where they have a great field,
as they had at Ravenna. For, knowing the disorder that they produce in
withdrawing, they avoid it when they can by putting themselves in one file,
making the front extensive as was said; but when the country constrains
them, they stay in the disorder written of above without thinking of the
remedy. In this same disorder they ride through enemy country, either if
they prey upon it or if they manage another affair of war. In Santo Regolo,
in the territory of Pisa, and elsewhere—where the Florentines were
defeated by the Pisans in the time of the war between the Florentines and
that city because of its rebellion after the coming into Italy of Charles, king
of France—ruin did not arise from anywhere else than from the friendly
cavalry. Being in front and beaten back by the enemy, it crashed into and
broke the Florentine infantry, wherefore all the remainder of the troops
turned back. Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, former head of the Florentine
infantry, has often affirmed in my presence never to have been defeated
except by the cavalry of friends. When they serve in the military with the
French, the Swiss, who are the masters of modern wars, take care above all
things to put themselves on the side so that if the friendly cavalry is beaten
back it will not push into them. Although these things appear easy to
understand, and very easy to do, nonetheless not even one of our
contemporary captains is found who imitates the ancient orders and
corrects the modern. And although they may still have their army tripartite,
calling one part the vanguard, another the battalion, and another the
rearguard, they do not make it serve other than to command them in their
quarters. But in putting them to work it is rare, as is said above, that they do
not make all these bodies incur one and the same fortune.

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[3] Because to excuse their ignorance many cite the violence of artillery,
which does not suffer many orders of the ancients to be used in these times,
I wish to dispute this matter in the following chapter, and I wish to examine
if artillery is such an impediment that one cannot use ancient virtue.

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17 ft

How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed
by Armies in the Present Times; and
Whether the Opinion Universally Held of It

Is True

[1] When I was considering, besides the things written above, how many
fights I in the field (in our times called with a French word “days,” 1 and by
the Italians “feats of arms”) were waged by the Romans in different times,
there came into my consideration the universal opinion of many who would
have it that if there had been artillery in those times, the Romans would not
have been permitted—or not so easily—to take provinces and make peoples
pay tribute to them, as they did, nor would they in any mode have made
such mighty acquisitions. They also say that by means of these firearms men
cannot use or show their virtue as they could in antiquity. They add a third
thing: that one comes to battle with more difficulty than one came to it
then, and that one cannot keep there to the orders of those times, so that
war will in time be reduced to artillery. Judging it not to be outside the
purpose to dispute whether these opinions are true, how much artillery has
increased or diminished the force of armies, and whether it takes away or
gives opportunities to good captains to work virtuously, I shall begin to
speak to their first opinion: that the ancient Roman armies would not have
made the acquisitions they made if there had been artillery. Responding to
that, I say that war is made either to defend oneself or to take the offensive;
hence, first to be examined is to which of these two modes of war it is more
useful or more harmful. Although there may be something to say on each
side, nonetheless I believe that without comparison it does more harm to
whoever defends himself than to whoever takes the offensive. The reason I
say this is that whoever defends himself either is inside a town or is in camp
inside a stockade. If he is inside a town, either this town is small, as are the
larger part of fortresses, or it is great. In the first case, he who defends
himself is altogether lost, for the thrust of the artillery is such that no wall is

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found, however thick, that it does not knock down in a few days. And if he
who is inside does not have good spaces to withdraw into, with trenches and
embankments, 2 he is lost. Nor can he stand up against the thrust of the
enemy who then tries to enter through the breach in the wall; nor does the
artillery he may have help him in this, for it is a maxim that where men can
go en masse and with a thrust, artillery cannot stand up against them.
Therefore in the defense of towns the ultramontane furies are not stood up
to; Italian assaults are stood up to well since they are led into battles (which
they call by the very appropriate name of skirmishes), not en masse but in
small groups. Those who go with such disorder and coldness against a
breach in a wall where there is artillery go to a manifest death and artillery
avails against them. But when those who are compacted en masse, with one
shoving the other, go against a breach, if they are not sustained from
trenches or embankments, they enter in every place and artillery does not
hold them; and if some of them die, they cannot be so many that they
impede victory. This is known to be true from many stormings performed
by the ultramontanes in Italy, especially that of Brescia. For when that town
rebelled from the French and the fortress was still held for the king of
France, the Venetians, so as to sustain the thrust that could come from it
against the town, provided the whole street that descended from the fortress
to the city with artillery, putting it in front and on the flanks and in every
other appropriate place. Monsieur de Foix took no account of this. Instead,
with his squadron dismounted on foot, he passed through the middle of it
and seized the city; nor is it heard that he received any memorable harm
from it. So whoever defends himself in a small town, as was said, and finds
the walls on the ground, and does not have space for embankments and
trenches to withdraw to, and has to trust in artillery, is lost at once.

[2] If you defend a great town, and you have the advantage of being able to
withdraw, artillery is nonetheless beyond comparison more useful to
whoever is outside than to whoever is inside. First, because for artillery to
hurt those who are outside you are compelled of necessity to raise it above
the level of the town; for if you stay on that level, any little barricade and
embankment the enemy makes remains secure and you cannot hurt them.
So since you have to lift or pull yourself onto the walkway of the walls, or in
whatever mode raise yourself above the ground, you draw onto yourself two
difficulties. First is that you cannot bring there artillery of the massiveness
and power that anyone can bring from outside, since you are not able to
manage great things in small spaces. The other is that if you can actually

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bring it there, you cannot make the faithful and secure embankments for
saving said artillery that those outside can make, as they are on the terrain
and have the advantage and the space that they themselves wish, so much
that it is impossible for whoever defends a town to keep artillery in high
places when those who are outside have very much and powerful artillery.
And if they have to come into low places with it, it becomes in good part
useless, as was said. So the defense of the city has to be reduced to
defending it with one’s arms, 3 as was done in antiquity, and with light
artillery. If a little utility is obtained with respect to light artillery, a
disadvantage is obtained from it that counterbalances the advantage of
artillery. For thanks 4 to it the walls of towns are kept low and almost buried
underground in the trenches, so that when it comes to a hand-to-hand
battle, either because the walls are beaten down or because the trenches are
filled up, he who is inside has more disadvantages than he had before. And
so, as was said above, these instruments help him who besieges towns much
more than him who is besieged.

[3] As to the third thing—being reduced to a camp inside a stockade so as
not to do battle if it is not to your convenience or advantage—I say that in
this situation you ordinarily do not have any remedy with which to defend
yourself from combat other than what the ancients had; and sometimes, on
account of artillery, you are at a greater disadvantage. For if the enemy
comes upon you and has a little advantage from the country, as can easily
happen, and finds himself higher than you, or if on his arrival you have not
yet made your barricades and covered yourself well with them, he dislodges
you at once and without your having any remedy, and you are forced to go
out from your fortresses and come to fight. This happened to the Spanish in
the Battle of Ravenna, where they had dug in between the Ronco River and
a barricade. Because they had not raised it up high enough and the French
had a little advantage in the terrain, they were constrained by the artillery to
go out from their fortresses and come to fight. But given that the place you
have taken for a camp is, as it often must be, more eminent than the others
opposite it, and that the barricades are good and secure, so that by means of
the site and your other preparations the enemy does not dare to assault you,
in this case one will come to those modes that one came to in antiquity
when one individual was with his army in a spot that could not be attacked.
These are to overrun the country, to take or besiege towns friendly to you, or
to impede your supplies—so much so that you will be forced by some
necessity to dislodge and come to battle, where artillery, as will be said

251

below, does not work much. Whoever considers thus what types of wars the
Romans made, and sees how they made almost all their wars taking the
offensive against others and not defending against them, will see, if the
things said above are true, that they would have had more advantage, and
would have made their acquisitions more quickly, if there had been
[artillery] in those times.

[4] As to the second thing—that by means of artillery men cannot show
their virtue as they could in antiquity—I say it is true that men incur more
dangers than back then when they have to show themselves in small groups,
when they have to scale a town or make similar assaults, when they are not
confined together but have to appear by themselves one by one. It is also
true that captains and heads of armies are subjected more to the danger of
death than back then, since they can be reached with artillery in every place;
nor does it help them to be in the last squadrons and be provided with very
strong men. Nonetheless, both the one and the other of these two dangers
rarely inflict extraordinary harm since well-protected towns are not scaled
or assaulted with weak assaults, but when one wishes to capture them the
affair is reduced to a siege, as was done in antiquity. And even in those that
are captured by assaults, the dangers are not much greater than they were
back then. For whoever defended towns in that time also did not lack things
to shoot with, which, if they were not so furious, had a similar effect as to
killing men. As to the deaths of captains and condottieri, there are fewer
examples of them in the twenty-four years 5 that the wars have lasted in
recent times in Italy than there were in ten years in the time of the ancients.
For outside of Count Lodovico della Mirandola, who died at Ferrara when
the Venetians assaulted that state a few years ago, 6 and the duke of
Nemours, who died at Cirignuola, 7 it has not occurred that any of them
have died from artillery—for Monsieur de Foix died at Ravenna from steel,
not from fire. 8 So if men do not particularly demonstrate their virtue, it
arises not from artillery but from the bad orders and the weakness of
armies, for lacking virtue in the whole, they cannot show it in the part.

[5] As to the third thing they say—that one cannot get hand to hand and
that war will be conducted altogether by artillery—I say this opinion is
altogether false, and thus it will always be held by those who will try to put
their armies to work according to ancient virtue. For it suits whoever
wishes to make a good army to accustom his men with exercises either
feigned or true to get close to the enemy, to come at him wielding the
sword, and to stand chest to chest with him. And one ought to found oneself

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more on infantry than on horse for the reasons that will be said below. If
one founds oneself on infantrymen and on the modes said before, artillery
becomes altogether useless. For in getting close to the enemy, infantry can
flee the blows of artillery with more ease than in antiquity they could flee
the thrust of the elephants, the scythed chariots, and the other
unaccustomed opponents the Roman infantry opposed, against which they
always found the remedy. So much more easily would they have found it
against artillery inasmuch as the time during which it can hurt you is briefer
than was that during which elephants and chariots could hurt. For the latter
disordered you in the middle of the fight, while the former may impede you
only before the fight—and infantry easily escape this impediment when they
shoot, either by seeking cover from the nature of the site or by lowering
themselves on the ground when they shoot. Even this is seen by experience
not to be necessary, especially to defend oneself from heavy artillery, which
cannot be balanced in such a mode that it does not either go high and not
find you or go low and not reach you. When armies then get hand to hand, it
is clearer than fight that neither the heavy nor the small ones can hurt 9 you.
For if they have the artillery in front, it becomes your prisoner; if it is
behind, it hurts 10 their friends rather than you; on the flanks 11 it still cannot
wound you in such a mode that you cannot go and encounter it, and from
that will follow the said effect. Nor is this much disputed. For one sees the
example of the Swiss, who at Novara in 1513 went without artillery and
without horse to meet the French army, which was provided with artillery
inside its fortresses, and broke it without suffering any impediment from
them. And the reason is, besides the things said above, that for artillery to
be able to work it needs to be guarded by walls or by trenches or by
barricades; and if it lacks one of these guardians, it becomes a prisoner or
useless, as happens when it has to be defended by men, which happens in
battles and fights in the field. On the flank it cannot be put to work except in
the mode that the ancients put to work shooting instruments, which they put
outside their squadrons so they could engage in combat outside their ranks;
and whenever they were shoved back by cavalry or by others, their refuge
was behind the legions. Whoever counts on it otherwise does not understand
it well, and trusts in a thing that can easily deceive him. And if the Turk has
had victory over the Sophy and the sultan by means of artillery, 12 it arose
not from any virtue of it other than the fright that its unaccustomed noise
put into their cavalry.

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[6] Coming to the end of this discourse, I therefore conclude that artillery is
useful in an army when ancient virtue is mixed with it, but without that,
against a virtuous army, it is very useless.

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« 18 ?*

How by the Authority of the Romans and
by the Example of the Ancient Military
Infantry Should Be Esteemed More Than

Horse

[1] It can be clearly demonstrated by many reasons and many examples how
much more the Romans esteemed the military on foot than on horseback in
all their military actions. On it they founded all the plans of their forces, as
is seen by many examples, among others when they fought with the Latins
near Lake Regillus, where, when the Roman army was already bending, they
made their men on horseback dismount on foot to relieve it, and by
renewing the fight in this way had the victory. 1 The Romans are manifestly
seen here to have trusted in them more when they were on foot than when
they were kept on horseback. They used this same extreme in many other
fights and always found it the best remedy for their dangers.

[2] Nor should one oppose to this the opinion of Hannibal, who, on seeing
that the consuls in the battle of Cannae had made their cavalrymen
dismount on foot, made a joke of such a policy, saying: “Quam mallem
vinctos mihi traderent equites!” —that is, “I should prefer that they give
them to me bound.” Even though this opinion may have been in the mouth
of a very excellent man, nonetheless if one has to follow authority, one
should believe in a Roman republic and so many very excellent captains
who were in it more than in one Hannibal alone. Even without authorities
there are manifest reasons for it. For a man on foot can go many places
where a horse cannot go. He can be taught to observe order, and that he has
to resume it if it is disturbed; it is difficult to make horses observe order,
and impossible to reorder them when they are disturbed. Besides this, as in
men, some horses are found that have little spirit and some that have very
much; and often it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by a cowardly
man, and a cowardly horse by a spirited one, and, in whichever mode this

255

disparity occurs, from it arises uselessness and disorder. Ordered infantry
can easily break horse, and only with difficulty be defeated by them. Besides
many ancient and modern examples, this opinion is corroborated by the
authority of those who give rules for civil things, where they show that at
first wars began to be made with horse, since there was yet no order for
infantry. But when they were put in order, it was known at once how much
more useful they were than the former. It is not so, however, that because of
this, horse are not necessary in armies to perform reconnaissances, to raid
and prey upon countries, to follow enemies when they are in flight, and to be
also in part an opposition to the horse of the adversaries. But the foundation
and the sinew of the army, and that which should be esteemed more, should
be the infantry.

[3] Among the sins of the Italian princes that have made Italy servile toward
foreigners, there is none greater than having taken little account of this
order, and having turned all one’s care to the military on horseback. This
disorder has arisen from the malignity of the heads and from the ignorance
of those who held states. For since the Italian military was transferred
twenty-five years ago to men who did not hold states but were like captains
of fortune, 3 they at once thought of how they could maintain their
reputation while staying armed themselves with the princes unarmed. Since
a large number of infantrymen could not be continually paid by them, and
they did not have subjects they could avail themselves of, and a small
number did not give them reputation, they turned to keeping horse. For two
hundred or three hundred horse that were paid by a condottiere maintained
his reputation, and the payment was not such that it could not be fulfilled by
the men who held states. So that this would continue more easily and so as
to maintain their reputation, they removed all affection and reputation for
infantrymen, and transferred it to their horse. They increased so much in
this disorder that in the largest army whatever the least part was infantry.
This usage, together with many other disorders that were mixed with it,
made the Italian military weak in such a mode that this province has been
easily trampled on by all the ultramontanes. This error of esteeming horse
more than infantry is shown more openly by another Roman example.
When the Romans were encamped at Sora, a crowd of horse came out of
the town to assault the camp, and the Roman master of the horse went
against them with his cavalry and met them chest to chest. Fate had it that
in the first encounter the heads of both armies died. While the others
remained without government and the fight continued nonetheless, the

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Romans dismounted on foot so as to overcome the enemy more easily and
constrained the enemy cavalrymen to do likewise, if they wished to defend
themselves. Because of all this, the Romans brought back the victory. 4 No
example could be greater than this in demonstrating how much more virtue
there is in infantry than in horse. For if in other struggles the consuls made
the Roman cavalrymen dismount, it was to relieve the infantry who were
suffering and had need of aid, but in this place they dismounted neither to
succor the infantry nor to combat enemy men on foot, but, doing combat on
horseback against horse, they judged that while they could not overcome
them on horseback they could more easily defeat them by dismounting. I
wish thus to conclude that ordered infantry cannot be overcome without
very great difficulty, unless by other infantry. The Romans Crassus and Mark
Antony ran through the dominion of the Parthians for many days with very
few horse and very many infantry, and had innumerable horse of the
Parthians against them. Crassus with part of the army was left there dead;
Mark Antony virtuously saved himself. Nonetheless in these Roman
afflictions it is seen how much infantry prevailed over horse; for being in an
extensive country, where mountains are rare, rivers very rare, the seas far
away, and distant from every advantage, Mark Antony nonetheless, in the
judgment of the Parthians themselves, very virtuously saved himself. Nor
did all the Parthian cavalry ever dare to try the ranks of his army. If Crassus
was left there, whoever will read well of his actions will see that it was by
deception rather than force, nor did the Parthians ever in all his disorders
dare to push against him; instead, always skirting around him, impeding his
supplies, making promises and not observing them, they led him to extreme
misery. 5

[4] I would believe I had to undergo more labor in arguing 6 how much the
virtue of infantry is more powerful than that of horse if there were not very
many modern examples of it that render very full testimony for it. Nine
thousand Swiss have been seen at Novara, cited by us above, to go and
confront ten thousand horse and as many infantrymen, and defeat them. For
the horse could not take the offensive against them, and they little esteemed
the infantrymen because they were in good part Gascon troops and badly
ordered. Then twenty-six thousand Swiss were seen to go above Milan to
meet Francis, king of France, who had with him twenty thousand horse,
forty thousand infantrymen, and a hundred artillery wagons. And if they did
not win the battle as at Novara, they did combat virtuously for two days and
then, when they were defeated, half of them saved themselves. 7 Marcus

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Regulus Attilius presumed with his infantry to stand up against not horse
alone but elephants. And if his plan did not succeed, it was not because the
virtue of his infantry was not so much that he could trust in it so much as to
believe it could overcome that difficulty. 8 I repeat, therefore, that to
overcome ordered infantrymen it is necessary to oppose them with
infantrymen better ordered than they; otherwise one goes to a manifest loss.
In the times of Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand
Swiss descended into Lombardy, where the duke, having Carmignuola then
for his captain, sent him with about a thousand horse and a few infantrymen
against them. 9 Not knowing their order of combat, he went to encounter
them with his horse, presuming he could break them at once. But finding
them immovable, and having lost many of his men, he withdrew. Being a
very able man and knowing how to take up new policies among new
accidents, he recovered more troops and went to meet them. Coming
against them, he made all his men-at-arms dismount on foot, put them at
the head of his infantry, and went to beset the Swiss. They did not have any
remedy, for since the men-at-arms of Carmignuola were on foot and well
armed they could easily enter among the ranks of the Swiss without
suffering any damage, and having entered among them they could easily
attack them, so that of all their number there remained alive [only] that part
that was preserved by the humanity of Carmignuola. 10

[5] I believe that many know the difference of virtue that there is between
the one and the other of these orders; but so great is the unhappiness of
these times that neither ancient examples nor modern nor confession of
error is sufficient to make modern princes repent. They should think that if
they wish to bestow reputation on the military of a province or a state, it is
necessary to resuscitate these orders, keep near them, give them reputation,
give them life, so that they may bestow both life and reputation on him. 11
And as they deviate from these modes, so they deviate from the other modes
spoken of above. Hence it arises that acquisitions are for the harm, not the
greatness, of a state, as will be said below.

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« 19 ?*

That Acquisitions by Republics That Are
Not Well Ordered and That Do Not
Proceed according to Roman Virtue Are
for Their Ruin, Not Their Exaltation

[1] These opinions contrary to the truth, founded on the bad examples that
have been introduced by these corrupt centuries of ours, keep men from
thinking of deviating from accustomed modes. When would one have been
able to persuade an Italian up to thirty years ago that ten thousand
infantrymen could assault ten thousand horse and as many infantrymen in a
plain, and not only combat but defeat them, as one saw, by the example
often cited by us, at Novara? 1 And although the histories may be full of it,
they still would not have lent it their faith. And if they had lent it their faith,
they would have said that in these times one is better armed, and that a
squadron of men-at-arms would be capable of charging a cliff and not
merely infantry—and thus they corrupted their judgment with these false
excuses. Nor would they have considered that Lucullus with a few
infantrymen broke a hundred and fifty thousand horse of Tigranes, and that
among those cavalrymen were a sort of cavalry altogether similar to our
men-at-arms. 2 And thus, as this fallacy has been uncovered by the example
of the ultramontane troops, and as it is seen by it that all that is narrated
about infantry in the histories is true, they ought to believe all the other
ancient orders to be true and useful. 3 And if this were believed, republics
and princes would err less, would be stronger in opposing a thrust that might
come against them, and would not put their hope in flight; and those who
have in their hands a civil way of life would know better how to direct it,
either by way of expanding it or by way of maintaining it. And they would
believe that increasing the inhabitants of one’s city, getting partners and not
subjects, sending colonies to guard countries that have been acquired,
making capital out of booty, subduing the enemy with raids and battles and
not with sieges, keeping the public rich and the private poor, and

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maintaining military exercises with the highest seriousness is the true way
to make a republic great and to acquire empire. And if this mode of
expanding does not please them, one should think that acquisitions made by
any other way are the ruin of republics, and should put a check on every
ambition, regulate one’s city inside with laws and customs, prohibit
acquisition, and think only of defending oneself and of keeping one’s
defenses well ordered—as do the republics of Germany, which live and have
lived freely in these modes for a time. Nonetheless, as I said at another
point when I discoursed of the difference there was between ordering to
acquire and ordering to maintain, it is impossible for a republic to succeed
in staying quiet and enjoying its freedom and little borders. 4 For if it will
not molest others, it will be molested, and from being molested will arise
the wish and the necessity to acquire; and if it does not have an enemy
outside, it will find one at home, as it appears necessarily happens to all
great cities. And if the republics of Germany can live in that mode, and
have been able to endure for a time, it arises from certain conditions in that
country that are not elsewhere, without which they could not keep to a like
mode of life.

[2] That part of Germany of which I speak was subject to the Roman
Empire as were France and Spain, but when it came into decline and its
title to empire was reduced in that province, the more powerful of those
cities, to make themselves free, began buying themselves off from the
empire by reserving to it a small annual payment, according to the
cowardice or necessity of the emperors, so that little by little all those cities
that were directly under the emperor and not subject to any prince bought
themselves off in like mode. In the same times that these cities bought
themselves off, it occurred that certain communities subject to the duke of
Austria rebelled against him, among which were Fribourg and the Swiss
and the like. Prospering in the beginning, they little by little achieved so
much increase that they not only did not return under the yoke of Austria,
but put all their neighbors in fear—they are those who are called the Swiss.
Thus this province was divided into the Swiss, republics (whom they call
free towns), princes, and emperor. And the cause why wars do not arise
among so much diversity of ways of life, or if they arise they do not long
endure, is that sign of the emperor, who, should he happen not to have
forces, nonetheless has so much reputation among them that he is a
conciliator for them, and eliminates every scandal with his authority by
interposing himself as a mediator. The greater and longer wars that have

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been there are those that have occurred between the Swiss and the duke of
Austria; and although for many years the emperor and the duke of Austria
have been one and the same thing, he has not therefore ever been able to
overcome the audacity of the Swiss, with whom there has never been any
mode of accord unless by force. Nor has the rest of Germany brought him
much aid; both because the communities do not know how to take the
offensive against whoever wishes to live freely like them, and because those
princes partly cannot because they are poor and partly will not because they
are envious of his power. Those communities can thus live content with
their small dominion, because, thanks 5 to the imperial authority, they do
not have cause to desire more. They can live united inside their walls
because they have nearby the enemy who would take the opportunity to
seize them whenever they should be in discord. If that province were in
other conditions, it would suit them to seek to expand and break that quiet
of theirs. Since there are no such conditions elsewhere, one cannot take this
mode of life and needs either to expand by way of leagues or to expand like
the Romans. Whoever governs himself otherwise seeks not his life but his
death and ruin, for in a thousand modes and from many causes his
acquisitions are harmful. For he very likely acquires empire without forces,
and whoever acquires empire without forces will be fittingly ruined.
Whoever impoverishes himself through wars cannot acquire forces, even
should he be victorious, since he spends more than he obtains from his
acquisitions, as the Venetians and the Florentines have done, who have been
much weaker when one had Lombardy and the other Tuscany than they
were when one was content with the sea and the other with six miles of
borders. For all arose from their having wished to acquire and not having
known how to take up the mode to do so. They deserve more blame
inasmuch as they have less excuse, since they saw the mode the Romans
took and could have followed their example, while the Romans, without any
example, by their own prudence, knew how to find it by themselves. Besides
this, acquisitions sometimes do no middling harm to every well-ordered
republic, when it acquires a city or a province full of delights, 6 whereby it
can take their customs through the intercourse 7 it has with them, as
happened first to Rome and then to Hannibal in the acquisition of Capua. 8
If Capua had been more distant from the city, so that the remedy for the
error of the soldiers would not have been nearby, or if Rome had been
corrupt in some part, without doubt that acquisition would have been the
ruin of the Roman republic. Titus Livy vouches for this with these words:

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“Even then least wholesome for military discipline, Capua, with its means
for every pleasure, diverted the charmed spirits of the soldiers from the
memory of their fatherland.” 9 And truly, similar cities or provinces avenge
themselves against their conqueror without fighting and without blood, for
by permeating it with their bad customs they expose it to being conquered
by whoever assaults it. Juvenal in his Satires could not have better
considered this part, saying that through the acquisition of foreign lands,
foreign customs entered Roman breasts, and in exchange for thrift and other
very excellent virtues, “gluttony and luxury have made their home and
avenge a conquered world.” 10 If acquiring was thus about to be pernicious
for the Romans in the times when they proceeded with so much prudence
and so much virtue, what will it be for those who proceed so distantly from
their modes, and who avail themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary
soldiers, besides the other errors they make, which are much discoursed of
above? From this the harms that will be mentioned in the following chapter
often result for them.

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«20 ft

What Danger That Prince or Republic
Runs That Avails Itself of Auxiliary or
Mercenary Military

[1] If I had not treated at length in another work of mine 1 how useless
mercenary or auxiliary military is, and how useful one’s own is, I would
extend myself in this discourse much more than I will do. But since I have
spoken of it at length elsewhere, I will be brief in this part. Nor has it
seemed to me that I should pass it by, since I found in Titus Livy such an
extensive example as to auxiliary soldiers. For auxiliary soldiers are those
whom a prince or republic sends, captained and paid by it, for your aid.
Coming to the text of Livy, I say that when the Romans with their armies,
which they had sent for the relief of the Capuans, had defeated two armies
of Samnites in two different places, and thereby freed the Capuans from the
war the Samnites made against them, and they wished to return to Rome,
they left two legions in the country of Capua to defend the Capuans so they
would not be despoiled of a garrison and become prey anew to the
Samnites. 2 These legions, rotting in idleness, began to take delight in it; so
much so that, having forgotten their fatherland and their reverence for the
Senate, they thought about taking up arms and making themselves lords of
that country that they had defended with their virtue. For it appeared to
them that the inhabitants were not worthy of possessing those goods that
they did not know how to defend. Having foreseen this thing, the Romans
crushed and corrected it, 3 as will be shown extensively where we speak of
conspiracies. 4 I therefore say anew that of all the other kinds of soldiers,
auxiliaries are the most harmful, for the prince or republic who puts them
to work in his aid does not have any authority over them, but he who sends
them alone has authority there. For auxiliary soldiers are those who are sent
to you by a prince, as I have said, under his captains, under his insignia, and
paid by him, as was that army the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers,
when they have conquered, usually prey as much on him who has led them

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as on him against whom they are led; they do so either through the malignity
of the prince who sends them or through their own ambition. Although the
intention of the Romans was not to break the accord and the conventions
they had made with the Capuans, nonetheless the ease with which those
soldiers could crush them seemed so great that it could persuade them to
think of taking from the Capuans their town and their state. Very many
examples of this could be given, but I wish this to be enough and also that
of the Rhegini, whose life and town were taken away by a legion that the
Romans had put there as a guard. 5 A prince or a republic should then take
up any other policy rather than having recourse to leading auxiliary troops
into his state for his defense if he has to trust altogether in them, for any
pact, any convention, however hard, that he has with the enemy will be
lighter for him than such a policy. If past things are read well and those of
the present are reviewed, it will be found that for one who has had a good
end from this, infinite ones were left deceived by it. A prince or an
ambitious republic cannot have a greater opportunity for seizing a city or a
province than to be asked to send his armies to its defense. Therefore he
who is so ambitious that he calls in such aid, not only to defend himself but
to take the offensive against others, seeks to acquire that which he cannot
hold and which can be easily taken away from him by him who acquires it
for him. But so great is the ambition of man that to obtain a present wish he
does not think of the evil that in a brief time is to result from it. Nor in this,
as in other things discoursed of, do ancient examples move him, for if they 6
were moved by them they would see that the more liberality is shown
toward neighbors and the more aversion to seizing them, the more they fling
themselves into one’s lap, as will be said below through the example of the
Capuans.

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21 n

The First Praetor the Romans Sent
Anyplace Was to Capua, Four Hundred
Years after They Began to Make War

[1] How different the Romans were in their mode of proceeding in
acquisition from those who in the present times expand their jurisdiction
has been very much discoursed of above; 1 also that they let those towns they
did not demolish live under their own laws, even those that surrendered not
as partners but as subjects. They did not leave in them any sign of the
empire of the Roman people but obliged them to some conditions, which, if
observed, kept them in their state and dignity. These modes are known to
have been observed until they went out of Italy and began to reduce
kingdoms and states to provinces.

[2] There is no clearer example of this than that the first praetor sent by
them to any place was to Capua, which they sent there not from their
ambition but because they were asked by the Capuans, who, since there was
discord among them, judged it necessary to have a Roman citizen inside the
city who would reorder and reunite them. Moved by this example and
constrained by the same necessity, the Anzianti also asked them for a
prefect. 2 Titus Livy says about this accident and this new mode of ruling,
“For now not only Roman arms, but laws, prevailed.” 3 One sees, therefore,
how much this mode made Roman increase easy. For those cities especially
that are used to living freely or accustomed to being governed by those of
their own province remain content more quietly under a dominion they do
not see, even though it may have in itself some hardship, than under one
they see every day that appears to them to reprove them every day for their
servitude. There follows closely from this another good for the prince. Since
his ministers do not have in hand the judges and magistrates who render
civil or criminal justice 4 in those cities, there can never arise a judgment 5
with disapproval or infamy for the prince; and this way many causes of
calumny and hatred toward him are lacking. [To see] that this is true,

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besides the ancient examples of it that could be brought up, there is a fresh
example of it in Italy. For, as everyone knows, Genoa having often been
seized by the French, the king has always, except in the present times, sent a
French governor who governs it in his name. At present alone, not by the
king’s choice but because necessity has thus ordered it, he has let that city
be governed by itself and by a Genoese governor. 6 Without doubt whoever
seeks which of these two modes brings more security to the king in his rule
over it, and more contentment to the populace, would without doubt
approve this last mode. Besides this, men fling themselves into your lap so
much more the more you appear averse from seizing them; and they fear
you so much less on account of their freedom the more you are humane and
tame with them. This tameness and liberality made the Capuans run to the
Romans to ask for a praetor; if the Romans had demonstrated the least wish
to send one, they would at once have become jealous and would have
distanced themselves from them. But what need is there to go for examples
to Capua and Rome, having them in Florence and Tuscany? Everyone
knows how much time it has been since the city of Pistoia came voluntarily
under Florentine rule. Everyone also knows how much enmity there has
been between the Florentines and the Pisans, Lucchese, and Sienese. This
difference of spirit has arisen not because the Pistoiese do not prize their
freedom as do the others and do not judge themselves as highly as the others
but because the Florentines have always comported themselves with them
like brothers but with the others like enemies. This has made the Pistoiese
run willingly under their rule, while the others have exerted and exert all
their force so as not to come under it. And without doubt if the Florentines
by way either of laws or of aids had tamed their neighbors and not made
them savage, they would without doubt at this hour be lords of Tuscany.
This does not mean I judge that arms and force do not have to be put to
work, but they should be reserved for the last place, where and when other
modes are not enough.

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«22

How False the Opinions of Men Often Are
in Judging Great Things

[1] How false the opinions of men often are has been seen and is seen by
those who find themselves witnesses of their decisions, which, if they are
not decided by excellent men, are often contrary to every truth. Because
excellent men in corrupt republics, especially in quiet times, are treated as
enemies, either from envy or from other ambitious causes, one goes behind
someone who either is judged to be good through a common deception or is
put forward by men who wish for the favor rather than the good of the
collectivity. This deception is uncovered afterward in adverse times, and by
necessity refuge is sought in those who were nearly forgotten in quiet times,
as will be fully discoursed of in its place. 1 Certain accidents also arise about
which men who have not had great experience of things are easily deceived,
since the accident that arises has in itself much verisimilitude capable of
making men believe whatever they are persuaded of about such a thing.
These things have been said because of what Numisius the praetor
persuaded the Latins of after they were defeated by the Romans 2 and
because of what was believed by many a few years ago when Francis I, king
of France, came to acquire Milan, which was defended by the Swiss. 3 I say,
therefore, that when Louis XII was dead and Francis of Angouleme, who
succeeded to the kingdom of France, desired to restore to the kingdom the
duchy of Milan seized a few years before by the Swiss at the encouragement
of Pope Julius II, 4 he desired to have aid in Italy that would make his
enterprise easier. Besides the Venetians, whom Louis had won over, 5 he
tried the Florentines and Pope Leo X, for it seemed to him that his
enterprise would be easier when he should have won them over, since
troops of the king of Spain were in Lombardy and other forces of the
emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo did not cede to the king’s wishes but
was persuaded by those who counseled him (according to what is said) to
stay neutral, since they showed him that in this policy consisted certain
victory. 6 For it did not suit the church to have powers in Italy, neither the

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king nor the Swiss, but since he wished to return it to its ancient freedom, it
was necessary to free it from servitude to both the one and the other.
Because it was not possible to conquer the one and the other, either by
themselves or both together, one of them had to overcome the other, so that
the church with its friends might strike the one that then would be left the
victor. It was impossible to find a better opportunity than the present, since
both the one and the other were in the field, and the pope had his forces in
order so they could present themselves on the borders of Lombardy near
both the one and the other armies, under color of wishing to guard his own
affairs, and stay there until they should come to battle. It was reasonable,
since both the one and the other armies were virtuous, that this would be
bloody for all in both parties, and leave the victor in a weakened mode, so
that it would be easy for the pope to assault him and break him. Thus he
would be left with his glory as the lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all Italy.
How false this opinion was is seen from the result of the affair: for when the
Swiss were overcome after a long fight, 7 the troops of the pope and of Spain
did not presume to assault the victors but prepared for flight. Even that
would not have helped them if it had not been for the humanity or the
coldness of the king, who did not seek a second victory, but for whom it
was enough to make an accord with the church.

[2] This opinion has certain reasons that at a distance appear true but are
altogether alien from the truth. For it rarely happens that the victor loses
very many of his soldiers, for some of the victors die in the fight but none in
the flight—and in the ardor of combat, when men have turned face to face,
few of them fall, especially because it most often lasts for a short time. And
if, however, it lasts for very much time and very many of the victors die, so
great are the reputation that victory draws behind it and the terror that it
carries with it that it by far exceeds the harm that he has endured through
the death of his soldiers. So that if one army went to find him in the opinion
that he would be weakened, it would find itself deceived, unless that army
were such that it could already combat him at any time, both before the
victory and afterward. In this case it could win or lose according to its
fortune and virtue, but that which fought before and won would have the
advantage rather than the other. This is known with certainty from the
experience of the Latins, from the fallacy that Numisius the praetor took
up, and from the harm the peoples who believed him received from it. After
the Romans had conquered the Latins, he cried out through all the country
of Latium that then was the time to assault the Romans, who were

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weakened by the fight they had had with them; that the Romans were left a
victory only in name, while they had endured all the other harms as if they
had been conquered; and that any little force that should assault them anew
could finish them. Therefore the peoples who believed him made a new
army and were at once defeated and suffered the harm that those always
will suffer who hold such opinions. 8

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«23 M

How Much the Romans, in Judging
Subjects for Some Accidents That
Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled from the

Middle Way

[1] “Now in Latium the state of affairs was such that they could endure
neither peace nor war.” 1

[2] Of all unhappy states the unhappiest is that of a prince or a republic
brought to the extreme where it cannot accept peace or sustain war. Those
are brought there who are offended too much by the conditions of peace
and, on the other side, if they wish to make war, must either throw
themselves forth as prey for whoever aids them or be left as prey for the
enemy. To all these extremes one comes through bad counsels and bad
policies from not having measured one’s forces well, as is said above. 2 For
the republic or prince that measures them well is led only with difficulty
into the extreme the Latins were led into. When they should not have come
to an accord with the Romans they did come to an accord, and when they
should not have declared 3 war with them they did declare it. Thus they
knew how to act in such a mode that the enmity and the friendship of the
Romans were equally harmful to them. The Latins were then conquered and
altogether afflicted first by Manlius Torquatus and then by Camillus, who,
after constraining them to give in and consign themselves into the arms 4 of
the Romans, putting guards through all the towns of Latium, and taking
hostages from all of them, returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that
all Latium was in the hands of the Roman people. 5 Because this judgment
is notable and deserves to be observed so that it can be imitated when
similar opportunities are given to princes, I wish to bring up the words of
Livy put in the mouth of Camillus. They vouch both for the mode of
expansion the Romans took and for how in judgments of state they always
fled from the middle way and turned to extremes. For a government is

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nothing other than holding subjects in such a mode that they cannot or
ought not offend you. This is done either by securing oneself against them
altogether, taking from them every way of hurting you, or by benefiting
them in such a mode that it would not be reasonable for them to desire to
change fortune. All this is comprised first by Camillus’s proposal and then by
the judgment on it given by the Senate. His words were these: “The
immortal gods have made you so powerful over this decision as to put the
decision in your hands whether Latium is to be or not to be. Therefore you
can provide perpetual peace for yourselves, as far as pertains to the Latins,
either by raging or by forgiving. Do you wish to make very cruel decisions
against those who have surrendered and been conquered? You may destroy
all Latium. Do you wish to increase the Roman republic 6 on the example of
your forefathers by accepting the conquered into citizenship? Matter is at
hand for growing by means of the greatest glory. That rule is certainly the
firmest that is obeyed gladly. Therefore, while their spirits are stupefied with
expectation, you should preoccupy them either with punishment or with
benefit.” 7 The decision of the Senate followed this proposal in accordance
with the words of the consul. 8 Bringing forward, town by town, all those of
some moment, they either benefited them or eliminated them. They gave
exemptions and privileges to those who were benefited, giving them
citizenship 9 and securing them on every side. They demolished the towns of
the others, sent colonies there, brought them to Rome, and dispersed them
so that they could no longer hurt either through arms or through counsel.
Nor did they, as I said, 10 ever use the neutral way in affairs of moment.

[3] Princes ought to imitate this judgment. The Florentines ought to have
come close to this when Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rebelled in
1502. 11 If they had done so, they would have secured their rule, made the
city of Florence very great, and given themselves the fields they lacked to
live off. But they used that middle way that is very harmful in judging men:
they exiled part of the Aretines, fined part of them, took away from all of
them their honors and former ranks in the city, and left the city intact. If
any citizen counseled in the deliberations that Arezzo should be
demolished, those who to themselves seemed wiser said that it would be of
little honor to the republic to demolish it since it would seem that Florence
lacked forces to hold it. These reasons are among those that seem true and
are not, since by this same reason a parricide or someone criminal and
scandalous would not have to be killed, since it would be a shame for the
prince to show he does not have forces able to check one man alone. Such

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as have similar opinions do not see that men individually, and a whole city
together, sometimes sin against a state so that a prince has no remedy other
than to eliminate it as an example to the others and for his own security.
Honor consists in being able and knowing how to punish it, not in being
able to hold it with a thousand dangers, for the prince who does not punish
whoever errs in such a mode that he can err no more is held to be either
ignorant or cowardly.

[4] How necessary this judgment is that the Romans gave is also confirmed
by the sentence they gave on the Privernates. 12 Here two things should be
noted from Livy’s text: one, that which is said above, that subjects should be
either benefited or eliminated; the other, how much generosity of spirit,
how much speaking the truth helps, when it is said in the presence of
prudent men. The Roman Senate was gathered to judge the Privernates,
who after having rebelled were then by force returned under Roman
obedience. Many citizens were sent by the people of Privernum to beseech
pardon from the Senate, and when they came into its presence one of the
senators asked one of them “what punishment did he consider the
Privernates deserved.” 13 To this the Privernate responded, “That which they
deserve who consider themselves worthy of freedom.” To this the consul
replied, “If we remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to
have with you?” To which he responded, “If you give a good one, both
faithful and perpetual; if a bad one, not long-lasting.” 14 Whereupon, even
though many were upset by this, the wiser part of the Senate said, “The
voice of a free man had been heard, nor could it be believed that any people
or indeed any man should remain in a condition that was painful longer
than was necessary. Peace is faithful where men are willingly pacified, nor
could faith be hoped for in that place where they wished for servitude.”
Upon these words they decided that the Privernates should be Roman
citizens and honored them with the privileges of citizenship, saying, “Only
those who think of nothing except freedom are worthy to become
Romans.” 15 So much did this true and generous response please generous
spirits, for any other response would have been lying and cowardly. Those
who believe otherwise of men, especially of those used to being or to
seeming to themselves to be free, are deceived in this, and under this
deception take up policies that are not good for themselves and not such as
to satisfy them. From this arise frequent rebellions and the ruin of states.
But to return to our discourse, I conclude from this and from the judgment
given on the Latins that when one has to judge powerful cities that are used

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to living freely, one must either eliminate them or caress them; otherwise
every judgment is in vain. 16 One ought to flee altogether from the middle
way, which is harmful, as it was to the Samnites when they had closed off
the Romans at the Caudine Forks. 17 They did not then wish to follow the
view of the old man who counseled them to let the Romans go honorably or
kill them all, but took a middle way, disarming them and putting them
under the yoke, letting them go full of ignominy and indignation. So a little
later they came to know through their harm that the judgment of that old
man had been useful and their decision harmful, as will be fully discoursed
of in its place. 18

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m24 M

Fortresses Are Generally Much More
Harmful Than Useful

[1] To the wise of our times it will perhaps seem a thing not well considered
that when the Romans wished to secure themselves against the peoples of
Latium and of the city of Privernum, 1 they did not think of building some
fortress, which would be a check to keep them faithful, 2 especially since it
is a saying in Florence, cited by our wise ones, that Pisa and other similar
cities should be held with fortresses. 3 And truly if the Romans had been
made like them, they would have thought of building some; but because
they were of another virtue, of another judgment, of another power, they
did not build any. While Rome lived freely and followed its orders and its
virtuous institutions, it never built any to hold either cities or provinces; but
it did save 4 some of those that had been built. Hence, having seen the
Romans’ mode of proceeding in this business and that of the princes of our
times, it seems to me that it must be put into consideration whether it is
good to build fortresses, or whether they do harm or are useful to him who
builds them. Thus it should be considered that fortresses are made either to
defend oneself from enemies or to defend oneself from subjects. In the first
case they are not necessary; in the second they are harmful. Beginning to
give reasons why they are harmful in the second case, I say that for the
prince or republic that fears his or its subjects and their rebellion, such fear
must first arise from the hatred one’s subjects have for one, the hatred from
one’s bad behavior, and the bad behavior either from believing one can hold
them by force or from the lack of prudence of whoever governs them. One
of the things that make one believe he can force them is having fortresses
next to them; for the bad treatment that is the cause of their hatred arises in
good part from the prince’s or the republic’s having fortresses, which, when
this is true, are far more hurtful than useful. For first, as was said, they make
you more audacious and more violent toward your subjects. Then there is
not the security inside them that you persuade yourself of, since all the
forces and all the violence that are used to hold a people are null except for

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two: either you are always able to put a good army in the field, as the
Romans were; or you disperse, eliminate, disorder, and disunite them in
such a mode that they cannot get together to hurt you. Because if you
impoverish them, “arms remain to the despoiled”; 5 if you disarm them,
“fury supplies arms”; 6 if you kill their heads and follow by injuring the
others, the heads are reborn like those of the Hydra. If you make fortresses,
they are useful in times of peace because they give you more spirit to do
evil to them, but they are very useless in times of war because they are
assaulted by the enemy and by subjects; nor is it possible for them to put up
resistance to both the one and the other. And if ever they were less than
useless, it is in our times, in respect to artillery, because of whose fury it is
impossible to defend small places where one cannot withdraw to
embankments, as we discoursed of above. 8

[2] I wish to dispute this matter in more detail. Either you, prince, wish to
hold the people of your city in check with these fortresses, or you, prince or
republic, wish to check a city seized by war. I wish to turn to the prince,
and I say to him that to hold his citizens in check such a fortress cannot be
more useless, for the causes said above. For it makes you more prompt and
less hesitant to crush them, and this crushing makes them so disposed
toward your ruin and inflames them so that the fortress, which is the cause
of that, cannot then defend you. So much so that a wise and good prince, so
as to keep himself good and not to give cause to or dare his sons to become
bad, will never make a fortress, so that they may found themselves not upon
fortresses but upon the benevolence of men. And if Count Francesco Sforza,
who became duke of Milan, was reputed wise and nonetheless made a
fortress in Milan, I say that in this he was not wise, and the effect has
demonstrated that such a fortress was for his heirs’ harm, not their security.
For, judging that by means of it they could live securely while offending
their citizens and subjects, they did not spare 9 any kind of violence, so that
having become hateful beyond measure, 10 they lost that state when the
enemy first assaulted them. 11 In war that fortress neither defended them nor
was at all useful to them, and in peace it was of very much harm to them.
For if they had not had it, and if by their little prudence they had harshly
managed their citizens, they would have uncovered the danger sooner and
have withdrawn from it, and then would have been able to resist the French
thrust more spiritedly with friendly subjects and without a fortress than with
enemy ones and with the fortress. They do not help you in any aspect, for

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they are lost either through the fraud of whoever guards them, or through
the violence of whoever assaults them, or through starvation. And if you
wish that they should help you and aid you to recover a lost state, where the
fortress alone is left to you, you must have an army with which you can
assault him who has expelled you. And if you had that army, you would get
the state back in any case, even if the fortress were not there, and so much
the more easily as the men would be more friendly to you than they were to
you when you had badly treated them because of the pride of the fortress. It
is seen from experience that this fortress of Milan has not done anything
useful to either of them, neither the Sforzas nor the French, in times
adverse to the one or the other. Instead it has brought very much harm and
ruin to all, since because of it they did not think of a more honest mode of
holding that state. When Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino and son of Federico,
who in his times was such an esteemed captain, was expelled from his state
by Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI, and then returned there
through an accident that arose, he had all the fortresses that were in that
province ruined, since he judged them harmful. Since he was loved by men,
out of respect for them he did not want [fortresses]; and he saw he could not
defend [fortresses] on the enemy’s account, since an army in the field was
needed to defend them; so he turned to ruining them. Having expelled the
Bentivogli from Bologna, Pope Julius made a fortress in that city, and then
had the people vexed 12 by his governor. 13 The people therefore rebelled, he
lost the fortress at once, and thus the fortress did not help him and did hurt
him, whereas if he had behaved otherwise it would have helped him. When
Niccolo da Castello, father of the Vitelli, 14 returned to his fatherland, from
which he had been exiled, he at once demolished two fortresses Pope Sixtus
IV had built there, judging that not the fortress but the benevolence of the
people had to keep him in that state. But of all the other examples, that of
Genoa, which ensued in very recent times, is the freshest and most notable
in every aspect, and capable of showing the uselessness of building
[fortresses] and the utility of demolishing them. Everyone knows that in
1507 Genoa rebelled against Louis XII, king of France, who came in person
with all his forces to reacquire it. When he had recovered it, he made a
fortress stronger than all the others of which there is knowledge at present.
For it was impregnable by its site and by every other circumstance, being
placed upon the top of a hill that extends into the sea, called Codefa by the
Genoese. From it he could fire on the whole port and a great part of the city
of Genoa. It occurred then in 1512 that when the French troops were
expelled from Italy, Genoa rebelled, notwithstanding the fortress; Ottaviano

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Fregoso took over its state; and, with all industry, within a limit of sixteen
months he captured it by starvation. Everyone believed and many counseled
that he should have preserved it as his refuge for any accident, but being
very prudent he knew that not fortresses but the will of men maintains
princes in their states, and he ruined it. Thus founding his state not upon the
fortress but upon his virtue and prudence, he has held and holds it. And
whereas a thousand infantrymen were customarily enough to vary the state
of Genoa, his adversaries have assaulted him with ten thousand and have
not been able to hurt him. By this it is thus seen that demolishing the
fortress has not hurt Ottaviano and making it did not defend the king. For if
he were able to come into Italy with his army, he could have recovered
Genoa though he did not have a fortress there; but if he were unable to
come into Italy with his army, he could not have held Genoa though he did
have the fortress there. Thus for the king it was expensive to make and
shameful to lose; for Ottaviano it was glorious to reacquire and useful to
ruin.

[3] But let us come to the republics that make fortresses not in their
fatherlands but in towns they acquire. And if the said example of France
and Genoa should not be enough to show this fallacy, I wish Florence and
Pisa to be enough for me. The Florentines made fortresses there to hold that
city. They did not know that if they wished to hold a city that had always
been an enemy to the Florentine name, had lived freely, and had in rebellion
had freedom as its refuge, it was necessary to observe the Roman mode:
either to make it a partner or to demolish it. For the fortresses’ virtue was
seen during the coming of King Charles, 15 to whom they were given up
either through the lack of faith of those who guarded them or through fear
of a greater evil; whereas if there had not been any, the Florentines would
not have founded on them their ability 16 to hold Pisa, and the king would
not have been able to deprive the Florentines of that city in that way. The
modes by which it had been kept until that time would perhaps have been
sufficient to preserve it, and without doubt would not have given a worse
proof than the fortresses. I conclude thus that for holding one’s own
fatherland a fortress is harmful, and for holding towns that have been
acquired fortresses are useless. I wish to be enough for me the authority of
the Romans, who knocked down walls and did not put up walls in the lands
they wished to hold by violence. To whoever cites to me against this opinion
Taranto 17 in ancient and Brescia in modern times (which places were
recovered from the rebellion of subjects by means of fortresses), I respond

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that for the recovery of Taranto at the end 18 of a year Fabius Maximus was
sent with all of his army, which would have been capable of recovering it
even if the fortress had not been there—and even if Fabius did use that way,
if it had not been there he would have used another that would have had the
same effect. I do not know of what utility a fortress may be to restore a
town to you that for its recovery has need of a consular army and a Fabius
Maximus for captain. And that the Romans would have retaken it in any
case is seen by the example of Capua, where there was no fortress and they
reacquired it by virtue of the army. But let us come to Brescia. I say that
what occurred in that rebellion rarely occurs: that the fortress that is left
with your forces when the town has rebelled has an army that is big and
nearby, like that of the French. For Monsieur de Foix, the king’s captain,
was with his army at Bologna, and when he heard of the loss of Brescia he
went without at that point deferring it, arrived in three days at Brescia, and
got back the town through the fortress. To be able to help, therefore, even
the fortress of Brescia had need of a Monsieur de Foix and of a French
army that brought it relief in three days. Thus this example is not enough
against the contrary examples; for in the wars of our times very many
fortresses have been taken and retaken with the same fortune with which
the countryside was retaken and taken, not only in Lombardy, but in the
Romagna, in the kingdom of Naples, and throughout all parts of Italy.

[4] But as to the building of fortresses to defend oneself from enemies from
outside, I say that they are not necessary to peoples and kingdoms that have
good armies and are useless to those that do not have good armies. For good
armies without fortresses are sufficient to defend oneself, and fortresses
without good armies cannot defend you. This is seen from the experience of
those who have been held to be excellent both in government and in other
things, as is seen with the Romans and the Spartans: for if the Romans did
not build fortresses, the Spartans not only abstained from them but did not
permit their cities to have walls, for they wished for the virtue of the
individual man to defend them, and no other defense. Wherefore when a
Spartan was asked by an Athenian if the walls of Athens seemed to him
beautiful, he responded, “Yes, if they were inhabited by women.” 19 Thus if
a prince who has good armies has some fortress upon the seacoast at the
frontier of his state that can stand up against the enemy for several days
until he is in order, it would sometimes be a useful thing but is not
necessary. But if the prince does not have a good army, to have fortresses
throughout his state or at the frontiers is harmful or useless. Harmful since

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he easily loses them, and when lost they make war on him; or if they are,
however, so strong that the enemy cannot seize them, they are left behind by
the enemy army and come to be fruitless. For when they do not have very
hardy opposition, good armies enter into enemy countries without
hesitation over cities or fortresses that they may leave behind, as is seen in
the ancient histories and as is seen to have been clone by Francesco
Maria, 20 who to assault Urbino in very recent times left behind ten enemy
cities without any hesitation. Thus a prince who can make a good army can
do without building fortresses; one who does not have a good army should
not build them. He should fortify well the city he inhabits and keep it
provided and its citizens well disposed, to be able to sustain an enemy thrust
until either an accord or external aid may free him. All other plans are
expensive in times of peace and useless in times of war. And so he who will
consider all I have said will come to know that as the Romans were wise in
every other order of theirs, so were they prudent in this judgment of the
Latins and of the Privernates, in which, not thinking of fortresses, they
secured themselves against them with more virtuous and wiser modes.

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«25 a

To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize
It by Means of Its Disunion Is a
Contradictory Policy

[1] There was so much disunion between the plebs and the nobility in the
Roman republic that the Veientes, together with the Etruscans, thought that
by means of such disunion they could extinguish the Roman name. When
they had made an army and overrun the fields of Rome, the Senate sent
against them Gaius Manilius and Marcus Fabius. When they led their army
near the army of the Veientes, the Veientes did not cease both with assaults
and with opprobrium to offend and reproach the Roman name. So great
was their temerity and insolence that the Romans from being disunited
became united and, coming to fight, broke them and won. 1 It is seen,
therefore, how much men are deceived, as we discoursed of above, 2 in
taking up policies, and how often they believe they will gain a thing and they
lose it. The Veientes believed that by assaulting the disunited Romans they
would conquer them; and this assault was the cause of the union of the
latter and of their own ruin. For the cause of the disunion of republics is
usually idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war. Therefore, if
the Veientes had been wise, the more they saw Rome disunited, the more
they would have kept war distant from them and sought to crush them with
the arts of peace. The mode is to seek to become trusted by the city that is
disunited, and to manage oneself between the parties as an arbiter until they
come to arms. When they do come to arms, it is to give favors slowly to the
weaker party, both to keep them at war longer and make them consume
themselves and so that very large forces will not make them all fear that you
wish to crush them and become their prince. When this business is well
governed, it will almost always turn out to have the end that you set for
yourself. The city of Pistoia, as I said in another discourse 3 and for another
purpose, did not come under the republic of Florence by any art other than
this. Since it was divided, with the Florentines favoring now one party and

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now the other, they led it, without disapproval from either the one or the
other, to the limit where, tired of its tumultuous way of life, it came
spontaneously to throw itself into the arms 4 of Florence. The city of Siena
has never changed its state through the favor of the Florentines except when
the favors have been weak and few. For when they have been very large and
vigorous, they have made that city united in defense of the ruling state. I
wish to add one other example to those written above. Filippo Visconti,
duke of Milan, often started wars with the Florentines, founding himself on
their disunion, and was always left the loser, so that he had to say, grieving
over his enterprises, that the craziness of the Florentines had made him
spend two million in gold uselessly.

[2] Thus, as is said above, the Veientes and the Tuscans were left deceived
by this opinion and were finally overcome in one battle by the Romans. And
so in the future will anyone be left deceived by it who believes that by a
similar way and by a similar cause he can crush a people.

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*$26 m

Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred
against Those Who Use Them, without Any

Utility to Them

[1] I believe that one of the great prudences men use is to abstain from
menacing or injuring anyone with words. For neither the one nor the other
takes forces away from the enemy, but the one makes him more cautious
and the other makes him have greater hatred against you and think with
greater industry of how to hurt you. This is seen from the example of the
Veientes, who were discoursed of in the chapter above. They added to the
injury of the war against the Romans the opprobrium of words, from which
every prudent captain should make his soldiers abstain. For they are things
that ignite and inflame the enemy to revenge and, as was said, in no aspect
impede his offense, so much so that those who come against you are all
arms. A notable example of this once occurred in Asia, where Gabades,
captain of the Persians, had been in camp at Amida for some time and,
being tired of the tedium of the siege, decided to depart. Once he removed
his camp, those in the town all came onto the walls, made proud by the
victory, and did not spare 1 any kind of injury, reproaching, accusing, and
reproving the cowardice and poltroonery of the enemy. Angered by this,
Gabades changed his counsel and returned to the siege, and so great was the
indignation from the injury that in a few days he took and plundered it. 2
The same happened to the Veientes, for whom it was not enough, as was
said, to make war on the Romans; they also vituperated them with words.
Going as far as the stockade of their camp to speak injuriously to them, they
angered them much more with words than with arms. Those soldiers who
before had combated unwillingly constrained the consuls to join the fight so
that the Veientes, like the aforesaid, bore the punishment of their
contumacy. 3 Good princes of armies and good governors of republics have
then to take every opportune remedy so that these injuries and reproofs may
not be used either in the city or in his army, either among themselves or

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against the enemy. For used against the enemy the inconveniences written
above come from them, and among themselves they would do worse if not
provided against as prudent men have always provided against them. The
Roman legions, having been left at Capua, conspired against the Capuans, as
will be narrated in its place, 4 and when a sedition that arose from this
conspiracy was quieted by Valerius Corvinus, among the other institutions
in the convention that was made, they ordered very heavy punishments for
those who should ever reprove any of those soldiers for that sedition. 5 When
Tiberius Gracchus in the war with Hannibal was made captain over a
certain number of slaves that the Romans from lack of men had armed,
among the first things he ordered was capital punishment for anyone who
should reprove any one of them for their servitude. 6 So much was it
esteemed a harmful thing by the Romans, as was said above, to vilify men or
to reprove them for anything shameful, for there is nothing that inflames
their spirits so much or generates greater indignation, whether said as true
or as a joke. “For pungent jokes, when drawn too much from truth, leave a
bitter memory.” 7

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«27 M

For Prudent Princes and Republics It
Should Be Enough to Conquer, for Most
Often When It Is Not Enough, One Loses

[1] Using words of little honor against the enemy arises most often from an
insolence that either victory or the false hope of victory gives you. This false
hope makes men err not only in speaking but also in working. For when this
hope enters into the breasts of men, it makes them pass beyond the mark
and most often lose the opportunity of having a certain good through hoping
to have an uncertain better. Because this is a limit that deserves
consideration, since men are very often deceived about it to the harm of
their state, it seems to me that it should be demonstrated through
particulars, with ancient and modern examples, since it cannot be
demonstrated so distinctly through reasons. After Hannibal had defeated the
Romans at Cannae, he sent his spokesmen to Carthage to announce the
victory and request assistance. 1 What had to be done was disputed in the
Senate there. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian citizen, counseled
that this victory should be used wisely to make peace with the Romans,
since they, having won, could have it with honorable conditions, and one
should not wait to have to make one after a loss. For the intention of the
Carthaginians should have been to show the Romans that they were able
enough to combat them, and, having had victory over them, one should not
seek to lose it through the hope of a greater. This policy was not taken up,
but it was known well by the Carthaginian Senate to have been wise later
when the opportunity was lost.

[2] When Alexander the Great had already taken all of the East, the
republic of Tyre (which was noble and powerful in those times through
having their city in water like the Venetians), having seen the greatness of
Alexander, sent him spokesmen to say to him that they wished to be his
good servants and to give him the obedience he wished but that they were
not ready to accept either him or his troops into the town. 2 Whereupon,

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indignant that a city wished to close to him the gates that all the world had
opened to him, Alexander repelled them, did not accept their conditions,
and encamped there. The town was in water and very well supplied with
provisions and other supplies necessary for its defense—so much so that
after four months Alexander perceived that one city was taking him more
time to its glory than many other acquisitions had taken him, and he
decided to try for an accord and concede them what they themselves had
asked. But those of Tyre had been made proud and not only did not wish to
accept the accord, but killed those who came to put it into practice.
Indignant at this, Alexander set himself to its capture with so much force
that he took it, demolished it, and killed and made slaves of the men.

[3] In 1512 a Spanish army came into the Florentine dominion to put the
Medici back in Florence and tax the city, brought by citizens from inside
who had given them hope that once they were in the Florentine dominion
they would take up arms in their favor. Having entered onto the plain and
not discovering anyone, and having a lack of provisions, they tried for an
accord, which the people of Florence, having become proud, did not accept,
whence arose the loss of Prato and the ruin of that state. 3

[4] Therefore princes who are assaulted cannot make a greater error, when
the assault is made by men very much more powerful than they, than to
refuse every accord, especially when it is offered to them. For one will never
be offered so base that there is not inside it in some part the well-being of
him who accepts it, and there will be a part of victory for him. For it should
have been enough for the people of Tyre that Alexander accepted the
conditions he had refused before, and their victory was enough when with
arms in hand they had made such a man condescend to their wish. It should
have been enough also for the Florentine people and have been victory
enough for them if the Spanish army yielded to some of their wishes and
did not fulfill all of its own. For the intention of that army was to change the
state in Florence, to remove it from its devotion to France, and to draw
money from it. If of three things it had two of them (which were the last
two) and one remained to the people (which was the preservation of its
state), each had in that some honor and some satisfaction. Nor should the
people have cared about the two things since it remained alive; nor should it
have wished to put that—even if it had seen a greater and almost certain
victory—in any part at the discretion of fortune, thereby going to the last
stake, which nobody prudent ever risks unless necessitated. When Hannibal
departed from Italy, where for sixteen years he had been glorious, called

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back by his Carthaginians to relieve the fatherland, he found Hasdrubal and
Syphax defeated and found the kingdom of Numidia lost and Carthage
restricted to the limits of its walls, with no refuge remaining to it other than
him and his army. 4 Knowing that this was the last stake of his fatherland, he
did not wish to put it at risk before he had tried every other remedy. He was
not ashamed to ask for peace since he judged that if his fatherland had any
remedy it was in that and not in war. When that was denied him, he did not
wish to fail to engage in combat, even if he should lose, since he judged that
he was still able to win or, losing, to lose gloriously. And if Hannibal, who
was so virtuous and had his army intact, sought peace before fighting, when
he saw that by losing it his fatherland would become servile, what should
another do of less virtue and of less experience than he? But men make this
error who do not know how to put limits to their hopes, and, by founding
themselves on these without otherwise measuring themselves, they are
ruined.

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«28

How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a
Prince Not to Avenge an Injury Done
against the Public or against a Private

Person

[1] What indignation makes men do is easily known from what happened to
the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as spokesmen to the French who
had come to assault Tuscany and Chiusi in particular. 2 Since the people of
Chiusi had sent to Rome for aid against the French, the Romans sent
ambassadors who in the name of the Roman people were to signify to the
French that they should abstain from making war on the Tuscans. When the
French and the Tuscans came to fight, these spokesmen, being on the spot
and more capable of doing than saying, put themselves among the first to
combat against the former. From this it arose that since they were
recognized by them, [the French] turned against the Romans all the
indignation they had against the Tuscans. This indignation became greater
because when the French through their ambassadors made a complaint to
the Roman Senate about this injury, and asked that in satisfaction of that
harm the Fabii written above should be given over to them, not only were
they not consigned to them or punished in any other mode, but when the
electoral meetings came they were made tribunes with consular power. So
that when the French saw those honored who should have been punished,
they took all to have been done for their disparagement and ignominy.
Inflamed with indignation and anger, they came to assault Rome and took
it, except for the Capitol. This ruin arose for the Romans only through the
inobservance of justice, for when their ambassadors sinned “against the law
of nations” 3 and should have been punished, they were honored. It is
therefore to be considered how much every republic and every prince should
take account of doing similar injuries, not only against a collectivity but
even against an individual. For if a man is greatly offended either by the

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public or by a private person 4 and is not avenged according to his
satisfaction, if he lives in a republic he seeks to avenge himself, even if with
its ruin; and if he lives under a prince and has any generosity in himself he
is never quiet until he avenges himself against him, even if he sees evil for
himself in that.

[2] To verify this there is no example more beautiful or more true than that
of Philip King of Macedon, father of Alexander. He had in his court
Pausanias, a beautiful and noble youth, with whom Attalus, one of the first
men near Philip, was in love. Having often sought to get him to consent to
him, and finding him averse to such things, he decided to have by deception
and by force that which he saw he could not have by any other direction.
Having made a festive 5 banquet to which came Pausanias and many other
noble barons, after everyone was full of food and wine, he had Pausanias
taken and brought bound, and not only vented his own lust by force, but also
for greater ignominy had him reproached in a similar mode by many of the
others. Pausanias complained of this injury often to Philip, who, after
holding him for a time in hope that he would be avenged, not only did not
avenge him but elevated Attalus to the government of a province of Greece.
Whereupon Pausanias, seeing his enemy honored and not punished, turned
all his indignation not against the one who had done him the injury but
against Philip, who had not avenged him. On the festive 6 morning of the
wedding of Philip’s daughter, whom he had married to Alexander of Epirus,
when Philip was going to the temple to celebrate it in the middle of the two
Alexanders, son-in-law and son, he killed him. 7 This example is very
similar to that of the Romans and notable for whoever governs. For he
should never esteem a man so little that he believes that when he adds injury
on top of injury, he who is injured will not think of avenging himself with
every danger and particular harm for himself.

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«29 M

Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It
Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans

[1] If how human affairs proceed is considered well, it will be seen that
often things arise and accidents come about that the heavens have not
altogether wished to be provided against. And if what I say happened at
Rome (where there was so much virtue, so much religion, and so much
order), it is no marvel that it should happen much more often in a city or a
province that lacks the things said above. Because this place is very notable
for demonstrating the power of heaven over human affairs, Titus Livy
demonstrates it extensively and in very efficacious words, saying that since
heaven for some end wished the Romans to know its power, it first made the
Fabii err, whom they sent as spokesmen to the French, and by means of
their work incited the latter to make war on Rome. Then it ordered that
nothing worthy of the Roman people should be done in Rome to put down
that war, having ordered before that Camillus, who alone could have been
the sole remedy for such an evil, should be sent into exile at Ardea. 1 Then,
when the French came toward Rome, they who had often created a dictator
as a remedy for the thrust of the Volsci and other neighboring enemies of
theirs did not create one when the French came. Also, in making the levy of
soldiers, they made it weakly and without any extraordinary diligence; and
they were so lazy in taking up arms that they were only with trouble in time
to encounter the French above the river Allia, ten miles distant from
Rome. 2 There the tribunes put their camp without any of the accustomed
diligence—not looking at the place in advance, not surrounding it with a
trench and a stockade, and not using any remedy, human or divine. And in
ordering the battle they made the ranks 3 sparse and weak, in such a mode
that neither the soldiers nor the captains did anything worthy of Roman
discipline. They engaged in combat without any blood, for they fled before
they were assaulted; the greater part of them went to Veii and the others
withdrew to Rome. Without otherwise entering their homes, they entered
the Capitol in such a mode that the Senate, without thinking of defending

289

Rome, did not even close the gates, and part of them fled and part of them
entered the Capitol with the others. In defending it, however, they used
some orders without tumult. For they did not weigh it down with useless
persons; they put there all the grain they could so that they would be able to
endure the siege; and of the useless crowd of old men, women, and children,
the greater part fled to the towns round about and the remainder stayed in
Rome as prey for the French. So whoever had read of the things done by
that people for so many years before and then read of those times could not
believe in any mode that it was one and the same people. After speaking of
all the disorders spoken of above, Titus Livy concludes by saying, “So much
does Fortune blind spirits where it does not wish its gathering strength
checked.” 4 Nor can this conclusion be more true, so that men who live
ordinarily in great adversity or prosperity deserve less praise or less blame.
For most often it will be seen that they have been brought to ruin or to
greatness through a great advantage that the heavens have provided them,
giving or taking away from them an opportunity to be able to work
virtuously.

[2] Fortune does this well, since when it wishes to bring about great things
it elects a man of so much spirit and so much virtue that he recognizes the
opportunities that it proffers him. Thus in the same manner, when it wishes
to bring about great ruin, it prefers men who can aid in that ruin. And if
anyone should be there who could withstand it, either it kills him or it
deprives him of all faculties of being able to work anything well. One knows
very well from this text that to make Rome greater and lead it to that
greatness it came to, fortune judged it was necessary to beat it (as we will
discourse of at length in the beginning of the following book), 5 but still did
not wish to ruin it altogether. For this it is seen to have had Camillus exiled
but not killed; made Rome be taken but not the Capitol; and ordered that
the Romans not think of any good thing to protect Rome but later not lack
any good order to defend the Capitol. So that Rome would be taken, it
made the greater part of the soldiers who had been defeated at the Allia go
from there to Veii and thus cut off all ways for the defense of the city of
Rome. In ordering this, it prepared everything for its recovery, having led an
intact Roman army to Veii and Camillus to Ardea, so it would be possible
to make a massive body 6 under a captain not stained with any ignominy
from the loss and with his reputation intact for the recovery of his
fatherland.

290

[3] We could bring up some modern example in confirmation of the things
said, but because we do not judge it necessary since this can satisfy anyone
whatever, we will omit it. I indeed affirm it anew to be very true, according
to what is seen through all the histories, that men can second fortune but
not oppose it, that they can weave its warp but not break it. They should
indeed never give up 7 for, since they do not know its end and it proceeds by
oblique and unknown ways, they have always to hope and, since they hope,
not to give up in whatever fortune and in whatever travail they may find
themselves.

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«30 ft

Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy
Friendships Not with Money but with
Virtue and the Reputation of Strength

[1] The Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and although they awaited
relief from Veii and Camillus, since they were being expelled by starvation,
they came to a settlement with the French to buy themselves off for a
certain quantity of gold. 1 The gold was already being weighed on the basis
of such a convention when Camillus came up with his army. Fortune did
this, the historian says, “so that Romans should not live redeemed by gold.” 2
This affair is notable not only in this aspect but throughout the course of
this republic’s actions, in which it is seen that they never acquired lands
with money, never made peace with money, but always with the virtue of
arms—which I do not believe ever happened to any other republic. Among
the other signs by which the power of a strong state is known is seeing how
it lives with its neighbors. And if it governs itself so that to keep it friendly
the neighbors become its tributaries, then that is a certain sign that state is
powerful; but if said neighbors, although inferior to it, draw money from it,
then that is a great sign of its weakness.

[2] Let all the Roman histories be read, and you will see that the
Massilians, 4 the Aedui, 5 the Rhodians, 6 Hiero the Syracusan, 7 and Kings
Eumenes 8 and Massinissa, 9 who all were neighbors of the borders of the
Roman Empire, contributed to expenses and tributes for its needs so as to
have its friendship, not seeking any reward from it other than to be
defended. The contrary will be seen in weak states. Beginning with ours of
Florence, in times past, when its reputation was greater, there was no
lordling in the Romagna who did not have a stipend from it; and
furthermore it gave to the Perugians, the Castellans, and all its other
neighbors. For if that city had been armed and vigorous, all would have
gone to the contrary: to have protection from it, many would have given
money to it, and sought not to sell it their friendship but to buy its. Nor have

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the Florentines alone lived in this cowardice, but also the Venetians, and the
king of France, who with so great a kingdom lives as a tributary of the
Swiss and of the king of England. All of which arises from his having
disarmed his people and from that king and the others named before having
wished rather to enjoy the present utility of being able to plunder their
peoples, and to escape an imagined rather than a true danger, than to do
things that might secure them and make their states perpetually happy. If
this disorder brings forth some quiet, with time it is of necessity a cause of
irremediable harms and min. It would be lengthy to tell how often the
Florentines, the Venetians, and that kingdom have bought themselves off in
their wars, and how often they have submitted to an ignominy to which the
Romans only once were about to submit. It would be lengthy to tell how
many lands the Florentines and the Venetians have bought: one saw later the
disorder of this, and that the things they acquire with gold they do not know
how to defend with steel. The Romans observed this generosity and this
mode of life while they lived freely; but later, when they entered under the
emperors, and the emperors began to be bad and to love the shade more
than the sun, they also began to buy themselves off, now from the Parthians,
now from the Germans, now from other peoples round about, which was the
beginning of the ruin of so great an empire.

[3] Similar inconveniences proceed, therefore, from having disarmed your
people, from which results another greater one: that the nearer the enemy
draws to you, the weaker he finds you. For he who lives in the modes said
above treats those subjects inside his empire badly and those on the borders
of his empire well, so as to have well-disposed men to keep the enemy
distant. From this it arises that to keep him more distant, he gives stipends
to the lords and peoples who are nearby his borders. Hence it arises that
states made thus put up a little resistance on his borders, but when the
enemy has passed them, they do not have any remedy. And they do not
perceive that this mode of proceeding of theirs is against every good order.
For the heart and the vital parts of a body have to be kept armed and not its
extremities, since without the latter it lives, but if the former are hurt it
dies; and these states keep the heart unarmed and the hands and feet armed.

[4] What this disorder has done to Florence was seen and is seen every day:
as soon as an army passes beyond its borders and enters near its heart, it
does not find any more remedy. Of the Venetians the same proof was seen a
few years ago; and if their city were not wrapped by the waters, its end
would have been seen. This experience is not seen so often in France,

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because it is so great a kingdom that it has few enemies superior to it;
nonetheless, when the English assaulted that kingdom in 1513, the whole
province shook, and the king himself and everyone else judged that one
defeat alone might have taken away from him the kingdom and the state. 10
The contrary happened to the Romans, for the nearer the enemy drew to
Rome, the more powerful he found that city in resisting him. In the coming
of Hannibal into Italy, one sees that after three defeats 11 and so many
deaths of captains and soldiers, they could not only stand up against the
enemy but win the war. All this arose from having the heart well armed and
taking less account of the extremities. For the foundation of its state was
the people of Rome, the Latin name, the other partner towns in Italy, and
their colonies, from which they drew so many soldiers that with them they
were sufficient to combat and hold the world. That this is true is seen from
the question Hanno the Carthaginian asked Hannibal’s spokesmen after the
defeat of Cannae. 12 After they had magnified the things done by Hannibal,
they were asked by Hanno whether anyone had come from the Roman
people to ask for peace and whether any town of the Latin name or of the
colonies had rebelled against the Romans. When they answered negatively
as to both the one thing and the other, Hanno replied, “This war is still as
intact as before.” 13

[5] One sees, therefore, both from this discourse and from what we have
often said elsewhere, how much difference there is between the mode of
proceeding of the present republics and that of the ancient ones. Because of
this, one also sees miraculous losses and miraculous acquisitions every day.
For where men have little virtue, fortune shows its power very much; and
because it is variable, republics and states often vary and will always vary
until someone emerges who is so much a lover of antiquity that he regulates
it in such a mode that it does not have cause to show at every turning of the
sun how much it can do.

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«31 ft

How Dangerous It Is to Believe the

Banished

[1] It does not seem to me outside the purpose to reason, among these other
discourses, about how dangerous it is to believe those who have been
expelled from their fatherland, these being things that have to be put into
practice every day by those who hold states, especially since this can be
demonstrated by a memorable example brought up by Titus Livy in his
histories, although outside his purpose. 1 When Alexander the Great passed
with his army into Asia, Alexander of Epirus, his brother-in-law and uncle,
came with troops into Italy, called by the banished Lucanians, who gave
him hope that by means of them he could seize all of that province. Hence,
having come into Italy under their faith and hope, he was killed by them,
since they had been promised a return to their fatherland by their fellow
citizens if they killed him. It should therefore be considered how vain are
both the faith and the promises of those who find themselves deprived of
their fatherland. For as to faith, it has to be reckoned that whenever they can
reenter their fatherland by means other than yours, they will leave you and
draw close to others, notwithstanding whatever promises they have made
you. And as to vain promises and hopes, their wish to return home is so
extreme that they naturally believe many things that are false, and from art
add many more to them. So that between what they believe and what they
say they believe, they fill you with such hope that by founding yourself on it,
either you make an expense in vain or you undertake an enterprise in which
you are ruined.

[2] I wish the aforesaid Alexander and furthermore Themistocles the
Athenian to be enough for me as examples. The latter, when he was made a
rebel, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so much if he would
assault Greece that Darius turned to the enterprise. When Themistocles
then could not observe those promises to him, either from shame or from
fear of torture, he poisoned himself. And if this error was made by
Themistocles, a very excellent man, it should be reckoned how much those

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err in this who from less virtue let themselves be pulled more by their wish
and their passion. 2 A prince should thus go slowly in taking up enterprises
on the report of someone banished, 3 since most often he is left either with
shame or with very grave harm. And because taking towns furtively and
through intelligence from others in them rarely succeeds, it does not seem
to me outside the purpose to discourse of that in the following chapter,
adding to that by how many modes the Romans acquired them.

t$j

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«32 M

In How Many Modes the Romans Seized

Towns

[1] Since all the Romans turned to war, they always made it with every
advantage, both as to expense and as to every other thing sought in it. From
this it arose that they guarded themselves from taking towns by siege, for
they judged the expense and inconvenience of this mode to be so great as to
overcome by far the utility that could be drawn from what it acquired.
Because of this they thought it would be better and more useful to subjugate
towns by every other mode than by besieging them—hence, in so many wars
and in so many years, there are very few examples of sieges made by them.
The modes, then, by which they acquired cities were either by storm or by
surrender. Storming was either by force and open violence or by force
mixed with fraud. Open violence was either by assault without knocking
down the walls (which they called “attacking the city with a crown,” 1 for
they surrounded the city with the whole army and engaged in combat from
all sides, and they very often succeeded in taking even a very big city in one
assault, as when Scipio took New Carthage in Spain); 2 or, if this assault was
not enough, they addressed themselves to breaking the walls with rams and
with other of their war machines; or they made a mine and entered the city
through it (by which mode they took the city of the Veientes); 3 or, to be
equal to those who defended the walls, they made towers of wood or made
barricades of earth leaning on the walls from outside so as to reach their
height on those. Against these assaults, whoever defended in the first case,
that of being assaulted all around, bore more immediate danger and had
more doubtful remedies. For he needed to have very many defenders in
every place, and either those that he had were not so many that they could
either cope everywhere or reinforce one another, or, if they could, they were
not all of equal spirit to resist, and through one part that yielded in the
fighting they all lost. Therefore it often occurred, as I have said, that this
mode had a happy outcome. But when it did not succeed at first, they did
not retain it much because it was a dangerous mode for the army. For it

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extended itself over so much space that it was left too weak everywhere to
be able to resist a sortie that those inside might make, and also the soldiers
disordered and tired themselves; but once and unexpectedly they would try
such a mode. As to breaking the walls, it was opposed, as in the present
times, with embankments. To resist mines they made a countermine, and
through it opposed the enemy either with arms or with other devices,
among which were filling barrels with feathers that they set fire to and, once
inflamed, put in the mine, which with smoke and stench impeded the
enemy’s entry. And if they assaulted them with towers, they devised how to
ruin them with fire. And as to embankments of earth, they broke the wall at
the lower part where the embankment leaned and drew inside the earth that
those outside piled up there; so that with the earth being put there from
outside and removed from inside, the embankment did not grow. These
modes of storming cannot be tried at length, but one needs either to leave
the field or seek to win the war by other modes (as Scipio did when, having
entered into Africa and having assaulted Utica and not succeeded in taking
it, he left the field and sought to break the Carthaginian armies), 4 or truly to
turn to the siege (as they did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and
similar towns they seized by siege). As to acquiring towns by furtive
violence, it occurs as happened at Palaepolis, which the Romans seized
through a treaty with those inside. 5 Many stormings of this sort have been
tried by the Romans and by others, and few have succeeded. The reason is
that every least impediment breaks the plan, and impediments come about
easily. For either 6 the conspiracy is uncovered before one gets to the act—
and it is uncovered without much difficulty, partly because of the
faithlessness of those to whom it is communicated and partly because of the
difficulty of putting it into practice, since one has to meet with enemies and
with those with whom you are not permitted to speak unless under some
color. But if the conspiracy is not uncovered in managing it, a thousand
difficulties emerge later in the act. For if you come before the planned time
or if you come afterward, everything is spoiled; if a fortuitous noise is
raised, as by the geese of the Capitol, if an accustomed order is broken—
every least error, every least mistake that is made ruins the enterprise.
Added to this is the darkness of the night, which puts more fear in whoever
labors in those dangerous things. And since the greater part of the men who
are led to similar enterprises are inexpert in the site of the country and the
places where they are brought, they become confused, cowardly, and
embroiled from every least and fortuitous accident, and every false

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imagination is able to make them turn about. Nor was anyone ever found
who was more happy in these fraudulent and nocturnal expeditions than
Aratus of Sicyon, 7 who was as worthy in these as he was pusillanimous in
daylight and open struggle. This can be judged to have been rather from a
hidden virtue in him than because there should naturally have been more
happiness in these. Thus of these modes very many are put into practice,
few are brought to the proof, and very few succeed.

[2] As to acquiring towns by surrender, they give themselves either willingly
or forcibly. The will arises either from some extrinsic necessity that
constrains them to take refuge with you, as Capua did with the Romans, or
from desire to be well governed, when they are attracted by the good
government that prince holds over those who willingly consign themselves
into his lap, as did the Rhodians, the Massilians, and other similar cities
who gave themselves to the Roman people. As to forced surrender, either
such force arises from a long siege, as was said above, or it arises from a
continual crushing by raids, depredations, and other ill treatment, wishing
to escape from which a city surrenders. Of all the said modes, the Romans
used the last more than any; for more than four hundred fifty years they paid
attention to tiring out their neighbors with defeats and raids and to gaining
reputation over them by means of accords, as we have discoursed of
elsewhere. 8 On such a mode they always founded themselves, although they
tried them all, but in the others they found things that were either dangerous
or useless. For in a siege, there are length and expense; in storming, doubt
and danger; in conspiracies, uncertainty. They saw that with a defeat of an
enemy army they acquired a kingdom in a day, and in taking an obstinate
city by siege they consumed many years.

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*$33 ft

How the Romans Gave Free Commissions
to Their Captains of Armies

[1] I reckon that when reading this Livian history and wishing to profit from
it, all the modes of proceeding of the Roman people and Senate should be
considered. Among the other things that deserve consideration is seeing
with what authority they sent their consuls, dictators, and other captains of
armies outside. Their authority is seen to have been very great and the
Senate not to have reserved any authority to itself other than that of starting
new wars and of ratifying peace, and it consigned all other things to the
judgment and power of the consul. For once the people and the Senate had
decided upon a war—for instance, against the Latins—they consigned all
the rest to the judgment of the consul, who could either wage a battle or not
wage it, encamp at this town or that other one, as he liked. 1 These things are
verified by many examples, especially by what occurred in an expedition
against the Tuscans. 2 For when Fabius the consul had defeated them near
Sutri and then planned to pass with his army through the Ciminian forest
and go into Tuscany, not only did he not take counsel with the Senate, but
he did not give them any knowledge of it, although the war would have to
be waged in a new, doubtful, and dangerous country. This is testified to also
by the decisions made by the Senate about that. It had heard of the victory
Fabius had had and feared he would take up the policy of passing through
the said forest into Tuscany. Judging that it would be good not to attempt
that war and run into that danger, it sent two legates to Fabius to make him
understand he was not to pass into Tuscany. They arrived when he had
already passed through there and had had the victory, and instead of being
impeders of the war they turned into ambassadors of the acquisition and the
glory that was gained. Whoever will consider this limit well will see it was
used very prudently. For if the Senate had wished that a consul should
proceed into war little by little 3 according to his commission, it would have
made him less circumspect and more slow, for it would not have seemed to
him that the victory would have been all his but that the Senate, by whose

300

counsel he was governed, would share in it. Besides this, the Senate would
have been obliged to wish to give counsel about a thing that it could not
understand, for notwithstanding that in it were men all very much trained in
war, nonetheless, since it was not on the spot and did not know infinite
particulars that are necessary to know for whoever wishes to give counsel
well, it would have made infinite errors in giving counsel. Because of this
they wished that the consul should act by himself and that the glory should
be all his—the love of which, they judged, would be a check and a rule to
make him work well. This part is more willingly noted by me since I see
that the republics of the present times, such as the Venetian and the
Florentine, understand it otherwise, and if their captains, superintendents,
or commissioners have to set up one artillery piece, they wish to understand
and give counsel about it. This mode deserves the praise that the others
deserve, all of which together have led them to the limits where they at
present find themselves.

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Third Book

If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Live
Long, It Is Necessary to Draw It Back
Often toward Its Beginning

[1] It is a very true thing that all worldly things have a limit to their life; but
generally those go the whole course that is ordered for them by heaven, that
do not disorder their body but keep it ordered so that either it does not alter
or, if it alters, it is for its safety and not to its harm. Because I am speaking
of mixed bodies, such as republics and sects, I say that those alterations are
for safety that lead them back toward their beginnings. So those are better
ordered and have longer life that by means of their orders can often be
renewed or indeed that through some accident outside the said order come
to the said renewal. And it is a thing clearer than light that these bodies do
not last if they do not renew themselves.

[2] The mode of renewing them is, as was said, to lead them back toward
their beginnings. For all the beginnings of sects, republics, and kingdoms
must have some goodness in them, by means of which they may regain their
first reputation and their first increase. Because in the process of time that
goodness is corrupted, unless something intervenes to lead it back to the
mark, it of necessity kills that body. Speaking of the bodies of men, these
doctors of medicine say “that daily something is added that at some time
needs cure.” 1 Speaking of republics, this return toward the beginning is
done through either extrinsic accident or intrinsic prudence. As to the first,
one sees that it was necessary that Rome be taken by the French, if one
wished that it be reborn and, by being reborn, regain new fife and new
virtue, and regain the observance of religion and justice, which were
beginning to be tainted in it. This is very well understood through Livy’s
history, where he shows that in taking out the army against the French, and
in creating the tribunes with consular power, they did not observe any
religious ceremony. 2 So, likewise, not only did they not punish the three
Fabii who “against the law of nations” 3 had engaged in combat against the

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French, but they created them tribunes. 4 It ought to be easily presupposed
that they were beginning to take less account of other good institutions
ordered by Romulus and by the other prudent princes than was reasonable
and necessary to maintain their free way of life. Thus came this external 5
beating, so that all the orders of the city might be regained and that it might
be shown to that people that it was necessary not only to maintain religion
and justice but also to esteem its good citizens and to take more account of
their virtue than of those advantages that it appeared to them they lacked
through their works. This, one sees, succeeded exactly; for as soon as Rome
was retaken, they renewed all the orders of their ancient religion, they
punished the Fabii who had engaged in combat “against the law of
nations,” 6 and next they so much esteemed the virtue and goodness of
Camillus that they put aside all envy—the Senate and the others—and they
again placed all the weight of that republic on him. 7 It is thus necessary, as
was said, that men who live together in any order whatever often examine
themselves either through these extrinsic accidents or through intrinsic
ones. As to the latter, it must arise either from a law that often looks over
the account for the men who are in that body or indeed from a good man
who arises among them, who with his examples and his virtuous works
produces the same effect as the order.

[3] Thus this good emerges in republics either through the virtue of a man
or through the virtue of an order. As to this last, the orders that drew the
Roman republic back toward its beginning were the tribunes of the plebs,
the censors, and all the other laws that went against the ambition and the
insolence of men. Such orders have need of being brought to life by the
virtue of a citizen who rushes spiritedly to execute them against the power
of those who transgress them. Notable among such executions, before the
taking of Rome by the French, 8 were the death of the sons of Brutus, 9 the
death of the ten citizens, 10 and that of Maelius the grain dealer; 11 after the
taking of Rome it was the death of Manlius Capitolinus, 12 the death of the
son of Manlius Torquatus, 13 the execution of Papirius Cursor against his
master of the cavalrymen Fabius, 14 and the accusation of the Scipios. 15
Because they were excessive and notable, such things made men draw back
toward the mark whenever one of them arose; and when they began to be
more rare, they also began to give more space to men to corrupt themselves
and to behave with greater danger and more tumult. For one should not
wish ten years at most to pass from one to another of such executions; for

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when this time is past, men begin to vary in their customs and to transgress
the laws. Unless something arises by which punishment is brought back to
their memory and fear is renewed in their spirits, soon so many delinquents
join together that they can no longer be punished without danger. Those
who governed the state of Florence from 1434 up to 1494 used to say, to
this purpose, that it was necessary to regain the state every five years;
otherwise, it was difficult to maintain it. 16 They called regaining the state
putting that terror and that fear in men that had been put there in taking it,
since at that time they had beaten down those who, according to that mode
of life, had worked for ill. But as the memory of that beating is eliminated,
men began to dare to try new things and to say evil; and so it is necessary to
provide for it, drawing [the state] back toward its beginnings. This drawing
back of republics toward their beginning arises also from the simple virtue
of one man, without depending on any law that stimulates you to any
execution; nonetheless, they are of such reputation and so much example
that good men desire to imitate them and the wicked are ashamed to hold
to a life contrary to them. In Rome those who particularly produced these
good effects were Horatius Coclus, 17 Scaevola, 18 Fabricius, 19 the two
Decii, 20 Regulus Attilius, 21 and some others who with their rare and
virtuous examples produced in Rome almost the same effect that laws and
orders produced. If the executions written above, together with these
particular examples, had continued at least every ten years in that city, it
follows of necessity that it would never have been corrupt; but as both of
these two things began to diminish, corruptions began to multiply. For after
Marcus Regulus no like example may be seen there, and although the two
Catos emerged in Rome, there was so much distance from him to them and
between them from one to the other, and they remained so alone, that with
their good examples they were not able to do any good work—and
especially the last Cato, who, finding the city in good part corrupt, was not
able to make the citizens become better with his example. 22 Let this be
enough as to republics.

[4] But as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the
example of our religion, which would be altogether eliminated if it had not
been drawn back toward its beginning by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick.
For with poverty and with the example of the fife of Christ they brought
back into the minds of men what had already been eliminated there. Their
new orders were so powerful that they are the cause that the dishonesty of
the prelates and of the heads of the religion do not ruin it. Living still in

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poverty and having so much credit with peoples in confessions and sermons,
they give them to understand that it is evil to say evil of evil, and that it is
good to live under obedience to them and, if they make an error, to leave
them for God to punish. So they do the worst they can because they do not
fear the punishment that they do not see and do not believe. This renewal,
therefore, has maintained and maintains this religion. 23

[5] Kingdoms also have need of renewing themselves and of bringing back
their laws toward their beginnings. How much good effect this part
produces is seen in the kingdom of France, which lives under laws and
under orders more than any other kingdom. Parlements are those who
maintain these laws and orders, especially that of Paris. 24 They are renewed
by it whenever it makes an execution against a prince of that kingdom and
when it condemns the king in its verdicts. Up until now it has maintained
itself by having been an obstinate executor against the nobility; but
whenever it should leave any of them unpunished and they should come to
multiply, without doubt it would arise either that they would have to be
corrected with great disorder or that that kingdom would be dissolved.

[6] One therefore concludes that nothing is more necessary in a common
way of life, whether it is sect or kingdom or republic, than to give back to it
the reputation it had in its beginnings, and to contrive that it be either good
orders or good men that produce this effect, and not have an extrinsic force
to produce it. For although sometimes it is the best remedy, as it was in
Rome, it is so dangerous that it is not in any way to be desired. To
demonstrate to anyone how much the actions of particular men made Rome
great and caused many good effects in that city, I shall come to the
narration and discourse of them; within these limits this third book and last
part of this first decade will conclude. Although the actions of the kings
were great and notable, nonetheless since the history states them
thoroughly, I shall omit them; nor shall I speak of them otherwise except for
anything they may have worked pertaining to their private advantage; and I
shall begin with Brutus, father of Roman liberty. 23

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a

That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate
Craziness at the Right Time 1

[1] There was never anyone so prudent nor esteemed so wise for any
eminent work of his than Junius Brutus deserves to be held in his
simulation of stupidity. Although Titus Livy expresses but one cause that
induced him to such simulation, which was to be able to live more securely
and to maintain his patrimony, nonetheless when his mode of proceeding is
considered, it can be believed that he also simulated this to be less observed
and to have more occasion for crushing the kings and freeing his own
fatherland whenever opportunity would be given him. That he thought of
this may be seen, first, in the interpreting of the oracle of Apollo, when he
simulated falling so as to kiss the earth, judging that through this he would
have the gods favorable to his thoughts, 2 and afterward, when over the dead
Lucretia he was the first among her father and husband and other relatives
to draw the knife from the wound and to make the bystanders swear that
they would never endure that in the future anyone should reign in Rome. 3
From his example all those who are discontented with a prince have to
learn: they should first measure and first weigh their forces, and if they are
so powerful that they can expose themselves as his enemies and make war
on him openly, they should enter on this way, as less dangerous and more
honorable. But if they are of such quality that their forces are not enough
for making open war, they should seek with all industry to make themselves
friends to him; and to this effect, they should enter on all those ways that
they judge to be necessary, following his pleasures and taking delight in all
those things they see him delighting in. This familiarity, first, makes you live
secure, and without carrying any danger it makes you enjoy the good
fortune of that prince together with him and affords you every occasion for
satisfying your intent. It is true that some say that with princes one should
not wish to stand so close that their ruin includes you, nor so far that you
would not be in time to rise above their ruin when they are being ruined.
Such a middle way would be the truest if it could be observed, but because I

307

believe that it is impossible, one must be reduced to the two modes written
above—that is, either to distance oneself from or to bind oneself to them.
Whoever does otherwise, if he is a man notable for his quality, lives in
continual danger. Nor is it enough to say: “I do not care for anything; I do
not desire either honors or useful things; I wish to live quietly and without
quarrel!” For these excuses are heard and not accepted; nor can men who
have quality choose to abstain even when they choose it truly and without
any ambition, because it is not believed of them; so if they wish to abstain,
they are not allowed by others to abstain. Thus one must play crazy, like
Brutus, and make oneself very much mad, praising, speaking, seeing, doing
things against your intent so as to please the prince. Since we have spoken
of the prudence of this man in recovering freedom in Rome, we shall now
speak of his severity in maintaining it.

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«3 M

That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of
Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain a Newly

Acquired Freedom

[1] Not less necessary than useful was the severity of Brutus in maintaining
in Rome the freedom that he had acquired there. It is an example rare in all
memories of things to see the father sit on the tribunals and not only
condemn his sons to death but be present at their death. This will always be
known by those who read of ancient things: that after a change of state,
either from republic to tyranny or from tyranny to republic, a memorable
execution against the enemies of present conditions is necessary. Whoever
takes up a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and whoever makes a free state
and does not kill the sons of Brutus, maintains himself for little time. 1 And
because this topic is largely discoursed of above, 2 I refer to what was said
then; I will bring up only one example here that has been memorable in our
days and in our fatherland. This is Piero Soderini, who believed he would
overcome with his patience and goodness the appetite that was in the sons
of Brutus for returning to another government, and who deceived himself.
Although because of his prudence he recognized this necessity, and though
fate and the ambition of those who struck him gave him opportunity to
eliminate them, nonetheless he never turned his mind to doing it. For
besides believing that he could extinguish ill humors with patience and
goodness and wear away some of the enmity to himself with rewards to
someone, he judged (and often vouched for it with his friends) that if he
wished to strike his opponents vigorously and to beat down his adversaries,
he would have needed to take up extraordinary authority and break up civil
equality together with the laws. Even though afterward it would not be used
tyrannically by him, this thing would have so terrified the collectivity that it
would never after join together, after his death, to remake a gonfalonier for
life—which order, he judged, it would be good to increase and maintain. 3
Such respect was wise and good; nonetheless he should never allow an evil

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to run loose out of respect for a good, when that good could easily be
crushed by that evil. Since his works and his intention had to be judged by
the end, he should have believed that if fortune and life had stayed with
him, everyone could certify that what he had done was for the safety of the
fatherland and not for his own ambition; and he could regulate things so that
a successor of his would not be able to do for evil what he had done for
good. But his first opinion deceived him, as he did not know that malignity
is not tamed by time or appeased by any gift. So much so that, through not
knowing how to be like Brutus, he lost not only his fatherland but his state
and his reputation. And as it is a difficult thing to save a free state, so it is
difficult to save a royal one, as will be shown in the following chapter.

A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a
Principality While Those Who Have Been
Despoiled of It Are Living

[1] The death of Tarquin Priscus, caused by the sons of Ancus, and the
death of Servius Tullius, caused by Tarquin the Proud, show how difficult
and dangerous it is to despoil one individual of the kingdom and to leave
him alive, even though one might seek to win him over by compensation. 1
And one sees that Tarquin Priscus was deceived because it appeared to him
that he possessed the kingdom lawfully, since it had been given to him by
the people and confirmed by the Senate. Nor did he believe that there could
be so much indignation in the sons of Ancus that they would not have to be
content with what contented all Rome. Servius Tullius deceived himself in
believing he could win over the sons of Tarquin with new compensations. 2
So, as to the first, every prince can be warned that he never lives secure in
his principality as long as those who have been despoiled of it are living. As
to the second, every power can be reminded that old injuries are never
suppressed by new benefits, and so much the less as the new benefit is less
than the injury was. 3 Without doubt, Servius Tullius was hardly prudent to
believe that the sons of Tarquin would be patient to be the sons-in-law of
him over whom they judged they ought to be king. This appetite for reigning
is so great that it enters the breasts of not only those who expect the
kingdom but also those who do not expect it, as it was in the wife of young
Tarquin, the daughter of Servius. Moved by this rage, against all paternal
piety, she moved her husband against her father to take away from him his
life and the kingdom—so much more did she esteem it to be queen than
daughter of a king. Thus, if Tarquin Priscus and Servius Tullius lost the
kingdom through not knowing how to secure themselves against those from
whom they had usurped it, 4 Tarquin the Proud lost it through not observing
the orders of the ancient kings, as will be shown in the following chapter.

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«5 M

What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a
Kingdom Lose It

[1] When Tarquin the Proud had killed Servius Tullius, and there were no
heirs remaining of him, he came to possess the kingdom securely, since he
did not have to fear those things that had offended his predecessors.
Although the mode of seizing the kingdom had been extraordinary and
hateful, nonetheless, if he had observed the ancient orders of the other
kings, he would have been endured and would not have excited the Senate
and plebs against him so as to take the state away from him. Thus he was
expelled not because his son Sextus had raped Lucretia 1 but because he had
broken the laws of the kingdom and governed it tyrannically, as he had
taken away all authority from the Senate and adapted it for himself. That
business that was done in public places to the satisfaction of the Roman
Senate he brought to do in his palace, with disapproval and envy for him; so
in a brief time he despoiled Rome of all the freedom it had maintained
under the other kings. Nor was it enough for him to make the Fathers
enemies of himself, for he also excited the plebs against himself, tiring it
out in mechanical things all alien to what his predecessors had put them to
work in. 2 So, having filled Rome with cruel and proud examples, he had
already disposed the spirits of all Romans to rebellion whenever they would
have opportunity for it. If the accident of Lucretia had not come, as soon as
another had arisen it would have brought the same effect. For if Tarquin
had lived like the other kings and Sextus his son had made that error, Brutus
and Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarquin and not to the Roman
people for vengeance against Sextus. 3 Thus princes may know that they
begin to lose their state at the hour they begin to break the laws and those
modes and those customs that are ancient, under which men have lived a
long time. And if when deprived of the state they ever become so prudent
that they recognize with how much ease principalities may be held by those
who take counsel wisely, they would grieve much more for their loss and
condemn themselves to a greater penalty than they would have been

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condemned to by others. For it is much easier to be loved by the good than
by the wicked, and to obey the laws than to wish to command them. If they
wish to understand the mode they have to keep to do this, they do not have
to go to more trouble than to take for their mirror the lives of good princes,
such as would be Timoleon of Corinth, 4 Aratus of Sicyon, 5 and the like. In
their lives he will find so much security and so much satisfaction for
whoever rules and whoever is ruled that the wish to imitate them ought to
come to him, since, for the reasons given, he can easily do it. For when men
are governed well they do not seek or wish for any other freedom, as
happened to the peoples governed by the two named before, whom they
constrained to be princes while they lived even though they often attempted
to return to private life. And because in this and the two preceding chapters
humors excited against princes and the conspiracies made by the sons of
Brutus against the fatherland and those made against Tarquin Priscus and
Servius Tullius have been reasoned about, it does not appear to me a thing
outside the purpose to speak of them thoroughly in the following chapter,
since there is matter worthy of being noted by princes and private
individuals. 6

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&6 n

Of Conspiracies

[1] It did not appear to me that reasoning about conspiracies should be omitted, since it is a thing so dangerous to
princes and private individuals; for many more princes are seen to have lost their lives and states through these than
by open war. For to be able to make open war on a prince is granted to few; to be able to conspire against them is
granted to everyone. On the other side, private men enter upon no enterprise more dangerous or more bold than
this, for it is difficult and very dangerous in every part of it. Hence it arises that many of them are attempted, and
very few have the desired end. Thus, so that princes may learn to guard themselves from these dangers and private
individuals may put themselves into them more timidly—indeed, that they may learn to be content to live under
the empire that has been proposed for them by fate—I shall speak of them thoroughly, not omitting any notable
case in the evidence of both. And truly, the verdict of Cornelius Tacitus is golden, which says that men have to
honor past things and obey present ones; and they should desire good princes and tolerate them, however they may
be made. 1 And truly, whoever does otherwise most often ruins himself and his fatherland.

[2] Thus, entering into the matter, we should consider first against whom conspiracies are made; and we shall find
them to be made either against the fatherland or against a prince, of which two I wish to reason at present. For
those that are made to give a town to enemies that besiege it or that have, for any cause, a similarity with this, have
been sufficiently spoken of above. 2 We shall treat, in this first part, of those against the prince, and first we shall
examine the causes of these, which are many. But one of them is very important, more than all the others; and this
is being hated by the collectivity. For it is reasonable that the prince who has excited this universal hatred against
himself has particular individuals who have been more offended by him and who desire to avenge themselves. This
desire of theirs is increased by that universal bad disposition that they see to be excited against him. A prince, thus,
should flee these private charges, 3 and what he has to do to flee them I do not wish to speak of here, since it has
been treated elsewhere; 4 for if he guards himself from this, simple particular offenses will make less trouble 5 for
him. First, because one rarely meets men who reckon an injury so much that they put themselves in so much
danger to avenge it; the other, because if they were even of the spirit and had the power to do it, they are held back
by the universal benevolence that they see a prince has. It must be that the injuries are in property, in blood, or in
honor. Of those having to do with blood, menaces are more dangerous than executions; 6 indeed, menaces are very
dangerous, and in executions there is no danger. For whoever is dead cannot think of vengeance; those who remain
alive most often leave the thought of it to you. 7 But he who is menaced and who sees himself constrained by a
necessity either to act or to suffer becomes a man very dangerous for the prince, as we shall tell particularly in its
place. Outside this necessity, property and honor are the two things that offend men more than any other offense,
from which the prince should guard himself. For he can never despoil one individual so much that a knife to
avenge himself does not remain for him, and he can never dishonor one individual so much that a spirit obstinate
for vengeance is not left to him. Of honors taken away from men, that concerning women is most important; after
this, contempt of one’s person. This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon; 8 this has armed many others
against many other princes. In our times Giulio Belanti would not have been moved to conspire against Pandolfo,
tyrant of Siena, if not because he had been given by him and then had taken away a daughter of his for a wife, as
we shall tell in its place. 0 The greatest cause that made the Pazzi conspire against the Medici was the inheritance
of Giovanni Bonromei, which was taken away from them by the latter’s order. 10 Another cause of it—and a very
great one—that makes men conspire against the prince is the desire to free the fatherland that has been seized by
him. This cause moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar; 11 this has moved many others against the Phalarises, 12
Dionysiuses, 1 ’ and other seizers of their fatherland. Nor can any tyrant guard himself from this humor except by
laying down the tyranny. And because no one is found who does this, few are found who do not come out badly.
Hence arises that verse of Juvenal:

To the son-in-law of Ceres few kings descend without killing and wounds, and few tyrants with a dry death. 14

The dangers that are borne in conspiracies, as I said above, are great, since they are borne at all times; for in such
cases danger is encountered in managing them, in executing them, and after they are executed. Those who conspire
are either one individual or they are more. With one individual, it cannot be said that it is a conspiracy, but a firm
disposition arisen in one man to kill the prince. This alone lacks the first of the three dangers incurred in
conspiracies; for before the execution no danger is borne, since no other has his secret, nor does he bear the danger

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that his plan will come back to the ear of the prince. This decision so made can fall to any man of whatever sort:
great, small, noble, ignoble, familiar or not familiar to the prince; for it is permitted to everyone to speak to him
some time, and to whomever it is permitted to speak it is permitted to vent his spirit. Pausanias, who has been
spoken of other times, 15 killed Philip of Macedon, who was going to the temple between his son and his son-in-
law with a thousand armed men around. But he was noble and known to the prince. A Spaniard, poor and abject,
gave a stab in the neck to King Ferdinand, king of Spain; it was not a mortal wound, but one may see from this
that he had spirit and occasion to do it. 16 A dervish, a Turkish priest, drew a scimitar on Bajazet, father of the
present Turk; he did not wound him, but he had indeed the spirit and occasion to wish to do it. 17 Of spirits so
made very many are found, I believe, who would wish to do it because in wishing there is neither penalty nor any
danger; but few who do it. But of those who do it, there are very few or none who are not killed in the deed; so no
one is found who wishes to go to a certain death. But let us drop these individual wishes and come to conspiracies
among more.

[3] I say it is to be found in the histories that all conspiracies are made by great men or those very familiar to the
prince. 18 For others, if they are not quite mad, are unable to conspire, since weak men and those not familiar to
the prince lack all those hopes and all those occasions that are required for the execution of a conspiracy. First,
weak men are unable to find a match in whoever might keep faith with them. For one individual cannot consent to
their will under any of those hopes that make men enter into great dangers, so that as they are enlarged to two or
three persons, they find an accuser and are ruined. But even if they have been so happy as to lack this accuser, in
the execution they are surrounded by such difficulties, for not having easy entry to the prince, that it is impossible
for them not to be ruined in its execution. For if great men, who have easy entry, are crushed by those difficulties
that will be told of below, it must be that in these the difficulties increase without end. Therefore men (since where
life and property enter into it, they are not altogether insane), when they see themselves weak, guard themselves
about doing it; and when they are fed up with a prince, they attend to cursing him and wait for those who have
greater quality than they to avenge them. And even if it should be found that anyone such as these had attempted
something, the intention and not the prudence should be praised in them. One sees, therefore, that those who have
conspired have all been great men, or familiars of the prince. Many of them have conspired, moved as much by too
many benefits as by too many injuries, as was Perennius against Commodus, 19 Plautianus against Sever us, 70
Sejanus against Tiberius. 21 All these were placed by their emperors in so much wealth, honor, and rank that it did
not appear they lacked anything for the perfection of their power but the empire; and since they did not wish to be
lacking this, they were moved to conspire against the prince. All their conspiracies had the end that their
ingratitude deserved, although of similar ones in fresher times, that of Jacopo d’Appiano against Messer Piero
Gambacorti, prince of Pisa, had a good end. Jacopo, though raised and nourished and given reputation by him,
then took away the state from him. 22 In our times, that of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon was among
these. Flaving come to so much greatness that it did not appear to him that he lacked anything except the kingdom,
Coppola lost his life because he wished also for that. 23 And truly, if any conspiracy against princes made by great
men ought to have had a good end, it ought to be this, since it was made by another king, so to speak, and by one
who has so much occasion to fulfill his desire; but the greed for dominating that blinds him also blinds him in
managing the enterprise. For if they knew how to do this wickedness with prudence it would be impossible that
they not succeed. Thus, a prince who wishes to guard himself against conspiracies should fear more those to whom
he has done too many favors 24 than those to whom he has done too many injuries. 25 For the latter are lacking in
occasion, the former abound in it; and the wish is similar because the desire to dominate is as great as or greater
than is that of vengeance. They should therefore give so much authority to their friends as there may be some
interval between it and the principate, and that in the middle there may be something to desire; otherwise it will
be a rare thing if it does not happen to them as to the princes written about above. But let us return to our order.

[4] I say that since those who conspire have to be great men and have easy access to the prince, one has to
discourse of the results of their enterprises, such as they have been, to see the cause that made them be happy or
unhappy. As I said above, dangers are found within them at three times: before, in the deed, and after. Few are
found that have a good outcome because it is impossible—almost—to pass through them all happily. And
beginning to discourse of the dangers before, which are the most important, I say that one needs to be very prudent
and to have great luck in managing a conspiracy for it not to be exposed. They are exposed either by report or by
conjecture. Report arises from finding lack of faith, or lack of prudence, in the men to whom you communicate it.
Lack of faith is easily found because you cannot communicate it except to your trusted ones, who for your love will
put themselves in the way of death, or to men who are discontented with the prince. Of the trusted one might be
able to find one or two; but as you extend yourself to many, it is impossible for you to find them. Next, the
benevolence that they bear for you indeed needs to be great if the danger and the fear of punishment are not to
appear greater to them. Next, men most often deceive themselves about the love that you judge a man bears to you,

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nor can you ever secure yourself of it unless you make experiment of it; and to make experiment of it in this is
very dangerous. Even if you have made experiment of it in some other dangerous thing in which they have been
faithful to you, you cannot from that faith measure this one, since this surpasses every other kind of danger by very
far. If you measure faith by the discontent that one individual has with the prince, you can easily deceive yourself
in this; for as soon as you have manifested your intent to that discontented one, you give him matter with which to
content himself, and to maintain him in faith it must indeed be either that the hatred is great or that your authority
is very great.

[5] From here it arises that very many [conspiracies] are revealed and crushed in their first beginnings, and that
when one has been secret among many men a long time, it is held a miraculous thing, as was that of Piso against
Nero 26 and, in our times, that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici. 27 More than fifty men were
aware of these, and they were led into execution before being exposed. As to being exposed by lack of prudence, it
arises when a conspirator speaks of it with little caution, so that a slave or another third person hears you, as
happened to the sons of Brutus, who in managing the affair with the legates of Tarquin were heard by a slave, who
accused them; 28 or indeed when through levity you come to communicate it to a woman or boy whom you love or
to a similar, flighty person, as did Dymnus, one of the conspirators with Philotas against Alexander the Great, who
communicated the conspiracy to Nicomachus, a boy loved by him; he told it at once to Cebalinus, his brother, and
Cebalinus to the king. 29 As to being exposed by conjecture, there is the conspiracy of Piso against Nero for an
example. In this Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, made a will the day before he had to kill Nero; ordered that
Milichus, his freedman, sharpen an old and rusty dagger of his; freed all his slaves and gave them money; and had
bandages ordered to bind wounds—by which conjectures Milichus became aware of the thing and accused him to
Nero. Scaevinus was taken and with him Natalis, another conspirator, who had been seen to speak together at
length and in secret the day before; and since they were not in accord on the discussion 9 ’ they had had, they were
forced to confess the truth; so the conspiracy was exposed, with ruin to all the conspirators. 31

[6] It is impossible to guard oneself from these causes of the exposure of conspiracies, so that through malice,
imprudence, or levity it is not exposed at whatever time the knowers of it surpass the number of three or four.
When more than one of them is taken, it is impossible not to find it out, because two cannot be agreed together in
all their reasonings. When only one of them is taken, and he is a strong man, he can silence the conspirators with
the strength of his spirit; but the conspirators must not have less spirit than he to stay steady and not expose
themselves by flight, for the conspiracy is exposed by one party in which the spirit fails, whether by the one who is
held or the one who is free. Rare is the example introduced by Titus Livy in the conspiracy made against
Hieronymus, king of Syracuse, in which Theodoras, one of the conspirators, was taken and with great virtue
concealed all the conspirators and accused the friends of the king. On the other hand, the conspirators trusted so
much in the virtue of Theodoras that no one left Syracuse or gave any sign of fear. 32 Thus one passes through all
these dangers in managing a conspiracy before one comes to its execution, for which, if one wishes to escape, there
are these remedies. The first and the most true—indeed, to say better, the only one—is not to give time to the
conspirators to accuse you, and to communicate the thing to them when you want to do it, and not before. Those
who have done thus escape for certain the dangers in practicing it, and most often the others; indeed they have all
had a happy end, and any prudent individual would have occasion to govern himself in this mode. I wish it to be
enough for me to bring up two examples.

[7] Nelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus, gathered many relatives and friends
in his house; and when he had urged them to free the fatherland, some of them requested time to deliberate and
order themselves. Then Nelematus had his slaves lock the house, and to those whom he had called in, he said:
“Either you swear to go now to do this execution or I will give you all as prisoners to Aristotimus.” Moved by these
words, they swore, and having gone without lapse of time, they executed the order of Nelematus happily. 33 When a
Magian had by deception seized the kingdom of the Persians, and Ortanes, one of the great men of the kingdom,
had understood and exposed the fraud, he conferred with six other princes of that state, saying that he was about to
avenge the kingdom from the tyranny of that Magian. When someone of them asked for time, Darius, one of the
six called by Ortanes, got up and said: “Either we shall go now to do this execution or I will go there to accuse all.”
And so, getting up in accord, without giving time for someone to repent, they executed their plans happily. 34
Similar to these two examples also is the mode that the Aetolians adopted for killing Nabis, the Spartan tyrant.
They sent their citizen Alexamenus to Nabis with thirty horse and two hundred infantrymen under color of sending
him aid; and the secret they communicated only to Alexamenus, and on the others they imposed obedience to him
in anything whatsoever, under penalty of exile. He went to Sparta and never communicated his commission except
when he wished to execute it; hence they succeeded in killing him. 35 Thus by these modes these men escaped the
dangers that are borne in managing conspiracies; and whoever imitates them will always escape them.

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[8] [To show] that everyone can do as they did, I wish to give the example of Piso, cited above. Piso was a very
great and very reputed man and a familiar of Nero, in whom he trusted very much. Nero often went to his gardens
to eat with him. Thus Piso could make friends with men of spirit, of heart, and of disposition apt for such an
execution (which is very easy for someone great); and when Nero was in his gardens, he could communicate the
affair to them, and with fitting words he inspired them to do that which they did not have time to refuse and in
which it was impossible not to succeed . 16 So, if all the others are examined, few will be found that could not be
conducted in the same mode. But because men ordinarily understand little of the actions of the world, they often
make very grave errors, and so much the greater in those that have more of the extraordinary, as is this. Thus the
thing should never be communicated unless necessary and in the deed; and if indeed you wish to communicate it,
communicate it to one alone, of whom you have had very long experience or who is moved by the same causes as
you. To find one individual so made is much easier than to find more, and because of this there is less danger in it.
Then, if even he deceives you, there is some remedy for defending yourself, which there is not where the
conspirators are very many. For from someone prudent I have heard it said that to one individual everything can be
spoken of, because if you do not let yourself be led to write in your hand, the yes of one individual is worth as
much as the no of the other. Everyone should guard himself from writing as from a reef, for there is nothing that
convicts you more easily than what is written by your hand. When Plautianus wished to have Severus the emperor
and his son Antoninus killed, he commissioned the thing to Saturninus, the tribune, who—since he wished to
accuse him, not to obey him, and feared that when it came to the accusation, Plautianus would be more believed
than he—asked for a note in his hand that would vouch for this commission. Plautianus, blinded by ambition, did
that for him; hence it followed that he was accused and convicted by the tribune. Without that note and certain
other marks, Plautianus would have been superior, so boldly did he deny. 17 Thus some remedy is found for the
accusation of one individual when you cannot be convicted by a writing or other marks, from which one individual
should guard himself.

[9] In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman called Epicharis, who in the past had been the mistress of Nero.
Judging that it would be to the purpose to put among the conspirators a captain of some triremes whom Nero kept
as his guard, she communicated to him the conspiracy but not the conspirators. Hence, when that captain broke his
faith and accused her to Nero, so much was Epicharis’s audacity in denying it that Nero, left confused, did not
condemn her. 8 There are thus two dangers in communicating the thing to one alone: one, that he accuses you in
evidence; the other, that having been convicted and constrained by the punishment, he accuses you after he has
been taken because of some suspicion or some indication from him. But in both of these two dangers there is some
remedy, as one can deny the one by citing the hatred that he has for you, and deny the other by citing the force that
constrained him to tell lies. Thus it is prudence not to communicate the thing to anyone, but to act according to
the examples written above; or, if indeed you communicate it, not to pass beyond one individual, where if there is
some more danger, there is very much less of it than to communicate it to many.

[10] Close to this mode is when a necessity constrains you to do to the prince that which you see the prince would
like to do to you, which is so great that it does not give you time except to think about securing yourself. This
necessity almost always brings the affair to the end desired, and to prove it I wish two examples to be enough.
Commodus the emperor had Letus and Elettus as heads of the praetorian soldiers and among his first friends and
familiars; he had Marcia among his first concubines or mistresses. Because he was at some time reprehended by
them for the modes with which he stained his person and the empire, he decided to have them killed; and he wrote
on a list Marcia, Letus, Elettus, and some others that he wished to have killed the following night, and he put the
list under the pillow of his bed. When he went to wash himself, a boy favorite of his came to find that list while
playing about the room and on the bed; and as he went outside with it in hand, he met Marcia, who took it away
from him and, having read it and seen its content, at once sent for Letus and Elettus. Having all three recognized
the danger they were in, they decided to forestall it; and without losing time, they killed Commodus the following
night. 39

[11] Antoninus Caracalla, the emperor, was with his armies in Mesopotamia and had as his prefect Macrinus, a
man more civil than warlike. As it happens that princes who are not good always fear that another may work
against them that which they fear they deserve for themselves, Antoninus wrote to his friend Maternianus in Rome
that he should learn from the astrologers if there was anyone who aspired to the empire and make him aware of it.
Hence Maternianus wrote him that Macrinus was the one who aspired to it; and when the letter reached the hands
of Macrinus before those of the emperor, and because of that he recognized the necessity either of killing him
before a new letter arrived from Rome or of dying, he commissioned the centurion Martial, his trusted one, whose
brother Antoninus had killed a few days before, to kill him; which was executed by him happily. 40 Thus one sees
that the necessity that does not give time produces almost the same effect as the mode told above by me that
Nelematus of Epirus held to. One also sees that which I said almost at the beginning of this discourse: that
menaces offend princes more and are the cause of more efficacious conspiracies than offenses. From those a prince

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should guard himself, for they have either to caress men or secure themselves against them, 41 and never reduce
them to such straits that they have to think that they must either die or make someone else die.

[12] As to dangers that are incurred at the execution, these arise either from varying the order, or from spirit
lacking in him who executes, or from an error that the executor makes through lack of prudence or through not
bringing the thing to perfection by leaving alive part of those who were planned to be killed. I say, thus, that there
is not anything that produces so much disturbance and hindrance to all actions of men as there is to have to vary an
order in an instant, without having time, and to have to bend it from what had been ordered before. If this
variation produces disorder in anything, it does so in things of war and in things similar to those of which we are
speaking. For in such actions there is nothing so necessary to produce as that men firm up their spirits to execute
the part that touches them. If men had turned their fancy for many days to one mode and to one order, and that
suddenly varies, it is impossible that all not be disturbed, and that everything not be ruined, so that it is far better to
execute a thing according to the order given, even though one sees some inconvenience in it, than to enter into a
thousand inconveniences through wishing to suppress that. This happens when one has no time to reorder oneself,
for if one has time, man can govern himself by his own mode.

[13] The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is known. The order given was that they
give a breakfast for the cardinal of San Giorgio and kill them at that breakfast, in which it had been assigned who
had to kill them, who had to seize the palace, and who had to run through the city and call the people to freedom.
It befell that when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the cardinal were in the cathedral church in Florence for a solemn
office, it was understood that Giuliano was not breakfasting there that morning. That made the conspirators
assemble together, and what they had to do in the house of the Medici they decided to do in church. That came to
disturb the whole order because Giovambatista da Montesecco did not wish to share in the homicide, saying that
he did not wish to do it in church. So they had to change new ministers in every action, who did not have time to
firm up their spirits and made such errors that in its execution they were crushed. 42

[14] Spirit is lacking in whoever executes either through reverence or through the executor’s own cowardice. So
great are the majesty and the reverence that accompany the presence of a prince that it is an easy thing for them
either to soften or to terrify an executor. After Marius had been taken by the Minturnans, a slave was sent to kill
him, who, frightened by the presence of that man and by the memory of his name, became cowardly and lost all
force for killing him. 43 If this power is in a man bound and a prisoner, and drowned in bad fortune, how much
greater can it be held to be in an unshackled prince with the majesty of his ornaments, pomp, and retinue! So
much pomp as this can frighten you, or, truly, with some gratifying greeting mollify you. Some persons conspired
against Sitalces, king of Thrace; they fixed the day of the execution; they assembled at the place that had been
fixed, where the prince was; but no one of them moved to hurt 44 him, so that they left without having attempted
anything and without knowing what had impeded them; and they faulted one another. They fell into such an error
many times, so that when the conspiracy was discovered, they bore the penalty for the evil that they were able and
not willing to do. 15 Two of his brothers conspired against Alfonso, duke of Ferrara, and they used Giannes, priest
and cantor of the duke, as a middleman. Many times at their request he brought the duke to them so that they had
the liberty to kill him. Nonetheless, never did one of them dare to do it, so that, when discovered, they bore the
penalty of their wickedness and lack of prudence. 46 This negligence could not have arisen from other than that
either the presence [of the prince] must have terrified them or some humanity of the prince must have humiliated
them. In such executions, inconvenience or error arises through lack of prudence or lack of spirit; for both of these
two things possess you, and when carried away by that confusion of brain, you say or do that which you ought not.

[15] That men are possessed and confused Titus Livy cannot demonstrate better than when he describes
Alexamenus the Aetolian when he wished to kill Nabis the Spartan, of whom we have spoken above. 47 When the
time of the execution came and he had exposed to his men what had to be done, Titus Livy says these words: “And
he himself gathered his spirit, confused by the thought of so great a thing.” 48 For it is impossible that anyone not
be confused, even though of firm spirit and used to the death of men and to putting steel to work. Therefore one
ought to choose men experienced in such managing and to believe in no one else, even though held very spirited.
For of spirit in great things there is no one who may promise himself a sure thing without having had experience.
Thus this confusion can either make the arms drop from your hands or make you say things that produce the same
effect. Lucilla, sister of Commodus, ordered that Quintianus kill him. He awaited Commodus in the entrance of
the amphitheater and, approaching him with a naked dagger, cried out, "The Senate sends you this!”—which
words made him be taken before he had lowered his arm to strike. 49 Messer Antonio da Volterra, delegated, as was
said above, to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici, said in approaching him, “Oh, traitor”—which utterance was the salvation
of Lorenzo and the ruin of that conspiracy. 50 For the causes that have been said, one cannot bring the thing to
perfection when one conspires against one head; but one does not easily bring it to perfection when one conspires
against two heads. Indeed it is so difficult that it is almost impossible that it succeed. For to do a like action at the

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same time in different places is almost impossible, for one cannot do it at different times if one does not wish the
one to spoil the other. So if conspiring against a prince is a thing doubtful, dangerous, and hardly prudent,
conspiring against two is altogether vain and flighty. If there were not reverence for the historian, I would never
believe possible what Herodian says of Plautianus, when he commissioned Saturninus the centurion that he alone
kill Severus and Antoninus, who inhabited different countries. 51 For it is a thing so distant from the reasonable that
any other than this authority would not make me believe it.

[16] Certain young Athenians conspired against Diodes and Hippias, tyrants of Athens. They killed Diodes; and
Hippias, who was left, avenged him. 55 Chion and Leonidas, Heracleans and disciples of Plato, conspired against
Clearchus and Satirus, tyrants; they killed Clearchus, and Satirus, who remained alive, avenged him. 51 The Pazzi,
many times cited by us, succeeded in killing only Giuliano. 54 So, everyone ought to abstain from similar
conspiracies against many heads, because one does not do good either to oneself or to the fatherland or to anyone.
Indeed, those who are left become more unendurable and more bitter, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea know,
which were cited before by me. It is true that the conspiracy that Pelopidas made to free his fatherland, Thebes,
had all the difficulties, though nonetheless it had a very happy end because Pelopidas conspired not only against
two tyrants but against ten. Not only was he not trusted, and entry to the tyrants was not easy for him, but he was a
rebel; nonetheless, he was able to come to Thebes, kill the tyrants, and free the fatherland. Yet nonetheless he did
everything with the aid of one Charon, counselor of the tyrants, from whom he had easy entry for his execution. 55
There should not be anyone, nonetheless, who takes example from him because it was an impossible enterprise,
and a marvelous thing to succeed, as was and is held by the writers who celebrate it as a thing rare and almost
without example. Such an execution can be interrupted by a false imagination or by an unforeseen accident that
arises in the deed. The morning that Brutus and the other conspirators wished to kill Caesar, it happened that he
spoke at length with Gnaeus Popilius Lenatus, one of the conspirators; and seeing this lengthy speaking, the others
suspected that the said Popilius had revealed the conspiracy to Caesar. They were about to try to kill Caesar there
and not wait for him to be in the Senate; and they would have done it if the discussion had not ended, and having
seen that it did not produce any extraordinary movement in Caesar, they were reassured. 56 These false
imaginations are to be considered and, with prudence, to be held in respect; and so much the more since it is easy
to have them. For whoever has a stained conscience easily believes that one speaks of him; one can hear a word,
said for another end, that perturbs your spirit and makes you believe it was said about your case. It either makes
you expose the conspiracy yourself by flight or confuses the action by hastening it out of its time. And this arises all
the more easily when there are many to be aware of the conspiracy.

[17] As to accidents, because they are unexpected, one cannot show them except with examples so as to make men
cautious in accord with them. Because of the indignation he had against Pandolfo, who had taken away from him
the daughter whom previously he had given as wife, Giulio Belanti of Siena, of whom we have made mention
above, decided to kill him and chose this time. Pandolfo used to go almost every day to visit an invalid relative of
his, and in going there he would pass by the houses of Giulio. Thus, having seen this, he ordered his conspirators to
be in the house in order to kill Pandolfo while he was passing; and when they had placed themselves armed inside
the exit, he kept one at the window so that as Pandolfo passed, when he was close to the exit, he would make a
sign. It happened that when Pandolfo came, and that one had made the sign, he met a friend who stopped him; and
some of those who were with him kept coming onward, and as they saw and heard the noise of arms, they
discovered the ambush, so that Pandolfo saved himself and Giulio and his partners had to flee from Siena. The
accident of that encounter prevented that action and made Giulio ruin his enterprise. 57 Because such accidents are
rare, one cannot produce any remedy for them. It is surely necessary to examine all those that can arise and
remedy them.

[18] At present it remains only to dispute about the dangers that are incurred after the execution. These are only
one, and that is when someone is left who may avenge the dead prince. Thus his brothers can be left or his sons or
other adherents for whom the principality awaits. And they who may produce this vengeance can be left either by
your negligence or by the causes said above, as happened to Giovanni Andrea da Lampagnano, together with his
conspirators, when they killed the duke of Milan. Since a son of his and two of his brothers were left, they were in
time to avenge the dead. 55 And truly in these cases the conspirators are excused because they have no remedy for
it; but when someone is left alive from it through lack of prudence or by their negligence, then it is that they merit
no excuse. Some Forli conspirators killed Count Girolamo, their lord, and took his wife and his children, who were
small. Since it appeared to them that they could not live secure if they did not become masters of the fortress, and
the castellan was not willing to give it to them. Madonna Caterina (so the countess was called) promised the
conspirators that if they let her enter it, she would deliver it to them and they might keep her children with them as
hostages. Under this faith they let her enter it. As soon as she was inside, she reproved them from the walls for the
death of her husband and threatened them with every kind of revenge. And to show that she did not care for her

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children, she showed them her genital parts, saying that she still had the mode for making more of them. So, short
of counsel and late to perceive their error, they suffered the penalty of their lack of prudence with a perpetual
exile. 59 But of all the dangers that can come after the execution, there is none more certain nor more to be feared
than when the people is the friend of the prince that you have killed. For conspirators do not have any remedy for
this since they can never secure themselves against it. As example there is Caesar, who, because he had the people
of Rome as his friend, was avenged by it; for having expelled the conspirators from Rome, it was the cause that in
various times and in various places all were killed.' 10

[19] Conspiracies that are made against the fatherland are less dangerous for the ones who make them than are
those against princes. For in managing them there are fewer dangers than in the latter; in executing them they are
the same; after the execution there is not any. In managing them there are not many dangers because a citizen can
order himself for power without making his mind and his plan manifest to anyone. And unless these orders of his
are interrupted, his enterprise can proceed happily; if they are interrupted with some laws, he can bide his time
and enter by another way. It is understood that this is in a republic where there is some part of corruption, for
since one not corrupt has no place for a wicked beginning, these thoughts cannot befall one of its citizens. Thus
citizens can aspire to the principality by many means and many ways when they do not bear the danger of being
crushed, both because republics are slower than a prince, suspect less, and through this are less cautious and
because they have more respect for their great citizens and through this the latter are bolder and more spirited in
acting against them. Everyone has read the conspiracy of Catiline written by Sallust and knows that after the
conspiracy was exposed, Catiline not only stayed in Rome but came to the Senate and spoke rudely to the Senate
and to the consul, so much was the respect that that city had for its citizens. 61 When he had left Rome and he was
already out with his armies, Lentulus and those others would not have been taken if there had not been letters in
their hands that accused them manifestly. 62 Hanno, a very great citizen in Carthage aspiring to tyranny, had
ordered that the whole Senate be poisoned at the wedding of a daughter of his, and afterward that he be made
prince. When this affair was learned of, the Senate did not make any provision for it other than a law that put
limits on the expenses for banquets and weddings, so much was the respect that they had for his qualities. 63 It is
indeed true that in executing a conspiracy against the fatherland there are more difficulty and greater dangers
because it is rare that your own forces conspiring against so many are enough; and not everyone is prince of an
army, as was Caesar, 64 or Agathocles, 6 ' or Cleomenes, 66 and such, who have seized their fatherland at a stroke and
with their forces. For to such the way is very easy and very secure; but others who do not have so many added
forces must do things either with deception and art or with foreign forces. As to deception and art, when
Pisistratus the Athenian had conquered the Megarians, and through this acquired favor in the people, he went out
one morning wounded, saying that out of envy the nobility had injured him, and he asked to be able to lead armed
men with him as his guard. From this authority he easily rose up to so much greatness that he became tyrant of
Athens. 67 Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Siena, and the guard of the piazza was given to his
government as a mechanical affair that others had refused; nonetheless, in time those armed men gave him so
much reputation that in a short time he became prince of it. 68 Many others have adopted other devices and other
modes, and in space of time and without danger they have led themselves to it. Those who have conspired to seize
the fatherland with their forces or with external armies have had various outcomes according to fortune. Catiline,
cited before, came to ruin beneath it. 69 Since poison did not succeed for Hanno, of whom we have made mention
above, he armed many thousands of persons from his partisans, and they and he were killed. 70 So as to make
themselves tyrants, some of the first citizens of Thebes called a Spartan army in aid, and they took the tyranny of
that city. 71 So when all conspiracies made against the fatherland are examined, none—or few—will be found that
were crushed in their managing, but all either were successful or were ruined in the execution. When they were
executed, they no longer bore any other dangers than the nature of the principality bears in itself, for when one
individual has become tyrant, he has the natural and ordinary dangers that tyranny brings him, for which he has no
remedies other than have been discoursed of above. 72

[20] This is how much it occurs to me to write on conspiracies; and if I have reasoned on those that are done with
steel and not with poison, it arises because they all have one same order. It is true that those of poison are more
dangerous, being more uncertain, because not everyone has the occasion for it and one needs to delegate to
whoever has it, and this necessity of delegating makes danger for you. Then for many causes a draft of poison can
be not fatal, as happened to those who killed Commodus, for after he had thrown up the poison they had given him,
they were forced to strangle him if they wished for him to die. 71 Princes therefore have no greater enemy than
conspiracy, for when a conspiracy is made against them, either it kills them or it brings them infamy. For if it
succeeds, they are dead; if it is exposed, and they kill the conspirators, it is always believed that it was the
invention of that prince to vent his avarice and cruelty at the expense of the blood and property of those whom he
has killed. Yet I do not wish to fail to warn that prince or that republic that might be conspired against, so that they

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may have warning that when a conspiracy manifests itself to them, they should seek out and learn very well its
quality, and measure well the conditions of the conspirators and of themselves, before they undertake an enterprise
to avenge it. When they find it large and powerful, they should never expose it until they have prepared themselves
with sufficient forces to crush it; if they do otherwise, they would expose their own ruin. So they ought to
dissimulate it with all industry, for conspirators, seeing themselves exposed, are driven by necessity and work
without hesitation. As example, when the Romans left two legions of soldiers as guard of the Capuans against the
Samnites, as we have said elsewhere, 74 the heads of the legions conspired together to crush the Capuans. When this
thing was learned in Rome, they commissioned Rutilius, the new consul, to provide for it. To put the conspirators
to sleep, he made public that the Senate had reaffirmed the stations of the Capuan legions. Since these soldiers
believed that, and it appeared to them they had time to execute their plan, they did not seek to hasten the affair;
and so they stayed until they began to see that the consul was separating them one from another—which generated
suspicion in them and made them expose themselves, and they put their wish into execution. 76 Nor can there be a
greater example than this on one side and the other, for through this one sees how slow men are in affairs when
they believe they have time and how quick they are when necessity drives them. Nor can a prince or a republic that
wishes to defer the exposure of a conspiracy to its advantage use better means than with art to offer opportunity
soon to conspirators, so that in waiting for it—or since it appears to them that they have time—they give time to
the former or the latter to punish them. Whoever has done otherwise has hastened his own ruin, as did the duke of
Athens and Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. When the duke became tyrant of Florence and learned that he was being
conspired against, he had one of the conspirators taken without otherwise examining the affair, which made the
others at once take up arms and take the state from him. 76 When Guglielmo was commissioner in Val di Chiana in
1501 and had learned that there was a conspiracy in Arezzo in favor of the Vitelli to take that town away from the
Florentines, he went at once to that city, and without thinking about the strength of the conspirators or about his
own, and without preparing himself with any force, with the counsel of his son the bishop he had one of the
conspirators taken. After his taking, the others at once took arms and took away the town from the Florentines; and
from commissioner, Guglielmo became prisoner. 77 But when conspiracies are weak, they can and should be
crushed without hesitation. Nor also to be imitated in any mode are two means that are used, almost contrary to
one other: the one by the duke of Athens named before, who had one individual killed who made a conspiracy
manifest to him to show that he believed he had the benevolence of Florentine citizens. 78 The other [was used] by
Dion the Syracusan: to try out the intent of anyone whom he had under suspicion, he consented that Callippus, in
whom he trusted, make a show of making a conspiracy against him. Both of these turned out badly; for the one
took away spirit from accusers and gave it to whoever wished to conspire. The other gave an easy way to his own
death; indeed, he was his own head of his conspiracy, as came to him by experience, because Callippus, being able
to deal against Dion without hesitation, dealt so much that he took from him his state and his life. 79

I**-..**

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Whence It Arises That Changes from
Freedom to Servitude and from Servitude
to Freedom Are Some of Them without
Blood, Some of Them Full of It

[1] Someone perhaps will doubt whence it arose that of many changes that
are made from free life to tyrannical, and to the contrary, some of them are
made with blood, some without; for as is understood through the histories,
in similar variations sometimes infinite men have been put to death,
sometimes no one has been injured. That came about in the change that
Rome made from kings to consuls, where none other than the Tarquins
were expelled, with no offense to anyone else. 1 That depends on this: for the
state that is changed arises with violence or not, and because when it arises
with violence it must arise with the injury of many, it is necessary later, in
its ruin, that the injured wish to avenge themselves, and from this desire for
vengeance arise the blood and death of men. But when that state is caused
by common consent of a collectivity that has made it great, later, when it is
ruined, the said collectivity does not have cause to offend other than the
head. And of this sort was the state of Rome with the expulsion of the
Tarquins, as was also the state of the Medici in Florence, in the ruin of
whom later, in 1494, none other than themselves were offended. 2 So such
changes do not come to be dangerous, but those are indeed very dangerous
that are made by those who have to avenge themselves, which have always
been of a sort to terrify whoever does nothing but reads of them. And
because the histories are full of these examples, I wish to omit them.

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Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic
Should Consider Its Subject

[1] It has been discoursed of above 1 that a wicked citizen cannot work for
ill in a republic that is not corrupt, which conclusion is fortified, beyond the
reasons that were said then, with the examples of Spurius Cassius and
Manlius Capitolinus. This Spurius was an ambitious man, and he wished to
take up extraordinary authority in Rome and to gain the plebs for himself by
conferring on them many benefits, such as dividing among them the fields
that the Romans had taken away from the Hernici. This ambition of his was
exposed by the Fathers and brought under so much suspicion that when he
spoke to the people and offered to give them the money that had been drawn
from the grain that the public had made to come from Sicily, they refused
him altogether, since it appeared to them that Spurius wished to give them
the price of their freedom. 2 But if such a people had been corrupt, it would
not have refused the said price, and it would have opened the way to
tyranny that it closed. Manlius Capitolinus makes a much greater example
of this, for through him one sees how much virtue of spirit and body, how
many good works done in favor of the fatherland, an ugly greed for rule
later cancels. 3 As one sees, it arose in him because of the envy that he had
for the honors that were done to Camillus. He came to such blindness in his
mind that, not thinking of the mode of life of the city, not examining the
subject it had, which was not yet apt to receive a wicked form, he set out to
make tumults in Rome against the Senate and against the laws of the
fatherland. There one knows the perfection of that city and the goodness of
its matter, for in his case none of the nobility moved to favor him, although
they had been very fierce defenders of one another; none of his relatives
undertook an enterprise in his favor. With the other accused, unkempt
persons were accustomed to appear, clad in black, all sad-looking so as to
beg for pity in favor of the accused; with Manlius, none was seen. The
tribunes of the plebs, who were always accustomed to favor what appeared
would come to the benefit of the people—and the more those things went

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against the nobles, the more did they bring them to the fore—in this case
united with the nobles so as to crush a common plague. Although the people
of Rome, very desirous of its own utility and a lover of things that went
against the nobility, did very many favors to Manlius, nonetheless, as the
tribunes summoned him and delivered his cause to the judgment of the
people, that people, from defender having become judge, without any
respect condemned him to death. Therefore I do not believe that there is an
example in this history more apt to show the goodness of all the orders of
that republic than this, seeing that no one in that city moved to defend a
citizen full of every virtue, who publicly and privately had performed very
many praiseworthy works. For love of the fatherland was able to do more in
all of them than any other respect, and they considered present dangers that
depended on him much more than past merits, so much that with his death
they freed themselves. And Titus Livy says: “This end had a man who would
have been memorable if he had not been born in a free city.” 4 Two things
are to be considered here: one, that one has to seek glory in a corrupt city by
modes other than in one that still lives politically; the other (which is almost
the same as the first), that men in their proceeding—and so much the more
in great actions—should consider the times and accommodate themselves
to them.

[2] Those who by bad choice or by natural inclination are in discord with
the times most often live unhappily, and their actions have a bad outcome;
but it is to the contrary with those who are in concord with the time. And
without doubt, from the words of the historian cited before, one can
conclude that if Manlius had been born in the times of Marius and Sulla,
when the matter was already corrupt and he would have been able to
impress the form of his ambition, he would have had the same results and
successes as Marius and Sulla and as others later who aspired to tyranny
after them. So, likewise, if Sulla and Marius had been in the times of
Manlius, they would have been crushed amidst their first enterprises. For a
man can indeed begin to corrupt a people of a city with his modes and his
wicked means, but for him it is impossible that the life of one individual be
enough to corrupt it so that he himself can draw the fruit from it. Even if it
might be possible for him to do it with length of time, it would be
impossible because of the mode of proceeding of men, who are impatient
and cannot defer a passion of theirs for long. Next, they deceive themselves
in things that concern them and in those especially that they very much
desire, so that either by lack of patience or by deceiving themselves in it,

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they would enter upon an enterprise against the time and would come out
badly. So if one wishes to take up authority in a republic and put a wicked
form in it, there is need to find the matter disordered by time, and which
little by little and from generation to generation may be led to disorder—
which is led there of necessity if, as is discoursed of above, 5 it is not often
refreshed with good examples or pulled back toward its beginnings with
new laws. Thus Manlius would have been a rare and memorable man if he
had been born in a corrupt city. And so citizens who in republics make any
enterprise, either in favor of freedom or in favor of tyranny, ought to
consider the subject that they have, and to judge from that the difficulty of
their enterprises. For as much as it is difficult and dangerous to wish to
make a people free that wishes to five servilely, so much is it to wish to
make a people servile that wishes to live free. Because it is said above that
men in their working ought to consider the qualities of the times and to
proceed according to them, we shall speak of this at length in the following
chapter.

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How One Must Vary with the Times If One
Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune

[1] I have often considered that the cause of the bad and of the good fortune
of men is the matching of the mode of one’s proceeding with the times. For
one sees that some men proceed in their works with impetuosity, some with
hesitation and caution. And because in both of these modes suitable limits
are passed, since one cannot observe the true way, in both one errs. But he
comes to err less and to have prosperous fortune who matches the time with
his mode, as I said, and always proceeds as nature forces you. Everyone
knows that Fabius Maximus proceeded hesitantly and cautiously with his
army, far from all impetuosity and from all Roman audacity, and good
fortune made this mode of his match well with the times. For when
Hannibal, young and with fresh fortune, had come into Italy and had already
defeated the Roman people two times, and when that republic was almost
deprived of its good military and was terrified, better fortune could not have
come than to have a captain who held the enemy at bay with his slowness
and caution. Nor also could Fabius have been matched with times more
suitable to his modes, from which he became glorious. One sees that Fabius
did this by nature and not by choice because when Scipio wished to cross to
Africa with the armies to put an end to the war, Fabius spoke against it very
much, as one who was unable to detach himself from his modes and his
custom; so that Hannibal would still be in Italy if it had been up to him, as
he was not aware that the times had changed for him and that he needed to
change the mode of war. If Fabius had been king of Rome, he could easily
have lost that war; for he did not know how to vary his procedure as the
times varied. But he was born in a republic where there were diverse
citizens and diverse humors; as it had Fabius, who was the best in times
proper for sustaining war, 1 so later it had Scipio in times apt for winning it.

[2] Hence it arises that a republic has greater life and has good fortune
longer than a principality, for it can accommodate itself better than one
prince can to the diversity of times 2 through the diversity of the citizens

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that are in it. For a man who is accustomed to proceed in one mode never
changes, as was said; and it must be of necessity that when the times change
not in conformity with his mode, he is ruined.

[3] Piero Soderini, cited before at other times, 3 proceeded in all his affairs
with humanity and patience. He and his fatherland prospered while the
times were conformable to the mode of his proceeding; but as times came
later when he needed to break with patience and humility, he did not know
how to do it, so that he together with his fatherland was ruined/ Pope Julius
II proceeded all the time of his pontificate with impetuosity and fury, and
because the times accompanied him well, all his enterprises succeeded for
him. But if other times had come that had demanded other counsel, of
necessity he would have been ruined, for he would not have changed either
mode or order in managing himself. 5 Two things are causes why we are
unable to change: one, that we are unable to oppose that to which nature
inclines us; the other, that when one individual has prospered very much
with one mode of proceeding, it is not possible to persuade him that he can
do well to proceed otherwise. Hence it arises that fortune varies in one man,
because it varies the times and he does not vary the modes. The ruin of
cities also arises through not varying the orders of republics with the times,
as we discoursed of at length above. 6 But they are slower, for they have
trouble varying because they need times to come that move the whole
republic, for which one alone is not enough to vary the mode of proceeding.

[4] And because we have made mention of Fabius Maximus, who held
Hannibal at bay, it appears to me good to discourse in the following chapter
of whether, if a captain wishes to do battle in any mode with the enemy, he
can be prevented by him from doing it.

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«10?n

That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When
the Adversary Wishes Him to Engage in It

in Any Mode

[1] “Gnaeus Sulpitius the dictator dragged out the war against the Gauls, as
he was unwilling to commit himself to fortune against an enemy whom
time and a foreign place were daily making weaker.” 1

When an error is followed in which all men or the greater part deceive
themselves, I do not believe that it is bad to reprove it often. Therefore,
although I have often shown above how actions in great things do not
conform to those of ancient times, 2 nonetheless it does not appear to me
superfluous to repeat it at present. For if one deviates from ancient orders in
any part, it is especially in military actions, in which at present not one of
those things is observed that were very much esteemed by the ancients. This
inconvenience has arisen because republics and princes have imposed this
care on others, and to flee the dangers they have withdrawn from this
exercise. If indeed one sometimes sees a king of our times go [to war] in
person, one does not believe, therefore, that other modes arise from him
that deserve more praise. For they do that exercise, when indeed they do it,
for pomp and not for any other praiseworthy cause. Yet they make lesser
errors when they sometimes look their armies in the face, keeping for
themselves the title of command, than republics make—and especially the
Italian ones—that entrust themselves to others and do not understand
anything that belongs to war; 3 and, on the other hand, since they wish to
decide about it so as to appear to be the prince themselves, they make a
thousand errors in such a decision. Although I have discoursed of some of
them elsewhere, 4 at present I do not wish to be silent about a very
important one. When these idle princes or effeminate republics send out a
captain of theirs, the wisest commission it seems to them they give him is to
impose on him that he not come to battle in some mode 5 —indeed, that
above all he guard himself against fighting. Since it appears to them that

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they are imitating in this the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who in deferring
combat saved the state for the Romans, they do not understand that most
often this commission is null or is harmful. For one ought to accept this
conclusion: that a captain who wishes to stay in the field cannot flee battle
whenever the enemy wishes to engage in it in any mode. This commission is
nothing other than to say: “Do battle to the enemy’s purpose and not yours.”
For if one wishes to stay in the field, and not to do battle, there is no secure
remedy for it other than to put oneself at least fifty miles distant from the
enemy and then to keep good spies so that you have time to distance
yourself when he comes to you. Another policy for it is to shut oneself in a
city, and both of these two policies are very harmful. In the first, one leaves
one’s country as prey to the enemy; and a worthy prince will rather try the
fortune of battle than lengthen the war with so much harm to the subjects.
In the second policy is manifest loss, for it must be that when you retire
with an army into a city, you come to be besieged, and in a short time suffer
hunger and come to surrender. So to escape battle by these two ways is very
harmful. The mode that Fabius Maximus adopted of staying in strongholds
is good when you have so virtuous an army that the enemy does not dare to
come to meet you in the midst of your advantages. Nor can one say that
Fabius fled from battle, but rather that he wished to wage it at his
advantage. 6 For if Hannibal had gone to meet him, Fabius would have
awaited him and done battle with him, but Hannibal never dared to engage
in combat with him in his mode. So the battle was fled by Hannibal as well
as by Fabius; but if one of them had wished to engage in it in any mode, the
other would have had only one of three remedies: the two said above, or to
flee.

[2] That what I say is true one sees manifestly with a thousand examples,
and especially with the war that the Romans made with Philip of Macedon,
father of Perseus. For when Philip was assaulted by the Romans, he decided
not to fight, and so as not to come to it he wished to do first as Fabius
Maximus had done in Italy; and he put himself with his army on the
summit of a mountain, where he fortified himself very much, judging that
the Romans would not dare go to meet him. But when they went there and
engaged in combat with him, they expelled him from that mountain; and
he, unable to resist, fled with the greater part of the troops. What saved him,
so that he was not entirely wasted, was the unevenness of the country, which
made the Romans unable to follow him. Thus, not willing to fight and
having encamped himself near the Romans, Philip had to flee; and having

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come to know by this experience that when he did not wish to engage in
combat it was not enough to stay on top of mountains, and since he did not
wish to close himself up in towns, he decided to take up the other mode of
staying many miles distant from the Roman camp. Hence, if the Romans
were in one province, he went off to the other; and so always wherever the
Romans left, he entered. Seeing at last that in lengthening the war in this
way his condition was worsening, and that his subjects were being crushed
now by him, now by the enemy, he decided to try the fortune of battle, and
so came to a real battle with the Romans. 7 Thus it is useful not to engage in
combat when armies are in the conditions that Fabius’s army had and that
Gnaeus Sulpitius’s had then: 8 that is, having an army so good that the enemy
does not dare come to meet you inside your fortresses, and when the enemy
is in your home, and so suffers from the necessities of living, without having
gotten much of a foothold. In this case it is the useful policy for the reasons
that Titus Livy says: “He was unwilling to commit himself to fortune against
an enemy whom time and a foreign place were daily making weaker.” 9 But,
in every other situation, you cannot flee battle except with your dishonor
and danger. For to flee as did Philip is like being defeated, and with the
more shame the less proof has been made of your virtue. If he succeeded in
saving himself, no other would succeed who had not been aided by the
country as he. That Hannibal was not master of war no one will ever say;
and when he was up against Scipio in Africa, if he had seen advantage in
lengthening the war he would have done it; and perchance, being a good
captain and having a good army, he would have been able to do it, as did
Fabius in Italy. But since he did not do it, one ought to believe that some
important cause moved him. For a prince who has put an army together and
sees that by lack of money or friends he cannot hold such an army for long is
altogether mad if he does not try fortune before such an army has to
dissolve; for by waiting he loses for certain, by trying he might be able to
win.

[3] One other thing here is also very much to be esteemed, which is that one
ought to wish to acquire glory even when losing; and one has more glory in
being conquered by force than through another inconvenience that has
made you lose. So Hannibal ought to have been constrained by these
necessities. On the other hand, if Hannibal had deferred battle and Scipio
had not had enough spirit to go to meet him in his strongholds, he would
not have allowed him to be able to stay there secure and with advantage as
in Italy, because he had already conquered Syphax and acquired so many

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towns in Africa. That did not happen to Hannibal when he was up against
Fabius, nor to the French who were up against Sulpitius.

[4] So much the less can he flee battle who assaults another’s country with
an army; for if he wishes to enter into the enemy’s country, he must fight
with him if the enemy puts himself against him. If he encamps before a
town, he is all the more obliged to fight, as happened in our times to Duke
Charles of Burgundy who, when he was encamped at Morat, a town of the
Swiss, was assaulted and defeated by the Swiss, and as happened to the
army of France that was likewise defeated by the Swiss as it was encamping
at Novara.

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11 ft

That Whoever Has to Deal with Very
Many, Even Though He Is Inferior, Wins If
Only He Can Sustain the First Thrusts

[1] The power of the tribunes of the plebs in the city of Rome was great,
and it was necessary, as has been discoursed of by us many times, 1 because
otherwise one would not have been able to place a check on the ambition of
the nobility, which would have corrupted that republic a long time before it
did corrupt itself. Nonetheless, as has been said other times, 2 because in
everything some evil is concealed that makes new accidents emerge, it is
necessary to provide for this with new orders. When, therefore, the
tribunate authority became insolent and formidable to the nobility and to all
Rome, some inconvenience would have arisen from it harmful to Roman
freedom had they not been shown by Appius Claudius 3 the mode with
which they had to defend themselves against the ambition of the tribunes.
This was that they always found among them someone who was either
fearful or corruptible or a lover of the common good, so that they disposed
him to oppose the will of the others, who wished to press forward some
decision against the will of the Senate. That remedy was a great tempering
of so much authority, and it often helped Rome. This has made me consider
that whenever there are many powers united against another power, even
though all together are much more powerful, nonetheless one ought always
to put more hope in that one alone, who is less mighty, than in the many,
even though very mighty. For, leaving aside all those things in which one
alone can prevail over many (which are infinite), this will always occur: that
by using a little industry, he will be able to disunite the very many and to
weaken the body that was mighty. In this I do not wish to bring up ancient
examples, of which there are very many; but I wish modern ones, followed
in our times, to suffice for me.

[2] In 1483 all Italy conspired against the Venetians, and after they were
altogether lost and could no longer remain with an army in the field, they

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corrupted Signor Ludovico, 4 who was governing Milan; and through such
corruption made an accord in which they not only got back the lost towns
but usurped part of the state of Ferrara. So those who lost in the war
remained superior in the peace. 5 A few years ago the whole world conspired
against France; nonetheless, before the end of the war was seen, Spain
rebelled from the confederates and made an accord with it so that the other
confederates were constrained, soon after, to come to accord too. 6 So
without doubt, when one sees a war started by many against one, 7 one ought
always to make a judgment that that one 8 has to remain superior, if it is of
such virtue that it can sustain the first thrusts and with temporizing await
the time. For if it were not so, it would bear a thousand dangers, as
happened in ’08 to the Venetians, who would have escaped that ruin if they
had been able to temporize with the French army and had time to win over
to themselves one of those who were leagued against them. But not having
virtuous arms so that they could temporize with the enemy, and because of
this not having had time to separate one of them, they were ruined. For one
may see that when he got back his things the pope made himself their
friend, and so did Spain; and both of these princes would very willingly
have saved the state of Lombardy for them against France, so as not to
make it so great in Italy, if they had been able. Thus the Venetians could
have given part to save the rest. If they had done that in time—so that it did
not appear that it had been necessity, and before the start of the war—it
would have been a very wise policy; but after the start it was worthy of
reproach and perchance of little profit. But before such a start, few of the
citizens in Venice could see the danger, very few could see the remedy, and
no one could counsel it. 9 But to return to the beginning of this discourse, I
conclude that as the Roman Senate had a remedy for the safety of the
fatherland against the ambition of the tribunes, because they were many, so
any prince whoever who is assaulted by many will have a remedy whenever
he knows how to use with prudence suitable means to disunite them.

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12 ft

That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose
Every Necessity to Engage in Combat on
His Soldiers and Take It Away from Those

of Enemies

[1] At other points we have discoursed of how useful is necessity to human
actions and to what glory they have been led by it. 1 As it has been written by
certain moral philosophers, the hands and the tongue of men—two very
noble instruments for ennobling him—would not have worked perfectly nor
led human works to the height they are seen to be led to had they not been
driven by necessity. 2 Thus, since the virtue of such necessity was known by
the ancient captains of armies, and how much the spirits of soldiers through
it became obstinate in engaging in combat, they would do every work so
that their soldiers were constrained by [necessity]; and on the other hand,
they used all industry so that enemies would be freed from it. Because of
this they often opened the way to the enemy that they could have closed to
it, and to their own soldiers they closed that which they could have left
open. Thus he who desires either that a city be defended obstinately or that
an army in the field engage in combat obstinately ought to contrive above
every other thing to put such necessity in the breasts of whoever has to
engage in combat. Hence a prudent captain who has to go capture a city
ought to measure the ease or the difficulty of capturing it from knowing and
considering what necessity constrains its inhabitants to defend themselves;
and if he finds there very much necessity that constrains them to defense, he
should judge the capture difficult; otherwise he should judge it easy.
Therefore it arises that towns are more difficult to acquire after rebellion
than they were in the first acquiring, for in the beginning they surrendered
easily, not having cause to fear punishment because they had not offended;
but since it appears to them that they have offended when they have rebelled
afterward, and because of this they fear punishment, they become difficult
to capture. Such obstinacy also arises from the natural hatreds that

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neighboring princes and neighboring republics have for one another, which
proceeds from the ambition to dominate and from jealousy for their state—
especially if they are republics—as happened in Tuscany. Such rivalry and
contention have made and will always make the capture of one by another
difficult. Therefore, whoever considers well the neighbors of the city of
Florence and the neighbors of the city of Venice will not marvel, as many
do, that Florence had more expense in wars and acquired less than Venice.
For it all arises from the Venetians’ not having had neighboring towns so
obstinate for defense as Florence has had, because all the cities next to
Venice had been used to living under a prince, and not free, and those who
were accustomed to serving often reckoned little a change of patron—
indeed, they often desired it. So although Venice has had more powerful
neighbors than Florence, because it found the towns less obstinate, it has
been able to conquer them sooner than did the latter, which was surrounded
all by free cities.

[2] Thus, to return to the first discourse, when he assaults a town, a captain
ought to contrive with all diligence to lift such necessity from its defenders,
and in consequence such obstinacy—if they have fear of punishment, he
promises pardon, and if they had fear for their freedom, he shows he does
not go against the common good but against the ambitious few in the city,
which has many times made campaigns and captures of towns easier.
Although such coloring over as this is easily recognized, and especially by
prudent men, nonetheless peoples are often deceived in it who, greedy for
present peace, close their eyes to whatever other snare might be laid under
the big promises. Infinite cities have become servile in this way, as
happened to Florence in very near times, 3 and as happened to Crassus and
his army. Although he recognized the vain promises of the Parthians, which
were made to take away from his soldiers the necessity of defending
themselves, he was not therefore able to keep them obstinate, blinded by the
offers of peace that were made to them by their enemies, as one sees
particularly from reading his life. 4 I say therefore that when the Samnites
overran and plundered the fields of the Roman confederates, outside the
agreements in the accord and through the ambition of the few, and when
they then sent ambassadors to Rome to ask for peace, offering to restore the
things plundered and to give as prisoners the authors of the tumults and the
plundering, they were rebuffed by the Romans. After they returned to
Samnium without hope of accord, Claudius Pontius, then captain of the
army of the Samnites, showed with a notable oration of his that the Romans

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wished for war in any mode, and although they by themselves desired peace,
necessity made them continue the war, saying these words: “War is just to
whom it is necessary, and arms are pious to those for whom there is no
hope save in arms.” 5 On that necessity he, with his soldiers, founded hope
of victory. So as not to have to return again to this matter, it appears to me
good to bring up those Roman examples that are most worthy of notice.
Gaius Manilius was with the army up against the Veientes, and since part of
the Veientian army entered the stockade of Manilius, Manilius ran with a
band to their relief; and they seized all the exits in the camp so that the
Veientes could not save themselves. Hence, seeing themselves closed in, the
Veientes began to combat with so much rage that they killed Manilius and
would have crushed all the rest of the Romans if by the prudence of one
tribune the way had not been opened for them to go out. 6 Here one sees that
while necessity constrained the Veientes to combat, they combated very
ferociously; but when they saw the way open, they thought more of fleeing
than of engaging in combat.

[3] The Volsci and the Aequi had entered into Roman borders with their
armies. The consuls were sent up against them. So in the travail of the fight,
the army of the Volsci, whose head was Vettius Messius, found itself at a
stroke enclosed between its stockade, which had been seized by the
Romans, and the other Roman army; and seeing that they needed either to
die or to make a way for themselves with steel, he said these words to his
soldiers: “Go with me; neither wall nor ditch oppose you but the armed
oppose the armed; alike in virtue, you are superior in necessity, which is the
last and greatest weapon.” 7 So this necessity is called by Titus Livy “the last
and greatest weapon.” When Camillus, the most prudent of all the Roman
captains, was already inside the city of the Veientes with his army and
wanted to make its taking easier and to take away from the enemy a last
necessity of defending themselves, he commanded—so that the Veientes
heard—that no one should hurt those who were unarmed, so that when the
arms were thrown to earth, that city was taken almost without blood. 8 Such
a mode was later observed by many captains.

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« 13 ?*

Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good
Captain Who Has a Weak Army or a Good
Army That Has a Weak Captain

[1] When Coriolanus had become an exile from Rome, he went to the
Volsci, and having contracted an army there to avenge himself against his
citizens, he came to Rome. From there he later departed, more through
piety for his mother than by the strength of the Romans. At this place Titus
Livy says that it is to be known by this that the Roman republic grew more
by the virtue of the captains than of the soldiers, considering that in the past
the Volsci had been conquered and that they had conquered only after
Coriolanus was their captain. 1 Although Livy holds such an opinion,
nonetheless in many places of his history one sees that the virtue of the
soldiers had given marvelous proofs of itself without a captain and that they
had been more orderly and more ferocious after the death of their consuls
than before they died, as occurred in the army that the Romans had in Spain
under the Scipios. When the two captains died, it was able with its virtue
not only to save itself but to conquer the enemy and to preserve that
province for the republic. 2 So reviewing 3 the whole, one will find many
examples where only the virtue of the soldiers won the battle, and many
others where only the virtue of the captains has produced the same effect,
so that one can judge that the one has need of the other, and the other of
the one.

[2] Here it is good to consider, first, what is more to be feared, a good army
badly captained or a good captain accompanied by a bad army. And
following Caesar’s opinion in this, one ought to reckon little of both. For as
he was going into Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who had a very good
army, he said that he reckoned them little “because he was going against an
army without a leader,” showing the weakness of the captains. On the
contrary, when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, he said, “I go against
a leader without an army.” 4

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[3] One can consider another thing: to whom is it easier, to a good captain
to make a good army or to a good army to make a good captain? On which I
say that such a question appears decided, because many who are good will
more easily find or instruct one individual so that he becomes good than one
individual will make many. When Lucullus was sent against Mithridates he
was altogether inexpert in war; nonetheless that good army, in which there
were very many very good heads, soon made him a good captain. 5 The
Romans, for lack of men, armed very many slaves and gave them to
Sempronius Gracchus to exercise, who in a short time made a good army. 6
As we have said elsewhere, 7 a short time after Pelopidas and Epaminondas
had drawn their fatherland, Thebes, from servitude to the Spartans, they
made very good soldiers of Theban peasants, who were able not only to
withstand the Spartan military but to conquer it. So the affair is even,
because the one good can find the other. Nonetheless, a good army without
a good head usually becomes insolent and dangerous, as the army of
Macedon became after the death of Alexander, 8 and as the veteran soldiers
in the civil wars were. 9 So I believe that a captain who has time to instruct
men and occasion to arm them is very much more to be trusted than an
insolent army with a head made tumultuously by it. Thus the glory and the
praise are to be doubled for those captains who have had not only to
conquer the enemy but to instruct their army and make it good before they
come hand to hand with him; for in these a double virtue is shown, and so
rare that if such a task had been given to many, they would be reckoned and
reputed very much less than they are.

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What Effects New Inventions That Appear
in the Middle of the Fight and New Voices
That Are Heard May Produce

[1] Of how much moment in conflicts and in fighting a new accident may be
that arises because of a thing newly seen or heard is demonstrated in very
many places, and especially by this example that occurred in the fighting
that the Romans did with the Volsci. Here Quintius, seeing one of the wings
of his army bending, began to cry out loudly that it should stand steady
because the other wing of the army was victorious, and—this word having
given spirit to his men and terrified the enemy—he won. 1 If such voices
produce great effects in a well-ordered army, in a tumultuous and badly
ordered one they produce the greatest because the whole is moved by a like
wind. I wish to bring up one notable example of this that occurred in our
times. The city of Perugia was divided a few years ago into two parties,
Oddi and Baglioni. The latter were reigning; the others were exiles who,
having gathered an army by means of their friends and brought themselves
down to some town of theirs near Perugia, entered that city one night with
the favor of the party and without being discovered came to take the piazza.
Because that city has chains on all the corners of the streets that keep it
locked up, the Oddi troops had one individual in front who broke the locks
on them with a steel sledgehammer so that the horse could pass through.
When all that remained for them to break was the one that blocked the
piazza, and the call to arms had already been raised, he who was breaking it
was pressed by the crowd that was coming behind him and, because of this,
was unable to lift his arms well to break. To be able to manage, he came out
and said, “Get back!”—and this voice going from rank to rank saying
“Back!” began to make the last ones flee, and little by little the others, with
so much fury that they were broken by themselves. So the plan of the Oddi
was in vain, because of so weak an accident. 2

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[2] Here it is to be considered that the orders in an army are necessary not
so much to be able to engage in combat in orderly fashion as that every least
accident not disorder you. For it is not because of anything else that popular
multitudes are useless for war except that every noise, every voice, every
uproar upsets them and makes them flee. So a good captain among his other
orders ought to order whoever are those who have to pick up his voice and
relay it to others, and accustom his soldiers not to believe any but them and
his captains not to say anything but what has been commissioned by him.
For when this part has not been well observed, it has often been seen to
have produced the greatest disorders.

[3] As to seeing new things, every captain ought to contrive to make one of
them appear while the armies are hand to hand, which gives spirit to his
men and takes it away from the enemy; for among the accidents that give
you victory, this is most efficacious. As witness of this, one can bring up
Gaius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator. Coming to battle with the French, he
armed all the pillagers and vile people in the camp, and when they had been
mounted on mules and other pack animals with arms and ensigns to appear
as troops on horseback, he put them under the ensigns behind a hill and
commanded that at a given sign, at the time when the fighting was most
vigorous, they be exposed and shown to the enemies. When that thing was
so ordered and done, it gave so much terror to the French that they lost the
battle. 3 Thus a good captain ought to do two things: one, with some of these
new inventions, to see to terrifying the enemy; the other, to be prepared so
that when such have been done by the enemy against him, he can expose
them and make them turn out vain. So did the king of India to Semiramis,
who, seeing that that king had a good number of elephants, and wishing to
terrify him and to show him that she too had plenty of them, constructed 4
very many of them with the hides of buffaloes and cows, and having put
them on top of camels, sent them ahead. But when the deception was
recognized by the king, he made that plan of hers turn out not only vain but
harmful. The dictator Mamercus was opposing the Fidenates, who to
terrify the Roman army ordered that in the ardor of fighting a number of
soldiers should come out of Fidenae with flames on spears so that the
Romans, seized by the newness of the thing, would break orders within
themselves. On this it is to be noted that when such inventions have more of
the true than the fictional, one can indeed then represent them to men
because, having very much of the mighty, one cannot expose their weakness
so soon; but when they have more of the fictional than the true, it is good

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either not to do them or, when doing them, to hold them at a distance such
that they cannot be exposed so soon, as did Gaius Sulpitius with the mule
riders. For when there is weakness inside them, as they are brought close
they are soon exposed and do harm to you, and not favor, as did the
elephants to Semiramis and the flames to the Fidenates. Although in the
beginning they disturbed the army a little, nonetheless, as the dictator
intervened and began to cry out to them—saying that they should not shame
themselves by fleeing smoke like bees, and that they should turn around to
them, crying out, “Destroy Fidenae with its own flames, which you were
unable to placate with your benefits”—that shift turned out to be useless to
the Fidenates, and they were left losers in the fighting. 6

«15?n

That One Individual and Not Many Should
Be Put over an Army; and That Several
Commanders Hurt

[1] When the Fidenates had rebelled and had killed the colony that the
Romans had sent to Fidenae, to remedy this insult the Romans created four
tribunes with consular power. They left one of them for the guarding of
Rome and sent three against the Fidenates and the Veientes. Because they
were divided among themselves and disunited, they brought back dishonor
and not harm. For they were themselves the cause of the dishonor; the
virtue of the soldiers was the cause of not receiving harm. Hence the
Romans, seeing this disorder, had recourse to the creation of the dictator 1
so that one alone might reorder what three had disordered. Hence one
recognizes the uselessness of many commanders in an army or in a town
that has to be defended; and Titus Livy cannot say it more clearly than with
the words written below: “Three tribunes with consular power documented
how useless plural command is for war; since each insisted on his own
counsel, while to the others it seemed otherwise, they made room for
opportunity to the enemy.” 2 Although this example is enough to prove the
disorder that several commanders produce in war, I wish to bring up some
others, both modern and ancient, for greater clarification of the thing.

[2] In 1500, after the recapture of Milan by the king of France, Louis XII,
he sent his troops to Pisa so as to restore it to the Florentines;
Giovambatista Ridolfi and Luca di Antonio degli Albizzi were sent there as
commissioners. Because Giovambatista was a man of reputation and of
greater age, Luca left the governing of everything entirely to him; and if he
did not demonstrate his ambition by opposing him, he demonstrated it by
keeping silent, and by neglecting and disparaging everything so that he did
not help actions in the camp either by work or by counsel, as if he had been
a man of no moment. But one may then see quite the contrary when,
because of a certain accident that followed, Giovambatista had to return to

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Florence; there Luca, left alone, demonstrated how much he was worth with
spirit, with industry, and with counsel—all of which things were lost while
there was company with him. 3 In confirmation of this, I wish to bring up
anew the words of Titus Livy, who—in referring to how, when Quintius and
his colleague Agrippa were sent by the Romans against the Aequi, Agrippa
wished for the whole administration of the war to be with Quintius—says:
“It is most healthy in the administration of great things that the summit of
command be with one individual.” 4 That is contrary to what these republics
and princes of ours do today in sending to places more than one
commissioner, more than one head, to administer them better, which
produces confusion beyond reckoning. If one seeks the causes of the ruin of
Italian and French armies in our times, one will find the most powerful to
have been this. And it can be concluded truly that it is better to send one
man of common prudence alone on an expedition than two very worthy
men together with the same authority.

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16 n

That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find
True Virtue; and in Easy Times Not
Virtuous Men but Those with Riches or
Kinship Have More Favor

[1] It has always been, and will always be, that great and rare men are
neglected in a republic in peaceful times. For through the envy that the
reputation their virtue has given them has brought with it, one finds very
many citizens in such times who wish to be not their equals but their
superiors. On this there is a good passage in Thucydides, the Greek
historian. He shows that when the Athenian republic was on top in the
Peloponnesian War, and had checked the pride of the Spartans and almost
subdued all the rest of Greece, it rose to so much reputation that it planned
to seize Sicily. This enterprise came under dispute in Athens. Alcibiades
and some other citizen, planning to be the heads of such an enterprise,
counseled that it be done, as those who, while thinking little of the public
good, thought of their honor. But Nicias, who was the first among those
reputed in Athens, argued against it. The greatest reason that he brought up
in haranguing the people, so that they might lend him faith, was this: that in
counseling that this war not be made, he was counseling a thing that would
do nothing for him. For while Athens was at peace, he knew that there were
infinite citizens who wished to go ahead of him; but if war was made, he
knew that no citizen would be superior or equal to him. 1

[2] By this one sees, therefore, that in republics there is the disorder of
giving little esteem to worthy men in quiet times. That thing makes them
indignant in two modes: one, to see themselves lacking their rank; the other,
to see unworthy men of less substance 2 than they made partners and
superiors to themselves. That disorder in republics has caused much ruin,
because those citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised and know
that easy and not dangerous times are the cause of it strive to disturb them,

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starting new wars to the prejudice of the republic. Thinking over what could
be the remedies, I find two of them: one, to maintain the citizens poor so
that they cannot corrupt either themselves or others with riches and without
virtue; the other, to be ordered for war so that one can always make war and
always has need of reputed citizens, as did the Romans in their first times.
For since armies were always kept outside that city, there was always a
place for the virtue of men; nor could rank be taken away from one
individual who deserved it and given to another individual who did not
deserve it. For if indeed [the Roman republic] did so at some time by error
or for trial, so much disorder and danger soon followed for it that it at once
returned to the true way. But the other republics that are not ordered like
that one and that make war only when necessity constrains them cannot
defend themselves from such an inconvenience; indeed, they always run into
them, and disorder will always arise when that neglected and virtuous
citizen is vindictive and has some reputation and connection in the city.
The city of Rome at one time had a defense; but also, after it had conquered
Carthage and Antiochus (as was said elsewhere) 3 and no longer feared wars,
it appeared to it that it could commit armies to whomever it wished, with
regard not so much to virtue as to other qualities that gave them favor
among the people. For one may see that Paulus Aemilius often suffered
rejection for the consulate, nor was he made consul before the Macedonian
War broke out, which, being judged dangerous, was committed to him by
agreement of the whole city. 4

[3] When in our city of Florence many wars continued after 1494, and all
the Florentine citizens had made a bad showing, the city by fate came upon
one individual who showed how armies have to be commanded, who was
Antonio Giacomini. While dangerous wars had to be made, all the ambition
of the other citizens ceased, and in the choice of commissioner and head of
the armies he had no competitor; but as soon as a war had to be made in
which there was no doubt, and very much honor and rank, he found so
many competitors for it that when three commissioners had to be chosen to
encamp before Pisa, he was omitted. Although one did not plainly see that
ill to the republic followed from not having sent Antonio there, nonetheless
one could very easily have made a conjecture about it; for since the Pisans
no longer had the wherewithal to defend themselves or to live, if Antonio
had been there they would have been pressed so much that they would have
given themselves to the discretion of the Florentines. But since they were
besieged by heads who knew neither how to press them nor how to force

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them, they were treated so that the city of Florence bought them when it
could have had them by force. Such indignation must have been able to do
very much in Antonio, and he needed to be patient and good indeed not to
desire to avenge himself, either with the ruin of the city, if he was able, or
with the injury of some particular citizen. 5 From that a republic ought to
guard itself, as will be discoursed of in the following chapter.

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17 ft

That One Individual Should Not Be
Offended and Then That Same One Sent to
an Administration and Governance of

Importance

[1] A republic ought to consider very much not putting someone over any
important administration to whom any notable injury has been done by
another. Claudius Nero, who left the army that he had confronting
Hannibal, and with part of it went to the Marches to meet the other consul
so as to do combat with Hasdrubal before he could join with Hannibal, had
in the past been confronting Hasdrubal in Spain. Then he had enclosed him
in a place with his army so that Hasdrubal needed either to engage in
combat to his disadvantage or die of hunger, and he was so astutely
detained by Hasdrubal with certain negotiations of an accord that he came
out from under and took away from him the opportunity of crushing him.
When that thing was known in Rome, it prompted a great charge against
him among the Senate and the people, and throughout the city he was
spoken of indecently, not without great dishonor and indignation for him. 1
But since he had then been made consul and sent up against Hannibal, he
adopted the policy written above, which was very dangerous, so that all
Rome remained doubtful and stirred up until the news came of the defeat of
Hasdrubal. When Claudius was then asked for what cause he had adopted so
dangerous a policy, whereby without an extreme necessity he had almost
staked the freedom of Rome, he replied that he had done it because he
knew that if he succeeded he would reacquire the glory he had lost in Spain;
and if he did not succeed, and this policy of his had had a contrary end, he
knew that he would have avenged himself against the city and the citizens
who had so ungratefully and indiscreetly offended him. 2 When the passions
of such offenses are able to do so much in a Roman citizen, and in those
times when Rome was still uncorrupt, one ought to think about how much
they are able to do in a citizen of another city that is not made as it was

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then. Because one cannot give a certain remedy for such disorders that arise
in republics, it follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic,
because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways.

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« 18 ?*

Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain
Than to Foretell the Policies of the Enemy

[1] Epaminondas the Theban used to say that nothing was more necessary
and more useful to a captain than to know the decisions and policies of the
enemy. 1 Because such knowledge is difficult, he who employs himself so as
to make conjectures about them deserves so much the more praise. It is not
so difficult to understand the plans of the enemy as it is sometimes difficult
to understand his actions, and not so much actions that are done by him at a
distance as ones present and near. For it has often happened that when a
tight has lasted until night, whoever has won believes he has lost, and
whoever has lost believes he has won. That error has made things be decided
contrary to the safety of the one who decided, as happened to Brutus and
Cassius, who lost the war because of this error; for when Brutus had won on
his wing, Cassius believed he had lost, so that the whole army was defeated;
and, made desperate for his safety by this error, he killed himself. 2 In our
times, in the battle that Francis, king of France, made with the Swiss in
Fombardy at Santa Cecilia, that part of the Swiss who were left whole when
night came over believed they had won, not knowing of those who had been
defeated and killed. That error made them not save themselves and made
them wait to engage in combat again in the morning, at such a disadvantage
to them; and they also made the army of the pope and of Spain err, and
through such an error come close to ruin, for upon the false news of victory
it crossed the Po, and if it had proceeded too far ahead, it would have been
left prisoner of the victorious French. 3

[2] The like error occurred in the Roman camps and in those of the Aequi.
When the consul Sempronius was there with the army up against the
enemy, and after the fighting was set off, the battle dragged on until evening,
with varying fortune for the one and the other. When night came, both
armies being half-defeated, neither of them returned to its quarters; indeed,
each retreated to hills nearby where it believed it would be secure. The
Roman army divided into two parts: one went with the consul, the other

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with Tempanius, a centurion, by the virtue of whom the Roman army had
not been entirely defeated that day. When morning came, the Roman
consul, without further understanding of the enemy, withdrew toward
Rome; the army of the Aequi did likewise because each of these believed
that the enemy had won and so each retreated without caring about leaving
its quarters as booty. It happened that Tempanius, who was retiring with the
rest of the Roman army, learned from certain wounded of the Aequi that
their captains had left and had abandoned the lodgings. Hence, upon this
news, he entered the Roman quarters and saved them, and then he
plundered those of the Aequi, and returned to Rome victorious. 4 That
victory, as one sees, consisted only in whichever of them first understood
the disorders of the enemy. Here one ought to note that it can often occur
that two armies that are confronting each other may be in the same disorder
and be suffering the same necessity, and that the one is then left the victor
that is the first to understand the necessity of the other.

[3] I wish to give a domestic and modern example of this. In 1498, the
Florentines had a large army around Pisa and were strongly pressing that
city, which the Venetians had taken under protection, and the Venetians,
not seeing another mode of saving it, decided to divert the war by assaulting
the dominion of Florence from another side. Having made a powerful army,
they entered by the Val di Lamona and seized the village of Marradi and
besieged the castle of Castiglione, which is on the hill above. When the
Florentines heard of this, they decided to come to the aid of Marradi and
not to diminish the forces they had around Pisa; and having made new
infantry and ordered new troops on horseback, they sent them in that
direction. Their heads were Jacopo IV d’Appiano, lord of Piombino, and
Count Rinuccio da Marciano. Thus when these troops were led to the top of
the hill above Marradi, the enemy got out from around Castiglione, and all
went to the village. After both of these two armies had been at the front for
some days, both suffered very much for provisions and for every other
necessary thing. The one not having dared to confront the other, nor
knowing each other’s disorders, both decided on the same evening to move
their quarters on the coming morning and to retire to the rear, the Venetian
toward Bersighella and Faenza, the Florentine toward Casaglia and the
Mugello. Thus when morning came and each of the camps had begun to get
its baggage under way, by chance a woman left the village of Marradi and
came toward the Florentine camp, secure because of old age and poverty,
and desirous of seeing certain of her relatives who were in that camp. 5

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When the captains of the Florentine troops learned from her that the
Venetian camp was leaving, they were made bold by the news; and having
changed their counsel, they went after the enemies as if they had dislodged
them, and they wrote to Florence that they had repelled them and won the
war. That victory arose from nothing other than having learned before the
enemies that they were going—which knowledge, if it had come first to the
other side, would have had the same effect against ours.

t$J

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« 19 ?*

Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance
Is More Necessary Than Punishment

[1] The Roman republic was stirred up by the enmities of the nobles and of
the plebs; nonetheless, when war was upon them, they sent out Quintius and
Appius Claudius with the armies. Because Appius was cruel and coarse in
commanding he was badly obeyed by his men, so that he fled almost
defeated from his province; because Quintius was kind and of humane
disposition, he had his soldiers obedient, and he brought back victory. 1
Hence it appears that in governing a multitude, it is better to be humane
rather than proud, merciful rather than cruel. Nonetheless, Cornelius
Tacitus, with whom many other writers consent, concludes the contrary in
one of his judgments, when he says: 2 “In ruling a multitude, punishment is
worth more than compliance.” 3 Considering how one could save both of
these opinions, I say: you have to rule either men who are ordinarily
partners with you or men who are always subject to you. When they are
partners with you, one cannot use punishment entirely, nor that severity on
which Cornelius reasons; and because the Roman plebs had equal command
in Rome with the nobility, one individual who became prince of it for a
time could not manage it with cruelty and coarseness. One may often see
that the Roman captains who made themselves loved by their armies and
who managed them with compliance had better fruit than those who made
themselves extraordinarily feared, unless they were accompanied by an
excessive virtue, as was Manlius Torquatus. But whoever commands
subjects, of whom Cornelius reasons, ought to turn rather to punishment
than to compliance so that they do not become insolent and do not trample
on you because of too much easiness from you. But this ought also to be
moderated so that one escapes hatred, for to make oneself hated never turns
out well for any prince. The mode of escaping it is to let the property of
subjects be, for no prince is desirous of bloodshed if robbery is not
concealed underneath it, unless he is necessitated, and this necessity comes
rarely. But when robbery is mixed with it, it always comes; nor are the

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causes and the desire of shedding it ever lacking, as is broadly discoursed of
in another treatise on this matter. 4 Thus Quintius deserved more praise than
Appius, and the judgment of Cornelius, within its limits and not in the
cases observed of Appius, deserves to be approved.

[2] And because we have spoken of punishment and compliance, it does not
appear to me superfluous to show that one example of humanity was able to
do more with the Falisci than arms.

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«20 ft

One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do
More with the Falisci Than Any Roman

Force

[1] When Camillus was with the army around the city of the Falisci and
besieging it, a schoolmaster of the noblest children of that city, thinking to
gratify Camillus and the Roman people, went out of the town with them
under color of exercise, led them all to the camp before Camillus, and
presented them, saying that through them the town would give itself into his
hands. Not only was that present not accepted by Camillus, but, having
stripped that master and bound his hands behind him, and given each one of
those children a rod in hand, he had him accompanied to town with many
beatings from them. When that affair was learned of by the citizens, the
humanity and integrity of Camillus pleased them so much that, without
wishing to defend themselves more, they decided to give them the town. 1
Here it is to be considered with this true example how much more a
humane act full of charity is sometimes able to do in the spirits of men than
a ferocious and violent act, and that often those provinces and those cities
that arms, warlike instruments, and every other human force have not been
able to open have been opened by one example of humanity and of mercy,
of chastity or of liberality. Many other examples of that besides this one are
in the histories. One sees that Roman arms were unable to expel Pyrrhus
from Italy, and the liberality of Fabricius expelled him from it, when he
made manifest to him the offer that that familiar of his had made to the
Romans to poison him. 2 One sees too that the capture of New Carthage did
not give Scipio Afficanus so much reputation in Spain as that example of
chastity gave him, of having returned the wife—young, beautiful, and
untouched—to her husband, the fame of which action made all Spain
friendly to him. 3 One sees too how much this part is desired in great men by
peoples, and how much it is praised by writers, and by those who describe
the life of princes, and by those who order how they ought to live. Among

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them Xenophon toils very much to demonstrate how many honors, how
many victories, how much good fame being humane and affable brought to
Cyrus, and not giving any example of himself either as proud, or as cruel, or
as lustful, or as having any other vice that stains the life of men. 4 Yet
nonetheless, seeing that Hannibal attained great fame and great victories
with modes contrary to these, it appears to me good to discourse in the
following chapter on whence this arises.

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#?21 n

Whence It Arises That with a Different
Mode of Proceeding Hannibal Produced
Those Same Effects in Italy as Scipio Did in

Spain

[1] I reckon that some might be able to marvel when they see that some
captain, notwithstanding that he has held to a contrary life, may have
nonetheless produced effects similar to those who have lived in the mode
written about above. So it appears that the cause of the victories does not
depend on the causes said before; indeed, it appears that those modes bring
you neither more force nor more fortune, since one can acquire glory and
reputation through contrary modes. So as not to depart from the men
written about above, and to clarify better what I wished to say, I say that
one sees Scipio enter Spain and with his humanity and mercy at once make
that province friendly to him, and make himself adored and admired by its
peoples. 1 To the contrary, one sees Hannibal enter Italy and with modes all
contrary—that is, with cruelty, violence, robbery, and every type of
faithlessness—produce the same effect that Scipio had produced in Spain;
for all the cities of Italy rebelled to Hannibal, all the peoples followed him. 2

[2] Thinking over whence this could arise, one sees several reasons within
it. The first is that men are desirous of new things, so much that most often
those who are well off desire newness as much as those who are badly off.
For, as was said another time, 3 and it is true, men get bored with the good
and grieve in the ill. Thus this desire makes the doors open to everyone who
makes himself head of an innovation in a province: if he is foreign, they run
after him; if he is from the province, they are around him, promoting and
favoring him, so that in whatever mode he proceeds he succeeds in making
great progress in those places. Besides this, men are driven by two principal
things, either by love or by fear; so whoever makes himself loved commands,
as does he who makes himself feared. Indeed, most often whoever makes

357

himself feared is more followed and more obeyed than whoever makes
himself loved. 4

[3] Therefore it is of little import to a captain whichever of these ways he
walks in, provided that he is a virtuous man and that the virtue makes him
reputed among men. For when it is great, as it was in Hannibal and in
Scipio, it cancels all those errors that are made so as to make oneself loved
too much or to make oneself feared too much. For great inconveniences apt
to make a prince come to ruin can arise from both of these two modes: for
he who desires too much to be loved becomes despicable, however little he
departs from the true way; the other, who desires too much to be feared,
becomes hateful, however little he exceeds the mode. One cannot hold
exactly to the middle way, for our nature does not consent to it, but it is
necessary to mitigate those things that exceed with an excessive virtue, as
did Hannibal and Scipio. Nonetheless, one may see that both were hurt by
their modes of life, and were exalted as well.

[4] The exaltation of both has been told of. The hurt, 5 as to Scipio, is that
his soldiers in Spain rebelled against him, together with part of his friends,
an affair that arose from nothing other than their not fearing him. For men
are so unquiet that however little the door to ambition is opened for them,
they at once forget every love that they had placed in the prince because of
his humanity, as did the soldiers and friends told of before. So, to remedy
this inconvenience, Scipio was constrained to use part of the cruelty he had
fled from. 6 As to Hannibal, there is no particular example where his cruelty
and lack of faith hurt him, but one can well presuppose that Naples and
many other towns that stayed faithful to the Roman people stayed for fear of
that. One may see this well, that his impious mode of life made him more
hateful to the Roman people than any other enemy that that republic ever
had, 7 so that whereas they made the one who wished to poison him
manifest to Pyrrhus while he was with his army in Italy, they never
pardoned Hannibal even though he was unarmed and dispersed, so that they
had him killed. 8 Thus arose these disadvantages for Hannibal because he
was held impious and a breaker of faith and cruel. But as against these, a
very great advantage resulted to him from them, which is admired by all the
writers: that although his army was composed of various kinds of men, no
dissension ever arose in it, either among them or against him. That could
not have derived from anything other than the terror that arose from his
person, which was so great—mixed with the reputation that his virtue gave

358

him—that it held his soldiers quiet and united. Thus I conclude that the
mode in which a captain proceeds is not very important, provided that in it
is the great virtue that seasons both modes of life; for as was said, in both
there is defect and danger unless they are corrected by an extraordinary
virtue. And if Hannibal and Scipio produced the same effect—one with
praiseworthy things, the other with detestable—it does not appear to me
good to omit discoursing also of two Roman citizens who by diverse modes,
but both praiseworthy, attained the same glory.

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*\ 22 k

That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus
and the Kindness of Valerius Corvinus
Acquired for Each the Same Glory

[1] There were two excellent captains in Rome at one and the same time,
Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus. They lived in Rome with like
virtue, with like triumphs and glory, and each of them, in what pertained to
the enemy, acquired it with like virtue; but in what belonged to the armies
and to their dealings with the soldiers, they proceeded very diversely. For
Manlius commanded his soldiers with every kind of severity, without
interrupting either toil or punishment; Valerius, on the other hand, dealt
with them with every humane mode and means and full of a familiar
domesticity. For one may see that to have the obedience of the soldiers, one
killed his son and the other never offended anyone. Nonetheless, with so
much diversity of proceeding, each produced the same fruit, both against
enemies and in favor of the republic and of himself. For no soldier ever
drew back from fighting or rebelled from them or was in any part discrepant
from their wish, although the commands of Manlius were so harsh that all
other commands that exceeded the mode were called “Manlian
commands.” 1 Here it is to be considered, first, whence it arises that Manlius
was constrained to proceed so rigidly; another, whence it came that Valerius
could proceed so humanely; another, what cause made these diverse modes
produce the same effect; and last, which of them is better and more useful
to imitate. If anyone considers well the nature of Manlius from where Titus
Livy begins to make mention of him, he will see him as a very strong man,
pious toward his father and his fatherland, and very reverent to his
superiors. These things can be known from the death of the Frenchman,
from the defense of his father against the tribune, and from the fact that
before he went to the fight with the Frenchman he went to the consul with
these words: “Without your command I will never fight against the enemy,
not if I should see certain victory.” 2 Thus when a man so made comes to the

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rank that commands, he desires to find all men similar to himself, and his
strong spirit makes him command strong things; and that same one wishes
them to be observed when they are commanded. And it is a very true rule
that when one commands harsh things, one must make them observed with
harshness; otherwise you will find yourself deceived. Here it is to be noted
that if one wishes to be obeyed, it is necessary to know how to command;
and those know how to command who make a comparison between their
qualities and those of whoever has to obey, and when they see proportion
there, then they may command; when disproportion, they abstain from it.

[2] So a prudent man used to say that to hold a republic with violence, there
must have been proportion from whoever is forcing to that which is forced. 3
At whatever time there is this proportion, one can believe that the violence
would be lasting, but if the one to whom violence is done is stronger than
the one doing violence, one can suspect that any day that violence might
cease.

[3] But returning to our discourse, I say that to command strong things one
must be strong; and he who is of this strength and who commands them
cannot then make them observed with mildness. But whoever is not of this
strength of spirit ought to guard himself from extraordinary commands and
can use his humanity in ordinary ones, because ordinary punishments are
imputed not to the prince but to the laws and to those orders. Thus one
ought to believe that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly by his
extraordinary commands, to which his nature inclined him. They are useful
in a republic because they return its orders toward their beginning and into
its ancient virtue. As we said above, if a republic were so happy that it often
had one who with his example might renew the laws, and not only restrain it
from running to ruin but pull it back, it would be perpetual. 4 So Manlius
was one of those who retained military discipline in Rome with the
harshness of his commands—constrained first by his nature, then by the
desire he had that what his natural appetite had made him order be
observed. On the other hand, Valerius could proceed humanely as one to
whom it was enough that things be observed that were customary to observe
in the Roman armies. That custom, because it was good, was enough to
honor him; and it was not toilsome to observe it, and it did not necessitate
Valerius’s punishing transgressors, whether because there were none or
because, when there had been some, they imputed their punishment, as was
said, to the orders and not to the cruelty of the prince. So Valerius was able
to make all humanity arise from him, from which he could acquire the

361

soldiers’ favor and their contentment. Hence it arises that since both had the
same obedience, they could produce the same effect while working
diversely. Those who might wish to imitate them can fall into those vices of
scorn and hatred of which I told above of Hannibal and Scipio. You escape
that with an excessive virtue that is in you, and not otherwise.

[4] It remains now to consider which of these two modes of proceeding is
more praiseworthy. I believe that is disputable because the writers praise
both the one mode and the other. Nonetheless, those who write about how a
prince has to govern side more with Valerius than with Manlius; and
Xenophon, cited before by me, by giving many examples of the humanity of
Cyrus, 5 conforms very much with what Titus Livy says of Valerius. For
when he had been made consul against the Samnites, and the day came
when he ought to engage in combat, he spoke to his soldiers with that
humanity with which he governed himself, and after such speaking Titus
Livy says these words: “Nowhere else was a leader more familiar with the
soldier, since he undertook all obligations ungrudgingly among the meanest
of the soldiers. Also in military sport, when those of the same age entered
contests among themselves in swiftness and strength, he was courteously
easygoing; he would win and lose with the same face, nor would anyone be
rejected who offered himself as a peer; in deeds he was kind according to
circumstance; in words he was no less mindful of the freedom of another
than of his own dignity; and (than which nothing is more popular) he
carried on the magistracies with the same arts by which he sought them.” 6
Titus Livy speaks honorably in the same way of Manlius, showing that his
severity in the death of his son made the army so obedient to the consul that
it was the cause of the victory that the Roman people had against the
Latins. He proceeds so far in praising him that after such a victory—having
described, as he has, all the order of the battle and shown all the dangers
that the Roman people incurred there and the difficulties there were in
winning—he makes this conclusion: that only the virtue of Manlius gave
that victory to the Romans. Making comparison of the strength of both
armies, he affirms that that side would have won that had Manlius for
consul . 1 So, when all that which the writers speak of it has been considered,
it would be difficult to judge. Nonetheless, so as not to leave this part
undecided, I say that in a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I
believe the proceeding of Manlius is more praiseworthy and less dangerous,
because this mode is wholly in favor of the public and does not in any part
have regard to private ambition. For by such a mode, showing oneself

362

always harsh to everyone and loving only the common good, one cannot
acquire partisans; for whoever does this does not acquire particular friends
for himself, which we call, as was said above, partisans. 8 So a similar mode
of proceeding cannot be more useful or more desirable in a republic, since
the public utility is not lacking in it and there cannot be any suspicion of
private power. But the contrary is in Valerius’s mode of proceeding, for if
indeed the same effects are produced as to the public, nonetheless, because
of the particular goodwill that he acquires with the soldiers, many doubts
resurge as to the bad effects on freedom of a long command.

[5] If these bad effects did not arise in Publicola, the cause was that the
spirits of the Romans were not yet corrupt, and he had not been in their
government for long and continually 9 But if we have to consider a prince, as
Xenophon is considering, we shall take the side altogether of Valerius, and
leave Manlius; for a prince ought to seek obedience and love in soldiers and
in subjects. Being an observer of the orders and being held virtuous give
him obedience; affability, humanity, mercy, and the other parts that were in
Valerius—and that, Xenophon writes, were in Cyrus—give him love. 10 For
being a prince particularly well wished for and having the army as his
partisan conform with all the other parts of his state; but in a citizen who
has the army as his partisan, this part already does not conform with his
other parts, which have to make him live under the laws and obey the
magistrates.

[6] Among the ancient things of the Venetian republic, one reads that when
the Venetian galleys returned to Venice and a certain difference came
between those in the galleys and the people, whence they came to tumult
and to arms, and since the affair could not be quieted either by the force of
the ministers or by the reverence of citizens or by fear of the magistrates, at
once a gentleman appeared before those seamen who had been their captain
the year before, for love of whom they departed and gave up fighting. That
obedience generated such suspicion in the Senate that a short time
afterward the Venetians secured themselves against him either by prison or
by death. 11 I conclude, therefore, that the proceeding of Valerius is useful in
a prince and pernicious in a citizen, not only to the fatherland but to
himself: to it, because those modes prepare the way for tyranny; to himself,
because in suspecting his mode of proceeding, his city is constrained to
secure itself against him to his harm. So by the contrary I affirm that the
proceeding of Manlius is harmful in a prince and useful in a citizen, and
especially to the fatherland; and also it rarely offends, unless indeed the

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hatred that your severity brings you is increased by the suspicion that your
other virtues bring upon you because of their great reputation, as will be
discoursed of Camillus below.

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«23 M

For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled

from Rome

[1] We have concluded above that proceeding as did Valerius hurts the
fatherland and oneself, and proceeding as did Manlius helps the fatherland
and sometimes hurts oneself. That is proved very well by the example of
Camillus, who in his proceeding resembled Manlius rather than Valerius.
Hence Titus Livy, speaking of him, says that “the soldiers both hated and
marveled at his virtue.” 1 What made him held marvelous was the solicitude,
the prudence, the greatness of his spirit, the good order that he observed in
employing himself and in commanding the armies; what made him hated
was being more severe in punishing them than liberal in rewarding them.
Titus Livy brings up these causes of the hatred: first, that he applied to the
public the money that was drawn from the goods of the Veientes that were
sold and did not divide it as booty; another, that in the triumph, he had his
triumphal chariot pulled by four white horses, from which they said that
because of his pride he wished to be equal to the sun; third, that he made a
vow to give to Apollo the tenth part of the booty of the Veientes, which,
since he wished to satisfy the vow, he had to take out of the hands of the
soldiers who had already seized it. 2 Here those things that make a prince
hateful to the people are well and easily noted, of which the principal one is
to deprive it of something useful. 3 That is a thing of very much importance,
because when a man is deprived of things that have utility in themselves, he
never forgets, and every least necessity makes you remember them; and
because necessities come every day, you remember them every day. The
other thing is appearing proud and swollen, which cannot be more hateful
to peoples, and especially to free ones. Although no disadvantage arises for
them from that pride and that pomp, nonetheless they hold whoever uses
them in hatred. A prince ought to guard himself from that as from a reef,
because to draw on hatred without profit for oneself is a policy altogether
rash and hardly prudent. 4

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366

m24 M

The Prolongation of Conunands Made

Rome Servile

[1] If one considers well the proceeding of the Roman republic, one will see
that two things were the cause of the dissolution of that republic: one was
the contentions that arose from the Agrarian law; the other, the
prolongation of commands. If these things had been known well from the
beginning, and proper remedies produced for them, a free way of life would
have been longer and perhaps quieter. Although, as to the prolongation of
command, one does not see that any tumult ever arose in Rome, nonetheless
one may see in fact how much the authority that citizens took through such
decisions hurt the city. If the other citizens for whom the magistracy was
extended had been wise and good as was Lucius Quintius, 1 one would not
have run into this inconvenience. His goodness is of notable example, for
when a convention of accord had been made between the plebs and the
Senate, and the plebs had prolonged the command of the tribunes for a
year, judging them capable of resisting the ambition of the nobles, the
Senate, because of rivalry with the plebs and so as not to appear any less
than it, wished to prolong the consulate for Lucius Quintius. He altogether
rejected this decision, saying that one should wish to seek to eliminate bad
examples, not to increase them with another worse example; and he wished
for new consuls to be made. 2 If that goodness and prudence had been in all
Roman citizens, the custom of prolonging magistracies would not have been
allowed to be introduced, and from those one would not have come to the
prolongation of commands, a thing that in time ruined the republic. The
first for whom the command was extended was Publius Philo. 3 When he
was in camp at the city of Palaepolis, and the end of his consulate was
coming, and it appeared to the Senate that he had that victory in hand, they
did not send a successor for him but made him proconsul, so that he was the
first proconsul. Although started by the Senate for public utility, that thing
was what in time made Rome servile. For the farther the Romans went
abroad with arms, the more such extension appeared necessary to them and

367

the more they used it. That thing produced two inconveniences: one, that a
lesser number of men were practiced in commands, and because of this
they came to restrict reputation to a few; the other, that when a citizen
remained commander of an army for a very long time, he would win it over
to himself and make it partisan to him, for the army would in time forget
the Senate and recognize that head. Because of this, Sulla and Marius could
find soldiers who would follow them against the public good; because of
this, Caesar could seize the fatherland. For if the Romans had never
prolonged magistracies and commands, if they would not have come so
soon to so much power, and if their acquisitions had been later, they would
have come later still to servitude.

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«25 M

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of
Many Roman Citizens

[1] We have reasoned elsewhere that the most useful thing that may be
ordered in a free way of life is that the citizens be kept poor. 1 Although in
Rome it does not appear which order was the one that produced this effect,
since the Agrarian law especially had so much opposition, nonetheless one
may see from experience that four hundred years after Rome had been
built, very great poverty was there. Nor can one believe that any greater
order produced this effect other than seeing that the way to any rank
whatever and to any honor whatever was not prevented for you because of
poverty, and that one went to find virtue in whatever house it inhabited.
That mode of life made riches less desirable. One sees this manifested, for
when the consul Minucius was besieged with his army by the Aequi, Rome
was filled with fear lest that army be lost; so they had recourse to creating a
dictator, the ultimate remedy in things that afflicted them. They created
Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then at his small villa, on which he
labored with his own hands. That thing is celebrated with golden words by
Titus Livy, who says, “It is worth listening to by those who scorn all human
things in comparison with wealth and do not think there is any place for
great honor and virtue except where riches flow lavishly.” 2 Cincinnatus was
plowing his small villa, which did not surpass a limit of four jugera , 3 when
the legates of the Senate came from Rome to convey to him the election to
his dictatorship, to show him in what danger the Roman republic found
itself. Having put on his toga, come to Rome, and gathered an army, he
went to free Minucius; and when he had defeated and despoiled the enemy
and freed him, he did not wish the besieged army to share in the plunder,
saying these words to it: “I do not wish that you share in the plunder of
those of whom you were about to be the plunder.” 4 And he deprived
Minucius of the consulate and made him a legate, saying to him, “Stay in
this rank until you learn to know how to be a consul.” 5 He had made Lucius
Tarquinius, who served in the military on foot because of his poverty, his

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master of the horse. One notes, as was said, the honor that was paid in
Rome to poverty, and that to a good and worthy man, such as Cincinnatus
was, four jugera of earth was enough to nourish him. One sees that poverty
as it was still in the times of Marcus Regulus, for when he was in Africa
with the armies, he asked license from the Senate to be able to return to
look after his villa, which was spoiled for him by his workers. 6 Here one
sees two very notable things: one, poverty, and the fact that they were
content with it, and that it was enough to those citizens to get honor from
war, and everything useful they left to the public. For if [Marcus Regulus]
had thought of getting rich from war, it would have given him little trouble
that his fields had been spoiled. The other is to consider the generosity of
spirit of those citizens whom, when put in charge of an army, the greatness
of their spirit lifted above every prince. They did not esteem kings, or
republics; nothing terrified or frightened them. When they later returned to
private status, they became frugal, humble, careful of their small
competencies, obedient to the magistrates, reverent to their superiors, so
that it appears impossible that one and the same spirit underwent such
change. This poverty even lasted until the times of Paulus Aemilius, which
were almost the last happy times of that republic, when one citizen who
enriched Rome with his triumph nonetheless kept himself poor. Poverty was
still so much esteemed that Paulus, in honoring whoever had borne himself
well in the war, gave to his son-in-law a cup of silver that was the first silver
to have been in his house. 7 One could show with a long speech how much
better fruits poverty produced than riches, and how the one has honored
cities, provinces, sects, and the other has ruined them, if this matter had not
been celebrated many times by other men. 8

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#?26 ft

How a State Is Ruined Because of Women

[1] In the city of Ardea a sedition arose between the patricians and the
plebeians because of a wedding in which, when a rich woman had to marry,
a plebeian and a noble alike asked for her. Since she did not have a father,
the tutors wished to join her to the plebeian, the mother to the noble. From
this arose so much tumult that they came to arms, in which the whole
nobility armed itself in favor of the noble and the whole plebs in favor of
the plebeian. So when the plebs had been overcome, it left Ardea and sent
to the Volsci for aid; the nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were first, and
when they reached the surroundings of Ardea, they encamped. The Romans
came up and enclosed the Volsci between the town and themselves so that
they constrained them, pressed by hunger, to surrender at discretion. When
the Romans entered into Ardea and killed all the heads of the sedition, they
settled things in that city. 1

[2] In this text are several things to be noted. First, one sees that women
have been causes of much ruin, and have done great harm to those who
govern a city, and have caused many divisions in them. As has been seen in
this history of ours, the excess done against Lucretia took the state away
from the Tarquins; 2 another, done against Virginia, deprived the Ten of
their authority. 3 Among the first causes Aristotle puts down of the ruin of
tyrants is having injured someone on account of women, by raping them or
by violating them or by breaking off marriages, as this part is spoken of in
detail in the chapter where we treat conspiracies. 4 I say thus that absolute
princes and governors of republics are not to take little account of this part,
but they should consider the disorders that can arise from such an accident
and remedy them in time so that the remedy is not with harm and reproach
for their state or for their republic, as happened to the Ardeans. For having
allowed that rivalry to grow among their citizens, they were led to divide
among themselves; and when they wished to reunite, they had to send for
external help, which is a great beginning of a nearby servitude.

371

[3] But let us come to the other notable thing, the mode of reuniting cities,
of which we shall speak in the coming chapter.

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«27 M

How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and
How That Opinion Is Not True That to
Hold Cities One Needs to Hold Them

Divided

[1] By the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the Ardeans
together, one notes the mode by which a divided city ought to be
composed. 1 That is none other than to kill the heads of the tumults; nor
ought it to be healed otherwise. For it is necessary to pick one of three
modes: either to kill them, as they did; or to remove them from the city; or
to make them make peace together under obligations not to offend one
another. Of these three modes, this last is most harmful, least certain, and
most useless. For it is impossible where very much blood has run, or other
similar injuries, that a peace made by force last, since every day they
together look themselves in the face; and it is difficult for them to abstain
from injuring one another, since every day new causes of quarrel can arise
among them through interchange. 2

[2] Of this one cannot give a better example than the city of Pistoia. That
city was divided fifteen years ago, as it is still, into Panciatichi and
Cancellieri; but then it was up in arms and today it has laid them down. 3
After many disputes among them, they came to bloodshed, to the ruin of
houses, to plundering property from one another, and to every other
extreme of enemies. The Florentines, who had to settle them, always used
that third mode with them; and always greater tumults and greater scandals
arose from it. So, worn out, they came to the second mode of removing the
heads of the parties, of whom they put some in prison; some others they
confined in various places so that the accord they made could remain, and it
has remained until today. But without doubt the first [mode] would have
been most secure. Because such executions have in them something of the
great and the generous, however, a weak republic does not know how to do

373

them and is so distant from them that it is led to the second remedy only
with trouble. These are among the errors I told of at the beginning 4 that the
princes of our times make who have to judge great things, for they ought to
wish to hear how those who have had to judge such cases in antiquity
governed themselves. But the weakness of men at present, caused by their
weak education and their slight knowledge of things, makes them judge
ancient judgments in part inhuman, in part impossible. They have certain
modern opinions of theirs altogether distant from the true, as was that
which the wise of our city used to say a while ago: that one needed to hold
Pistoia with parties and Pisa with fortresses. 5 They do not perceive how
both of these two things are useless.

[3] I wish to omit fortresses because we speak of them above at length, 6 and
I wish to discourse on the uselessness that derives from keeping the towns
that you have to govern divided. First, it is impossible for you to maintain
both these parties friendly to yourself, whether you govern them as prince or
as republic. For it is given by nature to men to take sides in any divided
thing whatever, and for this to please them more than that. So having one
party of that town discontented makes you lose it in the first war that comes,
for it is impossible to guard a city that has enemies outside and inside. If it
is a republic that governs it, there is no finer mode of making your citizens
wicked and of making your city divided than to have a divided city to
govern; for each party seeks to have support, and each makes friends for
itself with various corruptions. So two very great inconveniences arise from
it: one, that you never make them friends to yourself through not being able
to govern them well, since the government often varies, now with one, now
with the other humor; the other, that such concern for party of necessity
divides your republic. Biondo, speaking of the Florentines and the Pistoiese,
vouches for it by saying. “While the Florentines planned to reunite Pistoia,
they divided themselves.” 7 One can therefore easily consider the ill that
arises from this division.

[4] In 1502, when Arezzo was lost, and all the Val di Tevere and the Val di
Chiana, seized from us by the Vitelli and by Duke Valentino, a Monsieur de
Lant came, sent by the king of France to have all those lost towns restored
to the Florentines. When Lant found men in every fortified town who, in
visiting him, said that they were of the party of the Marzocco, he very much
blamed this division, saying that if in France one of the subjects of the king
should say he was of the party of the king, he would be punished, because
such a word would signify nothing other than that in that town there were

374

people unfriendly to the king; and that king wishes that all the town be his
friends, united and without a party. 8 But all these modes and these opinions
diverging from the truth arise from the weakness of whoever is lord, who,
when they see that they cannot hold states with force and with virtue, turn
to such devices, which sometimes in quiet times help somewhat; but when
adversities and hard times come, they show their fallaciousness.

375

#?28 n

That One Should Be Mindful of the Works
of Citizens Because Many Times
underneath a Merciful Work a Beginning
of Tyranny Is Concealed

[1] When the city of Rome was overburdened with hunger, and public
provisions were not enough to stop it, one Spurius Maelius, who was very
rich for those times, had the intent to make provision of grain privately, and
to feed the plebs with it, gaining its favor for him. Because of this affair he
had such a crowd of people in his favor that the Senate, thinking of the
inconvenience that could arise from that liberality of his, so as to crush it
before it could pick up more strength, created a dictator over him and had
him killed. 1 Here it is to be noted that many times works that appear
merciful, which cannot reasonably be condemned, 2 become cruel and are
very dangerous for a republic if they are not corrected in good time. And to
discourse of this thing more particularly, I say that a republic without
reputed citizens cannot stand, nor can it be governed well in any mode. On
the other side, the reputation of citizens is the cause of the tyranny of
republics. If one wishes to regulate this thing, one needs to order oneself so
that the citizens are reputed for a reputation that helps and does not hurt the
city and its freedom. So one ought to examine the modes with which they
get reputation, which are in effect two: either public or private. The public
modes are when one individual by counseling well, by working better in the
common benefit, acquires reputation. One ought to open to citizens the way
to this honor and to put up rewards both for counsel and for works so that
they have to be honored and satisfied with them. If these reputations, gained
by these ways, are clear and simple, they will never be dangerous; but when
they are gained by private ways, which is the other mode cited before, they
are very dangerous and altogether hurtful. The private ways are doing
benefit to this and to that other private individual—by lending him money,
marrying his daughters for him, defending him from the magistrates, and

376

doing for him similar private favors that make men partisans to oneself and
give spirit to whoever is so favored to be able to corrupt the public and to
breach the laws. A well-ordered republic ought, therefore, to open the ways,
as was said, to whoever seeks support 3 through public ways and close them
to whoever seeks it through private ways, as one sees Rome did. For to
reward whoever worked well for the public, it ordered triumphs and all the
other honors that it gave to its citizens; and to harm whoever sought under
various colors to make himself great by private ways it ordered accusations.
And if these were not enough, because the people was blinded by a species
of false good, it ordered [the creation of] the dictator, who with his kingly
arm made whoever had gone out of bounds return within them, as it did by
punishing Spurius Maelius. One of these things that may be left unpunished
is capable of ruining a republic, for with that example it is only with
difficulty later brought back on the true way.

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«29 M

That the Sins of Peoples Arise from

Princes

[1] Princes should not complain of any sin that the peoples whom they have
to govern commit, for it must be that such sins arise either by his negligence
or by his being stained with like errors. Whoever reviews 1 the peoples who
in our times have been held full of robberies and of like sins will see that it
has arisen entirely from those who governed them, who were of a like
nature. Before those lords who commanded the Romagna were eliminated
in it by Pope Alexander VI, it was an example of every most criminal life,
because there one saw very great slaughter and pillage occur for every slight
cause. That arose from the wickedness of those princes, not from the
wicked nature of men, as they used to say. For since those princes were
poor and wished to live like the rich, they were necessitated to turn to much
pillaging and to use it in various modes. Among the other dishonest ways
they held to, they would make laws and would prohibit some action; then
they were the first who gave cause for their nonobservance; nor did they ever
punish the nonobservers except later, when they saw very many to have
incurred a like prejudice. Then they would turn to punishment, not out of
zeal for the law that had been made but out of greed for collecting the
penalty. Hence arose many inconveniences and above all this: that the
peoples became impoverished and were not corrected; and those who were
impoverished contrived to prevail against those less powerful than
themselves. 2 Hence all those ills rose up that were told of above, the cause
of which was the prince. That this is true Titus Livy shows when he narrates
that as the Roman legates were carrying the booty of the Veientes to Apollo,
they were taken by pirates of Lipari in Sicily and led to that town. When
Timasitheus, their prince, learned what gift this was, where it was going,
and who was sending it, though born at Lipari, he bore himself as a Roman
man and showed the people how impious it was to seize a gift such as this.
So with the consent of the collectivity, he let the legates go with all their
things. The words of the historian are these: “Timasitheus filled the

378

multitude, which is always like the ruler, with religion.” 3 And Lorenzo de’
Medici, in confirmation of this judgment, says:

And that which the lord does, many do later; For all eyes are turned to the
lord. 4

379

«30 ft

For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any
Good Work in His Republic by His
Authority, It Is Necessary First to
Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the
Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a

City

[1] When the Roman Senate learned that all Tuscany had made a new levy
so as to come to do harm to Rome, and that the Latins and the Hernici, who
in the past had been friends of the Roman people, had taken sides with the
Volsci, perpetual enemies of Rome, it judged that this war must be
dangerous. When Camillus found himself tribune with consular power, it 1
thought that they could do without creating the dictator if the other
tribunes, his colleagues, were willing to yield him the summit of command.
The said tribunes did that voluntarily: “Nor did they believe (says Titus
Livy) that anything they yielded to his majesty was taken away from their
majesty.” 2 Hence Camillus, having taken this obedience at its word,
commanded that three armies be enrolled. 3 He wished to be head of the
first himself, so as to go against the Tuscans. He made Quintus Servilius the
head of the second, which he wished to stay close to Rome, so as to oppose
the Latins and the Hernici if they should move. He put Lucius Quintius in
charge of the third army, which he enrolled so as to keep the city guarded
and the gates and the court defended in every case that might arise. Besides
this, he ordered that Horatius, one of his colleagues, provide the arms and
the grain and the other things that times of war require. He put Cornelius,
also his colleague, at the Senate and the public council, so that he might be
able to counsel actions that they had to do and execute daily; so that the
tribunes in those times were disposed to command and obey for the safety
of the fatherland. By this text one notes what a good and wise man may do,

380

and of how much good he may be the cause, and how useful he can be to his
fatherland when by means of his goodness and virtue he has eliminated
envy. That is many times the cause that men cannot work well, since the
said envy does not permit them to have the authority that it is necessary to
have in things of importance. This envy is eliminated in two modes: either
through some strong and difficult accident in which each, seeing himself
perishing, puts aside every ambition and runs voluntarily to obey him who
he believes can free him with his virtue, as happened to Camillus. After he
had given by himself so many samples of a most excellent man, and had
been dictator three times, and had always administered in that rank for
public usefulness and not for his own utility, he had made men not fear his
greatness; and because he was so great and so reputed, they did not esteem
it a shameful thing to be inferior to him (and so Titus Livy wisely says those
words: “Nor did they . . . ”)• In another mode, envy is eliminated when,
either by violence or by natural order, those who have been your
competitors in coming to some reputation and to some greatness die. As
they see you reputed more than they, it is impossible that they ever
acquiesce and remain patient. When they are men who are used to living in
a corrupt city, where the education has not produced any goodness in them,
it is impossible that by any accident they ever gainsay themselves; and to
obtain their wish and to satisfy their perversity of spirit, they would be
content to see the ruin of their fatherland. To conquer this envy, there is no
remedy other than the death of those who have it; and when fortune is so
propitious to the virtuous man that they die ordinarily, he becomes glorious
without scandal, when without obstacle and without offense he is able to
show his virtue. But if he does not have this luck, he must think of every
way of removing them from in front; and before he does anything, he needs
to hold to the modes that overcome this difficulty. And whoever reads the
Bible judiciously will see that since he wished his laws and his orders to go
forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other
than envy, were opposed to his plans. 4 Friar Girolamo Savonarola knew this
necessity very well; Piero Soderini, gonfalonier of Florence, knew it too.
The one was not able to conquer it because he did not have the authority to
enable him to do it (that was the friar) and because he was not understood
well by those who followed him, who would have had authority for it. Not
therefore because of him did it remain undone, and his sermons are full of
accusations of the wise of the world, and of invectives against them, for so
he called the envious and those who were opposed to his orders. The other
believed that with time, with goodness, with his fortune, with benefiting

381

someone, he would eliminate this envy; seeing himself very young of age,
and with so much new support that the mode of his proceeding brought
him, he believed he could overcome as many as were opposed to him
through envy without any scandal, violence, and tumult. He did not know
that one cannot wait for the time, goodness is not enough, fortune varies,
and malignity does not find a gift that appeases it. So both of these two were
ruined, and their ruin was caused by not having known how or having been
able to conquer this envy.

[2] The other notable point is the order that Camillus gave inside and
outside for the safety of Rome. And truly, not without cause do good
historians, as is ours, put certain cases particularly and distinctly so that
posterity may learn how they have to defend themselves in such accidents.
One ought to note in this text that there is no more dangerous nor more
useless defense than that which is done tumultuously and without order.
This is shown through that third army that Camillus had enrolled so as to
leave it in Rome as guard of the city. For many would have judged and
would judge this part superfluous, since that people was in the ordinary
course armed and warlike; and because of this, that it would not otherwise
be needed to enroll them, but it would be enough to arm them when the
need came. But Camillus, and whosoever might be wise as he was, judged it
otherwise; for he never permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a
certain order and a certain mode. So upon this example, one individual who
is put in charge of the guard of a city ought to avoid like a reef having it
arm the men tumultuously, but he ought first to have those enrolled and
selected whom he wishes to be armed, whomever they have to obey, where
to meet, where to go. Those who are not enrolled he ought to command to
stay each in his house to guard it. Those who hold to this order in a city that
has been assaulted can easily defend themselves; whoever does otherwise
will not imitate Camillus and will not defend himself.

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«31 ft

Strong Republics and Excellent Men
Retain the Same Spirit and Their Same
Dignity in Every Fortune

[1] Among the other magnificent things that our historian makes Camillus
say and do, so as to show how an excellent man ought to be made, he puts
these words in his mouth: “Neither did the dictatorship ever raise my spirits
nor did exile take them away.” 1 Through them one sees that great men are
always the same in every fortune; and if it varies—now by exalting them,
now by crushing them—they do not vary but always keep their spirit firm
and joined with their mode of life so that one easily knows for each that
fortune does not have power over them. Weak men govern themselves
otherwise, because they grow vain and intoxicated in good fortune by
attributing all the good they have to the virtue they have never known.
Hence it arises that they become unendurable and hateful to all those whom
they have around them. On that depends the sudden variation of fate; as
they see it in the face, they fall suddenly into the other defect and become
cowardly and abject. It arises from this that in adversities princes so made
think more of fleeing than of defending themselves, as those who are
unprepared for any defense because they have used good fortune badly.

[2] The virtue and the vice that I say are to be found in one man alone are
also found in a republic; and for example there are the Romans and the
Venetians. As to the first, no bad fate ever made them become abject, nor
did any good fortune ever make them insolent, as may be seen manifestly
after the defeat they had at Cannae and after the victory they had against
Antiochus. For they never grew cowardly because of the defeat even though
it was very grave because it had been the third; 2 they sent out armies; they
did not wish to ransom their prisoners against their orders; they did not send
to Hannibal or to Carthage to ask for peace. But, leaving behind all these
abject things, they thought always of war, arming the old and their slaves
because of a scarcity of men. 3 When this thing became known by Hanno the

383

Carthaginian, as was said above, 4 he showed to the Senate how little
account was to be taken of the defeat of Cannae. 5 So one may see that
difficult times did not terrify them nor render them humble. On the other
hand, prosperous times did not make them insolent, for when Antiochus
sent spokesmen to Scipio to ask for an accord before they came to battle
and before he had lost, Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace, which
were that he should retire inside Syria and leave the rest to the will of the
Roman people. Antiochus, having refused that accord, came to battle and
lost it, and sent back ambassadors to Scipio with the commission that they
accept all the conditions that were given them by the conqueror, to which
he did not propose another pact than what had been offered before he won,
adding these words: “For the Romans are not weakened in spirits if they are
conquered, nor are they accustomed to become insolent if they conquer.” 6

[3] The exact contrary of this was seen to be done by the Venetians. In good
fortune—since to them it appeared they had gained it with the virtue they
did not have—they came to so much insolence that they called the king of
France the son of San Marco; they did not esteem the church; they would
not be contained in Italy in any mode; and they had disposed themselves in
spirit to have a monarchy made like the Roman. Then, as good luck
abandoned them and they had a half-defeat at Vaila from the king of
France, they not only lost all their state by rebellion but gave a good part of
it to the pope and to the king of Spain out of cowardice and abjectness of
spirit. They grew so cowardly that they sent ambassadors to the emperor to
make themselves his tributaries, and they wrote letters to the pope full of
cowardice and submission so as to move him to compassion. They came to
that unhappiness in four days, and after a half-defeat; for after their army
had been in combat and was retiring, about half of it came into combat and
was crushed, so that one of the superintendents who saved himself arrived
at Verona with more than twenty-five thousand soldiers among those on foot
and on horseback. 7 So if there had been any quality of virtue at Venice and
in their orders, they could easily have remade themselves and showed their
face to fortune anew, and they could have been in time either to conquer, or
to lose most gloriously, or to have a very honorable accord. But the
cowardice of their spirit, caused by the quality of their orders, which were
not good in things of war, made them lose state and spirit in a stroke. And it
will always happen thus to anyone whatsoever who governs himself like
them. For becoming insolent in good fortune and abject in bad arises from
your mode of proceeding and from the education in which you are raised.

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When that is weak and vain, it renders you like itself; when it has been
otherwise, it renders you also of another fate; and by making you a better
knower of the world, it makes you rejoice less in the good and be less
aggrieved with the bad. What is said of one alone is said of many who live
in one and the same republic: they are made to that perfection that its mode
of life has.

[4] Although it was said another time that the foundation of all states is a
good military, and that where this does not exist there can be neither good
laws nor any other good thing, it does not appear to me superfluous to
repeat it. 8 For at every point in reading this history one sees this necessity
appear; and one sees that the military cannot be good unless it is trained,
and that it cannot be trained unless it is composed of your subjects. For one
does not always remain at war, nor can one remain at it; so one must be
able to train in time of peace, and with others than subjects one cannot do
this training out of regard for the expense. When, as we said above, 9
Camillus had come with his army against the Tuscans and his soldiers had
seen the greatness of the enemy’s army, they were all frightened since it
appeared to them that they were so inferior that they could not resist their
thrust. When this bad disposition in the camp came to the ears of Camillus,
he showed himself outside, and as he went through the camp speaking to
these and those soldiers, he got this opinion out of their heads; and at last,
without ordering the camp otherwise, he said: “What anyone has learned or
is accustomed to, he will do.” 10 Whoever considers well this means, and the
words he said to them so as to give them spirit to go against the enemy, will
consider that he could neither have said nor have done any of those things
to an army that had not first been ordered and trained both in peace and in
war. For a captain cannot trust in those soldiers who have not learned to do
anything, nor believe that they may do anything that is good; and if a new
Hannibal commanded them, he would be ruined under them. For while the
battle is on, a captain cannot be in every part. Unless he has first ordered it
in every part so as to be able to have men who have his spirit, 11 and indeed
the orders and modes of his proceeding, he must of necessity come to ruin.
Thus, if a city is armed and ordered as was Rome, and every day it falls to
its citizens, both in particular and in public, to make experiment both of
their virtue and of the power of fortune, it will always happen that they are
of the same spirit in every condition of time and will maintain their same
dignity. But if they are unarmed and rely only on the thrust of fortune and

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not on their own virtue, they vary with its varying and they will always give
an example of themselves such as the Venetians gave.

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*$32 ft

What Modes Some Have Held to for
Disturbing a Peace

[1] When the Circeii 1 and the Velitrae, 2 two of its colonies, had rebelled
from the Roman people in the hope of being defended by the Latins, and
when the Latins later were defeated and that hope failed, very many citizens
counseled that they ought to send spokesmen to Rome to recommend
themselves to the Senate. That policy was disturbed by those who had been
the authors of the rebellion, who feared that the entire penalty might come
down on their heads. To take away every argument 3 for peace, they incited
the multitude to arm itself and to overrun the Roman borders. And truly,
when anyone wishes that either a people or a prince should altogether take
away the spirit for an accord, there is no remedy more true or more stable
than to make them use some grave criminality against the one with whom
you do not wish the accord to be made. For the fear of that penalty which
will appear deserved to him because of the error committed will always
keep it at a distance. After the first war the Carthaginians had with the
Romans, the soldiers who had been put to work in that war by the
Carthaginians in Sicily and in Sardinia went to Africa when peace was
made. There, not being satisfied with their pay, they turned their arms
against the Carthaginians. When they had made two heads for themselves,
Matho and Spendius, they seized many towns from the Carthaginians and
sacked many of them. So as to try first every way other than fighting, the
Carthaginians sent to them as ambassador their citizen Hasdrubal, 4 who
they thought would have some authority with them since he had been their
captain in the past. When he arrived, and Spendius and Matho wished to
oblige all those soldiers not to hope ever again to have peace with the
Carthaginians and through this to oblige them to war, they persuaded them
that it was better to kill him, along with all the Carthaginian citizens who
were their prisoners nearby. Hence not only did they kill them but they
tormented them first with a thousand tortures, adding to this criminality an
edict that all Carthaginians who might be taken in the future ought to be

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slain in a similar mode. That decision and execution made the army cruel
and obstinate against the Carthaginians. 5

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«33

If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is
Necessary to Make the Army Confident
Both among Themselves and in the

Captain

[1] If one wishes an army to win a battle, it is necessary to make it
confident so that it believes it ought to win in every mode. The things that
make it confident are: that it be armed and ordered well, that [its members]
know one another. Nor can this confidence or this order arise except in
soldiers who have been born and have lived together. The captain must be
esteemed of a quality that they trust in his prudence; and they will always
trust if they see him ordered, solicitous, and spirited and if he holds up the
majesty of his rank well and with reputation. He will always maintain it if
he punishes them for errors and does not tire them in vain, observes
promises to them, shows the easy way to winning, and conceals or makes
light of things that at a distance could show up as dangers. Such things, well
observed, are the great cause that the army trusts and, by trusting, wins. The
Romans used to make their armies pick up this confidence by way of
religion; hence it arose that with auguries and auspices they created consuls,
made the conscription, left with the armies, and came to battle. Without
having done any of these things, a good and wise captain would never have
attempted any struggle, judging that he could easily have lost it if his
soldiers had not first understood the gods to be on their side. If any consul
or other captain of theirs had come to combat against the auspices, they
would have punished him as they punished Claudius Pulcher. 1 Although this
part is known in all the Roman histories, nonetheless it is proven more
certainly by the words that Livy used in the mouth of Appius Claudius.
When complaining to the people about the insolence of the tribunes of the
plebs, and showing that by means of them the auspices and other things
relating to religion were being corrupted, he says thus: “It is permitted for
them now to make fun of religion. For what difference does it make if the

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chickens do not feed, if they come out of the cage slowly, if a bird sounds
off? These are little things, but by not despising these little things, our
ancestors made this republic the greatest.” 2 For in these little things is the
force for holding the soldiers united and confident, which thing is the first
cause of every victory. Nevertheless, virtue must accompany these things;
otherwise they have no value. When they had their army out against the
Romans, the Praenestines went to encamp on the river Allia, the place
where the Romans had been conquered by the French. They did that so as to
put confidence in their soldiers and to terrify the Romans by the fortune of
the place. Although this policy of theirs was commendable for the reasons
that were discoursed of above, nonetheless the end of the thing showed that
true virtue does not fear every least accident. The historian says that very
well with the words put in the mouth of the dictator, who speaks thus to his
master of the horse: “Do you see that they, trusting in fortune, have taken a
position at Allia; but you, trusting in arms and spirit, attack the middle of
the line of battle?” 3 For a true virtue, a good order, a security taken from so
many victories, cannot be eliminated with things of little moment, nor can
a vain thing make them fear, nor a disorder offend them. This one sees
certainly when two Manlii were consuls against the Volsci: because they had
rashly sent part of the camp to plunder, it followed in time that both those
who had gone and those who had remained found themselves besieged,
from which danger not the prudence of the consuls but the virtue of the
soldiers themselves freed them. Whereupon Titus Livy says these words:
“The steady virtue of the soldiers even without a leader protected it.” 4

[2] I do not wish to omit a means used by Fabius to make his army
confident when he had newly entered into Tuscany with it, as he judged that
such trust was necessary because he had led it into a new country against
new enemies. So speaking to the soldiers before the fight, and having said
that he had many reasons through which they could hope for victory, he said
that he could also tell them certain good things, in which they would see
victory was certain, if it were not dangerous to make them manifest. 5 As
that mode was wisely used, so it deserves to be imitated.

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«34 M

What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the
People Begin to Favor a Citizen; and
Whether It Distributes Magistracies with
Greater Prudence Than a Prince

[1] Another time we have spoken of how Titus Manlius, who was later
dubbed Torquatus, saved Lucius Manlius, his father, from an accusation
that had been made against him by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the
plebs. 1 Although the mode of saving him was somewhat violent and
extraordinary, nonetheless that filial piety toward his father was so
gratifying to the collectivity that not only was he not reproved for it but,
when they had to make tribunes of the legions, Titus Manlius was put in the
second place. Because of that success, I believe it is good to consider the
mode that the people holds to when judging men in its distributions, and
because of what we see, whether it is true, as was concluded above, 2 that
the people is a better distributor than a prince.

[2] Thus I say that the people in its distributing goes by what is said of one
individual through public word and fame when one does not otherwise
know him through his known works, or through the presumption or opinion
that one has of him. Those two things are caused either by the fact that the
fathers of such have been great men and worthy in the city, and it is
believed that their sons ought to be like them until by their works the
contrary is understood; or it is caused by the modes held to by him of whom
it is spoken. The best modes that can be held to are to keep company with
grave men of good customs reputed wise by everyone. Because one can have
no greater indication of a man than the company that he keeps, one
individual who keeps honest company deservedly acquires a good name
because it is impossible that he not have some similarity with it. Or truly
this public fame is acquired by some extraordinary and notable action, even
though private, which has resulted honorably for you. Of all these three

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things that in the beginning give good reputation to one individual, none
gives it greater than this last. For the first one of relatives and fathers is so
fallacious that men go to it slowly, and it is soon consumed when the virtue
proper to him who has to be judged does not accompany it. The second,
which makes you known by way of your practices, is better than the first but
is much inferior to the third, for until some sign is seen that arises from you,
your reputation remains founded on opinion, which it is very easy to cancel.
But the third, having been begun and founded on fact and on your work,
gives you so much name at the beginning that you indeed need to work
many things contrary to this later if you wish to annul it. Thus men who are
born in a republic ought to take this direction and contrive with some
extraordinary works to begin to raise themselves up. Many in Rome did that
in their youth, either by promulgating a law that went for the common
utility, or by accusing some powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or
by doing such notable and new things of which one would have to speak.
Nor are such things necessary only to begin to give oneself reputation, but
they are also necessary to maintain it and increase it. If one wishes to do
this, one needs to renew them, as did Titus Manlius for the whole time of
his life; for after he had defended his father so virtuously and
extraordinarily, and through this action had got his first reputation, in a few
years he did combat with the Frenchman and, having killed him, took off
from him that collar of gold that gave him the name of Torquatus. Nor was
this enough, for later, by then of mature age, he killed his son for having
engaged in combat without license, even though he had overcome the
enemy. These three actions, then, gave him more name and made him more
celebrated for all centuries than did any triumph and any other victory, for
which he was decorated as much as any other Roman. 3 The cause is that in
those victories Manlius had very many like him; in these particular actions
he had either very few or no one.

[3] To Scipio the Elder, all his triumphs did not bring so much glory as
having defended his father on the Ticino while still a boy 4 and after the
defeat at Cannae, when with drawn sword he spiritedly made many young
Romans swear that they would not abandon Italy as they had already
decided among themselves. 5 Those two actions were the beginning of his
reputation and made a ladder for him to the triumphs of Spain and Africa.
That opinion of him was further increased when he sent back the daughter
to her father and the wife to her husband in Spain. 6 Not only is this mode of
proceeding necessary to those citizens who wish to acquire fame so as to

392

obtain honors in their republic, but it is also necessary to princes so as to
maintain reputation for themselves in their principalities. For nothing
makes them so much esteemed as to give rare examples of themselves with
some rare act or saying conforming to the common good, which shows the
lord either magnanimous, or liberal, or just, and is such as to become like a
proverb among his subjects.

[4] But to return to where we began this discourse, I say that when the
people begins to give a rank to one of its citizens, founding itself on the
three causes written above, it does not found itself badly. But later, when
the very many examples of good behavior of one individual make him more
known, it founds itself better, because in such a case it can almost never be
deceived. I speak only of those ranks that are given to men in the beginning,
before they are known through firm experience, or as they pass from one
action to another unlike it, in which, both as to false opinion and as to
corruption, [the people] will always make lesser errors than princes.
Because it can be that peoples might deceive themselves about the fame,
opinion, and work of a man, esteeming them greater than they are in truth
—which would not happen to a prince because he would be told and
warned by whoever counseled him—so that peoples too do not lack these
assemblies, good orderers of republics have ordered that when they have to
create the supreme ranks of the city, where it would be dangerous to put
inadequate men, and when it is seen that the popular vogue is directed
toward creating someone who might be inadequate, it is permitted to every
citizen and is attributed to his glory to make public in councils the defect of
that one, so that the people, not lacking knowledge of him, can judge better.
That this was used in Rome the oration of Fabius Maximus gives testimony.
He made it to the people during the Second Punic War, when in the
creation of the consuls favor was turning toward creating Titus Ottacilius.
Since Fabius judged him inadequate to govern the consulate in those times,
he spoke against him, showing his inadequacy, so that he took away the rank
from him and turned the favor of the people to whoever deserved it more
than he. 7 Thus in the election of magistrates peoples judge according to the
truest marks 8 that they can have of men; and when they can be counseled
like princes, they err less than princes; and the citizen who wishes to begin
to have the support 9 of the people ought to gain it for himself with some
notable act, as did Titus Manlius.

t$J

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«35 ft

What Dangers Are Borne in Making
Oneself Head in Counseling a Thing; and
the More It Has of the Extraordinary, the
Greater Are the Dangers Incurred in It

[1] How dangerous a thing it is to make oneself head of a new thing that
pertains to many, and how difficult it is to treat it and to lead it and, when
led, to maintain it, would be too long and too high a matter to discourse of.
So, reserving it for a more convenient place, 1 I shall speak only of those
dangers that citizens or those who counsel a prince bear in making oneself
head of a grave and important decision, so that all the counsel of it may be
attributed to him. For since men judge things by the end, all the ill that
results from it is attributed to the author of the counsel; and if good results
from it, he is commended for it, but the reward by far does not
counterbalance the harm. When the present Sultan Selim, dubbed the
Grand Turk, had prepared himself to make a campaign to Syria and Egypt
(as report some who came from his countries), he was encouraged by one of
his bashaws, whom he kept on the border of Persia, to go against the Sophy.
Moved by that counsel, he went on that campaign with a very large army;
and arriving in a very wide country, where there were very many deserts
and few rivers, and finding those difficulties there that had already brought
many Roman armies to ruin, he was crushed by them, so that he lost a great
part of this troops through hunger and plague, even though he had been
superior in the war. So, angered at the author of the counsel, he killed him. 2
One reads that very many citizens have been encouragers of an enterprise
and because it had a bad end were sent into exile. Some Roman citizens
made themselves heads in making the plebeian consul in Rome. 3 It
happened that the first who went out with his armies was defeated; hence
some harm would have come to those counselors if the party in whose
honor the decision had come had not been so rash. 4

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[2] Thus it is a very certain thing that those who counsel a republic and
those who counsel a prince are placed in these straits: if they do not counsel
without hesitation the things that appear to them useful—either for the city
or for the prince—they fail in their office; if they do counsel them, they
enter into danger of life and state, since all men are blind in this, in judging
good and bad counsel by the end. Thinking over in what mode they can
escape either this infamy or this danger, I do not see any other way for it
but to take things moderately, and not to seize upon any of them for one’s
own enterprise, and to give one’s opinion without passion and defend it
without passion, with modesty, so that if the city or the prince follows it, it
follows voluntarily, and it does not appear to enter upon it drawn by your
importunity. When you do thus, it is not reasonable that a prince and a
people wish you ill for your counsel, since it was not followed against the
wish of many—for one bears danger where many have contradicted, who
then at the unhappy end concur to bring you to ruin. And if in this case one
lacks the glory that is acquired in being alone against many to counsel a
thing when it has a good end, there are two goods in the comparison: first,
in the lack of danger; second, that if you counsel a thing modestly, and
because of the contradiction your counsel is not taken, and by the counsel of
someone else some ruin follows, very great glory redounds to you. Although
the glory that is acquired from ills that either your city or your prince has
cannot be enjoyed, nonetheless it is to be held of some account.

[3] I do not believe other counsel can be given to men in this part, for in
counseling them to be silent and not to say their opinion, it would be a
useless thing to the republic or to their prince, and they would not escape
the danger; for in a short time they would become suspect. It could even
happen to them as to those friends of Perseus, king of the Macedonians, to
whom it befell that when he had been defeated by Paulus Aemilius and was
fleeing with a few friends, one of them in talking over things past began to
tell Perseus of the many errors made by him that had been the cause of his
ruin. Turning to him, Perseus said, “Traitor, so you put off telling me it
until now, when I have no further remedy!” Upon these words he killed him
by his own hand. 5 So he bore the penalty of having been quiet when he
ought to speak, and of having spoken when he ought to be silent; he did not
escape the danger by not having given the counsel. So I believe the limits
written above are to be held and observed.

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«36

The Causes Why the French Have Been
and Are Still Judged in Fights at the
Beginning As More Than Men and Later
As Less Than Women

[1] The ferocity of that Frenchman who by the river Anio challenged any
Roman to engage in combat with him, as well as the fighting between him
and Titus Manlius, 1 remind me of what Titus Livy says several times: that
the French are more than men at the beginning of the fight, and in the
succeeding combat they come out less than women. 2 Thinking over whence
this arises, it is believed by many that their nature is made so, which I
believe is true; but because of this it is not that their nature, which makes
them ferocious at the beginning, cannot be ordered with art so that it
maintains them ferocious to the last.

[2] Wishing to prove this, I say that there are armies of three types: one,
where there is fury and order—because from order arises fury and virtue—
as was that of the Romans. For one sees in all the histories that in that army
there was a good order, which had brought military discipline to it for a
long time. For in a well-ordered army no one ought to do any work if it is
not regulated. Because of this, one will find that in the Roman army, which
all other armies ought to take for example since it conquered the world,
they did not eat, they did not sleep, they did not go whoring, they did not
perform any action either military or domestic without the order of the
consul. For those armies that do otherwise are not true armies, and if they
produce any proof [to the contrary], they do it by fury and impetuosity, and
not by virtue. But virtue, where ordered, uses its fury with modes and with
the times; neither does any difficulty debase it nor make it lack spirit. For
good orders refresh spirit and fury for them, nourished by the hope of
conquering, which never fails as long as the orders remain steady. The
contrary happens in those armies where there is fury and not order, as were

396

the French, who yet failed in combat. For when they did not succeed in
conquering with their first thrust, and when that fury in which they hoped
was not sustained by an ordered virtue, they had nothing beyond it in which
they might have confidence, and as that was cooled, they failed. 3 To the
contrary, the Romans, fearing dangers less because of their good orders, not
mistrusting in victory, would engage in combat firmly and obstinately with
the same spirit and the same virtue at the end as at the beginning; indeed,
stirred by arms, they would always become inflamed. The third kind of
armies is where there is neither natural fury nor accidental order, as are the
Italian armies of our times, which are altogether useless; and if they do not
meet with an army that flees because of some accident, they will never
conquer. Without bringing up other examples, one sees every day how they
make proof of not having any virtue. Because everyone understands with
the testimony of Titus Livy how a good military ought to be made, and how
a bad one is made, I wish to bring up the words of Papirius Cursor, when he
wished to punish Fabius, master of the horse, and he said: “No one would
have deference for men, no one for the gods; neither the edicts of
commanders nor the auspices would be observed; soldiers would wander
without leave in peaceful and in hostile territory forgetful of oaths, they
would discharge themselves by their license alone when they wanted; they
would leave the standards deserted, nor would they assemble on command,
nor would they distinguish day from night, favorable location or
unfavorable; they would fight by or against the order of the commander, and
not comply with standards, nor orders; in the mode of banditry the military
would be blind and haphazard instead of solemn and consecrated.” 4 Thus by
this text one can easily see whether the military of our times is blind and
haphazard or consecrated and solemn, and how much it lacks to be like
what could be called a military, and how far it is from being furious and
ordered, like the Roman, or furious only, like the French.

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397

^37 ft

Whether Small Battles Are Necessary

before the Main Battle ; 1 and If One
Wishes to Avoid Them, What One Ought to
Do to Know a New Enemy

[1] It appears that in the actions of men, as we have discoursed of another
time, 2 besides the other difficulties in wishing to bring a thing to its
perfection, one finds that close to the good there is always some evil that
arises with that good so easily that it appears impossible to be able to miss
the one if one wishes for the other. One sees this in all the things that men
work on. So the good is acquired only with difficulty unless you are aided by
fortune, so that with its force it conquers this ordinary and natural
inconvenience. The fight between Manlius and the Frenchman has
reminded me of this, where Titus Livy says: “This combat was of so much
moment to the event of the whole war that the army of the Gauls having left
its camp in panic, crossed over into the country of Tibur and then into
Campania.” 3 For I consider, on one side, that a good captain ought
altogether to avoid working for anything that is of small moment and can
produce bad effects on his army: for to begin a fight in which all one’s forces
are not at work and all one’s fortune is risked is a thing altogether rash, as I
said above, when I condemned the guarding of passes. 4

[2] On the other side, I consider that when wise captains come up against a
new enemy who is reputed, before they come to the main battle they are
necessitated to make trial of such enemies with light fighting for their
soldiers, so that by beginning to know and manage them they lose the terror
that fame and reputation have given them. This part is very important in a
captain, because it has within it almost a necessity that constrains you to do
it, when you appear to be going to a manifest loss without first having taken
away from your soldiers, by little experiences, the terror that the reputation
of the enemy had put in their spirits.

398

[3] Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their armies against the
Samnites, new enemies who in the past had never made trial of arms, one
with the other. Here Titus Livy says that Valerius had the Romans engage in
some light fighting with the Samnites, “lest a new war and a new enemy
terrify them.” 5 Nonetheless, it is a very grave danger lest when your soldiers
are left conquered in those battles, their fear and cowardice grow and effects
contrary to your plans follow from them; that is, that having planned to
make them secure, you terrify them. So this is one of those things that have
the evil so close to the good, and so much are they joined together that it is
an easy thing to take one, believing one has picked the other. I say on this
that a good captain ought to observe with all diligence lest something
emerge that through some accident can take away spirit from his army.
That which can take away spirit is to begin to lose; and so one ought to
guard oneself against small lights and not permit them unless with a very
great advantage and with hope of certain victory. One ought not to
undertake enterprises of guarding passes, where one cannot hold all one’s
army; one ought not to guard towns except those where one’s ruin would
follow of necessity if they were lost. Those that one guards ought to be
ordered, both with the guards and with the army, so that when it becomes a
question of their capture, one can put to work all one’s forces; the others
one ought to leave undefended. For every time that one loses a thing that
one abandons, and the army is still together, one does not lose reputation in
the war nor the hope of winning it. But when a thing is lost that you had
planned to defend, and everyone believes you will defend it, then is the
harm and the loss; and like the French, you have almost lost the war with a
thing of small moment.

[4] When Philip of Macedon, father of Perseus, a military man of great
standing in his times, was assaulted by the Romans, he abandoned and
despoiled very many of his countries, which he judged he could not guard.
He was one who, because he was prudent, judged it more pernicious to lose
reputation by not being able to defend what he had set out to defend than to
lose it as a thing neglected by leaving it in the prey of the enemy. 6 When
their affairs were in distress after the defeat at Cannae, the Romans denied
aid to many of their clients and subjects, committing them to defend
themselves the best they could. 7 These policies are very much better than to
undertake defenses and then not defend them, for in this policy one loses
friends and forces; in the former, friends only. But returning to small fights,
I say that if indeed a captain is constrained by the newness of the enemy to

399

do some fighting, he ought to do it so much to his advantage that there is no
danger of losing it; or truly he ought to do as Marius did (which is a better
policy). He was going against the Cimbri, very ferocious people who came
to plunder Italy and were coming with a great fright because of their
ferocity and multitude; and because they had already conquered a Roman
army, Marius judged it was necessary, before he came to fighting, to work
something by which the army would give up the terror that fear of the
enemy had given them; and as a very prudent captain, he gathered his army
more than one time in a place where the Cimbri would be passing with
their army. And so he wished his soldiers to see and to accustom their eyes
to the sight of that enemy from inside the fortresses of his camp, so that
when they saw a disordered multitude, full of baggage, with useless arms
and in part unarmed, they would be reassured and would become desirous
of fighting. 8 As that policy was wisely taken by Marius, so it ought to be
diligently imitated by others so as not to incur those dangers I told of above,
and not to have to do as the French, “who, frightened by a thing of small
importance, retired into the fields of Tibur and into Campania.” 9 And
because we have cited Valerius Corvinus in this discourse, I wish to
demonstrate by means of his words, in the following chapter, how a captain
ought to be made.

400

«38

How a Captain in Whom His Army Can
Have Confidence Ought to Be Made

[1] Valerius Corvinus, as we said above, 1 was with the army against the
Samnites, new enemies of the Roman people; hence, to make his soldiers
secure and to get them to know the enemy, he had his own men do certain
light fighting. And since this was not enough for him, he wished to speak to
them before the battle, and he showed with all efficacy how little they ought
to esteem such enemies, pleading the virtue of his soldiers, and his own.
Here one can note how a captain in whom the army has to have confidence
ought to be made, by the words that Livy makes him say, which words are
these: “Then also they should consider under whose leadership and auspices
they would have to fight, whether he was one to be listened to only as a
magnificent orator, ferocious only in words, inexpert in military operations,
or one who himself knew how to handle weapons, to advance ahead of the
standards, to be engaged in the midst and in the effort of fighting. Soldiers, I
want you to follow my deeds, not my words; to seek from me not only
discipline but also example, who have won for myself with this right hand
three consulates and the highest praise.” 2 These words, considered well,
teach to anyone whatever how he ought to proceed if he wishes to hold the
rank of captain; and one who has done otherwise will find in time that
whether he was led to the rank by fortune or by ambition, it will be taken
from him and will not give him reputation, for titles do not give luster to
men, but men to titles. One ought also to consider from the beginning of
this discourse that if great captains have used extraordinary extremes to
firm the spirits of a veteran army when it must confront unaccustomed
enemies, how much more greatly one has to use industry when one
commands a new army that has never seen the enemy in the face. For if the
unaccustomed enemy gives terror to the old army, so much more greatly
must every enemy give it to a new army. Yet many times these difficulties
have been seen to be conquered by good captains with the highest prudence,
as did Gracchus the Roman and Epaminondas the Theban, of whom we

401

have spoken another time, 3 who with new armies conquered armies that
were veteran and very much trained.

[2] The modes they kept to were to train them for several months in mock
battles and to accustom them to obedience and order; then, after those, they
put them to work with the greatest confidence in true fighting. Thus one
ought not to lack confidence that any military man can make good armies if
men are not lacking him; for that prince who has plenty of men and lacks
soldiers ought to complain not of the cowardice of the men but only of his
laziness and lack of prudence. 4

402

«39 M

That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of

Sites

[1] Among the other things that are necessary to a captain of armies is the
knowledge of sites and of countries, for without this general and particular
knowledge a captain of armies cannot work anything well. Because all the
sciences demand practice if one wishes to possess them perfectly, this is one
that requires very great practice. This practice, or truly this particular
knowledge, is acquired more through hunts than by any other training. So
the ancient writers say that the heroes who governed the world in their time
were nourished in the woods and by hunts, for besides this knowledge,
hunting teaches infinite things that are necessary in war. In the life of Cyrus,
Xenophon shows that when Cyrus was going to assault the king of Armenia,
in devising that struggle he reminded his men that this was none other than
one of those hunts that they had often undertaken with him. He reminded
those whom he sent in ambush on top of mountains that they were like
those who went to hold the nets on the ridges, and those who rode the plains
that they were like those who went to flush the beast from the cover so that
when hunted it would trip into the nets. 1

[2] This is said to show that hunts, as Xenophon gives proof, are an image
of a war; and because of this, such training is honorable and necessary to
great men. One also cannot learn the knowledge of countries in any other
advantageous mode than by way of hunting; for hunting, to one who uses it,
makes one know the particular lay of that country in which he trains. Once
one individual has made himself very familiar with a region, he then
understands with ease all new countries; for every country and every
member of the latter have some conformity together, so that one passes
easily from the knowledge of one to the knowledge of the other. But
whoever has not well practiced one of them can only with difficulty—
indeed never, unless after a long time—know the other. Whoever has this
practice knows with one glance of his eye how that plain lies, how that
mountain rises, where this valley reaches, and all other such things of which

403

he has in the past made a firm science. That this is true Titus Livy shows
with the example of Publius Decius, when he was tribune of the soldiers in
the army that Cornelius the consul led against the Samnites; and as the
consul retired into a valley where the army of the Romans could be enclosed
by the Samnites, and seeing himself in so much danger, he said to the
consul, “Do you see, Aulus Cornelius, that peak above the enemy? That is
the citadel of our hope and salvation if (because the blind Samnites have
left it) we take it quickly.” And before these words said by Decius, Titus
Livy says, “Publius Decius, tribune of the soldiers, spotted a single hill rising
in the pass, overhanging the enemy’s camp, of arduous approach to an army
with baggage, hardly difficult to those lightly equipped.” Hence, after he had
been sent up it with three thousand soldiers by the consul and had saved the
Roman army, and as he was planning to leave when night came and to save
himself and his soldiers too, he has him say these words: “Go with me so
that while some fight remains we may find out the places where the enemy
have posted their guards and where the way out from here lies open.
Wrapped in a military cloak so that the enemy would not notice the leader
going about, he surveyed all these things.” 2 Thus whoever considers all this
text will see how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the nature
of countries. For if Decius had not understood and known them, he could
not have judged how useful it would be to the Roman army to take that hill,
nor could he have known from afar whether the hill was accessible or not;
and when he had then gone to the top of it and wished to leave so as to
return to the consul, with the enemy around, he would not have been able
from afar to take sight of the ways to get away and the places guarded by
enemies. So it was of necessity fitting that Decius had such knowledge
perfected, which made him save the Roman army by taking that hill. Then,
when besieged, he knew how to find the way to save himself and those who
were with him.

404

*• 40 -k

That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a

Glorious Thing

[1] Although the use of fraud in every action is detestable, nonetheless in
managing war it is a praiseworthy and glorious thing, and he who
overcomes the enemy with fraud is praised as much as the one who
overcomes it with force. One sees this by the judgment those make of it
who write the lives of great men, who praise Hannibal and others who were
very notable in such modes of proceeding. Of the very many examples of
that to be read I shall not repeat any. I shall say only this: that I do not
understand that fraud to be glorious which makes you break faith given and
pacts made; for although this may at some time acquire state and kingdom
for you, as is discoursed of above, 1 it will never acquire glory for you. But I
speak of the fraud that is used with the enemy who does not trust in you and
that properly consists in managing war, as was that of Hannibal when at the
lake of Perugia 2 he simulated flight so as to enclose the consul and the
Roman army, and when he lit up the horns of his herd to escape the hands
of Fabius Maximus. 3

[2] Like such frauds was the one that Pontius, captain of the Samnites, used
to enclose the Roman army within the Caudine Forks. 4 Having put his army
close to the mountains, he sent more of his soldiers in shepherds’ clothing
with a very large herd to the plain. When they were taken by the Romans
and asked where the Samnites’ army was, they all agreed, according to the
order given by Pontius, to say that it was at the siege of Nocera. 5 That thing,
believed by the consuls, made them trap themselves within the Caudine
cliffs, where, after they entered, they were at once besieged by the Samnites.
This victory, had through fraud, would have been very glorious for Pontius
if he had followed the counsels of his father, who wished the Romans either
to save themselves freely or all be killed, and not to take the middle way,
“which neither provides friends nor removes enemies.” 6 That way was

405

always pernicious in things of state, as was discoursed of above in another
place. 7

406

41 ft

That the Fatherland Ought to Be
Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with
Glory; and It Is Well Defended in Any

Mode Whatever

[1] As was said above, 1 the consul and the Roman army were besieged by
the Samnites, who had set very ignominious conditions on the Romans
(which were: wishing to put them under the yoke and sending them back to
Rome disarmed), and because of this the consuls were as though dazed, and
all the army in despair. Lucius Lentulus, the Roman legate, said that it did
not appear to him that any policy whatever for saving the fatherland was to
be avoided; for since the life of Rome consisted in the life of that army, it
appeared to him it was to be saved in every mode, and that the fatherland is
well defended in whatever mode one defends it, whether with ignominy or
with glory. For if that army saved itself, Rome would have time to cancel
the ignominy; if it did not save itself, even though it died gloriously, Rome
and its freedom were lost. And so his counsel was followed. 2 That advice
deserves to be noted and observed by any citizen who finds himself
counseling his fatherland, for where one deliberates entirely on the safety of
his fatherland, there ought not to enter any consideration of either just or
unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or ignominious; indeed every other
concern 3 put aside, one ought to follow entirely the policy that saves its life
and maintains its liberty. That is imitated by the sayings and deeds of the
French so as to defend the majesty of their king and the power of their
kingdom, for they hear no voice more impatiently than that which would
say: such a policy is ignominious for the king. For they say that their king
cannot suffer shame in any decision whatever of his, whether in good or in
adverse fortune, because whether he loses or wins, all—they say—are the
king’s affairs.

407

«42 M

That Promises Made through Force Ought

Not to Be Observed

[2] When the consuls returned to Rome with the army disarmed and the
ignominy they received, the first to say in the Senate that the peace made at
Caudium ought not to be observed was the consul Spurius Postumius. He
said that the Roman people was not obligated, but that he and the others
who had promised the peace were indeed obligated; and so if the people
wished to free itself from every obligation, it had to give him and all the
others who had promised it into the hands of the Samnites as prisoners. He
held to this conclusion with so much obstinacy that the Senate was content
with it, and sending him and the others to Samnium as prisoners, they
protested to the Samnites that the peace was not valid. So favorable was
fortune in this case to Postumius that the Samnites did not detain him, and
when he returned to Rome, Postumius was more glorious with the Romans
for having lost than was Pontius with the Samnites for having won. 1 Here
two things are to be noted: one, that glory can be acquired in any action
whatever, because in victory it is acquired ordinarily; in loss, it is acquired
either by showing that such a loss did not come by your fault or through
doing at once some virtuous action that cancels it. The other is that it is not
shameful not to observe the promises that you have been made to promise
by force; and when the force is lacking, forced promises that regard the
public will always be broken and it will be without shame for whoever
breaks them. Various examples of this are read in all the histories; and every
day in present times they are seen. Not only are forced promises not
observed among princes, when the force is lacking, but all other promises
are also not observed when the causes that made them promise are lacking.
Whether this is a praiseworthy thing or not, or whether like modes ought to
be observed by a prince or not, is disputed by us at length in our treatise Of
the Prince , 2 so for the present we shall be silent about it.

408

^43 &

That Men Who Are Born in One Province
Observe Almost the Same Nature for All

Times

[1] Prudent men are accustomed to say, and not by chance or without
merit, that whoever wishes to see what has to be considers what has been;
for all worldly things in every time have their own counterpart in ancient
times. That arises because these are the work of men, who have and always
had the same passions, and they must of necessity result in the same effect.
It is true that their works are more virtuous now in this province than in
that, and in that more than in this, according to the form of education in
which those people have taken their mode of life. To see a nation keep the
same customs for a long time, being either continually avaricious or
continually fraudulent or having some other such vice or virtue, also makes
it easy to know future things by past. Whoever reads of things past in our
city of Florence and considers also those that have occurred in the nearest
times will find German and French peoples full of avarice, pride, ferocity,
and faithlessness, for all those four things have much offended our city in
diverse times. As to lack of faith, everyone knows how often money was
given to King Charles VIII, and he would promise to give over the fortress
of Pisa, and never gave it over. 1 In that the king showed a lack of faith and
his very great avarice. But let us let these fresh things go. Everyone can
understand what happened in the war that the Florentine people made
against the Visconti dukes of Milan when Florence, deprived of other
expedients, thought to bring the emperor into Italy to assault Lombardy
with his reputation and forces. The emperor promised to come with very
many troops, and to carry on that war against the Visconti, and to defend
Florence from their power if the Florentines gave him a hundred thousand
ducats to get started and a hundred thousand after he was in Italy. The
Florentines consented to these pacts, and after they had paid him the first
money and then the second, when he reached Verona he turned around

409

without doing 2 anything, asserting 3 he had been held back by those who had
not observed the agreements among them. 4 So, if Florence had not been
either constrained by necessity or overcome by passion, and had read and
known the ancient customs of the barbarians, it would not have been
deceived either this or many other times by them, as they have always been
in one mode and have used the same means in every part and with everyone.
One sees that they did so in antiquity to the Tuscans, who, being pressed by
the Romans because they had many times been put to flight and defeated by
them, and seeing that they could not resist their thrust by means of their
own forces, agreed with the French who inhabited Italy on this side of the
Alps to give them a sum of money so that they would be obliged to join
armies with them and go against the Romans. Hence it followed that the
French, having taken the money, did not wish then to take up arms for
them, saying that they had accepted it not to make war with their enemies
but so that they would abstain from plundering the Tuscan country. And so
through the avarice and lack of faith of the French, the Tuscan peoples were
left deprived at a stroke of their money and of the aid that they hoped for
from them. 5 So one sees by this example of the ancient Tuscans and by that
of the Florentines that the French have used the same means; and because
of this, one can easily conjecture how much princes can trust in them.

410

*• 44 *

One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and
Audacity What One Would Never Have
Obtained through Ordinary Modes

[1] When the Samnites were being assaulted by the army of Rome, and
were unable with their army to stand up to the Romans in the field, they
decided to leave their towns in Samnium guarded and to pass with their
entire army into Tuscany, which was in truce with the Romans, and to see
by such passing if they could induce the Tuscans by the presence of their
army to take up arms again, which they had refused to their ambassadors. In
the speaking that the Samnites did to the Tuscans, and especially in showing
what cause had induced them to take up arms, they used a notable term
when they said “they had rebelled because peace was harsher for slaves than
was war for the free.” 1 And so, partly with persuasions, partly by the
presence of their army, they induced them to take up arms again. Here it is
to be noted that when one prince desires to obtain a thing from another
individual, if the opportunity allows he ought not to give him space to
deliberate, and ought to act so that he sees the necessity of a quick decision,
which is when he who is asked sees that from refusing or delaying arises a
sudden dangerous indignation.

[2] This means has been seen to be well used in our times by Pope Julius
with the French and by Monsieur de Foix, captain of the king of France,
with the marquis of Mantua. For wishing to expel the Bentivogli from
Bologna, Pope Julius judged that for this he had need of French forces and
Venetian neutrality. 2 When he had inquired of both and received doubtful
and shifty replies, he decided to make them both come along with his
judgment by not giving them time; and departing from Rome with as many
troops as he could gather, he went toward Bologna. He sent to tell the
Venetians to remain neutral and to the king of France to send forces. So,
since all were left constrained by the small space of time, and they saw that
manifest indignation must arise in the pope if they delayed or refused, they

411

yielded to his wishes; and the king sent aid to him and the Venetians stayed
neutral.

[3] Also, Monsieur de Foix, who was with the army in Bologna and had
learned of the rebellion of Brescia, and wished to go for its recapture, had
two ways: one through the dominion of the king, long and tedious; the other
short, through the dominion of Mantua. Not only was he necessitated to
pass through the dominion of that marquis, but he had to enter through
certain enclosures between swamps and lakes, of which that region is full,
which were locked and guarded from him with fortresses and other modes.
Hence, having decided to go by the shorter way, and so as to conquer every
difficulty and not to give time to the marquis to deliberate, de Foix at a
stroke moved his troops by that way and notified him to send the keys to that
passage. So the marquis, taken aback by this sudden decision, sent him the
keys, which he would never have sent if de Foix had conducted himself
more fearfully, since that marquis was in league with the pope and with the
Venetians and had one of his sons in the hands of the pope, things that gave
him many honest excuses for refusing them. But assaulted by the sudden
policy, he yielded them for the causes that are told above. 3 So did the
Tuscans with the Samnites, because of the presence of the army of
Samnium, when they took the arms that they had refused to take up at other
times.

412

«45 a

What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to
Resist the Thrust of Enemies and, Having
Resisted It, to Charge Them; or Indeed to
Assault Them with Fury from the First

[1] Decius and Fabius were the Roman consuls with two armies confronting
the armies of the Samnites and the Tuscans; and since they came to the fight
and to the battle together, it is to be noted which of the two diverse modes
of proceeding held to by the two consuls in that struggle is better. 1 For
Decius assaulted the enemy with every thrust and with every force of his;
Fabius only resisted it, judging a slow assault to be more useful, reserving
his thrust to the last, when the enemy had lost its first ardor for combat and,
as we say, its wind. Here one sees by the success of the affair that the plan
came out much better for Fabius than for Decius, who exhausted himself in
his first thrusts, so that seeing his band of men rather turned around than
otherwise, he sacrificed himself to the Roman legions in imitation of his
father, so as to acquire with death the glory he had been unable to attain
with victory. When Fabius learned of this thing, so as not to acquire less
honor by living than his colleague had acquired by dying, he pushed on all
the forces he had reserved for such a necessity; hence he carried off a very
happy victory. Hence one sees that Fabius’s mode of proceeding is more
secure and more to be imitated.

413

*• 46 *

Whence It Arises That One Family in One
City Keeps the Same Customs for a Time

[1] It appears that not only does one city have certain modes and
institutions diverse from another, and procreates men either harder or more
effeminate, but in the same city one sees such a difference to exist from one
family to another. That is attested to be true in every city, and in the city of
Rome very many examples are read of. For one sees that the Manlii were
hard and obstinate, the Publicoli kind men and lovers of the people, the
Appii ambitious and enemies of the plebs; and so, many other families had
each of them its qualities separate from those of others. These things cannot
arise solely from the bloodline, because that must vary through the diversity
of marriages, but it necessarily comes from the diverse education of one
family from another. For it is very important that a boy of tender years
begin to hear good or bad said of a thing, for it must of necessity make an
impression on him, which afterward regulates the mode of proceeding in all
the times of his life. If this had not been, it would be impossible for all the
Appii to have had the same wish and to be agitated by the same passions, as
Titus Livy notes of many of them. 1 And last, after one of them had been
made censor, and his colleague had laid down the magistracy at the end of
eighteen months, as the law disposed, Appius did not wish to relinquish it,
saying that he could hold it for five years according to the first law ordered
for censors. Although very many assemblies were held over this, and very
many tumults generated, yet there was never any remedy by which he would
relinquish it, though he was against the will of the people and of the greater
part of the Senate. Whoever reads the oration he made against Publius
Sempronius, tribune of the plebs, will note there all the Appian insolence
and all the goodness and humanity used by infinite citizens so as to obey the
laws and the auspices of their fatherland.

C$3

414

«47 M

That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget
Private Injuries for Love of His Fatherland

[1] Marcius the consul was with the army against the Samnites, and when
he had been wounded in a fight, and because of this was putting his troops
in danger, the Senate judged it necessary to send Papirius Cursor the
dictator there to supply the defects of the consul. Since it was necessary that
the dictator be named by Fabius, who was consul with the armies in
Tuscany, and they feared that he would not wish to name him because he
was his enemy, the senators sent two ambassadors to beg him that, private
hatreds aside, he ought to name him for the public benefit. Fabius did that,
moved by charity for his fatherland, even though by being silent and in many
other modes he gave sign that such a nomination grieved him. 1 From that,
all those who seek to be held good citizens ought to take example.

415

«48 M

When One Sees a Great Error Made by an
Enemy, One Ought to Believe That There
Is a Deception Underneath

[1] When Fulvius the legate was left with the army that the Romans had in
Tuscany, the consul having gone to Rome for some ceremonies, the
Tuscans, to see if they could catch him in a trap, placed an ambush near the
Roman camps and sent some soldiers in shepherds’ dress with a very large
herd and had them come within sight of the Roman army. So disguised,
they approached the wall of the camp; hence the legate, marveling at their
presumption since it did not appear reasonable to him, followed a mode by
which he exposed the fraud. So the plan of the Tuscans was defeated. 1 Here
one can advantageously note that a captain of armies ought not to put faith
in an error that the enemy is evidently seen to make, for fraud will always be
underneath it, as it is not reasonable that men be so incautious. But often
the desire to conquer blinds the spirits of men, who do not see but what
appears to be done for them.

[2] When the French had conquered the Romans at the Allia, and come to
Rome and found the gates open and without guard, they stood all that day
and night without entering, fearing fraud and unable to believe that there
was so much cowardice and so little counsel in Roman breasts that they
would abandon the fatherland. 2 When in 1508 the Florentines were
encamped before Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a Pisan citizen, found himself a
prisoner of the Florentines; and he promised that if he were free he would
deliver a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army. He was freed; then, to
accomplish the thing, he came often to speak with the legates of the
commissioners. He would come not concealed but openly and accompanied
by Pisans, whom he left aside when he spoke with the Florentines. So one
could have conjectured his double intent because it was not reasonable, if
his conduct had been faithful, that he would have dealt so openly. But the
desire they had to have Pisa blinded the Florentines, so that when led

416

according to his order to the Lucca gate, they left many of their heads and
other troops there to their dishonor, because of the double dealing done by
the said Alfonso. 3

*• 49 *

A Republic Has Need of New Acts of
Foresight Every Day If One Wishes to
Maintain It Free; and for What Merits
Quintus Fabius Was Called Maximus

[1] It is of necessity, as was said other times, 1 that in a great city accidents
arise every day that have need of a physician, and according to their
importance, one must find a wiser physician. If such accidents ever arose in
any city, they arose in Rome, ones both strange and unhoped for, as when it
appeared that all the Roman women had conspired against their husbands to
kill them—so many were found who had poisoned them, and so many who
had prepared the poison to poison them. 2 So also was the conspiracy of the
Bacchanals that was exposed at the time of the Macedonian War, in which
many thousands of men and women were actually involved. 3 If that had not
been exposed, it would have been dangerous for that city, if indeed the
Romans had not been accustomed to punish multitudes of the erring. For if
the greatness of that republic and the power of its executions had not been
seen by infinite other signs, it is seen through the kinds of penalty that it
imposed on whoever erred. Nor did it hesitate to have killed by way of
justice an entire legion at once, and a city, and to banish eight or ten
thousand men under extraordinary conditions as would not be observed by
one alone, much less by many, as happened to those soldiers who had
engaged in combat unhappily at Cannae. It banished them to Sicily and
imposed on them that they not lodge in the town, and that they eat standing

4

up.

[2] But of all other executions, decimating the armies was [most] terrible,
in which by lot, out of the whole army, one individual of every ten was put
to death. Nor in punishing a multitude could one find a more frightening
punishment than this. For when a multitude errs and the author is not
certain, all cannot be punished because they are too many; to punish a part

418

of them and leave a part of them unpunished would do wrong to those who
are punished, and the unpunished would have spirit to err another time. But
if the tenth part of them is killed by lot when all deserve it, whoever is
punished grieves for his lot and whoever is not punished fears lest another
time it touch him, and guards himself against erring. 5

[3] Thus were punished the poisoners and the Bacchanals as their sins
deserved. Although these diseases produce bad effects in a republic, they are
not fatal because there is almost always time to correct them, but there is
actually no time in those that regard the state, which ruin the city if they are
not corrected by a prudent individual.

[4] Because of the liberality that the Romans practiced in giving
citizenship 6 to foreigners, so many new men were born in Rome that they
began to have so much share in the votes that the government began to vary,
and it departed from the things and from the men with which it was
accustomed to go. When Quintus Fabius, who was censor, perceived this, he
put all these new men from whom this disorder derived under four tribes, so
that by being shut in such small spaces they could not corrupt all Rome. This
affair was well understood by Fabius, and he applied a convenient remedy
without an alteration; it was so well received by the citizenry 7 that he
deserved to be called Maximus. 8

419

Glossary

English terms appearing in the translation are in boldface, followed by the Italian or Latin terms they
translate in italics and the listing of their occurrences by book, chapter, and paragraph number
(except when the chapter has only one paragraph). Certain abbreviations are slightly different from
those used in the introduction and the notes to the text: DL refers to the dedicatory letter, Pr to the
prefaces, and T to a chapter title. A parenthetical number followed by a multiplication cross (x)
indicates multiple occurrences. (L) indicates a Latin word. Negatives and other words with prefixes
are listed with their root words. Indicators of parts of speech (n. for noun, v. for verb, adj. for
adjective) are given only where the English terms are identical. See also refers to another English temi
used to translate that Italian term; cf refers to an etymologically or conceptually related term.

An asterisk next to an English or Italian term indicates that not all occurrences of that term are listed
in the glossary; all occurrences are given for other listed English terms (when they translate Italian,
not necessarily Latin) and for listed Italian terms (though it may be necessary to consult the entries
cross-referenced under See also to locate ah occurrences of a listed Italian term). Occurrences of
English terms when they translate Latin are usually given only when the Latin terms are cognates of
the Italian term translated. The glossary does not include words inserted in the translation in brackets
for clarification.

abject, abietta, I 49.2, III 6.2, III 31.1, III 31.2 (2x), III 31.3; abjectness, abiezione, II 2.2, III 31.3
absolute, assoluto, I 9.2,1 25,1 35,1 40.3,1 55.4, III 26.2
absolve, assolvere, I 5.4,1 8.3,1 24.1

accident, accidente, 1 Pr.2,1 2.1 (4x), I 2.2,1 2.7,1 3 T, I 6.4,1 12.2,1 16 T, I 16.1,1 16.5, I 17.2,
I 18.1,1 18.2,1 28.1,1 33.1,1 33.2 (3x), I 34.3 (3x), I 34.4,1 39 T, I 39.1,1 40 T, 140.1,1 45.2
(2x), I 46 (2x), 147.2,1 56 T, I 56 (2x), II 5 T, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 18.4, II 21.2, II 22.1
(2x), II 23 T, II 24.2 (2x), II 29.1, II 32.1, III 1.1, III 1.2 (2x), III 5, III 6.16, III 6.17 (3x), III

11.1, III 14.1 (2x), III 14.2, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 26.2, III 30.1 (2x), III 30.2, III 33.1, III 36.2,
III 37.3, III 49.1 (2x); accidental, accidentale, III 36.2. See also incident

account,* conto, I 12, I 45.2, I 52.3, I 55.1, I 55.2, I 57, I 59, II 4.2, II 10.2, II 17.1, II 17.3, II
18.3, II 21.2, II 28.1, II 30.4, III 1.2 (3x), III 26.2 (2x), III 31.2, III 35.2; account,* ragione, II

5.1. For ragione, see also just; reason; type

accuse, accused, accusate, accusato, I 5.4,1 6.4,1 7.1 (2x), I 7.4 (3x), I 8.2 (3x), I 8.3 (3x), I 9.2, I

11.1.128.1 45.3 (2x), I 47.3, I 53.5, I 58.1, I 58.2 (2x), I 58.3, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3 (3x), II 26, III
6.5 (2x), III 6.6 (2x), III 6.7, III 6.8 (2x), III 6.9 (3x), III 6.19, III 8.1 (2x), III 34.2;
accusation, accusa, I 5.4,1 7 T, I 7.4,1 7.5 (2x), I 8 T, I 8.2 (6x), I 8.4, I 11.1 (2x), III 1.3, III
6.8 (2x), III 28, III 30.1, III 34.1; accuser, accusatore, I 8.4 (2x), 149.3, III 6.3 (2x), III 6.20

accustom, assuefare, II 17.5, III 14.2, III 37.4, III 38.2; accustom, accustomed, consueto, consuesco
(L), I 21.2,1 51, II 2.4, II 4.1 (2x), II 19.1, II 21.2, II 29.1, II 32.1, III 9.2, III 12.1, III 31.4 (L),
III 49.1, III 49.4; accustom, solere, soleo (L), DL, I 43, III 8.1 (2x), III 31.2 (L), III 43;
accustomed, usitato, I 55.2; unaccustomed, inconsueto, III 38.1; unaccustomed, inusitato, I

11.2.1 29.3, II 12.4, II 17.5 (2x), III 38.1 (2x). For consueto, solere, usitato, see also custom
acquire, acquisition, acquistare, acquisto, acquistato, I 1.3,1 1.4,1 5 T, I 5.2 (2x), I 5.4 (5x), I 6.3, I

6.4 (3x), I 16.1 (2x), I 16.3, I 18.4, I 20 T, I 20, I 29.1 (3x), I 29.2 (2x), I 29.3 (3x), I 30.1
(3x), I 34.1, I 37.1 (2x), I 46, I 52.1, I 52.3, II 1 T, II 1.1 (4x), II 1.3 (2x), II 2.1 (2x), II 2.3
(2x), II 4.1 (3x), II 4.2 (3x), II 6.1 (4x), II 17.1 (2x), II 17.3, II 18.5, II 19 T, II 19.1 (6x), II
19.2 (12x), II 22.1 (2x), II 24.3 (2x), II 27.2, II 30.1, II 30.2, II 30.5, II 31.2, II 32.1 (3x), II

420

32.2 (2x), II 33, III 3 T, III 3, III 6.19, III 10.3 (2x), III 12.1 (3x), III 21.1, III 22 T, III 22.1, III

22.3, III 22.4 (3x), III 24, III 28, III 34.2 (2x), III 34.3, III 35.2 (2x), III 37.1, III 39.1, III 40.1
(2x), III 42 (3x), III 45 (2x); reacquire, riacquistare, II 24.2 (2x), II 24.3, III 17
action, azione, 1 Pr.l, I 9.2, I 11.1, I 14.1, I 40.1, I 50 T, I 50 (2x), I 51, I 53.1, I 58.1, I 60, 1
Pr.l, II 2.2 (3x), II 3, II 6.1, II 13.1, II 15.1, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 30.1, III 1.6 (2x), III 6.8, III
6.12 (2x), III 6.13, III 6.15, III 6.16, III 6.17, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 10.1 (2x), III 12.1, III 15.2, III

18.1 (2x), III 20, III 29, III 30.1, III 34.2 (4x), III 34.3, III 34.4, III 36.2, III 37.1, III 40.1, III
42 (2x)

administer, amministrare, 1 Pr.2, I 39.2 (2x), I 50 (2x), III 15.2, III 30.1; administration,
amministrazione, administratio (L), I 2.3,14.2,1 6.1, III 15.2, III 15.2 (L), III 17 T, III 17.1
adore, adorare, I 5.2,1 29.3, 1 Pr.2, III 21.1

advantage, vantaggio, I 58.3, II 6.2, II 12.3, II 17.3 (4x), II 22.2, II 32.1, III 6.20, III 10.1 (2x),
III 10.2, III 37.3, III 37.4; advantage, commodita, commodo, I 1.5 (2x), I 2.3, II 2.3, II 6.1, II

6.2, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 17.2 (3x), II 18.3, II 29.1, III 1.2, III 1.6, III 10.3, III 21.4;
advantageous, advantageously, commodo, I 1.1, II 5.2, II 12.2, III 39.2, III 48.1;
disadvantage, disax’vantaggio, II 10.2, II 17.2, II 17.3, III 17, III 18.1; disadvantage,
incommodita, II 17.2, III 21.4, III 23. For commodita, see also convenient; occasion

afraid, to be, fare paura, II 1.2; to be afraid, temere, I 16.3. See also fear

alive, vivo, 13.2,1 17.3,122,144.1,157,11 18.4,11 27.4, III 4,1116.2,1116.12, III 6.16, III 6.18.
See also lively

alone, solo,* solus (L), I 2.1,1 7.3,1 9 T, I 9.2 (2x), I 9.4,1 9.5,1 18.5,1 35, II 2.1 (2x), II 3, II 4.1
(3x), II 4.2, II 5.2 (2x), II 8.1 (2x), II 13.1 (4x), II 13.2 (2x), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20, II 23.3, II

24.2, II 29.1, II 30.2, II 30.4, III 1.3, III 6.2, III 6.8, III 6.9, III 6.15, III 9.3, III 11.1 (2x), III
15.1, III 15.2 (2x), III 31.2, III 31.3, III 35.2, III 36.2 (L), III 49.1

altars, altari, 115 (2x)

alter, alterare, I 25, III 1.1 (2x), III 8 T; alteration, alterazione, I 5.4, I 25, III 1.1, III 49.4;

alternating, alterazione, I 7.1. For alterare, see also upset; (/change
ambassador, ambasciadore, 144.1, II 11.2 (2x), II 28.1 (3x), II 33, III 12.2, III 31.2, III 31.3, III
32, III 44.1, III 47. Cf spokesmen

ambiguity, ambiguous, ambiguita, ambiguo, I 30.1 (2x), II 15 T, II 15.1 (5x), II 15.2 (3x)
ambition, ambizione, DL, I 2.3,1 4.1,1 5.2,1 5.4 (2x), I 6.4,1 7.4,1 8.3,1 9.1,1 9.2,1 9.4,1 10.5,1

18.2.1 20,1 30.2,1 33.2,1 35,1 36,1 37.1 (2x), I 37.3 (2x), I 39.2 (2x), I 40.5, I 42, I 43, I 46
T, 146,147.3,1 50 T, I 52.1,155.4,1 55.5, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 8.1, II 19.1, II 20 (2x), II 21.2, III

1.3, III 2, III 3 (2x), III 6.8, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1 (2x), III 11.2, III 12.1, III 12.2, III 15.2, III

16.3, III 21.4, III 22.4, III 24, III 30.1, III 38.1; ambitious, ambizioso, 1 Pr.2,1 5.4 (2x), I 6.2, I

7.3.1 29.1,1 29.3,1 30.1,1 30.2, I 45.2, I 47.3, I 55.5, II 20 (2x), II 22.1, III 8.1, III 12.2, III
46; ambitiously, ambiziosamente, I 9.2,1 46

ancestors, antichi, I 2.3. See also ancient; former
ancestral, patrio, I 1.4, II 5.2, II 8 T. Cf fatherland

ancient, antiquo, antico, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2 (8x), I 6.1,1 7.2,1 9 T, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.2, I 10.5, I 12.2, I

13.2.1 14.1,1 15,1 16.1, I 19.2, I 25 T, I 25 (5x), I 31.2, I 37 T, I 37.1, I 39.1 (2x), I 40.4, I

49.2.1 53.2,1 55.2,1 55.4,1 56,1 58.2, 1 Pr.l (3x), 1 Pr.2 (2x), 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 2.1 (2x), II 2.2
(4x), II 2.4, II 4.1 (3x), II 4.2, II 5.1 (2x), II 8.1 (2x), II 16 T, II 16.2 (2x), II 16.3 (2x), II 17.1,
II 17.3, II 17.4, II 17.5 (2x), II 17.6, II 18 T, II 18.2, II 18.5, II 19.1, II 20, II 21.2, II 22.1, II

24.3, II 24.4, II 27.1, II 30.5, III 1.2, III 3, III 4, III 5 (2x), III 10.1 (3x), III 11.1, III 12.1, III

15.1, III 22.3, III 22.6, III 27.2, III 39.1, III 43 (3x). See also ancestors; former; cf antiquity
anger (v.), irritare, I 7.1,1 8.2 (2x), II 14 (2x), II 15.2, II 26 (2x); anger (n.), ira, I 7.1, I 14.2, II

2.1, II 28.1; angered, irato, III 35.1

421

animal,* animate, I 16.1, II 2.2

animate (v.), animire, I 11.2. Cf inspire; spirit

animus, animo, I 7.3, 1 7.4. See also intent; mind; spirit; cf magnanimous; pusillanimous
antiquity, in antiquity, antiquita, antichita, anticamente, antiquamente, 1 Pr.2 (2x), I 1.4, I 58.2, 1
Pr.3, II 2.2, II 5.1 (2x), II 5.2, II 8.2, II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.3, II 17.4 (2x), II 17.5, II 30.5, III

27.2, III 43. Cf ancient

appearance, apparenza, I 46.1 ; spezie, I 53T. For spezie, see also species

appetite, appetito, I 5.2,1 5.4,1 7.4,1 8.3,1 37.3 (2x), I 42,1 44.2, 1 Pr.3 (3x), III 3, III 4, III 22.3
arbiter, arbitro, 149.1,1 55.4,1 59, II 22.1, II 25.1. Cf judge
argument, ragionamento, III 32. See also discuss; reason

aristocrats, ottimati, I 2.2 (2x), I 2.3, 1 2.5, 1 2.6 (2x), I 2.7 (4x), I 16.5 (4x), I 28, 1 52.3
arm (n.), arma, armi, arme, arma (L), I 7.3, 1 11.2 (2x), I 16.5, 1 18.4, 1 19.2, 1 19.4 (2x), I 21 T, I
21.1,121.2,121.3,121.3 (L), I 37.2 (2x), I 38.1, 1 44.2 (2x), I 52.1, 1 52.2, I 53.1, I 54, I 57,

II 2.1 (2x), II 2.2, II 2.3, II 3 (2x), II 4.1 (2x), II 4.2, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 8.4, II 9, II 10.1 (2x), II

10.3, II 12.1, II 12.4, II 13.2 (3x), II 14, II 15.1, II 16.1, II 17.1, II 20, II 21.2, II 21.2 (L), II
23.2, II 24.1 (L)(2x), II 25.1 (2x), II 26 (2x), II 27.3, II 27.4, II 29.1, II 30.1, II 32.1, III 6.15,

III 6.17, III 6.20 (2x), III 11.2, III 12.2 (L)(2x), III 12.3, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 19.2, III 20 (2x),
III 22.6, III 24, III 26.1, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 32, III 33.1 (L), III 36.2, III 37.3, III

37.4, III 43, III 44.1 (3x), III 44.3; arms, armato, I 7.5; men-at-arms, genti d’arini, I 29.2, I 56,
II 18.4 (2x); men-at-arms, uomini d’anne, II 19.1 (2x); arm, braccio* 147.1, II 17.2, II 23.2, II

25.1, III 6.15, III 14.1, III 28; arm (v.), armed, armare, armato, anno (L), I 2.3, I 6.3, I 6.4, I

19.4, I 38.2 (4x), I 40.6, I 43, I 44.1, I 54 (2x), II 2.1, II 2.2, II 3, II 4.1 (2x), II 4.2, II 12.4
(4x), II 18.3, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 26, II 30.2, II 30.3 (2x), II 30.4, III 6.2 (3x), III 6.17, III 6.19
(3x), III 12.3 (L)(2x), III 13.3 (2x), III 14.3, III 26.1, III 30.2 (4x), III 31.2, III 31.4, III 32, III
33.1; disarm, disarmare, II 23.4, II 24.1; disarmed, disarmato, II 2.2, II 30.2, II 30.3, III 41, III
42; unarmed, disarmato, I 6.3, I 27.1, I 38.2, II 4.2, II 12.4 (2x), II 18.3, II 30.3, III 12.3, III

21.4, III 31.4, III 37.4

army, esercito, exercitus (L), passim

arrogance, arrogant, arroganza, arrogante, I 47.2, II 14

art, arte, ars ( L), 1 Pr.2, 1 10.1 (2x), I 11.1, 1 19.2 (2x), I 19.3,140.3, 1 Pr.l, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 3, II
8.3, II 25.1 (2x), II 31.1, IP 6.19 (2x), III 6.20, III 22.4 (L), III 36.1
artillery, artiglierie, II 16.3 (2x), II 17 T, II 17.1 (12x), II 17.2 (9x), II 17.3 (3x), II 17.4 (4x), II
17.5 (lOx), II 17.6, II 18.4, II 24.1, II 33

assault (v.), assaltare, I 1.1, I 1.4, I 6.3, I 9.4, I 12.2, I 21.2 (2x), I 23.2, I 31.2, I 32, I 38.1, I
40.6, I 53.1, I 53.4, II 1.2 (3x), II 2.3, II 8.1 (2x), II 9 (4x), II 10.2, II 11.1, II 12 T, II 12.1
(4x), II 12.2 (2x), II 12.3, II 12.4 (4x), II 13.2, II 14, II 17.3, II 17.4 (2x), II 18.3, II 19.1, II

19.2, II 22.1 (2x), II 22.2 (2x), II 24.2 (5x), II 24.4, II 25 T, II 25.1, II 27.4, II 28.1 (2x), II
29.1, II 30.4, II 31.2, II 32.1 (3x), III 10.2, III 10.4 (2x), III 11.2, III 12.2, III 18.3, III 30.2, III

37.4, III 39.1, III 44.3, III 45 T, III 45; assault (n.), assalto, II 17.1, II 17.4 (3x), II 25.1 (2x), II

27.4, II 32.1 (4x), III 45; assault (n.), insulto, I 13.2
assert, causare, III 43. See also cause
astonishment, maraviglia, 1 40.3. See also marvel
astrologers, astrologi, III 6.11

astuteness, astutely, astuzia, astutamente, I 6.4, 1 41, II 5.2, II 12.2, III 17
attack,* offendere, I 34.4, II 17.3, II 18.4. See also hurt; offend
augurs, aruspici, I 12.1, 1 14.1; augury, augurio, I 14.1 (2x), III 33.1

422

auspices, auspicii, auspizi, aruspicare, auspicium (L), I 14 T, I 14.1 (3x), I 14.2 (4x), I 14.3 (4x), III

33.1 (3x), III 36.2 (L), III 38.1 (L), III 46
author, autore, I 25,145 T, I 58, III 12.2, III 32, III 35.1 (2x), III 49.2

authority, autorita, autoritade, 11.1,11.2,11.4,1 2.3 (2x), I 2.7 (4x), I 5.2 (2x), I 5.4 (2x), I 6.1, I
6.4 (2x), I 7.1 (3x), I 7.2 (2x), I 7.3, I 9.1 (2x), I 9.2 (3x), I 9.3, I 9.4, I 10.2, I 10.5, I 11.2
(2x), I 12.1,1 12.2,1 13.2,1 16.3,1 17.1,1 18.2,1 18.4,1 18.5,1 25,1 26, I 29.2, I 29.3, I 34 T
(2x), I 34.1 (3x), I 34.2 (4x), I 34.3 (2x), I 34.4 (3x), I 35 (1 lx), I 36,1 39.2 (2x), 140.2,140.3
(2x), I 40.4 (2x), I 40.5, I 41, I 44 T, I 44.1 (2x), I 44.2, I 47.1 (3x), I 49.2, I 49.3 (4x), I 50
(3x), I 52.1, I 53.2 (3x), I 53.3, I 53.5 (2x), I 54 T, I 54, I 55.2, I 55.5, I 58.1, II 4.1 (2x), II
12.4, II 18 T, II 18.2 (3x), II 19.2 (2x), II 20 (2x), II 24.3, II 33 (3x), III 3, III 5, III 6.3, III 6.4,
III 6.15, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1 (2x), III 15.2, III 24, III 26.2, III 30 T, III 30.1 (3x),
III 32

avarice, ax’arizia, DL, I 2.3,1 29.1 (3x), I 29.3 (2x), 140.5, II 4.2, III 6.20, III 43 (3x); avaricious,
avaro, III 43. Cf greed

avenge, vendicare, vendicarsi, I 5.4, I 7.5 (3x), I 16.5 (2x), I 47.2, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 4.1, II 19.2, II
28 T, II 28.1 (3x), II 28.2 (4x), III 6.2 (3x), III 6.3, III 6.7, III 6.16 (2x), III 6.18 (3x), III 6.20,
III 7 (2x), III 13.1, III 16.3, III 17; avenger, vendicatrice, I 28. Cf revenge; vindictive

bad, cattivo* I 5.2,1 7.5,1 8.3 (2x), I 9.1,1 10.4,1 18.3,1 18.4 (4x), I 20,1 24.1,1 49.2, I 49.3, 1
Pr.3, II 15.1, II 17.4, II 23.2 (2x), II 30.2, III 8.2 (2x), III 13.2, III 16.3, III 22.4, III 22.5, III
24, III 31.2, III 31.3, III 35.2, III 37.1, III 49.3; bad, badly, malo* male * malus (L), I 3.2, I

5.4.1 6.2,1 7.4 (2x), I 8.3 (2x), I 11.3,1 13.1,1 17.3,1 18.4,1 24.1,1 35,1 38.2 (3x), I 41, I 45
T, 146 (L), 147.2,147.3,1 50,153.1,157 (4x), II 18.4, II 19.1, II 23.4, II 24.1 (3x), II 24.2, II
30.3, III 6.2 (2x), III 6.14, III 6.20, III 8.2, III 10.1, III 13.2, III 14.1, III 19.1, III 21.2, III

31.1, III 31.3, III 31.4, III 34.4, III 46; bad, reo, I 2.2, I 2.3, I 2.5, I 3.1, I 12.2, I 35 (2x), I

38.2, III 36.2; bad, tristo, I 30.1,1 31 T, II 19.2, II 24.2, III 9.1, III 35. For cattivo, reo, tristo, see
also wicked; for male, see also evil; ill; cf malevolent

barbarian, barbaro, I 1.2,1 7.5,1 12.2, II 2.4, III 43
battalion, battaglia, II 16.1, II 16.2. See also battle

battle, battaglia, II 11.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.2, III 37 T, III 37.3, III 38.2; battle, giomata, I 14.1
(2x), I 14.2,1 31.1,1 36, II 6.1 (3x), II 16.1 (3x), II 16.2 (3x), II 17.1, II 17.3 (4x), II 17.5, II

18.2, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 25.2, II 33, III 9.4, III 10 T, III 10.1 (8x), III 10.2 (2x), III

10.3, III 10.4, III 13.1, III 14.3 (2x), III 18.1, III 18.2, III 31.2 (2x), III 31.4, III 33 T, III 33.1
(2x), III 37 T, III 37.2, III 38.1, III 45 T, III 45; battle, fortune of, fortuna della zuffa, II 10.1, II

10.2 (2x), III 10.1; battle, order of, ordering of, ordine della zuffa, ordinare la zuffa, II 16.1, II

29.1 , III 22.4. For battaglia, see also battalion; for giomata, see also day; for zuffa, see also fight
beast, bestia, I 2.3 \fiera, III 39.1

beatify, beatificare, II 2.2

beautiful, bello, I 11.3,1 31.2, II 24.4, II 28.2 (2x), III 20
because,* per cagione, III 14.1, III 26 T, III 26.1. See also cause

beginning (n principio, DL, I 1 T, I 1.1,1 1.2,1 1.3,1 1.4,1 1.5,1 2.1 (5x), I 2.3 (4x), I 2.7,1 9.2,
I 9.4, I 12.1, I 14.1, I 16.5, I 17.1, I 18.3, I 19.1, I 25, I 29.3, I 30.1, I 33.2, I 33.3, I 33.5, I

37.1.1 37.3,140.6,1 40.7,1 49 T, I 49.1,1 49.2 (5x), 149.3,1 55.3 (2x), I 55.5, II 6.1, II 9, II

13.2 (3x), II 15, II 19.2, II 29.2, II 30.2, III 1 T, III 1.1, III 1.2 (3x), III 1.3 (3x), III 1.4, III 1.5,
III 1.6, III 6.5, III 6.11, III 6.19, III 8.2, III 11.2, III 12.1, III 14.3, III 22.3, III 24, III 26.2, III

27.2, III 28 T, III 34.2 (2x), III 34.3, III 34.4, III 36 T, III 36.1 (2x), III 36.2, III 38.1
believe, credere, credo (L), passim, lack of belief, incredulitd, I 53.1; belief, opinione* I 12.1. For

incredulitd, cf credulity; for opinione, see also opinion; reputation

423

belongings, sustanza, I 6.2,1 37.1,1 55.5. Cf property

benefit, beneficio, benefizio, benificare, beneficium (L), DL, 1 Pr. 1, I 4.1, I 6.4, I 29.1 (L), I 32 T, I
32 (5x), I 51, I 52.1, I 59, II 23.2 (3x), II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, III 4 (2x), III 6.3, III 8.1 (2x), III
14.3 (L), III 28 (2x), III 30.1, III 47
betrothed, maritata, marito, I 22 (2x). See also husband; marry
Bible, Bibbia, III 30.1

bishop, vescovo, I 54, III 6.20. Cf episcopal

blame, biasimo, biasimare, DL, 1 Pr. 1 (2x), I 2.3,1 4.1,1 4.2,1 9.5,1 10.1 (4x), I 10.3 (2x), I 10.4,
I 21 T, I 24.1, I 28, I 38.3, I 44.2, I 49.1, I 53.5, 1 Pr.2 (2x), 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 15.2, II 19.2, II

29.1, III 27.4

blind (v.), blinded, accecate, accecato, DL, I 17.1,1 35,1 40.7,142,1 53.2, II 29 T, III 6.3 (2x), III
6.8, III 12.2, III 28, III 48.1, III 48.2; blind (n.), cieco, caecus (L), III 35.2, III 36.2, III 36.2 (L),
III 39.2 (L); blindness, cecita, III 8.1

blood, bloodline, bloodshed, bloody, sangue, sanguinosa, sanguis (L), I 4.1, I 5.4, I 10.5, I 17.3, I
37.2 (2x), 149.3,153.1,160 (2x), 160 (L), 112.2,114.1, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 29.1, III 6.2 (2x),
III 6.20, III 7 T, III 7 (2x), III 12.3, III 19.1, III 27.1, III 27.2, III 46
body,* corpo, II 2.2, II 2.4 (2x), II 3, II 5.2 (3x), II 12.4, II 16.1 (3x), II 16.2, II 30.3, III 1.1 (3x),
III 1.2 (3x), III 8.1, m 11.1
book, libro, 1 Pr.2,1 1.6,1 13.2, 1 Pr.3, II 29.2, III 1.6

boy, fanciullo, III 6.5 (2x), III 6.10; giovinetto, giovanetto, III 34.3, III 46. For fanciullo, see also
child; for giovanetto, cf youth
brain, cervello, I 55.5, III 6.14
bridle, freno, I 58.2. See also check

bring up, addurre, I 7.1, I 7.5, I 8.3, I 9.4, I 13.1, I 13.2, I 14.3, I 17.2, I 23.4, I 31.1, I 33.3, I

47.2, I 53.3, I 55.1, I 56, I 59, II 1.1, II 3, II 8.2, II 12.1, II 12.3, II 21.2, II 23.2, II 29.3, II
31.1, III 3, III 6.6, III 11.1, III 12.2, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 15.1, III 15.2, III 16.1, III 36.2 (2x)

brother, fratello, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 18.5, I 36, I 54, II 21.2, III 6.5, III 6.11, III 6.14, III 6.18 (2x);
brother-in-law, cognato, II 31.1

build, builder, building, edificare, edificatore, edicazione, edificio, 11.1 (2x), I 1.2, I 1.3 (6x), I 1.4
(6x), I 1.5 (6x), I 26 (2x), I 28,1 53.1,1 56, II 1.1, II 4.1, II 24.1 (7x), II 24.2 (2x), II 24.4 (4x),

III 25

calumny, calumniate, calumniator, calunnia, calunniare, calunnatore, I 5.4,1 7.5, I 8 T, I 8.2 (9x),

I 8.3 (6x), I 8.4 (2x), I 10.5, II 21.2

campaign, impresa, I 8.3, II 4.2, II 6.2, II 10.1, II 10.2, III 12.2, III 35.1 (2x). See also enterprise
capital, capitate, I 10.2,1 10.5,1 31.2, II 19.1, II 26; capital, capo* I 1.3. For capo, see also head
captain (n.), capitano, 1 Pr.2,1 8.3, I 13.1, I 14.2, I 15, I 21.2 (2x), I 23.4, I 29.1 (4x), I 30 T, I

30.1 (2x), I 31 T, I 31.1 (3x), I 31.2,1 38.3,1 44.1,1 49.3 (2x), I 53.5, II 2.2, II 2.4, II 8.1, II 9,

II 10.2 (3x), II 10.3, II 16.1, II 16.2 (3x), II 17.1, II 17.4 (2x), II 18.2, II 18.3, II 18.4, II 20, II

24.2, II 24.3 (2x), II 26 (3x), II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.4, II 33 T, II 33 (2x), III 6.9 (2x), III 9.1, III
9.4, III 10 T, III 10.1 (2x), III 10.2, III 12 T, III 12.1 (2x), III 12.2 (2x), III 12.3 (2x), III 13 T
(2x), III 13.1 (5x), III 13.2 (2x), III 13.3 (5x), III 14.2 (2x), III 14.3 (2x), III 18 T, III 18.1, III

18.2, III 18.3, III 19.1, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.1, III 22.6, III 31.4 (2x), III 32, III 33
T, III 33.1 (3x), III 37.1, III 37.2 (2x), III 37.3, III 37.4 (3x), III 38 T, III 38.1 (4x), III 39 T, III

39.1 (2x), III 39.2, III 40.2, III 44.2, III 48.1; captain (v.), capitanare, I 38.3, II 20, III 13.2
capture, capturer, espugnazione, espugnare, espugnatore, I 6 4,1 8.3,1 13.1 (5x), I 13.2 (2x), I 53.1,

I 53.5,1 59, II 17.4 (2x), II 24.2, II 27.2, III 12.1 (5x), III 12.2, III 20, III 37.3. See also storm

424

cardinal, cardinale, I 27.1,1 54, III 6.13 (2x)

care, cum, curare, I 5.2, I 9.2, I 14.1, I 31.1 (2x), I 55.4, II 1.2, II 4.1 (2x), II 16.2, II 18.3, II
27.4, III 2, III 6.18, III 10.1, III 18.2
caress, carezzare, accarezzare, II 23.4, III 6.11
case,* causa, I 5.4,1 40.3. See also cause
cathedral, cattedrale, III 6.13; duomo, 156

cause (n.), cagione, passim, caused, per cagione, I 13.2; cause (n.), causa, I 7.1, I 45.1, II 15.2, III
8.1, m 21,1, III 26.2; cause (v.), causare, I 1.4, I 4.2, I 5.4, I 6.2, I 6.4, I 9.2, I 11.4, I 32, I

33.2.133.5.147.3, 1 Pr.2, III 1.6, III 4 (2x), III 7, III 16.2, III 17, III 26.2, III 27.2, III 30.1,
III 31.3, III 34.2 (2x). For cagione, see also because; for causa, see also case; for causare, see also
assert

cavalry, cax’alleria, II 16.2 (3x), II 17.5 (2x), II 18.3 (2x), II 19.1; cavalrymen, cavalieri, II 18.2, II
18.3 (2x), II 19.1, III 1.3. C/horse

censors, Censori, I 49.1 (2x), III 1.3, III 46 (2x), III 49.4; censorship, Censura, I 5.2
centurion, centurione, 115 (2x), III 6.11, III 6.15, III 18.2
century, secolo, I 1.1,1 1.5,1 11.1,1 58.3, II 19.1, III 34.2. See also epoch
ceremony, cerimonia, I 10.5,1 12.1 (3x), II 2.2, II 5.1, III 1.2, III 48.1. Cf rites
chance (n.), caso* I 2.1, I 2.3, I 2.7, I 6.1, I 14.2, I 55.3, II 9 (4x), III 18.3, III 43; chance (v.),
sortire, I 19.1,1 19.4. For caso, see also perchance; for sortire, see also lot
change (v.), (ri)mutare, I 18.2,1 25,141,1 42,1 49.3, II 6.2, II 8.2 (2x), II 8.4, II 23.2, II 25.1, II
26, II 27.4, III 3, III 6.14, III 7 T, III 7 (4x), III 9.1 (2x), III 9.2 (2x), III 9.3 (2x), III 12.1, III

18.3, III 25; change (n.), mutazione, I 2.4,1 49.3. Cf alter

chapter, capitolo, I 2.7,1 4.2,1 5.3,1 6.4,1 7.5,1 14.3,1 16.6,1 18.5,1 22,1 25, I 26, I 28, I 47.3,

I 54,158.4, II 1.3, II 4.2, II 11.2, II 15.2, II 16.3, II 19.2, II 26, II 31.2, III 3, III 4, III 5 (2x),
III 8.2, III 9.4, III 16.3, III 20, III 26.2, III 26.3, III 37.4. See also treaty

charity, carita, III 20, III 47
chastity, castitd, III 20 (2x)

check (v.), frenare, I 8.1,1 18.1,1 18.2 (2x), I 18.5, I 37.3, 142, I 50, I 53.1, I 54 T, I 54 (3x), I
55.4,157, II 23.3, II 24.2; check (n .), freno, 13.2,1 6.1, I 49.3, I 55.4, II 19.1, II 24.1, II 24.2
(2x), II 33, III 11.1, III 16.1. See also bridle

child, figliuolo, I 16.3,1 32, II 2.3, III 6.18 (3x); fanciullo, II 29.1, III 20 (2x). For figliuolo, see also
daughter; son; for fanciullo, see also boy

choose, eleggere, DL (2x), I 1.4,1 2.3,1 2.5,1 5.2,1 9.1,1 10.5,1 11.1,1 18.3,142,1 59,1 60 (2x),

II 10.2, II 12.1, III 2 (2x), III 6.15, III 6.17, III 16.3; choice, elezione, I 1.4 (4x), I 1.5, I 2.3, I
3.2,1 5.2,1 10.1,1 34.4,1 38 T, I 38.2,1 58.3 (4x), II 1.2, II 6.1, II 13.2, II 21.2, III 8.2, III 9.1,

III 16.3. See also elect; levy

Christian, cristiano, 1 Pr.2,1 12.1 (2x), I 26, II 5.1 (3x), II 16.2. Cf Gentile
church, chiesa, I 12.2 (5x), I 27.1 (2x), II 8.4, II 22.1 (3x), III 6.13 (3x), III 31.3; Church, the

Roman, Chiesa romana, I 12 T, I 12.1,1 12.2

cite, cited before, allegare, preallegare, I 6.4, I 7.4, I 12.2, I 23.2, I 54, I 58.3 (2x), II 3, II 4.2
(2x), II 8.1, II 10.1, II 12.1 (5x), II 12.2 (3x), II 16.3, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 24.1, II 24.3, III 6.8,

III 6.16 (2x), III 6.19, III 8.2, III 9.3, III 22.4, III 28, III 37.4
citizen, cittadino, passim, citizenry, civilta, III 49.4; citizenship, civilita, civilta, II 3, II 23.4, III
49.4; citizenship, cittd, civitas (L), II 23.2 (L), II 23.2. For civilita and civilta, see also civility;
civilization; for cittd and civitas, see also city
city, cittd, cittade, passim, city, civitas (L), III 8.1. See also citizenship

425

civil, civilly, civile, civilmente, 1 Pr.2 (2x), I 2.3,1 10.5,1 11.1,1 11.2,1 13.2, I 14.1, I 33.3, I 37.2
(2x), 140.3,145.1,149.2,1 53.1, II 18.2, II 21.2, III 3, III 6.11, III 13.3; civility, civilita, I 2.3,

I 24.1,1 28; civilized, civile, I 11.5; civilization, civilita, civilta, I 11.1,1 11.3 (2x), I 55.4 (2x), II
2.4. For civile, see also life; life, way of; for civilita and civilta, see also citizenship

collectivity, universale, I 2.6,1 16.4,1 17.3, I 25, I 32, I 39.2 (2x), I 40.6, I 52.2 (2x), II 22.1, III
3, III 6.2, III 29, III 34.1; collectivity, universalita, universita, I 7.1,1 50 (2x), II 2.2, II 28.1, III 7
(2x). See also universal

colony, colonia, I 1.3,1 37.2 (4x), II 4.1, II 6.1 (2x), II 6.2 (3x), II 7 (4x), II 13.2, II 19.1, II 23.2,

II 30.4 (2x), III 15.1, III 32; colonist, colono, II 6.1, II 7 T, II 7

color, colore, colorire, I 18.5,1 34.3, II 9, II 22.1, II 32.1, III 6.7, III 12.2, III 20, III 28
combat, (ri)combattere, I 14.1,1 14.2 (2x), I 23.3, I 31.2, I 37.1 (3x), I 38.3, I 43 T, I 43 (3x), II

1.1 (3x), II 1.2 (2x), II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1, II 2.4, II 8.1 (2x), II 9, II 10.1, II 10.2 (3x), II 12.1, II

12.2, II 12.3 (2x), II 12.4, II 16.1 (3x), II 16.2 (2x), II 17.3, II 17.5, II 18.3 (2x), II 18.4 (2x),

II 19.1, II 22.2 (2x), II 26, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 28.1, II 29.1, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 1.2 (2x), III 10.1
(2x), III 10.2 (3x), III 12 T, III 12.1 (3x), III 12.2 (4x), III 14.2, III 17 (2x), III 18.1, III 22.4,

III 31.3 (2x), III 33.1, III 34.2 (2x), III 36.1 (2x), III 36.2 (2x), III 45, III 49.1
coming,* futuro, III 26.3. See also future

command (v.), commandare, I 1.4,1 8.3,1 9.1,1 9.2,1 11.2,1 13.2,1 14.2 (2x), I 16.5 (2x), I 34.1,
1 36,138.1,140.5,145.1,155.1,1 55.4,1 57,1 58.3, 1 Pr.2, II 4.1 (3x), II 8.1 (3x), II 11.2, II

16.2, III 5, III 12.3, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 16.3, III 19.1 (2x), III 21.2, III 22.1 (8x), III 22.3
(2x), III 23, III 29, III 30.1 (2x), III 30.2, III 31.4, III 38.1; command (n.), commandamento, I

31.2, II 16.1; co mm and (n.), imperio, imperium (L), I 5.2,1 20 (2x), I 34.1, III 10.1, III 15.1 (L),
III 19.1, III 22.1 (3x), III 22.1 (L), III 22.3 (3x), III 22.4, III 24 T, III 24 (7x), III 30.1;
commander, comandatori, III 15 T, III 15.1 (2x), III 24; commander, imperadore, imperator (L),
115, III 36.2 (L)(2x). For imperio and imperadore, see also emperor; empire; rule; cf imperial

commission,* commission, II 15.1, II 33 T, III 6.7, III 6.8 (2x), III 6.11, III 6.15, III 6.20, III 10.1
(3x), III 14.2, III 31.2; commissioner, commissario, I 8.3, I 38.3, II 33, III 6.20 (2x), III 15.2
(2x), III 16.3 (2x), III 48.2

common benefit, comune benefizio or beneficio, 1 Pr.l, III 28; common good, bene comune, I 4.1, I

9.2 (2x), 19.3, I 58.3, I 58.4, II 2.1 (2x), III 11.1, III 12.2, III 22.4, III 34.3; common utility,
comune utilita, I 2.3,1 16.3,1 49.2, III 34.2. See also utility; cf life, way of

community, communita, II 4.2 (2x), II 19.2 (3x)
company, compagnia, III 15.2, III 34.2. Copartner
compassion, compassione, I 2.3,1 56,1 58.2, III 31.3

conceal, concealed, nascondere, nascoso, nascosto, ascoso, I 3.2, I 53.2 (3x), 1 Pr.l (2x), II 5.2, III
11.1, HI 19.1, III 28 T, III 33.1, III 48.2. Cf covert; hidden
concubine, concubina, III 6.10

condition,* grado, I 40.6. See also degree; favor; rank
condottiere, condottiere, II 17.4, II 18.3

conduct (v.),* governare, I 38.2,140.3,1 40.5, III 44.3. See also govern

confederate, confederato, foederatus (L), II 8.3, II 14 (L), II 14, III 11.2 (2x), III 12.2;

confederation, confederazione, I 58.4,1 59 T, I 59 (2x). O'league
confess, confessare, I 16.3 (2x), I 22, II 1.1, II 2.3, III 1.4, III 6.5; confession, confession, II 1.1, II
18.5, III 1.4

confident, confidently confidente, confidentemente, I 14.3, II 12.3, III 33 T, III 33.1 (6x), III 33.2,
III 36.2, III 38 T, III 38.1, III 38.2 (2x); confidence, confidenza, confidare, I 14.3, I 15, I 24.1, I

29.3, See also trust

426

conform, conformare, I 2.7, I 49.1, I 52.3 (2x), III 22.4, III 22.5 (2x), III 34.3; conformable,
confonno, I 9.2, III 9.3; conformity, confomiita, disfonnita, disformo, I 59, III 9.2, III 39.2; to not
conform, disformare, I 16.5,1 18.1,1 37.3, II 16 T, III 10.1
conjecture, coniettura, conietturare, I 12.1,1 18.4,1 28,1 31.2,1 52.3,1 55.2,1 58.4, II 1.1, III 6.4,
III 6.5 (2x), III 16.3, III 18.1, III 43, III 48.2

conquer, conquered, vincere,* vinto,* vinco (L), I 9.4,1 15,1 15 (L), I 18.3, I 19.2, I 21.3, I 22, I

24.1.1 29.2 (2x), I 31.1, II 1.2, II 4.1, II 8.1 (3x), II 8.4, II 10.1 (6x), II 10.3, II 12.1 (3x), II

12.4 (3x), II 14 T, II 16.2, II 19.2, II 19.2 (L), II 20, II 22.1, II 22.2 (2x), II 23.2, II 23.2 (L)
(2x), II 25.1, II 27 T, III 6.19, III 10.3 (2x), III 12.1, III 13.1 (3x), III 13.3 (2x), III 16.2, III

30.1 (3x), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3, III 33.1, III 36.2 (4x), III 37.1, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 38.1 (2x),
III 44.3, III 48.1, III 48.2; conqueror, vincitore, II 19.2, III 31.2. For vincere, see also defeat

conscience, conscienza, I 27.1, I 55.2, III 6.16; conscious, coscienza, II 15.1; consciousness,
conscientia (L), II 14

consent, consentire, acconsentire, consentimento, I 9.1, I 17.1, I 36, I 38.3, I 53, II 8.3, II 28.2, III
6.3, III 6.20, III 7, III 19.1, III 21.3, III 29, III 43

conspire, congiurare, I 16.4,1 16.5,1 33.1, II 1.1, II 4.1, II 13.2, II 26, III 6.1, III 6.2 (4x), III 6.3
(4x), III 6.4, III 6.14 (2x), III 6.15 (4x), III 6.16 (3x), III 6.20 (4x), III 11.2 (2x), III 49.1;
conspire, conspirare, III 6.19 (2x); conspiracy, congiura, I 2.3,1 5.4,1 33.5, II 2.2, II 20, II 26, II

32.1 (2x), II 32.2, III 5, III 6 T, III 6.1, III 6.2 (5x), III 6.3 (5x), III 6.4, III 6.5 (3x), III 6.6
(4x), III 6.7, III 6.9 (2x), III 6.11, III 6.13, III 6.14, III 6.15, III 6.16 (5x), III 6.19 (5x), III 6.20
(lOx), III 26.2, III 49.1. For congiurare, cf swear; for conspirare, cf plot; for congiura, see also
league

constitute, constitute, I 2.3, I 4.2, I 5.1 (2x), I 9.2, I 11.1, I 49.3, I 55.6; constitution,
constituzione, I 2.6 (2x), I 6.4,1 58.2. See also institute; place
consul, Consolo, consul (L), I 2.7 (3x), I 5.2, I 9.2, I 13.2 (8x), I 14.2 (5x), I 16.4, I 18.2, I 20, I

25.1 34.4 (3x), I 34.4 (L), I 35 (4x), I 36 (5x), I 37.2 (2x), I 39.2 (6x), I 40.2, I 40.3, I 40.4, I

40.4 (L), 140.7,143,147.1,1 50 (4x), I 52.3,1 53.2,1 53.4, I 58.2, I 58.3, I 60, II 2.3, II 2.4,

II 6.2 (2x), II 10.2, II 11.2 (2x), II 16.1 (2x), II 18.2, II 18.3, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 26, II 33 (6x),

III 6.19, III 6.20 (2x), III 7, III 12.3, III 13.1, III 16.2, III 17 (2x), III 18.2 (3x), III 22.1, III

22.4 (3x), III 24, III 25 (2x), III 27.1, III 33.1 (4x), III 35.1, III 36.2, III 39.2 (5x), III 40.1, III
40.2, III 41 (2x), III 42 (2x), III 45 (2x), III 47 (3x), III 48.1; consular, consolare, consularis (L),
I 13.1,1 14.1,1 39.2 (2x), I 40.5, I 47.1 (3x), I 48, II 2.4, II 24.3, II 28.1, III 1.2, III 15.1, III

15.1 (L), III 30.1; consulate, consolato, consulatus (L), I 5.4, I 18.3 (2x), I 35, I 37.2, I 47.1
(2x), I 60 T, I 60 (3x), II 16.1, III 16.2, III 24 (2x), III 25, III 34.4, III 38.1 (L)

contemplative, contemplativo, II 2.2

content, contentare, contento, I 1.4,1 2.3,1 5.2,1 8.3,1 13.1 (2x), I 16.3,1 16.5 (3x), I 22, I 39.2, I

43.147.1 (2x), 155.3, II 19.2 (2x), II 21.2, III 4 (2x), III 6.1, III 6.4, III 6.10, III 25, III 30.1,
III 42; contentment, contentezza, II 21.2, III 22.3; discontent, discontented, male contento, mal
contentezza, I 37.1, 1 Pr.3, III 2, III 6.4 (3x), III 27.3

contention, contenzione, contentio (L), I 37.1,1 37.3,1 40.2,1 47.1 (L), III 12.1, III 24
contract (v.), contrarre, I 59, III 13.1

convenient, conveniente, I 9.4,1 16.5,1 50, III 35.1, III 49.4; conveniently, commodamente, I 23.2,
III 48.1; convenience, commodita, II 17.3; inconvenience, inconveniente, I 6.3 (3x), I 6.4, I 12.2,
I 16.4,1 18.3 (2x), I 18.4,1 23.2,1 33 T, I 33.2 (2x), 140.5,1 45.3,146,1 50, II 26, II 30.3, III
6.12 (2x), III 6.14, III 10.1,111 10.3,111 11.1,111 16.2,11121.3,11121.4, III 24 (2x), III 27.3, III
28, III 29, III 37.1; inconvenience, scommodo, II 32.1. For conveniente, see also fitting; suitable;
for commodita and scommodo, see also advantage; occasion

427

corrupt, corrompere, corrotto, corrumpo (L), I 1.5,1 2.1,1 2.2,1 6.2,1 8.3 (2x), I 10.3,1 10.5 (2x), I

10.6.1 11.3,1 16.2,1 16.6 (2x), I 17 T, I 17.1 (4x), I 17.2 (2x), I 17.3 (2x), I 18 T, I 18.1 (3x),

I 18.2,1 18.3 (2x), I 18.5,1 29.3,1 30.1 (2x), I 33.2,1 35 (2x), I 37.1,140.4 (L), 142 T, 142, I

47.3.1 48,1 49.1,1 49.3,1 52.1,1 55 T, I 55.1, I 55.2, I 55.4, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 19.1 (2x),

II 19.2, II 22.1, III 1.2, III 1.3 (3x), III 6.19, III 8.1 (3x), III 8.2 (4x), III 11.1 (2x), III 11.2, III

16.2, III 22.5, III 28, III 30.1, III 33.1, III 49.4; corruption, (in)corruzione, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 16.2
(2x), I 17.1 (3x), I 17.2 (2x), I 17.3 (2x), I 18.1 (2x), I 18.2, I 18.4, I 18.5, I 29.3, I 55.2, III

1.3, III 6.19, III 11.2, III 34.4; corruption, corruttela, I 55.3 (3x), I 55.4, III 27.3; corruptible,
corrottibile, III 11.1; noncorrupt, non corrotto, I 34.2 (2x); uncorrupt, incorrotto, incorrupt us (L), I

12.1 (2x), I 47.1 (L), I 55.3,1 58.2, III 17

council, concilio, consiglio, I 6.1,1 7.1,1 8.2,1 34.3,1 49 3 (2x), I 50 T, I 50 (4x), I 52.2,1 55.2, II

4.2, II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1 (2x), III 30.1. See also counsel

counsel (v.), consigliare, I 7.1, I 9.2, I 11.2 (2x), I 38.2 (2x), I 44.2, II 10.3, II 15.1, II 22.1, II

23.3, II 23.4, II 24.2, II 27.1, II 33 (5x), III 5, III 11.2, III 16.1 (3x), III 28, III 30.1, III 32, III
34.4 (2x), III 35 T, III 35.1, III 35.2 (6x), III 35.3, III 41; counsel (n.), consiglio, consilium (L), I
1.6 (2x), I 2.4,1 33.3,1 34.4,1 36,1 38.3,1 59, II 10.3, II 12.1 (2x), II 15.1 (L), II 23.2 (2x), II
26, II 33, III 6.18, III 6.20, III 9.3, III 15.2 (2x), III 18.3, III 28, III 34.4, III 35.1 (4x), III 35.2
(4x), III 35.3 (2x), III 40.2, III 41, III 48.2; counselor, consigliere, III 6.16; counselors,
consigliatori, III 35.1. For consiglio, see also council

country, paese, I 1.3,1 1.4 (8x), I 1.5,123.2,138.1,155.3,11 2.3 (2x), II 2.4 (2x), II 4.1, II 6.1, II
7, II 8 T, II 8.2 (5x), II 8.4 (5x), II 10.1, II 12.3 (3x), II 12.4 (2x), II 16.2 (2x), II 17.3 (2x), II

18.2, II 18.3, II 19.1 (2x), II 20 (2x), II 22.2, II 24.4, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.15, III 10.1, III 10.2
(2x), III 10.4 (2x), III 33.2, III 35.1 (2x), III 37.4, III 39.1, III 39.2 (5x), III 43

cousins, cugini, I 27.1

covert, coperto* II 13.2. Cf conceal; hidden

cowardice, cowardly, vilta, vile, invilire, I 6.3, I 10.1, I 27.1, I 29.1, I 53.2 (3x), I 57, II 2.2, II

12.4, II 14 (2x), II 18.2 (2x), II 19.2, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 26, II 30.2, II 32.1, III 6.14 (2x), III
31.1, III 31.2, III 31.3 (4x), III 37.3, III 38.2, III 48.2. See also v ile

crazy, pazzo, I 10.1,1 58.4, III 2; craziness, pazzia, I 58.4, II 25.1, III 2 T. Cf insane; mad
create, recreate, creare, ricieare, I 1.4,1 3 T, I 5.4,1 8.1, I 13.1 (2x), I 18.2, I 18.3, I 18.5 (2x), I
25 (2x), I 33.1,1 34.1,1 34.2, I 35 T, I 35 (2x), I 37.1, I 39.2 (3x), I 40.2 (2x), I 40.4, I 40.5
(4x), 141 (2x), 144.1 (2x), 147.1 (3x), I 47.2,1 49.1 (4x), I 49.3,1 50 (3x), II 29.1 (2x), III 1.2
(2x), III 15.1, III 25 (2x), III 28, III 30.1, III 33.1, III 34.4 (3x); creation, creazione, I 2.7, I 3.2,

14.1.14.2.1 7.1, I 13.1, I 17.1, I 33.5, I 34.4, I 35 T, I 35 (2x), I 37.1, I 40 T, I 40.1 (2x), I

40.2.140.3.140.7.147.1.149.1.149.2, III 15.1, III 34.4

credit, credito, I 52.1 (2x), III 1.4 (2x); credit, fede, I 12.1. For fede, see also faith; pledge; vouch; cf
trust

credulity, credulita, I 12.1; incredulous, incredulo, I 12.1. Cf believe

criminal, scelerato, I 10.4 (2x), I 40.7, I 45.1, II 2.2, II 23.3, III 29; criminal, criminalmente, II
21.2; criminality, sceleratezza, III 32 (2x)
crucify, crucifire, 131.1

cruel, cruelty, crudele, crudeltade, crudelitas (L), I 10.5 (2x), I 16.4, I 18.5, I 26, I 40.2, I 41 T, I
44.2 (L)(2x), 147.2,1 58.4, II 2.1, II 8.1, II 23.2, III 5, III 6.20, III 19.1 (3x), III 20, III 21.1,

III 21.4 (3x), III 22.3, III 28, III 32, III 41

crush, opprimere, I 1.4,1 6.4,1 7.1,1 7.2,1 27.1,130 T, I 30.1,1 34.4,1 38.1,1 39.2 (2x), 140 T, I

52.2, I 52.3, I 58.2, II 2.1, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 6.1, II 9 (2x), II 20 (2x), II 24.2, II 25.1 (2x), II

25.2, III 2, III 3, III 6.3, III 6.5, III 6.13, III 6.19 (2x), III 6.20 (3x), III 8.1, III 8.2, III 10.2, III

428

12.2, III 17, III 28, III 31.1, III 31.3, III 35.1; crushing, oppressione, II 24.2, II 32.2. See also
oppress

cult, culto, I 11.4,1 12.1. Cf hidden

custom, costume, I 10.4 (2x), I 12.2,1 18.1 (2x), I 31.2,1 36,1 37.2, I 40.3, I 42, I 49.1, I 55.3, I

58.3, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2, II 4.2, II 5.2, II 19.1, II 19.2 (3x), III 1.3, III 34.2, III 43 (2x), III 46 T;
custom, consuetudine, I 3.2,1 36,1 37 T, I 43, 1 Pr.2, III 5, III 9.1, III 22.3, III 24; customary,
consueto, I 23.4, I 34.3, II 9, III 22.3; customary, usitato, I 43; customarily, solere, II 24.2;
uncustomary, inusitato, 140.3. For consueto, solere, usitato, see also accustom

danger, pericolo, periculo, periculum (L), I 1.1,1 2.1 (2x), I 3.2,1 10.1,1 13.2 (2x), I 17.3, I 19.4, I

20.1 23 T, I 23.1, I 27.2, I 31.1, I 31.2, I 32 (3x), I 33.1 (2x), I 33.3, I 33.5, I 34.2, I 34.3, I

45.3.1 46 (2x), 147.1,1 47.2,147.3,1 50,1 52.3,1 53.1,1 53.3,1 57 (2x), I 58.1 (L), I 59,1 60,

II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.4 (4x), II 18.1, II 20 T, II 23.3, II 24.2, II 28.2 (2x), II 30.2, II 32.1, II

32.2, II 33, III 1.3 (2x), III 2 (2x), III 6.2 (8x), III 6.4 (4x), III 6.6 (2x), III 6.7, III 6.8, III 6.9
(3x), III 6.10, III 6.18 (2x), III 6.19 (lx), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 11.2 (2x), III

16.2, III 21.4, III 22.4, III 25, III 33.1 (2x), III 35 T (2x), III 35.1, III 35.2 (4x), III 35.3 (3x),

III 36.2, III 37.4 (2x), III 39.2, III 47.1; dangerous, pericoloso, periculoso, 1 Pr.l, I 2.1, I 8.1, I

29.3.131.1.1 33.3 (2x), I 34.3,1 35,1 46,149.3,1 50,1 52.2 (2x), I 52.3, II 8.1 (3x), II 8.3, II

12.4, II 28 T, II 31 T, II 31.1, II 32.1 (2x), II 32.2, II 33, III 1.6, III 2, III 4, III 6.1 (3x), III 6.2
(2x), III 6.4 (2x), III 6.15, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 7 (2x), III 8.2, III 13.3, III 16.2 (2x), III 16.3,
III 17 (2x), III 22.4, III 28 (3x), III 30.1, III 30.2, III 33.2, III 34.4, III 35.1, III 44.1, III 49.1

daughter, figliuola, I 11.1, II 6.2, II 28.2, III 4 (2x), III 6.17, III 6.19, III 28, III 34.3. Cf child; son
day,* giornata, II 17.1. See also battle

death, morte, mors (L), 14.1,1 7.2,19.1,1 9.2,1 9.5,1 10.4 (2x), I 10.5,1 10.6 (2x), I 14.2,1 17.2,
1 22,128,1 31.1,1 33.3,145.2, I 46, I 53.1 (2x), I 56, I 57, I 58.1 (3x), I 58.2, II 2.1 (2x), II

10.1 (2x), II 12.2 (2x), II 17.1, II 17.4 (2x), II 19.2, II 22.2, II 30.4, III 1.3 (4x), III 3 (3x), III 4
(2x), III 6.2 (L), III 6.2, III 6.4, III 6.15, III 6.18, III 6.20 (3x), III 7 (2x), III 8.1 (2x), III 13.1,
III 13.3, III 15.1, III 18.1, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 22.6, III 30.1, III 45, III 49.1, III 49.2; death,
morire, 153.1. See also die; kill

deceive, deceived, ingannare, ingannarsi, ingannato, DL (2x), 14.1,1 10.1,1 10.3,1 18.3,1 22, I 32,

I 33.5, I 35, I 36, I 41, I 46, I 47 T (2x), I 47.1, I 47.2, I 47.3 (5x), I 48 (2x), I 53 T, I 53.1
(2x), I 58.3, 1 Pr.2 (3x), 1 Pr.3, II 1.2, II 10.1 (2x), II 13.1 (3x), II 14 T, II 17.5, II 20, II 22.1,

II 22.2, II 23.4, II 25.1, II 25.2 (2x), II 27.1, III 3 (2x), III 4 (2x), III 6.4 (2x), III 6.8, III 8.2
(2x), III 10.1, III 12.2, III 22.1, III 34.4 (2x), III 43; deception, inganno, I 3.2,1 20, I 28, I 47.2
(2x), 147.3 (2x), 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 4.1, II 13.1, II 13.2 (2x), II 18.3, II 22.1 (2x), II 23.4,
II 28.2, III 6.7, III 6.19 (2x), III 14.3, III 48 T; undeceived, sgannarsi, I 50

decide, deliberare, diliberare, 1 Pr.l, I 9.2 (2x), I 15, I 16.5, I 18.3 (2x), I 21.1, I 31.1, I 33.1, I

34.2.1 34.3,1 38 T, I 38.1, I 38.4, I 40.3, I 40.4, I 51 (2x), I 53.5, I 59, II 2.1 (2x), II 4.2, II

15.1 (6x), II 15.2 (2x), II 16.1, II 22.1, II 23.4, II 26, II 27.2, II 28.2, II 33, III 6.10 (2x), III
6.13, III 6.17, III 10.1, III 10.2 (3x), III 13.3, III 18.1 (2x), III 18.3 (3x), III 20, III 34.3, III

44.1, III 44.2, III 44.3; decision, deliberazione, diliberazione, I 6.3,1 9.4, I 11.3, I 23.2, I 27.1, I

33.1.1 38.1 (2x), I 39.2,147.1,1 50,1 52.2,1 52.3,1 53.1,1 53.4 (2x), I 55.1 (3x), I 55.2,1 57,

I Pr.3, II 4.2, II 8.1, II 15 T, II 15.1 (4x), II 22.1, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 33, III 6.2, III 10.1, III

11.1 , III 18.1 , III 24 (2x), III 32, III 35.1 (2x), III 41 , III 44.1 , III 44.3. See also deliberate
deed,* opera, I 5.2, I 24.1 (4x), I 24.2 (2x), I 33.2, I 53.5, II 11.2, III 1.2 (2x), III 1.3, III 3, III

8.1, III 12.1 (2x), III 15.2, III 28, III 30 T, III 34.2 (3x). See also work; cf do

defeat (v.), defeated, rompere, * rotto* I 31.2 (2x), I 47.2,1 53.2, I 53.3, I 53.5, I 59 (2x), II 4.1,

II 10.1, II 12.3, II 12.4 (3x), II 15.2, II 16.2 (3x), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 27.1,

429

II 27.4, II 29.2, III 9.1, III 10.2, III 10.4 (2x), III 18.1 (2x), III 18.2 (2x), III 19.1, III 25, III

34.3, III 35.1, III 35.3, III 43, III 48.1; defeat (v.), vincere* 1 Pr.l, II 16.1, II 18.3, II 18.4, II

19.1, II 33, III 32; defeat (n.), rotta, I 11.1,1 15 (2x), 147.2,153.2, II 1.1 (2x), II 2.3, II 6.2, II

10.3, II 12.4, II 13.2, II 30.4 (3x), II 32.2 (2x), III 17, III 31.2 (3x), III 31.3 (2x), III 37.4. For
vincere, see also conquer

defend, difendere, I 1.1,1 1.4,1 2.3,1 5.2,1 6.2,1 7.1 (2x), I 7.3,1 10.4 (2x), I 10.5,1 12.2, I 29.2,

I 29.3 (2x), I 34.4,1 37.2 (2x), I 37.3, I 38.1 (3x), I 38.2 (2x), I 39.2, I 40.6(2x), I 45.1, I 46
(2x), I 49.1,1 53.5,1 58.1 (2x), I 59, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1 (3x), II 2.2, II 2.4, II 4.2, II 8.2,

II 9 (9x), II 10.1 (4x), II 11.1, II 11.2 (2x), II 12.1, II 12.4 (3x), II 13.2 (2x), II 17.1 (5x), II

17.2 (3x), II 17.3 (2x), II 17.4, II 17.5 (2x), II 18.3, II 19.1, II 20 (4x), II 22.1, II 24.1 (3x), II

24.2 (5x), II 24.4 (4x), II 29.1 (2x), II 29.2, II 30.2 (2x), II 32.1, III 6.8, III 8.1, III 11.1, III

12.1 (2x), III 12.2, III 12.3, III 15.1, III 16.2, III 16.3, III 20, III 28, III 30.1, III 30.2 (3x), III

31.1, III 32, III 34.2, III 34.3, III 35.2, III 37.3 (2x), III 37.4 (4x), III 41 T (2x), III 41 (3x), III
43; defender, difensore, I 23.1, I 45.1, II 10.1, II 14, II 32.1, III 8.1 (2x), III 12.2; defense,
difesa, difensione, defensivo, defensa (L), I 1.1, I 1.3, I 6.4, I 7.2 (2x), I 15 (L), I 16.2, I 21.1, I

27.1.1 33.5,138.2,1 56,1 57,11 1.1,112.1,11 2.2 (2x), II 9 (2x), II 10.1, II 11.2 (2x), II 17.1,
II 17.1, II 19.1, II 20 (2x), II 24.4, II 25.1, II 27.2, II 29.2, III 12.1 (2x), III 16.2, III 22.1, III
30 T, III 30.2, III 31.1, III 37.4; undefended, indifeso, III 37.3

degree,* grado, I 2.1 (2x), I 2.3 (2x), I 2.7,1 18.1. See also condition; favor; rank

deliberate, diliberare, I 6.1 III 6.7, III 41, III 44.1, III 44.3; deliberation, diliberazione, I 6.3, II

23.3, See also decide

delight, dilettarsi, delizia, dilettazione, diletti, 1 Pr.2,1 27.1, 1 Pr.3, II 19.2, II 20, III 2 (2x)
demonstrate, dimostrare, 12.7,1 3.1,14.1,1 6.4,1 7.1,1 9.2,1 12.1,1 16.1,1 27.2,1 44.1,149.1,1

53.2, I 57, II 1.1, II 3 (2x), II 13.2, II 15.2, II 17.4, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 21.2, II 24.2, II 27.1
(2x), II 29.1 (2x), II 31.1, III 1.6, III 6.15, III 14.1, III 15.2 (3x), III 20, III 37.4;
demonstration, dimostrazione, I 40.2,1 52.1

deserve, meritare, mereor (L), DL, I 2.6, I 4.2, I 8.1, I 9.2, I 9.5, I 10.1, I 10.4, I 10.6, I 34.3, I

47.1 (4x), 1 Pr.l (2x), 1 Pr.3, II 19.2, II 23.2, II 23.4 (L), II 27.1, II 29.1, II 33 (3x), III 2, III

6.3, III 6.11, III 10.1, III 16.2 (2x), III 18.1, III 19.1 (2x), III 32, III 33.2, III 34.2, III 34.4, III
41, III 49.2, III 49.3, III 49.4; deservedly, meritamente, I 47.1; undeservedly, immeritamente, III

16.2, See also merit

desire (n.), desiderio, desiderium (L), 1 Pr.l, I 4.1,1 5.2 (2x), I 6.2,1 9.4,1 10.6,1 16.5 (2x), I 37.1
(2x), I 39.1,140.5 (3x), 140.7 (2x), 144.2,1 45.1,1 46,147.1,1 58.1 (L), I 58.2, II 3, II 10.1,
II 15.1, II 32.2, III 6.2 (2x), III 6.3 (3x), III 7, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 22.3, III 48.1, III 48.2;
desire (v.), desired, desiderare, desiderato, desidero (L), DL, I 5.2 (2x), I 5.4 (2x), I 6.1, I 6.2, I

8.3.1 9.1,1 9.4 (2x), I 10.6 (2x), I 16.5 (5x), I 25 (3x), I 37.1 (2x), I 37.2, I 40.4 (L), I 40.5, I
53 T, I 53.1,1 53.4,158.1 (2x), I 58.2 (3x), 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 9, II 14, II 19.2, II 22.1 (2x),
II 23.2, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 2, III 6.1 (2x), III 6.2, III 6.10, III 8.2, III 12.1 (2x), III 12.2, III

16.3, III 20, III 21.2, III 21.3 (2x), III 22.1, III 44.1; desired, desideroso, I 37.2; desirable,
desiderabile, II 2.3, III 22.4, III 25; desirous, desideroso, I 8.1,1 38.3, II 4.2, III 8.1, III 18.3, III

19.1, III 21.2, III 37.4

devices, industrie, II 1.2, II 32.1, III 6.19, III 27.4. See also industry
devotion, divozione, I 12.1,1 12.2, II 27.4

dictator, Dittatore, dictator (L), I 5.4 (3x), I 8.1 (4x), I 13.1, I 31.2, I 33.1, I 33.5, I 34.1 (4x), I

34.2, I 34.3, I 34 4 (2x), I 35 (4x), I 40.7, I 49.1, I 49.3, I 50 (2x), I 58.2, II 29.1, II 33, III

10.1 (L), III 14.3 (3x), III 15.1, III 25, III 28 (2x), III 30.1 (2x), III 33.1, III 47 (2x);
dictatorial, dittatorio, I 34 T, I 34.1 (2x); dictatorship, dittatura, dictatura (L), I 5.4, I 30.2, I

34.2, III 25, III 31.1 (L)

430

die, dead, morire, mono, I 2.1, I 3.2, I 10.4 (2x), I 11.5 (2x), I 13.2, I 15, I 17.1 (4x), I 17.3, I

22.1.1 29.2 (2x), I 43,1 58.2, II 10.2, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.4 (4x), II 18.3 (2x),
II 22.1, II 22.2 (2x), II 29.2, II 30.3, III 2, III 6.2, III 6.11 (2x), III 6.18 (2x), III 6.20 (2x), III
12.3,111 13.1 (2x), III 17,11130.1 (2x), III 41.1, ID 45.1. See also death; kill

dignity, dignitci, degnita, dignitas (L), I 6.2,1 13.2,147.3,1 55.6,1 58.3, II 21.1, III 22.4 (L), III 31
T, III 31.4. Cf disdain; indignation; worthy
disciples, discepoli, III 6.16

discipline, discipline, discipline (L), II 16.2, II 19.2, II 29.1, III 22.3, III 36.2, III 38.1 (L)
discord, discordant, discordare, discordia, discordo, I 1.4, I 8.1, I 10.5, I 46, I 50 (2x), II 19.2, II

21.2, III 8.2

discourse (v.), discorrere, DL, I 1.1,1 1.6,1 2.2, I 2.7 (2x), I 4.1, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.1, I 6.4, I 7.5, I

12.2.1 14.1,1 16.2,1 16.6,1 29.1,1 29.3,1 31.1,1 33.5, I 35 (2x), I 37.3 (2x), I 40.1, I 47.3, I

56.1 58.3, II 1.3, II 4.2, II 6.1 (2x), II 8.1, II 10.3, II 13.2, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 19.1, II 19.2, II
20, II 21.1, II 22.1, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 25.1, II 26, II 29.2, II 31.2, II 32.2; discourse (n.),
discorso, DL, 1 Pr.l, I 1.6,1 16.5,1 18.1,1 19.3,129.3,1 37.1,140.1,1 40.7 (2x), 148,1 49.2, I

52.1.1 53.1,1 55.5, 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 1.1, II 17.6, II 20, II 23.4, II 25.1, II 30.5, II 31.1, III 1.6, III
3, III 6.4 (2x), III 6.11, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 9.3, III 9.4, III 10.1, III 11.1, III 11.2, III

12.1, III 12.2, III 16.3, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 22.6, III 27.3, III 28, III 33.1, III
34.4, III 35.1, III 37.1, III 37.4, III 38.1, III 40.1, III 40.2. For discorrere, see also discuss; review

discuss, discorrere, I 33.2, I 55.1; discuss, ragionare, I 13.2, II 4.2; discussion, ragionamento, III
6.5, III 6.16. For discorrere, see also discourse; review; for ragionare, see also reason; for
ragionamento, see also argument; reason
disdain, sdegno, I 34.4,1 36 T. See also indignation; (/dignity; worthy

dispute (v.), disputant* I 5.4,1 11.2,1 29.1,140.1,140.3,1 46,1 58.4,1 60 (2x), II 1.3, II 12.1, II

16.3, II 17.1, II 17.5, II 24.2, II 27.1, III 6.18, III 16.1, III 27.2, III 42; dispute (n.), disputa,
disputazione, I 22,1 37.2,1 40.2,1 53.1, II 15.1, II 15.2; disputable, disputabile, III 22.4

dissension, dissensione, I 5.2,1 6.4,1 7.5, III 21.4
divine, divino, I 11.4,1 12.1, II 29.1
diviner, indovino, I 12.1,1 56

do,* operare, 1 Pr.2,1 33.2, III 43.1. See also work; cf deed
doctor, dottore, III 1.2. (/physician

dominate, dominare, dominor (L), I 5.2 (2x), I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2x), II 4.2, III 6.3 (2x), III 12.1
dominion, dominio, I 6.3, I 6.4, I 12.2, II 1.2, II 2.1 (2x), II 4.1, II 4.2 (2x), II 18.3, II 19.2, II

21.2, II 27.3 (2x), III 18.3, III 44.3 (3x)

doubt (v.), dubitare, dubito (L), I 5.1,1 11.2,1 22,1 57, II 5.2, II 14.1 (L), III 7; doubt (n.), dubbio,

I 38.4 (2x), II 32.2, III 16.3; doubt, dubitazione, III 22.4; doubtful, dubbio, I 5.2, II 10.2, II
15.1, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.15, III 17, III 44.2; without doubt, sanza or senza dubbio, DL, I 1.4, I

5.2.16.4.17.1.1 10.6,1 11.3,1 12.1,1 19.2,1 30.1,145.3,158.3,11 1.1, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 12.4,

II 15.1, II 19.2, II 21.2 (4x), II 24.3, III 1.5, III 4, III 8.2, III 11.2, III 27.2. For dubitare, see also
fear; hesitate; suspect

duty,* ufficio, offizio, I 14.2,1 40.6, 1 Pr.3. See also office

earth, terra, II 12.2 (3x), II 32.1 (4x), III 2.1, III 12.3, III 25.1. See also ground; land; town
education, educazione, 14.1 (2x), I 11.1, II 2.2 (2x), III 27.2, III 30.1, III 31.3, III 43.1, III 46.1
effect, ejfetto, 13.2,14.1,14.2,15.2,16.1 (2x), 17.1 (2x), I 9.2 (2x), I 14.2,1 19.4,120 T, 135, I

37.1.143.1 58.2,1 58.3,160 (2x), II 4.2, II 5.2, II 17.4, II 17.5, II 24.2, II 24.3, III 1.2, III 1.3
(2x), III 1.5, III 1.6 (2x), III 2.1, III 5.1, III 6.11, III 6.15, III 13.1, III 14 T, III 14.1, III 18.3,

431

Ill 21 T, III 21.1 (2x), III 21.4, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.4 (2x), III 22.5, III 25.1 (2x), III 28.1,
III 37.1, III 37.3, III 43.1, III 49.3

effeminate, effeminato, I 6.4,1 19.1,1 19.3,1 21.3, II 2.2, III 10.1, III 46.1
efficacious, efficacio, II 29.1, III 6.11, III 14.3; efficacy, efficacia, III 38.1

elect, eleggere, I 20, I 34.4 (2x), II 8.1, II 29.2; election, elezione, I 13.1, I 35, III 25.1, III 34.4.
See also choose; levy

elephants, elefanti, II 17.5 (2x), II 18.4, III 14.3 (2x)

eliminate, spegnere, I 1.4 (2x), I 2.3 (3x), I 7.3 (2x), I 10.5, I 16.6, I 17.1 (3x), I 30.1, I 33.3, I

33.5.1 37.3,1 39.2,140.4,1 40.5 (3x), I 40.7 (2x), I 43, I 46, I 47.1, I 52.3, I 55.5, 1 Pr.l, II

1.1 (2x), II 1.2, II 2.2, II 4.2 (2x), II 5 T, II 5.1 (5x), II 5.2 (2x), II 8.1 (2x), II 19.2, II 23.2, II

23.3, II 23.4 (2x), II 24.1, III 1.3, III 1.4 (2x), III 3.1, III 24.1, III 29.1, III 30 T, III 30.1 (4x),
III 33.1

emperor, imperadore, I 10.4 (4x), I 10.5, I 29.2, I 30.1, I 58.2, II 11.1, II 19.2 (5x), II 22.1, II

30.2 (2x), III 6.3, III 6.8, III 6.10, III 6.11 (2x), III 31.3, III 43.1 (2x). See also command

empire, imperio, 1 Pr.2,1 1.1,11.2,11.3 (2x), I 1.5, I 2.7, I 4.1, I 5.3, I 6.3 (2x), I 9.4, I 10.3, I

10.4 (3x), I 11.1,1 12.2,1 13.1,1 17.3,1 21.3, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 33.1 (2x), I 34.3, I 39.2 (2x), I

49.2.1 50, 1 Pr.2 (3x), 1 Pr.3, II 1 T, II 1.1 (2x), II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2.2 (3x), II 3 (3x), II 4.1 (5x),
II 4.2 (2x), II 8.1 (3x), II 8.2, II 8.4, II 9, II 12.1, II 13.1 (3x), II 19.1, II 19.2 (5x), II 21.1, II
30.2 (2x), II 30.3 (2x), III 6.1, III 6.3, III 6.10, III 6.11. See also command; rule; cf imperial

enroll,* scrivere, III 30.1 (2x), III 30.2 (4x). See also write

enterprise, impresa, 1 Pr.2,1 11.1,1 11.4,1 13 T, I 13.1 (3x), I 14.1,1 18.5, I 23.4, I 27.2, I 43, I

53.5 (3x), II 13, II 4.1, II 9, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 22.1 (2x), II 25.1, II 31.1, II 31.2 (2x), II 32.1
(2x), III 6.1, III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.16, III 6.17, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 8.2 (4x), III 9.3, III

16.1 (2x), III 35.1, III 35.2, III 37.3. See also campaign

envy, envious, invidia, invidiare, invido, 1 Pr.l, I 8.1, I 24.2, I 40.4, I 52.2, I 53.3, 1 Pr.l (2x), II

13.2 (2x), II 14, II 19.2, II 22.1, III 1.2, III 5.1, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 30 T, III 30.1
(lOx)

ephors, efori, I 9.4 (2x), I 18.5
episcopal, episcopale, I 54. O'bishop
epoch, secolo, 1 Pr.3. See also century

equal, equally, equate, equalmente, agguagliare, aequus (L), aequalis (L), I 6.1,1 6.2,1 17.3,1 40.4, I
58.2, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 12.1, II 13.2 (L), II 23.2, II 32.1 (2x), III 16.1 (2x), III

19.1, III 22.4 (L), III 23.1; equality, equalitd, I 2.3,1 6.2 (2x), I 55 T, I 55.3,1 55.4,1 55.5 (2x),

I 55.6, II 4.1, III 3.1; inequality, inequalitd, I 17.3,1 55.6

err (v.), errare, I 24.2, I 29.3, I 36, I 42, I 58.2 (2x), I 58.3 (2x), 1 Pr.2, II 11.2, II 19.1, II 23.3
(2x), II 27.1, II 29.1, II 31.2, III 9.1 (2x), III 18.1, III 34.4, III 49.1 (2x), III 49.2 (3x); error
(n.), errore, DL (3x), 1 Pr.2, I 28 (2x), I 29.1, I 29.3 (2x), I 31 T, I 31.1, I 31.2 (2x), I 33.1, I

33.2 (2x), I 33.3, I 36 (2x), I 39.2 (2x), I 40.1 (2x), I 40.3, I 40.4, I 40.5 (2x), I 40.7 (3x), I
49.1,1 52.2 (2x), I 53.2,1 58.2 (2x), 158.4 (2x), 159, II 1.2 (2x), II 11.1 (2x), II 18.3, II 18.5,

II 19.2 (2x), II 27.4 (2x), II 31.2, II 32.1, II 33, III 1.4, III 5.1, III 6.8, III 6.12, III 6.13, III
6.14 (2x), III 6.18, III 10.1 (3x), III 16.2, III 18.1 (5x), III 18.2, III 21.3, III 27.2, III 29.1, III

32.1, III 33.1, III 34.4, III 35.3, III 48 T, III 48.1
eternal, etemo, I 27.2,1 29.1, II 5.1. Cf. sempiternal

evil, male* 1 Pr.2,1 2.3 (2x), I 8.3,1 9.2,1 10.3,1 18.4,1 26, I 29.3, I 33.2, I 33.5 (3x), I 37.1, I

37.3 (2x), 144.2,145.3,146,158.4 (2x), II 2.1, II 12.2, II 15.2, II 20, II 24.1, II 24.3, II 28.1,
II 29.1, III 1.3, III 1.4 (3x), III 3.1 (3x), III 6.14, III 11.1, III 37.1, III 37.3. See also bad; ill; cf
malevolent

exalt, esaltare, I 10.5, III 21.3, III 31.1; exaltation, esaltazione, I 37.1, II 2.2, II 19 T, III 21.4

432

example, esemplo, essemplum, exemplum (L), passim

excellent, eccellente, I 1.4,1 19 T, I 19.2 (2x), I 20,1 21.1,1 28, 1 34.3, 1 Pr.2, II 5.1, II 18.2 (2x),

II 19.2, II 22.1 (2x), II 24.4, II 31.2, III 22.1, III 30.1, III 31 T, III 31.1

excess, excessive, excesso, eccessivo,* I 19.4,140.7,1 55.4 (2x), II 2.1, II 4.1, III 1.3, III 19.1, III

21.3, III 22.3, III 26.2

excuse (n .), scusa, 19.2,19.5,1 10.6 (2x), 129.1 (2x), I 29.3,141,1 52.2, II 19.1, II 19.2, III 2.1,

III 6.18 (2x), III 44.3; excuse (v.), scasare I 9.2 (2x), 145.2 (2x), II 16.3

execute, esequire, 133.1,149.3, II 2.1, II 15.1, III 1.3, III 6.2 (2x), III 6.7 (3x), III 6.11, III 6.12
(3x), III 6.14, III 6.19 (3x), III 6.20, III 30.1; execution, esecuzione, I 7.2, 1 49.3, III 13 (5x), III

I. 5, III 3.1, III 6.2 (3x), III 6.3 (3x), III 6.5, III 6.6, III 6.7 (2x), III 6.8, III 6.12, III 6.13, III
6.14 (2x), III 6.15, III 6.16 (2x), III 6.18 (2x), III 6.19 (2x), III 6.20, III 27.2, III 32.1, III 49.1,
III 49.2

expand, ampliare, I 1.4,1 6.4 (5x), I 10.1,1 16.2,1 33.5, II 2.1 (2x), II 3, II 4 T, II 4.1 (3x), II 4.2
(2x), II 6.1, II 19.1 (2x), II 19.2 (3x), II 21.1; expansion, ampliare, I 6.3, I 6.4, II 23.2;
expansive, amplo, I 49.2, 1 Pr. 1

experience, esperienza, isperienza, 1 Pr.l, I 3.1, I 6.4, I 12.2 (2x), I 23.4, I 34.2, I 38.3, I 46, I
53.2, I 55.6, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 17.5, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 27.4, II 30.4, III
6.8, III 6.15, III 6.20, III 10.2, III 25.1, III 34.4, III 37.2; experienced, isperimentato, III 6.15.
See also experiment

experiment, esperienza, isperienza, 1 Pr.2, III 6.4 (3x), III 31.4. See also experience
external,* estemo, extemis (L), I 2.1, I 7.5, I 10.5, I 15 (L), II 4.1, II 24.4, III 6.19, III 26.2. See
also foreign

extinguish, estinguere, I 17.1,1 33.2, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 25.1, III 3

extraordinary, straordinario, istraordinario, I 4.1, I 5.4 (3x), I 7.1 (2x), I 7.3 (2x), I 7.5, I 9.2, I

II. 3,1 11.5,1 16.4,1 17.3,1 18.4,129.3,1 33.2,1 34.1, I 34.2, I 34.3 (3x), I 37.3 (2x), I 56, I
59, II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.4, II 29.1, III 3.1, III 5.1, III 6.8, III 6.16, III 8.1, III 21.4, III 22.3 (2x),
III 34.1, III 34.2 (2x), III 35 T, III 38.1, III 49.1; extraordinarily, straordinariamente,
straordinario, I 7.3, 1 16.4,1 31 T, III 19.1, III 34.2

extreme (adj.),* estremo* I 15 T, I 16.5, I 17.3, 1 Pr.2, II 2.2, II 18.3, II 23.2, II 31.1, III 17.1;
extreme (n.),* termine, * II 18.1, II 23.2 (3x), III 27.2, III 38.1; extremities, estremita, II 30.3, II

30.4. For termine, (/middle

extrinsic, estrinseco, 131.1,1 33.2 (2x), II 32.2, III 1.2 (2x), III 1.6. See also foreign

433

faction, fazione, I 7.1,1 37.2,1 54. See also struggle

faith, fede, fides (L), 14.1,1 11.5,138.3 (2x), 153.1 (2x), I 59 (lOx), II 5.1, II 9, II 10.1, II 19.1
(2x), II 23.4 (L), II 24.3, II 31.1 (3x), III 6.3, III 6.4 (5x), III 6.9, III 6.18, III 16.1, III 21.4
(2x), III 40.1, III 43 (3x), III 48.1; faithful, fedele, infede, fidelis (L), fidus (L), I 43 T, I 43, II

10.1 (2x), II 17.2, II 23.4 (L)(2x), II 24.1, III 6.4, III 21.4, III 48.2; faithlessness, infidelitd,
infidelta, II 4.2, II 9, II 32.1, III 21.1, III 43. For fede, see also credit; pledge; vouch; (/trust

fame, fama, I 10.1, I 19.1, I 27.1, I 52.2, 1 Pr.l, II 11.1, III 20 (3x), III 34 T, III 34.2 (2x), III

34.3, III 34.4, III 37.2. See also rumor; (/infamy
family, famiglia, I 15, II 8.1, II 8.2, III 46 T, III 46 (3x)
fancy, fantasia, III 6.12. Cf image

fate, sorte, I 16.1,1 53.1,1 54,1 59 (2x), II 2.1, II 13.2, II 16.1, II 18.3, III 3, III 6.1, III 16.3, III

31.1 , III 31.2, III 31.3. See also lot; luck; sort

father , padre, 13.1,1 11.1 (3x), I 19.2 (4x), I 22,1 26,1 31.2,140.4, II 24.2,1128.2,111 1.6,111 2,
III 3, III 4, III 6.2, III 10.2, III 22.1 (2x), III 26.1, III 34.1 (2x), III 34.2 (3x), III 34.3 (2x), III

37.4, III 40.2, III 45; Fathers (of the Roman Senate), Padri, I 8.1, I 49.1, III 5, III 8.1. Cf
parricide; patrimony

fatherland, patria, patria (L), 1 Pr.2, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.1, I 10.2 (2x), I 11.1 (3x), I 16.4, I 16.5, I

23.1.1 31.2,1 57,1 58.3,1 59,1 60, II 2.1 (2x), II 2.2, II 6.1, II 8.3, II 19.2 (L), II 20, II 24.2, II

24.3 (2x), II 27.4 (4x), II 29.2, II 31.1 (4x), III 2, III 3 (3x), III 5, III 6.1, III 6.2 (3x), III 6.7,
III 6.16 (3x), III 6.19 (5x), III 8.1 (3x), III 9.3 (2x), III 11.2, III 13.3, III 22.1, III 22.6 (2x), III
23 (2x), III 24, III 30.1 (3x), III 41 T, III 41 (4x), III 46, III 47 T, III 47, III 48.2. Cf ancestral

fault, colpa, incolpare, I 8.3,1 14.2,1 21.1,1 22, 1 52.8, III 6.14, III 42; fault, fallo, I 22,1 24.1
favor (n.), favore, I 2.7,14.1,1 12.1,1 13.2,1 14.2,1 18.3,129.3,1 33.2 (2x), I 33.3, I 33.4, I 35,

I 37.3,140.3, I 40.5 (2x), I 40.6, I 41, I 49.3, I 52.2 (2x), I 52.3 (2x), I 55.5, II 1.2, II 14, II

15.1, II 22.1, II 25.1 (3x), II 27.3, III 6.20, III 8.1 (4x), III 8.2 (2x), III 14.1, III 14.3, III 22.1,
III 22.4, III 26.1 (2x), III 28 (2x), III 34.4 (2x); favor (n.), grade, I 51 (3x), III 22.3, III 28;
favor (n), grazia, I 18.3 (2x), III 6.19, III 16 T, III 16.2; favors (n.), piaceri, III 6.3; favor (v.),
favorire, 18.3,1 12.1 (2x), I 16.5,1 33.2,133.4,137.2,140.5 (2x), I 52.1,1 52.2 (2x), II 1.1, II

10.2, II 15.2, II 25.1, III 6.10, III 8.1 (2x), III 21.1, III 28, III 34 T; favorable, favorevole, I 2.7,
III 2, III 42; favorite, favorito, III 6.10; unfavorable, disfavore, I 4.1, I 36, I 40.1 (2x); disfavor,
mal grado, I 53.3. For grado, see also condition; degree; rank; for grazia, see also grace; grateful;
for piaceri, see also pleasure

fear (v.), avere paura, I 3.2, I 46 (2x), I 58.4, II 1.2, II 24.1, III 12.2 (2x), III 49.2; fear (v.),
dubitare, I 30.2,1 32,148, 1 Pr.3, II 2.3, II 10.1, II 25.1, II 33, III 6.8, III 36.2, III 47; fear (v.),
temere, timeo (L), I 1.4, I 2.3 (2x), I 5.4, I 6.2 (2x), I 6.4, I 11.1, I 13.2 (2x), I 16.3, I 24.1, I

29.3 (2x), I 33.4,1 36,1 37.1,140.4 (L), I 46 (2x), I 55.1,1 58.4 (4x), II 10.2, II 12 T, II 21.2,
III 1.4, III 5, III 6.3, III 6.11 (2x), III 6.18, III 12.1 (2x), III 13.2, III 16.2, III 19.1, III 21.2
(2x), III 21.3 (2x), III 21.4, III 30.1, III 32, III 33.1, III 48.2; fear (n.), paura, 13.2 (3x), I 5.4, I

6.4, I 7.1, I 7.2 (2x), I 7.3, I 7.4, I 8.2, I 12.2, I 15 (2x), I 18.3 (3x), I 29.3, I 33.2, I 33.3, I

33.4 (2x), I 40.4 (2x), I 47.2, I 58.4 (2x), II 14 (2x), II 24.1, II 25.1, II 32.1, III 1.3 (2x), III

6.4, III 21.4, III 25, III 32, III 33.1, III 37.3, III 37.4; fear (n.), tenia, II 31.2; fear (n.), timore, I

2.3.1 8.2,1 10.4,1 11.1 (2x), I 11.4 (2x), I 13.2,1 15,1 52.2,1 59 (2x), 1 Pr.l, II 13.2, II 19.2,

II 24.3, III 6.6, III 21.2, III 22.6; fearful, pauroso, impaurito, I 15, I 45.3, III 11.1; fearfully,
trepidamente, III 44.3. For dubitare, see also doubt; hesitate; suspect; for paura and temere, see also
afraid

ferocious, feroce, ferox (L), I 11.1, I 16.1, I 46, I 57 (L), II 2.2 (2x), III 12.2, III 13.1, III 20, III

36.1 (2x), III 37.4, III 38.1 (L); ferocity, ferocita I 15,1 19.1,1 19.3, II 2.2, III 36.1, III 37.4, III
43

434

fever, febbre, I 39.2

fight (v.), azzuffarsi, venire alia zuffa, I 14.2,1 14.3 (2x), I 53.2 (2x), I 56, II 10.1, II 10.2 (4x), II
17.3 (2x), II 18.1, II 22.2, III 10.2 (2x), III 10.4, III 37.4, III 45; fight (n.), zuffa, I 14.1, I 14.2
(3x), I 14.3,1 15 (2x), I 31.2,1 53.2, II 10.1, II 16.1 (6x), II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.5 (3x), II 18.1
(2x), II 18.3, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 22.2 (2x), II 25.1, II 26, II 27.4, II 28.1, II 32.1, III 10.1, III

10.2, III 10.4, III 12.3, III 14 T, III 14.1 (2x), III 14.3 (3x), III 18.1, III 18.2, III 22.1 (2x), III
22.6, III 32, III 33.2, III 36 T, III 36.1 (2x), III 37.1 (2x), III 37.2, III 37.3 (2x), III 37.4 (3x),
m 38.1, m 38.2, III 47. See also battle
fitting, coiweniente, I 55.2, III 6.8. See also convenient; suitable

force (v.), forzare, forzamente, DL, I 11.1,1 14 T, I 16.3,1 32,1 38.2,1 38.3, 1 Pr.l (2x), II 5.1, II
8.4, II 9, II 17.3, II 24.1, II 32.2, III 6.5, III 6.20, III 20 T, III 20, III 21.2, III 40 (2x); force
(v.), sforzare, I 40.5 (2x), I 50, I 55.5 (2x), II 16.1 (2x), II 18.3, III 9.1, III 16.3, III 22.2 (2x),
III 30.1; force (n .), forza, I 2.4,1 6.4,1 7.2 (3x), I 7.5 (3x), I 13.1,1 17.3,1 19.4, I 22, I 23 T, I

23.1 (2x), I 23.2 (3x), I 29.3,1 34.1 (2x), I 34.4,1 38.2 (2x), I 38.3,1 38.4, I 40.4, I 40.6 (3x),

I 55.3,1 55.5,1 58.1,1 58.2,1 59, 1 Pr.3, II 1.1 (2x), II 1.2, II 2.3, II 3 (2x), II 4.1, II 6.1, II 9,

II 10.1 (3x), II 10.3, II 11 T, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 12.1 (2x), II 12.2, II 12.3 (3x), II 12.4 (4x), II
13 T, II 13.1 (4x), II 13.2, II 14 (3x), II 15.1, II 15.2, II 16.1 (2x), II 17.1, II 18.1, II 19.2 (5x),

II 21.2 (2x), II 22.1 (2x), II 22.2, II 23.2, II 23.3 (2x), II 23.4, II 24.1 (2x), II 24.2, II 24.3, II

25.1, II 26, II 27.2, II 28.2 (2x), II 32.1 (2x), II 32.2, III 1.6, III 2 (2x), III 6.9, III 6.14, III 6.19
(5x), III 6.20 (2x), III 10.3, III 16.3, III 18.3, III 22.6, III 27.1, III 27.4, III 33.1, III 37.1 (2x),

III 37.3, III 37.4, III 40.1, III 42 T, III 42 (3x), III 43 (2x), III 44.2; force (n.), sforzo, III 45;
forcibly, forzato, II 15.2, II 32.2. See also strength

foreign, estrinseco, I 15; foreign, forestiero, I 1.3,17.2, I 40.6,153.2, III 6.19, III 21.2; foreign,
peregrino, II 19.2 (2x); foreigner, esterno, I 14.3; foreigner, forestiero, I 1.1, I 1.5, I 6.2, I 6.3, I

23.4.1 49.3 (2x), II 2.4, II 3 T, II 3 (2x), II 18.3, III 49.4. See also external; extrinsic

form (n.), forma, I 1.5,1 6.1,1 11.3,1 15, I 17.3, I 18.4, I 45.1, II 16.1 (2x), III 8.1, III 8.2 (2x),
III 43; form (v.), formare* I 9.3,1 58.3

former,* antico, anticamente, I 12.2, I 17.1, I 40.4, I 43, I 45.1, I 55.2, II 16.2, II 23.3. See also
ancestors; ancient

fortress, fortezza, I 29.2, I 30.1, II 17.1 (3x), II 17.3 (2x), II 17.5, II 24 T, II 24.1 (7x), II 24.2
(27x), II 24.3 (14x), II 24.4 (9x), III 6.18, III 10.2, III 27.2, III 27.3, III 37.4, III 43, III 44.3.
See also strength

fortune, fortuna, fortuna (L), I 1.4,1 2.3,1 2.7 (2x), I 4.1 (3x), I 8.3, I 10.2, I 10.3, I 10.4, I 11.4
(2x), I 19.1, I 19.2, I 19.4, I 20, I 22, I 23 T, I 23.1 (3x), I 23.2, I 24.2, I 29.1 (2x), I 37.1, I

37.2, I 38.1, I 53.5, I 55.4, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3 (3x), II 1 T, H 1.1 (5x), II 1.2 (3x), II 1.3 (2x), II

10.1, II 10.2 (3x), II 10.3, II 12.3 (2x), II 13 T, II 13.1 (3x), II 16.2 (2x), II 22.2, II 23.2, II

24.3, II 27.4, II 29 T, II 29.1 (L), II 29.2 (2x), II 29.3 (2x), II 30.1, II 30.5, III 2, III 3, III 6.14,
III 6.19, III 9 T, III 9.1 (5x), III 9.2, III 9.3, III 10.1, III 10.1 (L), III 10.2 (2x), III 10.2 (L), III

18.2, III 21.1, III 30.1 (3x), III 31 T, III 31.1 (4x), III 31.2, III 31.3 (3x), III 31.4 (2x), III 33.1,
III 33.1 (L), III 37.1 (2x), III 38.1, III 41, III 42; misfortune, infortunio, I 10.5, I 55.4; captains
of fortune, capitani di ventura, II 18.3; fortuitous, fortuito, II 32.1 (2x). For ventura, see also luck;
for fortuito, see also haphazard

found (v.), fondare, 1 Pr.2, I 2.7, I 6.4, I 10.1, I 12.1 (2x), I 40.2, I 40.5, I 53.5, I 55.6 (2x), II

2.2, II 10.1, II 17.5 (2x), II 18.1, II 19.1, II 24.2 (2x), II 24.3, II 25.1, II 27.4, II 31.1, II 32.2,
III 12.2, III 34.2 (2x), III 34.4 (3x); founder, fondatore, I 9.1,1 9.3,1 10 T, II 3

foundation, fondamento, I 6.4 (2x), I 12.1 (3x), I 14.1,1 23.4 (2x), I 26, II 18.2, II 30.4, III 31.4
fraud, fraude, I 55.2, II 13 T, II 13.1 (5x), II 13.2, II 24.2, II 32.1, III 6.7, III 40 T, III 40.1 (4x),
III 40.2 (2x), III 48.1 (2x), III 48.2; fraudulent, fraudolento, II 32.1, III 43; defraud, fraudare, I

435

55.1

free (adj.), libero, liber (L), I 1.3 (2x), I 1.4,1 1.5,1 2.7 (3x), I 3.1,1 4 T, I 4.1 (2x), I 5.1, I 5.2, I

6.1 (2x), I 7.1,1 7.2, 1 8.2, I 9.2 (2x), I 10.3, I 16 T, I 16.1, I 16.2, I 16.3 (3x), I 16.4, I 16.5
(2x), I 17 T, I 17.1 (4x), I 17.2,1 17.3, I 18 T, I 18.1, I 18.4, I 20, I 23.1, I 24.1, I 25 T, I 25
(2x), I 28, I 29.3 (5x), I 31.1, I 33.2, I 34 T, I 34.2, I 35 T, I 35 (2x), I 36, I 37.2, I 37.3, I
40.1,140.5,143,147.1,149 T, 149.1 (3x), I 49.2 (3x), 149.3,1 55.2, II 2.1 (8x), II 2.3 (3x),
II 2.4 (2x), II 12.1, II 12.4, II 19.2, II 23.4, II 23.4 (L), II 33 T, III 1.2, III 3 (2x), III 6.5, III
6.6, III 7, III 8.1 (L), III 8.2 (2x), III 12.1 (3x), III 23, III 24, III 25 (2x), III 42, III 44.1, III
48.2 (2x), III 49 T; free towns, terre franche, II 19.2; freely, liberamente, I 10.3, I 16.3, I 53.1, I
58.4, II 9, III 40.2; free (v.), liberare, I 16.5,1 21.3,1 28,1 40.4,146,1 55.1, I 58.3, II 2.1 (2x),
II 22.1, II 24.4, III 2, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.16 (2x), III 25, III 30.1, III 33.1; freed, libero, I 8.1, I
22, II 20. See also life; life, way of; live; cf liberators

freedom, liberta, libertade, libertas (L), I 2.6,1 2.7, 1 4.1 (3x), I 4.2,1 5 T, I 5.1, I 5.2 (3x), I 6.4, I
7 T, I 7.1,1 13.2,1 15,1 16 T, I 16.1,1 16.4 (3x), I 16.5 (5x), I 16.6,1 17 T, I 17.1 (4x), I 17.2,

I 18.3 (2x), I 23.1, I 28 (4x), I 31.2, I 35 T, I 35, I 37.2, I 37.3, I 40.1, I 40.2, I 40.4, I 40.4
(L), 140.5,140.7 (2x), 146 (3x), I 47.1,147.3,149.1,149.3, I 52.2 (2x), I 55.4, I 57, I 58.4,

II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1 (8x), II 2.2 (3x), II 12.2, II 19.1, II 21.2 (2x), II 22.1, II 23.4 (L)(2x), II
24.3, III 1.6, III 2, III 3 T, III 3, III 5 (2x), III 6.13, III 7 T (2x), III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1, III
12.2, III 17, III 22.4, III 22.4 (L), III 28, III 41 (2x); freedom, libero, I 52.3

fright, frightful, spavento, I 15, I 45.3, II 8.1, II 17.5, III 37.4; frightful, formidolo, II 8.2;

frighten, spaventare, 14.1, III 6.14 (2x), III 25; frightening, spaventevole, III 49.2
future, avvenire,* II 25.2, III 2, III 32; future, futuro, I 12.1 (2x), I 39.1, I 40.3, I 56, I 58.4, 1
Pr.3, III 43. See also coming

general, generate, I 9.2,147.1, III 39.1; generally, generalmente, I 47.1, I 47.2, I 47.3, II 24 T, III
1.1; generality, generate, I 47 T, I 47.3,1 48

generate, generare, I 5.4, I 7.2, I 10.4, I 30.2 (2x), I 45.3, II 13.2, II 26 T, II 26.1, III 6.20, III
22.6, III 46; generation, generazione, I 2.3 (2x), III 8.2 (2x). See also kind; race
generous, generoso, I 27.1, II 23.4 (2x), III 27.2; generosity, generosita, I 2.3, I 38.1, II 23.4, II
28.1,1130.2,11125

Gentile, Gentile, I 12.1,1 14.1, II 2.2, II 5.1 (3x). Cf Christian

gentleman, gentiluomo, I 6.1 (3x), I 55.3 (2x), I 55.4 (3x), I 55.5 (2x), I 55.6 (6x), III 22.6
glory, gloria, gloria (L), I 1.3, I 1.5, I 8.1 (2x), I 10.1 (2x), I 10.3, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 10.6 (2x), I
19.2,1 24.2,1 29.1 (2x), I 30.1 (3x), I 30.2,1 36,143 T, I 43.1,1 52.3,1 58.3 (4x), 1 Pr.l (3x),

II 1.1, II 2.2, II 4.2 (2x), II 9.1, II 22.1, II 23.2 (L), II 27.2, II 33.1 (2x), III 8.1, III 10.3 (2x),

III 12.1, III 13.3, III 17, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 34.3, III 34.4, III 35.2 (3x), III
40.1, III 41 T, III 41, III 42, III 45; glorify, gloriare, II 2.2, II 8.4; glorious, glorioso, I 10.6, I
36, I 60, 1 Pr.l, II 24.2, II 27.4, III 9.1, III 30.1, III 40 T, III 40.1 (2x), III 40.2, III 42;
gloriously, gloriosamente, II 27.4, III 31.3, III 41

God, god, Dio, Iddio, Deus (L), I 11.1 (2x), I 11.2,1 11.3 (2x), I 11.4,111.5,1 12.1,1 13.1 (2x), I
13.2 (L), I 14.1,1 14.2,1 15 (2x), I 58.3, II 1.1, II 23.2 (L), III 1.4, III 2, III 33.1, III 36.2
gold, oro, aurum (L), II 6.2, II 10.1 (3x), II 10.2 (5x), II 25.1, II 30.1 (2x), II 30.1 (L), II 30.2, III
34.2; golden, aureo, I 10.5, III 6.1, III 25

goodness, bonta, I 11.3, I 17.1, I 27.1, I 28, I 55.1, I 55.2 (6x), I 58.2, I 58.3, III 1.2 (3x), III 3
(2x), III 8.1 (2x), III 24 (2x), III 30.1 (4x), III 46. Cf common benefit
govern, governare, DL, 1 Pr.2,1 2.1,1 2.3 (2x), I 2.4 (2x), I 6.1 (4x), I 6.2 (3x), I 7.2 (2x), I 10.5,
I 11.5,1 12.2,1 16.4,127.1,130.2,131.1,1 32, I 34.3 (2x), I 36 (2x), I 38.2, I 39.1, 140.4, I
45 T, I 47.2,1 53.5,1 58.2, II 4.1 (2x), II 4.2, II 10.1, II 19.2, II 21.2 (3x), II 24.1, II 25.1, II

436

28.2,1130.1,11 32.2,11 33.1,111 1.3, III 5 (3x), III 6.6, III 6.12, III 11.2, III 15.2, III 19.1, III

22.4 (2x), III 26.2, III 27.2, III 27.3 (5x), III 28, III 29 (2x), III 31.1, III 31.3, III 34.4, III 39.1;
governance, govemo, I 8.3, III 17 T; government, governo, I 2.2, I 2.3 (5x), I 2.4 (2x), I 2.5, I
2.7 (3x), I 4.2, I 6.1 (5x), I 16.2, I 18.2, I 21.1, I 26, I 30.2, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 49.2, I 58.3, II

18.3, II 23.2, II 24.4, II 28.2, II 32.2, III 3, III 6.19, III 22.5, III 27.3, III 49.4; governor,
govematore, I 2.3,1 27.1,1 53.5 (2x), II 4.1, II 21.2 (2x), II 24.2, II 26.1, III 26.2. For govemare,
see also conduct

grace, grazia, I 54. See also favor; grateful

grateful, grato, I 2.3, I 58.3; ungrateful, ingrato, I 2.3, I 28 T, I 29 T, I 29.3 (2x), I 30.1 (2x), I

30.2 (3x), I 31.1, I 58.3 (3x); ungratefully, ingratamente, III 17; gratitude, gratitudine, DL, I
29.2; gratitude, gratia (L), I 29.1; ingratitude, ingratitudine, I 24.1,1 28 (3x), I 29.1 (3x), I 29.3
(4x), I 30 T, I 30.1 (2x), I 30.2,1 58.3,1 59, III 6.3. For grato, see also gratify

gratify, gratifying, grato, DL, 140.4, III 6.14, III 34.1; gratify, gratificare, III 20. For grato, see also
grateful

grave, grave,* I 13.2,1 17.2,131.1,1 34.3,1 38.1,1 53.4,1 54 T, I 54 (3x), I 56, II 1.1, II 31.2, III
6.8, III 31.2, III 32, III 34.2, III 35.1, III 37.3
greed, cupiditd, I 29.1, III 6.3, III 8.1, III 29; greedy, cupido, III 12.2. Cf avarice
greetings,* salute, DL. See also health; safety; salvation; cf salutary
ground, terra, II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.5. See also earth; land; town

guard, guardare, guardia, I 2.5,1 4.2,1 5 T, I 5.1 (2x), I 5.2 (4x), I 6.4,17.1,1 23 T, I 23.2 (2x), I

23.4, I 27.1 (2x), I 30.1, I 30.2, I 35 (2x), I 40.6, I 40.7, I 49.3, I 52.2, II 6.1 (3x), II 7.1, II

17.5, II 19.1, II 20.1, II 22.1, II 23.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 32.1, III 6.1, III 6.2 (3x), III 6.3 (2x),
III 6.6, III 6.8 (2x), III 6.9, III 6.11, III 6.19 (2x), III 6.20, III 10.1, III 15.1, III 16.3, III 22.3,
III 23, III 27.3, III 30.1, III 30.2 (3x), III 37.1, III 37.3 (5x), III 37.4, III 39.2, III 44.1, III 44.3,
III 48.2, III 49.2; guardians, guardie, II 17.5; vanguard, antiguardo, II 16.2; rearguard,
retroguardo, II 16.2

habit, abito, I 17.3

hand,* mano, maims (L), I 5.1 (3x), I 5.2 (3x), I 7.5, I 8.3, I 11.1, I 15, I 24.2, I 27.1, I 30.1, I

38.3 (2x), I 44.2, I 49.3, I 52.1, I 52.2, I 55.1, I 55.3, I 55.4, I 57, II 2.1, II 15.1, II 19.1, II
21.2, II 23.2, II 23.2 (L), II 27.4, II 30.3, III 6.8 (3x), III 6.10, III 6.11, III 6.15, III 6.19, III

12.1, III 14.3 (2x), III 20 (3x), III 23, III 24, III 25, III 35.3, III 40.1, III 42, III 44.3; hand-to-
hand, alii mani, di mano, II 17.2, II 17.5, III 13.3

haphazard , fortuito, fortuitus (L), III 36.2, III 36.2 (L). See also fortune

happy, felice, I 2.1, I 11.4, I 12.1, I 12.2, I 43, II 30.2, II 32.1 (2x), III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.6, III
6.16, III 22.3, III 25, III 45; happiness , felicita, I 11.4, I 17.2, II 32.1; happily, felicemente, I
1.2,1 19.2,1 32.1, III 6.4, III 6.7 (2x), III 6.11, III 6.19; unhappy, infelice, infeliciter (L), I 2.1, I
15 (L), I 16.4, II 23.2 (2x), III 6.4, III 35.2; unhappiness, infelicita, I 2.1, II 18.5, III 31.3;
unhappily, infelicemente, infelice, III 8.2, III 49.1

hate, odiare, odi (L), I 2.3,1 8.2,1 52.2, 1 Pr.l, II 2.1, III 6.2, III 19.1, III 23, III 23 (L); hatred,
odio, I 2.3 (3x), I 8.3,1 11.1,1 37.2,1 39.2,1 40.5,147.2 (2x), I 58.3, 1 Pr.l, II 2.1, II 14.1, II

21.2, II 24.1 (3x), II 26 T, II 26.1, III 6.2, III 6.4, III 6.9, III 12.1, III 19.1, III 22.3, III 22.6, III
23 (3x), III 47; hateful, odioso, I 52.2, II 24.2, III 5, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 23 (2x), III 31.1

head, capo* 12.3 (2x), I 10.1,1 12.1,1 12.2,1 15 (2x), I 17.1 (2x), I 18.3, I 25, I 29.1, I 34.4, I
37.2 (4x), 140.1,144 T, 144.1 (3x), I 57 (3x), 115.1,11 16.1 (2x), II 16.2,1127.4, II 18.3 (2x),

II 24.1 (2x), III 1.4, III 6.10, III 6.15 (2x), III 6.16, III 6.20 (2x), III 7, III 12.3, III 13.3 (3x),

III 15.2, III 16.1, III 16.3 (2x), III 18.3, III 21.2, III 24, III 26.1, III 27.1, III 27.2, III 30.1 (2x),

437

Ill 31.4, III 32, III 35 T, III 35.1 (3x), III 48.2; head, testa,* II 18.4, III 32. For capo, see also
capital

heading, soprascritto, I 16.5. See also write

health, salute, II 5.2. See also greetings; safety; salvation; cf salutary
heart, cuore, I 2.3, II 30.3 (2x), II 30.4 (2x), III 6.8

heaven, cielo, 1 Pr.2,1 6.4,1 10.6 (2x), I 11.1,1 19.1, II 29.1 (2x), 1 Pr.3, II 2.2, II 5.1, II 5.2, II

29.1 (2x), III 1.1; heavenly, celeste, 156 (2x)

heir, erede, I 2.3, I 2.6, I 10.4, I 19.2, I 52.3, II 24.2, III 5; heir, ereditcirio, III 5 T. See also
inheritance

hesitate, dubitare, I 21.2,1 21.3,140.3, III 49.1; hesitation, rispetto, I 31.1, I 33.2, I 33.5, I 35, I

40.2, I 40.7, I 52.2, I 58.4, II 12.3, II 24 (2x), III 6.20 (3x), III 91 (2x); hesitant, rispettivo, I

30.2, I 31.1, I 45.3, II 24.2. For dubitare, see also doubt; fear; suspect; for rispetto, see also
respect; thank

hidden, occulto, I 3.1 (2x), I 58.3, II 32.1. O'conceal; covert; cult

history, istoria, storia, DL, 1 Pr.2 (3x), I 3.1,1 7.5,1 8.3,1 9.1,1 10.2,1 10.4 (2x), I 11.2, I 16.1, I

16.4, I 23.4, I 24.2 (2x), I 29.2, I 49.1, I 60, II 2.1 (2x), II 4.1 (2x), II 5.1, II 5.2, II 10.3, II

19.1 (2x), II 24.4, II 29.3, II 30.2, II 31.1, II 33.1, III 1.2, III 1.6, III 6.3, III 7 (2x), III 8.1, III
13.1,111 20,111 26.2,11131.4,111 33.1,111 36.2, III 42; historian, istorico, 149.1, I 58.1, I 58.2,

I 58.3, II 5.1, II 14.1, II 30.1, III 6.15, III 8.2, III 16.1, III 29, III 30.2, m 31.1, III 33.1
holy, santo* I 29.3

homicide, omicidio, omicida, I 9.1,1 24.1,1 40.3, III 6.13. C/ kill; slay

honest, onesto, I 2.3,1 16.3,1 46,1 52.2 (2x), II 24.2, III 34.2, III 44.3; honest, adonestare, I 34.1;
honestly, onestamente, I 52.2; dishonest, inonesto, disonesto, I 2.3,1 59, III 29. See also honorable;
indecently

honor (n.), onore, honor (L), DL, 1 Pr.2, I 5.2, I 5.4 (3x), I 8.1, I 10.1 (3x), I 10.5 (2x), I 11.1,
116.3 (3x), I 16.5,1 36 T, I 37.1,1 37.3 (2x), I 38.3,1 40.3,1 40.5,147.1 (L), I 50 (2x), I 55.6,

II 2.2, II 3 T, II 23.3 (3x), II 27.4, III 2, III 6.2 (3x), III 6.3, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 16.3, III 20, III
25 (3x), III 25 (L), III 28 (2x), III 34.3, III 35.1, III 45; honor (n.), onorevoli, II 27.1; honor
(v.), onorare, 1 Pr.2,12.3,1 14.3,1 16.3,1 31.1,1 31.2,1 33.2,1 38.1, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 9, II 23.4,

II 28.1 (2x), II 28.2, III 6.1, III 22.3, III 25 (2x), III 28; honorable, onorevole, I 6.4, I 24.2, I

27.1, I 30.1, I 36, I 38.2, I 54, II 10.2, III 2, III 31.1, III 39.2; honorably, onorevolmente,
onorato, I 54,1 58.2, II 14.1, II 23.4, III 22.4, III 34.2; dishonor (n.), disonore, I 31.2, III 10.2,

III 15.1 (2x), III 17, III 48.2; dishonor (v.), disonorare, I 29.1, III 6.2; dishonored, inonorato, I
29.2; dishonorable, disonorevole, I 36

honorable, oneste, II 27.1. See also honest

hope (v.), to put hope in, sperare, spero (L), I 5.2, I 37.2, I 55.1 (2x), I 55.2 (2x), I 58.4, I 59, II

2.4, II 15.2, II 19.1, II 23.4 (L) (2x), II 27.1, II 29.3 (2x), III 11.1, III 32, III 33.2, III 36.2, III
43; hope (n.), speranza, spes (L), 1 13.1,1 15,1 36,142,1 53 T, I 60 (4x), II 4.2, II 27.1 (4x), II

27.3, II 27.4, II 28.2, II 31.1 (4x), III 6.3 (2x), III 12.2 (2x), III 12.2 (L), III 32 (2x), III 36.2,
III 37.3 (2x), III 39.2 (L)

horse, cavallo, cctvagli, II 16.1 (3x), II 17.5, II 18 T, II 18.1, II 18.2 (8x), II 18.3 (9x), II 18.4 (6x),

II 19.1 (2x), III 6.7, III 14.1, III 23; on horseback, a cavallo, II 18.1 (3x), II 18.3 (3x), III 14.3,

III 18.3, III 31.3. See also master; cf cavalry

human, umano, humanus (L), I 1.5,1 6.3,1 10.1,1 11.4,1 26,1 37.1,1 42,1 56, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3 (2x),
II 2.2, II 2.4, II 5.2 (3x), II 29.1 (3x), III 12.1 (2x), III 20, III 25 (L); inhuman, inumano, III

27.2. See also humane

438

humane, umano, I 41.1, II 21.2, III 19.1 (2x), III 20 (2x), III 22.1 (2x); humanely, umcmamente, 1
Pr.l, I 3.2,1 31.1, III 22.3; humanity, umanita, I 40.3, I 47.2, I 53.5, I 59, II 18.4, II 22.1, III
6.14, III 9.3, III 19.2, III 20 T, III 20 (2x), III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22.3 (2x), III 22.4 (2x), III
22.5, III 46. See also human

humble, humbly, to humble, umile, umilmente, umiliarsi, rawniliare,* humiliter (L), I 46, I 47.2, I

58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2x), II 2.2, III 25, III 31.2; humiliate, umiliare, I 31.2, III 6.14; humility,
umiltd, 141 T, II 2.2 (2x), II 14 T, II 14.1, III 9.3

humor, omore, umore, 14.1,1 5.2,1 7.1 (3x), I 7.5, I 37.2, I 39.1, I 39.2, I 45.3, II 15.1, III 3, III
5, III 6.2, III 9.1, III 27.3

hurt,* offendere, I 35,1 52.2, II 17.5 (2x), II 24.1, II 24.2 (2x), III 6.14, III 12.3, III 18 T. See also
attack; offend

husband, marito, III 2, III 4, III 6.18, III 20, III 34.3, III 49.1. See also betrothed

idle, idly, ozioso, I 1.4,1 10.1,1 30.1,1 55.4, III 10.1; idleness, ozio, 1 Pr.2,11.2,1 1.4 (4x), I 6.4,

II 2.2, II 20, II 25.1

ignominy, ignominia, I 31.1, D 23.4, II 28.1, II 28.2, II 29.2, II 30.2, III 41 T, III 41 (2x), III 42;

ignominious, ignominioso, I 18.3,140.3, II 2.1, III 41 (3x)
ignorance, ignoranza, ignoranzia, 131 T, I 31.1,1 31.2 (3x), I 33.3, I 53.5, II 4.2, II 16.3, II 18.3;

ignorant, ignorante, 14.1,1 10.1,1 11.5, II 23.3; ignorantly, ignorantemente, I 10.1
ill, male* DL, I 7.2 (2x), I 12.1,1 34.3 (2x), I 34.4,1 37.3,1 39.2, I 43.1, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 49.1, I

53.3.1 58.3,1 58.4, II 32.2, III 1.3, III 3, III 6.4, III 8.1, III 16.3, III 21.2, III 27.3, III 29, III
35.1, III 35.2 (2x), III 46. See also bad; evil

image, imagine, immagine, I 12.1, I 53.1, II 5.1, III 39.2; imagine, immaginare, II 30.2;

imagination, immaginazione, III 6.16 (2x); immagine, II 32.1. Cf fancy
imitate, imitare, 1 Pr.2 (3x), I 1.4,1 5.3, 1 Pr.3, II 3, II 4.2 (3x), II 16.2, II 23.2, II 23.3, III 1.3,

III 5, III 6.7, III 6.20, III 10.1, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 30.2, III 33.2, III 37.4, III 41, III 45;

imitation, imitazione, 1 Pr.2,1 10.6, II 4.2, III 45

imperial, imperiale, II 19.2. C-command; empire

impetuosity, impeto, empire, I 8.1, III 9.1 (2x), III 9.3, III 36.2, III 44 T. See also thrust; vehemence
incident, accidente, I 7.1,1 7.4,1 44.1,1 58.1. See also accident
indecently, inonestamente, III 17.1. Cf honest

indignation, sdegno, isdegno, I 8.3,1 50,1 53.3, II 23.4, II 26, II 28.1 (4x), II 28.2, III 4, III 6.17,
III 16.3, III 17.1; indignant, sdegnato, II 27.2 (2x); indignation, indegnazione, I 7.1, I 55.1, II
26, III 44.1, III 44.2. For sdegno, see also disdain; (/dignity; worthy
industry, industria, 1 Pr.2,1 29.1,1 29.2,1 37.2, II 3.1, II 10.3 (2x), II 24.2, II 26, III 2, III 6.20,
III 11.1, III 12.1, III 15.2, III 38.1; industrious, industriarsi, industrioso, I 1.4, I 3.2. See also
devices

infamy, infamia, I 10.1,1 10.6,1 27.2,1 29.1, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2, II 21.2, III 6.20, III 35.2; infamous,
infame, I 10.1,158.3. Cf fame; rumor

infantry, fanteria, II 16.2 (2x), II 17.5 (5x), II 18 T, II 18.2 (3x), II 18.3 (9x), II 18.4 (4x), II 19.1
(2x), III 18.3; infantrymen, fanti, II 18.3 (2x), II 18.4 (6x), II 19.1 (3x), II 24.2, III 6.7
infinite, infinito, DL, 1 Pr.2 (2x), I 2.4,1 5.2,1 6.3,1 8.3,1 9.3,1 10.1,1 11.1,1 11.5, I 12.2 (2x), I

16.1.1 16.5 (2x), I 17.2,1 20,1 33.5,1 36, I 39.2, I 53.2, I 53.5 (2x), I 59, II 2.1, II 20, II 33,
III 7, III 11.1, m 12.2,111 16.1,111 30.1,11139.1,111 46,11149

inhabit, abitare, 11.1,1 1.3 (2x), I 1.4 (2x), I 6.1 (4x), I 6.2, I 12.2 (2x), I 53.1, I 57 (2x), II 2.1,
II 3 (4x), II 4.2, II 8.2, II 24.4 (2x), III 6.15, III 25, III 43; inhabitants, abitatori, I 1.1,1 1.2, I

439

1.3.1 1.5 (2x), I 2.3,1 6.1 (2x), I 6.2 (2x), I 26,1 55.2, II 3 (4x), II 5.2 (2x), II 8.1 (2x), II 8.2
(2x), II 19.1, II 20, III 12.1; uninhabited, disabitato, III 2.3

inheritance, credita, ereditaria, I 9.2,1 10.4,1 20, II 13.1, III 6.2. See also heir
injure, ingiuriare, I 28, I 32, I 46, II 24.1, II 26, II 28.2, III 6.19, III 7 (2x), III 26.2, III 27.1;
injury, ingiuria, iniuria (L), I 2.3 (3x), I 6.2,1 7.5,1 11.1,1 28,1 29.1 (L), I 29.3, I 33.3, I 45 T,
145.3,146,147.2,159,114.1,1126 (4x), II 28 T, II 28.1 (2x), II 28.2 (4x), III 4 (2x), III 6.2
(2x), III 6.3 (2x), III 7, III 16.3, III 17, III 27.1, III 47 T; injuriously, ingiuria, II 26
innovate, innovare, I 9.2,1 18.4; innovation, innovazione, I 18.2, III 21.2; innovation, novitci, I 7.3,
I 8.3. See also newness; cf renew
insane, insano, III 6.3. Cf crazy; mad

insolent, insolently, insolente, insolentemente, insolesco (L), I 2.7, I 24.1, I 29.1, I 30.1, I 35, II 14,
III 11.1, III 13.3 (2x), III 19.1, III 31.2 (2x), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3; insolence, insolenzia, I 2.6, I

3.2.1 16.5,1 18.5,1 52 T, I 53.1, II 1.1, II 25.1, II 27.1, III 1.3, III 31.3, III 33.1, III 46
inspire, inanimare, III 6.8. See also spirit

institute (v.), costituire, I 24 T; institution, constituzione, I 45.2, I 57, II 2.2, II 24.1, II 26, III 1.2;

institution, instituto, III 46. See also constitute; place
intent, animo, I 9.2, 1 27.1, 1 38.3, 1 44.2, 1 59, III 2 (2x), III 6.4, III 6.20, III 28, III 48.2. See also
animus; mind; spirit; (/magnanimous; pusillanimous
intention, intenzione, intento, DL, 1 Pr. 1, I 9.4, I 23.2, I 37.3, II 6.1, II 9 (2x), II 10.2, II 20, II

27.1, II 27.4, III 3, III 6.3

internal, intrinseca, I 40.6 (2x). See also intrinsic

interpret, interpretare, interpreter (L), I 13.2 (L), I 14 T, I 56, II 2.2, III 2; interpretations,
interpretazioni, II 2.2

intrinsic, intrinsica, I 33.2 (2x), III 1.2 (2x). See also internal
inure, avvezzare, I 17.3 (2x), I 38.2

joke, beffa, 157,11 18.2,11 26

judge (v.), giudicare, iudicare, passim, judge (v.), arbitror (L), II 15.1; judge (n.), giudice, I 7.4
(2x), I 7.5,1 40.3,149.3,1 50, II 21.2, III 8.1; judgment, giudicio, giudizio, iudicio, indizio, DL,
1 Pr. 1, 1 Pr.2 (2x), 15.4, I 11.1, I 19.2, I 22, I 45.1, I 47.1 (2x), I 47.3, I 58.2, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3
(4x), II 12.2, II 18.3, II 19.1, II 23 T, II 23.2 (3x), II 23.3, II 23.4 (3x), II 24.1, II 24.4, III 8.1,
III 11.2, III 27.2, III 40.1; judgment, sentenza, sentenzia, I 7.1,1 52.3,1 53.4, II 21.2, II 23.4, III

19.1 (2x), III 29, III 44.2; judgment, arbitrio, II 33 (2x). For arbitror, cf arbiter; for sentenza, see
also sentence; verdict; for arbitrio, see also liberty; will

judiciously, sensatamente, I 23.4, III 30.1

just, giusto, iustus (L), I 2.3, 1 9 4, I 27.2, III 12.2 (L), III 34.3, III 41; unjust, ingiusto, I 30.1, III
41; justice, giustizia, I 2.3, 1 10.5, II 28.1, III 1.2 (2x), III 49.1; justice, ragione, I 27.1, II 21.2;
justify, giustificare, I 8.3 (2x); justification, giustificazione, II 9. For giusto, see also real; for
ragione, see also account; reason; type

kill, ammazzare, I 4.1, I 9.4 (2x), I 10.4, I 11.1, I 14.2, I 15, I 16.4, I 18.5 (2x), I 22, I 24.2, I
40.4,140.7,144.2,145.1,147.2 (2x), I 53.5,1 55.3, II 2.2, II 8.1 (2x), II 8.2, II 16.1 (2x), II
17.4, II 18.1, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 27.2 (2x), II 28.2, II 29.2, II 31.1, III 1.2, III 3 T, III

3.1 (2x), III 6.2 (3x), III 6 5, III 6.7 (2x), III 6.8, III 6.10, III 6.11 (2x), III 6.12, III 6.13 (2x),
III 6.14 (2x), III 6.15 (4x), III 6.16 (6x), III 6.17 (2x), III 6.18 (2x), III 6.20 (3x), III 12.2, III

22.1, III 27.1 (2x), III 30.1, III 32 (2x), III 34.2, III 35.1, III 35.3, III 40.2, III 49.1, III 49.2;
kill, morire, I 7.1,1 7.2,1 9.1,1 10.4 (2x), I 10.5,1 13.2,1 15 (2x), I 16.6, I 22, I 24.1, I 27.1, I

440

29.1.1 31.1, I 31.2, I 36.1, I 47.2, I 53.3 (2x), I 58.2, I 59, II 2.1 (2x), II 31.1, III 5, III 6.10
(2x), III 6.11 (2x), III 6.18 (2x), III 6.19, III 6.20 (2x), III 15.1, III 18.1, III 21.4, III 26.1, III
28, III 34.2. For morire, see also die; cf homicide; slay

kind,* generazione, I 55.4, II 8.1 (2x), II 24.2, III 22.4. See also generation; race

king, re, passim, kingdom, regno, 1 Pr.2 (2x), I 1.3,1 1.4 (2x), I 2.7,1 9.1,1 9.2 (2x), I 9.3, I 9.4, I

10 T, I 10.1 (4x), I 10.4,1 11.4 (3x), I 11.5,1 12.1,1 16.5,1 19 T, I 19.1, I 19.2 (5x), I 21.1, I

21.2 (4x), I 25,1 26,1 29.2 (2x), I 36,1 42,1 43, I 55.2, I 55.4 (2x), I 55.5 (3x), I 58.2 (2x), I
59 (2x), 1 Pr.2 (3x), II 3, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 12.1 (3x), II 12.2 (2x), II 12.4 (2x), II 13.1
(2x), II 21.1, II 22.1 (2x), II 24.3, II 24.4, II 27.4, II 30.2 (2x), II 30.4 (3x), II 32.2, III 1.2, III
1.5 (5x), III 1.6, III 4 (5x), III 5 T, III 5 (3x), III 6.3, III 6.7 (3x), III 40.1, III 41; kingly, regio, I
2.7 (2x), I 18.5 (2x), I 34.4,1 55.4,1 58.3 (2x), III 28. See also royal; cf queen; reign

kiss, baciare, III 2

knowledge, cognizione, 1 Pr.2 (3x), I 2.3 (2x), I 47.3 (2x), I 55.4, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3, III 18.1, III 39.1
(4x), III 39.2 (4x); knowledge, conoscenza, III 34.4; knowledge, notizia, 1 Pr.l, I 56, I 58.2, 1
Pr.2, II 4.1, II 5.1, II 5.2 (2x), II 12.3, II 24.2, II 33.1, III 18.3, III 27.2
land, terra, 1 Pr.l, I 1.3,1 24.2,1 37.2, I 50, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2 (2x), II 19.2, II 24.3, II 30.1, II

30.2, II 30.4; land, terrene* II 6.1 (2x), II 7 T, II 7 (2x). See also earth; ground; town
language, lingua, II 5 T, II 5.1 (5x), II 5.2, II 16.1. See also tongue
lasciviousness, lascivia, I 2.3

laugh, ridere, I 1.5,1 47.2, II 11.2

law, legge, 1 Pr.2,1 1.2,1 1.4 (4x), I 1.5 (2x), I 2.1 (4x), I 2.3 (2x), I 2.5,1 2.6 (2x), I 2.7, I 3.1, I

3.2 (4x), 14.1 (5x), 16.1 (2x), I 6.2 (2x), I 6.4,1 7.1 (2x), I 9.3,1 9.4 (3x), I 10.4,1 11.1 (2x), I

11.3.1 13.2 (5x), I 16.5 (4x), I 17.3,1 18.1 (6x), I 18.2 (6x), I 18.3 (3x), I 18.4, I 18.5, I 32, I

33.2.1 34.2, I 34.3, I 35 (3x), I 37 T (2x), I 37.1 (3x), I 37.2 (5x), I 37.3 (6x), I 39.2, I 40.2
(5x), 140.3,140.4,140.5,145 T, 145.1 (2x), 145.2 (4x), I 46,1 49 T, 149.1 (4x), 149.2,1 50,
I 55.2,1 55.4,1 58.2 (5x), I 58.3 (3x), I 58.4 (2x), 1 Pr.2, II 3 (2x), II 4.1, II 5.1, II 8.1, II 19.1,

11 21.1, II 21.2, III 1.2, III 1.3 (4x), III 1.5 (3x), III 3, III 5 (3x), III 6.19 (2x), III 8.1, III 8.2, III
22.3 (2x), III 22.4, III 22.5 III 24, III 25, III 28, III 29 (2x), III 30.1, III 31.4, III 34.2 (2x), III
46 (3x); law, ius (L), II 21.2, II 28.1; law of nations, ins gentium (L), II 28.1, III 1.2 (2x);
lawfully, giuridicamente, III 4. For ius gentium, cf nation; race

lawgiver, lot ore delle leggi, II 1.1. See also legislator

league, lega, 159 T, 159.1, II 1.1, II 4.1 (2x), II 4.2 (4x), II 9, II 11.1, II 19.2, III 44.3; league of
princes, congiura de’principi, I 53.1. For lega, (/confederate; for congiura, see also conspire
learning (n.), dottrina, I 11.5,1 19.2,1 45.2

legates, legati, I 14.2, II 33, III 6.5, III 25 (2x), III 29 (2x), III 41, III 48.1 (2x), III 48.2
legion, legione, I 10.4,1 17.1, II 2.4 (2x), II 17.5, II 20 (3x), II 26, III 6.20 (3x), III 34.1, III 45,

III 49.1

legislator, legislatore, I 6.3; legislator, latore di leggi, 1 Pr.2,11.1,142. See also lawgiver
levity, leggerezza, III 6.5, III 6.6

levy of soldiers, elezione de’soldati, II 29.1. See also choose; elect

liberal, liberate, DL, I 32, II 6.2, III 23, III 34.3; liberality, liberalitd, I 51 T, II 20, II 21.2, III 20
(2x), III 28, III 49.4
liberators, liberatori, I 2. 3. Cf free
liberty, arbitrio, III 6.14. See also judge; will

license, luenza, licentia (L), I 2.3 (4x), I 2.6,1 3.2,1 10.5,1 38.2, I 40.4, I 47.3, II 13.2, III 25, III

34.2, III 36.2; licentious, licenzioso, I 2.2,1 58.4
lies, bugie, I 14.2, III 6.9; liar, bugiardo, I 14.2

441

life, vita, 12.3,12.4,1 2.5,1 2.6,1 5.2,16.3 (2x), I 10.4,1 11.4 (2x), I 11.5, I 12.1 (2x), I 16.4, I

17.1.1 17.3 (2x),I 19.1,124.1,129.3,133.2,140.5,145.1,153.1,1 56,158.2, I 58.4, 1 Pr.l,

I Pr.3, II 12.1, II 12.2, II 13.1 (2x), II 18.5 (2x), II 19.2, II 20, III 1.1 (2x), III 1.2, III 1.3, III
1.4, III 3 (2x), III 4, III 5 (2x), III 6.1, III 6.3 (2x), III 6.20, III 8.2, III 9.2, III 12.2, III 20 (2x),
111 21.1,11129,11134.2,11135.2,11139.1,11140.1,11141 (3x), III 46; life, vivere, I 18.4, I 53.1,
III 1.3; civil life, vita civile, I 26,1 34 T, I 58.3, II 2.2; free life, vita libera, I 17.3, III 7. See also
civil; free; life, way of; live

life, mode of, modo di vivere, I 8.2,1 18.4, I 38.1, II 2.2, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 30.2, III 1.3, III 8.1,
III 21.3, III 21.4 (2x), III 25, III 31.1, III 31.3, III 43. See also live
life, way of, vivere, I 26, I 29.3, II 19.2; ancient way of life, vivere antico, I 25; civil way of life,
vivere civile, I 3.1, I 7.3, I 9.1, I 19.1, I 55.4, II 2.2, II 19.1; civil and free way of life, vivere
civile e libero, I 9.2; common way of life, vivere commune, III 1.6; free way of life, vivere libero, I

2.7.15.1.16.1.17.2.1 16.3 (2x), I 25,1 33.2,1 36,1 49.1,1 49.3, II 2.1 (4x), II 2.3, III 1.2, III
24, III 25; new and free way of life, vivere nuovo e libero, I 25; political way of life, vivere
politico, I 6.1, I 6.4, I 18.4, I 25, I 55.4, 1 Pr.2; political and uncorrupt way of life, vivere
politico e incorrotto, I 55.3; servile way of life, vivere servo, II 2.3; tumultuous way of life, vivere
tumultuoso, II 25.1. See also ancient; civil; common benefit; corrupt; free; life, mode of; live;
politically; serve; tumult

live, vivere, vivo (L), passim, live freely, vivere libero, II 2.3, II 4.1, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 21.2, II 23.4,

II 24.1, II 24.3, II 30.2. See also free; life; life, mode of; life, way of
lively, vivo, II 11.1. See also alive

lord, signore, I 12.2, I 17.1, I 19.2, I 22.1, I 29.1 (2x), I 30.1, I 55.3, I 55.4, II 12.3, II 12.4, II
21.2, II 22.1, II 30.3, III 6.18, III 18.3, III 27.4, III 29 (3x), III 34.3; to make oneself lord,

insignorirsi, II 20; lordling, signorotto, II 30.2. See also master; cf signoria
lot, sorte, III 49.2 (3x); sortire* I 2.1. See also chance; fate; luck; sort

love (n.), amore, I 10.4,1 10.5, I 11.1, I 29.3, I 43, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 3 (2x), II 33, III 6.4 (2x), III

8.1, III 21.2, III 21.4, III 22.5 (2x), III 22.6, III 47 T; love (v.), amare, I 57, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3, II

2.1, II 2.2, II 2.4, II 24.2, II 30.2, III 5, III 6.5 (2x), III 19.1, III 21.2 (2x), III 21.3 (2x), III
22.4; to be or fall in love, innamorarsi, I 28.2, 140.4; lover, amatore, I 19.1,1 19.2,1 36, I 52.2,

I 58.3,11 2.2,1130.5,111 8.1,111 11.1, III 46; loving, amorevole, I 13.2

luck, sorte, III 6.4, III 31.3; ventura, III 30.1. For sorte, see also fate; lot; sort; for ventura, see also
fortune, captains of; cf perchance; perhaps

mad, motto, I 38.3, III 2, III 6.3, III 10.2. Cf crazy; insane

magistracy, magistrato, magistrate (L), I 18.3,1 39.2 (3x), 140.2, I 40.4 (3x), I 40.7, I 43, I 44.1
(2x), I 47.2,1 47.3 (2x), 148 T, I 49.1 (2x), I 49.2, I 50.3, I 60 T, III 22.4 (L), III 24 (3x), III
34 T, III 46; magistrate, magistrato, I 7.1, I 8.2, I 10.5, I 18.2 (2x), I 18.3, I 25, I 29.3 (2x), I

34.1.1 34.3,1 37.2,1 40.2,1 40.7 (2x), 146 (3x), I 50 T, I 50 (2x), I 55.2, I 56, I 58.2, I 58.3,

II 21.2, III 22.5, III 22.6, III 25, III 28, III 34.4

magnanimous, magnanimo, III 34.3. Cf animus; intent; mind; pusillanimous; spirit
magnificent, magnifico, magnificus (L), I 15, 1 Pr.l, II 2.2, III 31.1, III 38.1 (L); magnificence,
magnificenza, II 2.2 (2x)

maintain, mantenere, 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.3, I 1.5, I 2.3, I 2.6, I 5 T, I 5.2, I 5.3, I 5.4, I 6.1
(2x), I 6.2,1 6.4 (3x), I 7 T, I 11.1,1 11.5,1 12.1 (5x), I 16 T, I 16.6 (2x), I 17 T, I 17.1 (3x), I

17.2.1 18 T, I 18.1 (2x), I 18.5 (2x), I 19 T (2x), I 19.1, I 19.2 (3x), I 19.3, I 25, I 26, I 29.3
(2x), I 31.2,140.1,140.5, I 41, 143, I 49 T, I 49.1, I 49.2, 149.3, I 50, I 52.1, I 55.3 (2x), I
55.4 (2x), I 55.5 (2x), I 57,1 58.3, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 5.1, II 6.1 (2x), II 8.3 (2x), II 15.2, II 18.3

442

(3x), II 19.1 (3x), III 1.2 (2x), III 1.3, III 1.4 (2x), III 1.5, III 2 (2x), III 3 T, III 3 (3x), III 5, III
6.4, III 16.2, III 27.3, III 31.4, III 33.1, III 34.2, III 34.3, III 35.1, III 36.1, III 41; maintain,

mantenitori, III 1.5; maintenance, mantenere, I 9.2
majesty, maesta, maiestas (L), I 13.1,1 39.2, III 6.14 (2x), III 30.1 (2x), III 33.1, III 41 (L)
malevolent, malevolence, malvagio, malvagita, I 10.4,1 19.4,1 24.2,1 31.2,1 53.2, I 53.5. Cf bad;
evil

malice, malizia, I 27.1,1 31.1,1 31.2, III 6.6; malignity, malignita, 1 Pr.2,1 2.5, I 3.1 (2x), I 23.3,
I 42, 1 Pr.3, II 5.2, II 15.1, II 18.3, II 20, III 3, III 30.1
man,* uotno, passim See also arm; cf men, new

manage, management, maneggiare, maneggio, I 6.3 (2x), I 49.1, I 49.2, 1 Pr.l, II 2.2, II 16.1, II

16.2, II 17.2, II 24.2, II 25.1, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.5, III 6.6, III 6.7, III 6.15, III
6.19 (3x), III 9.3, III 14.1, III 19.1 (2x), III 37.2, III 40 T, III 40.1 (2x)

marry, maritare, II 28.2, III 26.1, III 28; marriages, matrimonii, II 3, III 26.2, III 46; marriages,
connubi, II 2.3. For maritare, see also betrothed

marvel (v.), maravigliare, 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 11.3, 147.1, [I Pr.l, II 2.4, III 12.1, III 21.1, III 48.1;
marvel (v.), miror (L), III 23; marvel (n.), marvelous, maraviglia, maraviglioso, I 1.4, I 1.5, I

40.2, I 49.2, I 49.3, I 58.3, 1 Pr.2, II 2.1 (4x), II 29.1, III 6.16, III 13.1, III 23; marvelously,
maravigliosamente, II 2.3. See also astonishment

master, maestro, II 16.2, II 18.3, III 1.3, III 10.2, III 20 (2x), III 25, III 33.1; master of the horse,
maestro dei cavagli, I 5.4, I 53.2, II 18.3, III 25, III 33.1, III 36.2; master, to become master,
signore, insignorire, I 6.4, 1 10.5, III 6.18. For signore, see also lord; cf signoria
maternal, materno, II 13.1. Cf mother

matter, materia, I 15, I 16.2, I 16.5, I 17.3 (3x), I 18 4, I 28, I 29.1, I 34.4, I 35 (2x), I 42.1, I
44.1,1 55.4,1 55.5, I 58.3, I 58.4 (2x), II 1.3, II 4.2, II 5.2, II 8.1, II 15.1, II 15.2, II 16.3, II

23.2, II 24.2, III 5, III 6.2, III 6.4, III 8.1, III 8.2 (2x), III 12.2, III 19.1, III 25, III 35.1
medicine, medicina, 1 Pr.2, III 1.2. Cf physician

memory, memoria, memoria (L), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 10.2, I 27.2, I 29.3, I 32, I 49.2, I 58.2, 1 Pr.l, II

4.1, II 4.2, II 5 T, II 5.1 (5x), II 5.2, II 19.2, II 26 (L), III 1.3 (2x), III 3, III 6.14; memorable,
memorabili, memorabilis (L), I 29.3, II 17.1, II 31.1, III 3 (2x), III 8.1 (L), III 8.2. See also
remembrances

men, new, genti nuove, III 49.4 (2x). See also arms, men-at-; people; race; troops
mercenary, mercenario, 1 43, II 19.2, II 20 T, II 20

mercy, piata, 141 T, III 20, III 21.1, III 22.5; merciful, pio, I 28,1 31.1, III 28 T, III 28; merciful,

pietoso, piatoso, III 19.1, III 41. See also piety

merit (v.), meritare, mereor( L), I 1.4,1 10.6,1 16.3,1 29.1,1 29.3 (2x), I 31.2, I 45.1, I 52.2, I 54
(L), III 6.18; merit (n.), merito, I 21 T, I 22 (2x), I 24.1 (3x), I 24.2, I 53.2, III 8.1, III 49 T;
without merit, immeritamente, III 43. See also deserve
middle, mezzo, medius (L), I 6.2, I 56, II 17.1, II 17.5, II 28.2, III 6.3, III 14 T, III 33.1 (L). See
also way; cf extreme

military, militare, milizia, militarius (L), militia (L), 1 Pr.2,1 1.4, I 4.1 (3x), I 9.1, I 11.2, I 12.2, I

14.1, I 21.1 (2x), I 21.3, I 44.1, I 53.3, 1 Pr.2, II 18 T, II 18.1 (2x), II 18.3 (3x), II 18.5, II

19.1, II 19.2, II 20 T, II 20, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 13.3, III 22.3, III 22.4 (L), III 31.4 (2x), III
36.2 (5x), III 36.2 (L), III 37.4, III 38.1 (L), III 38.2; to serve in the military, militare, I 21.2, I
29.2,143,151 (2x), II 4.2 (2x), II 16.1,11 16.2,11125. Cf serve

mind,* animo, I 9.1, I 10.1, I 18.4, I 47.3 (2x), III 3, III 6.19; mind,* mente, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 25, 1
Pr.3, III 1.4, III 8.1; mindful,* mente , III 28. For animo, see also animus; intent; spirit; cf
magnanimous; pusillanimous

443

minister (n.), ministro, I 2.3, 1 49.3, II 21.2, III 6.13, III 22.6; minister (v.), ministrare, I 25
miracle, miracolo, I 12.1 (2x), I 29.3; miraculous, miracoloso, II 30.5 (2x), III 6.5
mix, mescolare, I 2.6,1 48, 1 49.2, II 1.2, II 17.6, II 18.3, II 32.1, III 19.1, III 21.4; mixed, misto, I
2.7 (2x), II 5.2, III 1.1; mixed, accozzati, I 33.2
moderate (v.), moderare, I 36, 1 58.2, III 19.1; moderately, moderatamente. III 35.2
modem, modemo, 1 Pr.2, I 6.1, I 21.1, I 34.3, I 36, I 53.2, I 56, 1 Pr.2, II 12.2, II 16.2 (2x), II
18.2,11 18.4,11 18.5 (2x), II 24.3,11 27.1,11 29.3,111 11.1, m 15.1,111 18.3,111 27.2
monarchy, monarchia, I 53.1, III 31.3

money, danaio, danari, denari, I 4.1,1 6.4,1 8.3, 1 16.5,1 31.2 (2x), I 46, I 55.2, II 4.2, II 10 T, II

10.1 (8x), II 10.2 (5x), II 10.3 (7x), II 12.3, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 27.4, II 30 T, II 30.1 (3x), II

30.2, III 6.5, III 8.1, III 10.2, III 23, III 28, III 43 (5x); money, moneta, II 3
moral, morale. III 12.1

mortal, mortale, III 6.2; immortal, immortalis (L), II 23.2
mother, madre, II 12.2, III 13.1, III 26.1. Cf maternal

multitude, moltitudine, multitude (L), I 2.3 (3x), I 7.3, I 10.4, I 13.2, I 16.4 (2x), I 17.1, I 44 T, I

44.1.1 53.2,1 53.3,1 54 T, I 54 (2x), I 55 T, I 57 (4x), I 58 T, I 58.1 (3x), I 58.2 (7x), I 58.4, I
60, II 2.2, II 4.2, II 10.1, III 14.2, III 19 T, III 19.1, III 19.1 (L), III 29 (L), III 30.2, III 32, III
37.4 (2x), III 49.1, III 49.2 (2x)

name (v.), nominare, sopranominare, prenominare, I 6.1,1 40.3 (2x), 147.2 (2x), II 8.2 (2x), II 10.1,
II 30.2, III 5, III 6.20, III 47 (3x); name (n.), nome, nomen (L), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 2.7, I 4.1, I 6.1, I

10.3.1 13.2,1 25,1 26,1 28, I 34.1 (4x), I 37.2, I 39.2 (3x), I 40.5, I 47.1, I 47.2 (3x), I 52.3
(3x), I 55.4, I 55.5, I 55.6 (4x), I 58.3 (3x), II 2.1 (3x), II 4.1 (2x), II 5.2 (2x), II 8.2 (3x), II

11.1 (L)(3x), II 13.2 (3x), II 16.1, II 17.1, II 21.2, II 22.2, II 24.3, II 25.1 (2x), II 28.1, II 30.4
(2x), III 6.14, III 34.2 (4x)

narrate, narrare, I 40.1, I 47.2, I 56, I 58.1, II 1.1, II 10.1, II 19.1, II 26, III 29; narration,

narrazione, DL, III 1.6

nation, nazione, I 55.3, 1 Pr.2, II 16.1, III 43. C/Eaw; race

nature, natura, natura (L), 1 Pr.l, I 16.1,1 19.3,121.1,1 24.2,1 29.1,1 33.2, 1 37.1,1 40.2,1 40.7,

I 41 (2x), I 42, 1 57, 1 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (3x), I 58.3, 1 Pr.3, II 3, II 5.2, II 17.5, III 6.19, III 9.1
(2x), III 9.3, III 21.3, III 22.1, III 22.3 (2x), III 27.3, III 29 (2x), III 36.1 (2x), III 39.2, III 43
T; natural, naturale, 1 Pr.l, I 12.1, I 29.2, I 33.2, I 56 (2x), II 3, II 6.2, III 6.19, III 8.2, III

12.1, III 22.3, III 30.1, III 36.2, III 37.1; naturally, naturalmente, I 1.4, II 31.1, II 32.1. Cf
supernatural

necessary, necessarily, necessario, necessitato, passim , necessitate, necessitare, II 1.2, II 8.1, II 8.4,

II 10.1, II 10.2 (2x), II 12.3, II 13.2 (2x), II 16.1, II 23 T, II 27.4, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 19.1, III

22.3, III 29, III 37.2, III 44.3; necessity, necessitd, necessitade, necessitato, passim
nephew, nipote, I 14.2,1 27.1,1 52.3, II 10.1

neutral, neutrality, neutrale, II 15.2, II 22.1, II 23.2, III 44.2 (3x)

new, newly, anew, nuovo, di nuovo, passim See also news

newness, novitd, I 36, III 14.3, III 21.2, III 37.4. See also innovate

news, nuova, II 10.1, II 15.2, III 17, III 18.1, III 18.2, III 18.3; news, novelle, II 2.1

noble, nobile, I 3.2 (3x), I 4.1, I 5.1, I 5.2 (2x), I 5.4 (2x), I 6.2, I 7.3, I 7.5, I 8.1, I 13.1 (2x), I

30.2.1 33.2,1 37.1,1 37.2 (3x), I 37.3,1 39.2, I 40.3, I 40.4 (2x), I 40.5 (4x), I 40.6, I 45.1, I

46.147.1 (2x), 148 T, E 2.1, II 4.1, II 27.2, II 28.2 (2x), III 6.2 (2x), III 8.1 (2x), III 12.1, III

19.1, III 20, III 24, III 26.1 (4x); ignoble, ignobile, I 5.2, 1 5.4,1 30.2,1 48, III 6.2

444

nobility, nobilita, I 2.3,1 2.7,1 3.2 (3x), I 5.2 (2x), I 5.4,1 6.2 (2x), I 7.1 (2x), I 10.5 (2x), I 13.1,
I 13.2,1 37.1,1 37.2 (2x), I 37.3, I 39.2 (2x), I 40.2, I 40.3 (2x), I 40.4, I 40.5 (3x), I 40.6, I
41,145.3 (3x), 146 (2x), 147.1,147.2 (2x), I 51, I 52.1 (2x), II 2.1, II 25.1, III 1.5, III 6.19,
III 8.1 (2x), III 11.1 (2x), III 19.1, III 26.1

noise, romore* I 3.2,1 4.1,147.2,1 54, II 2.1, II 17.5, II 32.1, III 6.17, III 14.2. See also rumor

oath, giuramento, I 11.1 (4x), I 13.2 (2x), I 15 (2x), I 55.2; to take an oath, congiurare, I 27.1. See
also conspire; (/swear

obey, ubbidire, ubedire, I 2.3 (2x), I 11.1,1 13.2 (2x), I 36,1 50,1 55.4,1 57 (3x), I 58.2, 1 Pr.l, II

4.1, II 23.2, III 5, III 6.1, III 6.8, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 22.1 (2x), III 22.5, III 30.1 (2x), III 30.2,
III 46; obedient, ubbidiente, obediens (L), I 57 (L), II 16.1, III 19.1, III 22.4, III 25; obedience,
ubbidienza, obedienza, I 11.1, I 12 2, I 13.2, I 18.3, I 22, I 29.2 (2x), I 34.4, II 8.1, II 23.4, II

27.2, III 1.4, III 6.7, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.5 (2x), III 22.6, III 30.1, III 38.2; disobey,
disubbidire, I 38.2 (2x)

oblige, obligate, II 21.1, II 33, III 10.4, III 32 (2x), III 43; obligated, obligato, DL, I 11.2,1 13.2, I
16.5, I 58.4, I 59, III 42 (2x); obligation, obligo, DL, I 10.5, I 12.2 (2x), I 16.3 (2x), I 32, I

58.3, III 27.1, III 42

observe, observance, osservare, servare, osservanza, observo (L), I 2.1, I 6.2, I 8.2, I 11.4, I 12.1, I
14 T (2x), I 15,1 17.3,1 18.1,1 22,1 24.1,1 24.2,1 25 (2x), I 30.2 (2x), I 33.3,1 34.2, I 34.3, I
35, I 40.3, I 40.6, I 45.1 (2x), I 45.2 (2x), I 55.2, I 59 (2x), 1 Pr.2, II 1.3, II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1
(4x), 114.2,118.1,119,11 12.2,11 16.2,11 18.2,11 18.3,1121.1 (2x), II 23.2,11 24.3,11 30.2, III
1.2 (2x), III 2 (2x), III 4, III 5, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 12.3, III 14.2, III 19.1, III 22.1 (2x), III 22.3
(5x), III 23, III 33.1 (2x), III 35.3, III 36.2 (L), III 37.3, III 41, III 42 T, III 42 (5x), III 43, III
49.1; observant, osservante, I 59; observer, osservatore, II 1.3, III 22.5
obstinate, obstinately, ostinato, ostinatamente, I 19.4, II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 16.1, II 32.2,
III 1.5, III 6.2, III 12.1 (5x), III 12.2, III 32, III 36.2, III 46; obstinacy, ostinazione, I 15 (2x), I

31.2.1 37.3,1 39.2,1 50,1 54, II 5.1, II 16.1 (2x), III 12.1, III 12.2, III 42

occasion, commoditd, I 6.1 (2x), I 50,1 52.2, II 11.1, II 12.4, III 2 (2x), III 6.2 (2x), III 6.3 (3x),

III 6.6, III 6.20, III 13.3. See also advantage; convenient
offend, take the offensive, offendere, I 2.3, I 3.2, I 9.1, I 16.3, I 28, I 29.1 (2x), I 29.3, I 30.1, I
30.2,133.3,134.2,145.1,145.3 (2x), 146 T (2x), I 46 (5x), I 49.1,1 57, 1 Pr.l, II 2.1 (2x), II
9, II 17.1 (2x), II 18.4, II 19.2, II 20, II 23.2 (2x), II 24.2, II 25.1, II 28.1, III 5, III 6.2 (2x), III
6.11, III 7 (2x), III 12.1 (2x), III 17 T, III 17, III 22.1, III 22.6, III 27.1, III 33.1, III 43;

offense, offesa, offensione, I 2.3,1 7.2 (2x), I 16.2, I 21.1, I 37.2 (2x), I 45.3 (2x), II 26, III 6.2

(2x), III 6.11, III 7, III 17, III 30.1. See also attack; hurt
office, ufficio, uffizio, I 49.3 (2x), III 6.13, III 35.2. See also duty

old, vecchio, I 9.2,1 34.2,141,1 47.2 (2x), I 53.1,1 60 (2x), 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 23.4 (2x), II

27.1, II 29.1, III 4, III 6.5, III 31.2, III 38.1; to grow old, imecchiare, I 60, 1 Pr.3 (2x); old age,
vecchiezza, 1 Pr.3 (2x), III 18.3

opinion, opinione* DL, I 2.2 (2x), 14.1 (2x), 17.2, I 8.1, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 9.2 (2x), I 10.5, I 11.5, I

12.1.1 12.2,1 14.2,1 15,1 18.3,121.3,123.4,129.3,134.1,136,137.3,140.3, 1 41, 147.2, I

53.1.1 53.2 (2x), I 53.5,1 55.6,1 58.1,1 58.3 (5x), I 58.4, 1 Pr.l, II 1.1 (2x), II 2.1, II 10 T, II

10.1, II 10.2, II 10.3, II 12.1 II 15.2, II 16.1, II 17 T, II 17.1 (3x), II 17.5, II 18.2 (3x), II 19.1,
II 22 T, II 22.1 (2x), II 22.2 (3x), II 23.3, II 24.3, II 25.2, III 3, III 13.1, III 13.2, III 19.1, III
27 T, III 27.2, III 27.4, III 31.4, III 34 T, III 34.2 (2x), III 34.3, III 34.4 (2x), III 35.2, III 35.3.
See also believe; reputation

opportunity, occasione, occasio (L), I 3.1,1 6.2,1 6.3,1 9.4,1 10.6 (2x), I 13.1, I 14.2, I 16.5 (2x),
I 27.2, I 40.3 (2x), I 40.4, I 41, I 47.2, I 49.2, I 50, I 59 (2x), 1 Pr.3, II 9, II 15.2, II 17.1, II

445

19.2.1120.1122.1.1123.2.1127.1 (2x), II 29.1, II 29.2, III 2, III 3, III 5, III 6.20, III 15.1 (L),
III 17, III 44.1

oppress, opprimere, I 4.1 (2x), I 10.5, I 46; oppression, oppressione, I 8.1, I 40.5, II 8.2. See also
crush

oracle, oracolo, I 12.1 (3x), III 2

oration, to orate, orazione, orare, I 4.1, II 15.2, III 12.2, III 34.4, III 46. Cf spokesmen

order (n.), ordine, passim, order (v.), ordered, ordinare, ordinato, passim, orderer, ordinatore, I 2.1,

12.2.12.7.18.2.19.1.19.2.19.4.1 10.1,1 11.1,1 11.3,1 19.1, 149.3, 1 Pr.2, II 5.1, III 34.4;
ordering, ordinazione, I 1.4, I 9.2; orderly, ordinato, ordinamente. III 13.1, III 14.2; disorder
(n.), disordine, I 3.2, I 7.2, I 8.2, I 8.3, I 12.2 (2x), I 16.4, I 17.3, I 37.2, I 37.3 (3x), I 39.2, I
40.7,144.1,147.3 (3x), 149.2,1 50,1 55.2,1 55.6,1 57, I 58.3 (2x), II 2.3, II 11.1, II 16.1, II
16.2 (5x), II 17.1, II 18.2, II 18.3 (4x), II 29.1, II 30.2 (2x), II 30.4, III 1.5, III 6.12, III 8.2
(2x), III 14.2, III 15.1 (2x), III 16.2 (4x), III 17, III 18.2 (2x), III 18.3, III 26.2, III 33.1, III
49.4; disorder (v.), disordinare, I 2.1,1 49.3, II 16.1, II 17.5, II 24.1, II 32.1, III 1.1, III 14.2, III
15.1; disordered, inordinato, I 4.1,1 53.3, III 37.4; reorder, riordinare, I 2.1 (2x), I 10.6,1 13 T,
I 13.1,1 18.4,145.2,149.3,155.4,112.2,11 18.2,11 21.1,1116.12,111 15.1

ordinary, ordinario, 17.1,1 7.3,1 18.4 (2x), I 34.1,1 59, II 2.4, III 6.19, III 22.3 (2x), III 30.2, III
37.1 , III 44 T; ordinarily, ordinariamente, per Vordinario, 17.1,1 7.2,1 7.3 (2x), I 10.4 (2x), 148,

149.3.1 50, II 17.3, II 29.1, III 6.8, III 19.1, III 30.1, III 42

446

pact , potto, I 38.3,1 59, II 20, III 31.2, III 40.1, III 43
paradise, paradiso, II 2.2

pardon (n.), perdono, II 23.4, III 12.2; pardon (v.), perdonare, I 29.3, III 21.4. See also spare
parricide, parricida, I 27.2, II 23.3

partisan, partigiano, I 7.2 (2x), I 16.3 (4x), I 16.4 (2x), I 34.2, I 35, I 43, I 45.2, I 59, 1 Pr.l, III
6.19, III 22.4 (2x), III 22.5 (2x), III 24, III 28

partner, compagno, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 15, I 40.2, I 40.3 (2x), I 41, II 4.1 (2x), II 4.2 (9x), II 13.2, II

19.1, II 21.1, II 24.3, II 30.4, III 6.17, III 16.2, III 19.1 (2x). Cf company

party, parte* I 7.2 (2x), I 7.5,1 17.1,1 33.3,1 37.2 (3x), I 40.5 (2x), I 49.2,1 52.3 (2x), I 59 (3x),
II 2.1, II 2.2, II 14, II 15.2 (2x), II 22.1, II 25.1 (3x), III 6.6, III 14.1 (2x), III 27.2 (2x), III
27.3 (4x), III 27.4 (3x), III 35.1

passion, passione, I 37.1,1 58.3, II 12.4, II 15.1, II 17, II 31.2, III 8.2, III 35.2 (2x), III 43 (2x), III
46

past, addietro* I 53.1,1 53.5,1 59, III 6.9, III 13.1, III 17, III 30.1, III 32, III 37.3, III 39.2; past,
passato * I 2.3,1 10.5,1 15,1 25,1 28,1 39.1,1 53.5, 1 Pr.l (2x), 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 20, II

30.2, III 1.3, III 6.1, III 8.9, III 35.3, III 43 (2x)
path, via, 1 Pr.l (2x), I 2.7,1 5.4. See also way
patrimony, patrimonio, II 2.3, III 2. Cf father
patron, padrone, I 10.5, III 12.1

peace, pace, pax (L), I 1.3,1 10.5 (2x), I 11.1,1 19.1,1 19.2 (3x), I 19.3 (3x), I 21.1 (2x), I 33.5,
II 1.2, II 10.1, II 11.2 (2x), II 12.1, II 23.1 (L), II 23.2 (2x), II 23.2 (L), II 23.4 (L)(2x), II 24.1,

II 24.2, II 24.4, II 25.1 (2x), II 27.1, II 27.4 (2x), II 30.1, II 30.4, II 33, III 11.2, III 12.2 (4x),

III 16.1, III 27.1 (2x), III 31.2 (2x), III 31.4 (2x), III 32 T, III 32 (3x), III 42 (3x), III 44.1 (L);
peaceful, pacifico, I 19.2, III 16.1; peaceful, pacatus (L), III 36.2

penalty, pena, 131.1 (2x), 131.2, I 45.3, I 57 (2x), I 58.3, III 5, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.14 (2x), III
6.18, III 29.1, III 32 (2x), III 35.3, III 49.1. See also punish
people, popolo, populus (L), passim, people, popolare, I 16.5 (2x), I 41, I 55.6; people, gente, III

14.3, III 27.4. For popolare, see also populace; for gente, see also arms, men-at-; men, new; race;
troops

perchance, a caso, I 1.3; per avventura, III 10.2, III 11.2. For caso, see also chance; for avventura,
see also perhaps; cf fortune; luck

perfect, perfetto, I 2.1 (3x), I 2.7,1 3 T, I 34.3, 1 Pr.3, III 39.2; perfectly, perfettamente, I 27.1, III
12.1, III 39.1; perfection, perfezione, I 2.1, I 2.2, I 2.7 (2x), I 40.3, III 6.3, III 6.12, III 6.15
(2x), III 8.1, III 31.3, III 37.1; imperfect, imperfetto, I 9.4
perhaps,, forse, I 9.1, II 24.1, III 7; perhaps, per avventura, I 9.1,1 12.1,1 15,1 28, I 37.3, II 24.3,
III 24. For per avventura, see also perchance; cf fortune, captains of; luck
permit, permettere, I 5.2, I 10.3, I 12.2, I 33.3, I 37.2, II 2.2, II 24.4, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 37.3;

permitted, lecito, licet (L), 145.3, II 17.1, II 32.1, III 6.2 (3x), III 33.1 (L), III 34.4
perpetual, perpetuo, perpetuus (L), in perpetuum (L), I 9.2,1 10.1,1 13.2,1 27.1, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4
(L), III 6.18, III 17, III 22.3, III 30.1; perpetually, in perpetuo, I 34.2, II 30.2
philosopher, fdosofo I 56, II 5.1, III 12.1

physician, medico, 1 Pr. l (2x), I 39.2, III 49.1 (2x). O'doctor; medicine

piety, piata, pietate, I 54, III 4, III 13.1, III 34.1; pious, pietoso, piatoso, pius (L), I 27.1, III 12.2
(L), III 22.1; impious, impio, I 10.1,1 44.2, III 21.4 (2x), III 29. See also mercy
pity, misericordia. III 8.1

place,* costituire, I 14.2, III 6.3. See also constitute; institute

447

plan (v.), disegnare, I 2.3,1 7.5,1 11.1,1 21.1,1 23.2,1 23.4, I 33.5, 1 40.1, 1 47.2, I 52.1, I 55.2,

II 3 (2x), II 6.2, II 9 (2x), II 12.1, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.12, III 16.1 (2x), III 37.3 (2x), III 39.2;
plan (n.), disegno, I 6.4,1 9.4,1 11.3,1 14.2,1 18.5, II 9, II 12.3, II 18.1, II 18.4, II 24.4, II 29
T, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 30.1, III 37.3, III 45,

III 48.1

pleasure, piacere, 1 Pr.2; pleasures, piaciti, III 2; pleasure, voluptas (L), II 19.2. See also favor
plebs ,plebe, 12.7 (3x), I 3 T, I 3.2 (6x), 14 T, 14.1 (2x), I 5.1,1 5.2 (2x), I 6.2 (4x), I 6.3 (2x), I

7.1 (3x), 17.5 (2x), I 8.1 (5x), I 11.1,1 11.2,1 13.1,1 13.2 (6x), I 29.3,132 (2x), 137.1, I 37.2
(5x), I 37.3 (4x), I 39.2,1 40.1,140.2 (2x), I 40.3,140.4 (5x), 140.5,1 40.6, I 40.7, I 41 (2x),

144.1 (4x), 146 (2x), I 47.1 (3x), I 47.2 (2x), I 48, I 49.1, I 50, I 51 (3x), I 52.1 (2x), I 53.1
(2x), I 54,1 55.1 (3x), I 55.2,1 57 T, I 57,1 60 (3x), II 25.1, III 1.3, III 5 (2x), III 8.1 (2x), III

11.1, m 19.1 (2x), III 24 (3x), III 26.1 (2x), III 28, III 33.1, III 34.1, III 46 (2x); plebeian,
plebeio, I 5.2,1 5.4,1 6.2,1 13.1,147.1 (3x), 148 (3x), I 56, III 26.1 (4x), III 35.1

pledge, fede, I 38.3. See also credit; faith; vouch
plot, conspirazione, I 2.3. Cf conspire
poet, poet a, II 5.1 ; poetic, poetico, II 12.2

poison (v.), avvelenare, II 31.2, III 6.19, III 20, III 21.4, III 49.1 (2x); poison (n.), veleno, I 3.2, I
6.4, III 6.19, III 6.20 (4x), III 49.1

policy, partito, I 6.3,1 10.1,1 14.2,1 22 (2x), I 23.1 (2x), I 23.2 (2x), I 31 T, 1 31.1,1 32,1 33 T, I

33.2 (2x), I 33.5,1 37.3,1 38 T, I 38.1,1 38.2 (3x), I 38.3 (3x), I 38.4, I 40.3, I 40.4, I 52.1, I
52.3, I 53.1 (2x), I 53.2 (3x), I 53.3, I 54, I 59 (2x), II 10.2 (3x), II 10.3, II 11 T, II 11.2, II

12.1 (2x), II 14, II 15.1, II 15.2 (4x), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20 (2x), II 22.1, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 25
T, II 25.1, II 27.1, II 33, III 10.1 (3x), III 10.2, III 11.2, III 17 (3x), III 18 T, III 18.1, III 23, III
32,111 33.1,111 37.4 (4x), III 41 (2x), III 44.3,11145 T

politically, politicamente. III 8.1. Cf life, way of
pontificate, pontificato, III 9. 3. O'pope

poor, povero, DL, 1 Pr.l, I 24.2, I 26 (2x), I 32, I 35, I 37.1, II 8.4, II 19.1, II 19.2, III 6.2, III

16.2, III 25 (2x), III 29; poorly, povero, II 7; poverty, poverta, DL, I 1.4, I 3.2, I 6.2, III 1.4, III

18.3, III 25 T, III 25 (9x); poverty, poveraminte, III 1.4

pope, papa, I 27.1 (4x), II 10.1 (2x), II 11.1, II 22.1 (6x), II 24.2 (3x), III 9.3, III 11.2, III 18.1,
III 29, III 31.3 (2x), III 44.2 (3x), III 44.3 (2x). Cf pontificate
populace, Popolani, I 6.1; populace, popolari, II 21.2; popular, popolare, popularius (L), I 2.2 (2x),
I 2.3 (2x), I 2.5, I 2.6 (2x), I 2.7, I 3.2, I 4.2, I 5.1, I 5.2, I 7.1, I 16.5 (2x), I 18.5, I 24.1, I

40.2, I 40.5, I 47.3 (2x), I 53.5, I 58.1, II 21, II 15.1, III 14.2, III 22.4 (L), III 34.4. See also
people

populations, populazioni, II 8.1

power, potenza, 1 Pr.2,11.4,1 2.6,1 5.2,1 5.4,1 6.4 (2x), I 7.5,1 9.4,1 10.3,1 11.1, I 12.2 (2x), I

16.5.1 18.3 (3x), I 23.1,1 33.2,1 33.5 (2x), I 37.1,1 37.2,1 39.2,146,1 52 T, I 55.4, I 55.5, II

1.1, II 1.2 (2x), II 2.1, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 4.2 (4x), II 5.2, II 8.1, II 10.1 (2x), II 10.3, II 17.2, II

19.2, II 24.1, II 29.1 (2x), II 30.1, II 30.5, III 1.3, III 6.2, III 6.3, III 6.14, III 6.19, III 11.1, III

22.4, III 24, m 31.1, III 31.4, III 41, III 43, III 49.1; power, potestd, potestas (L), I 2.7, I 13.1, I

18.5.1 25,1 33.1,1 34.4,139.2 (3x), 144.2,147.1,1 47.2, I 48, II 9, II 28.1, II 33, III 1.2, III

15.1, III 15.1 (L), III 30.1; power, potente, I 12.2 (2x), 140.6, II 1.2 (3x), II 2.1, II 9 T, II 22.1,
III 4, III 11.1 (2x); powerful, potente, potens (L), I 2.3 (2x), I 4 T, I 5.2,1 5.4,1 6.4, I 7.4 (2x), I

8.3.1 12.1,1 12.2 (4x), I 18.3,1 23.2,1 37.1,1 37.2,1 39.2,1 40.5,1 46,1 47.1,1 47.3, I 49.1, I

49.3 (4x), I 50,1 52 T, I 55.4,1 58.2,1 59, 1 Pr.l, II 1.1 (3x), II 1.2, II 2.3, II 3, II 4.1 (2x), II

5.2, II 6.2, II 9 (2x), II 10.1, II 12.4, II 13.2, II 17.2, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, II

448

27.2, II 27.4, II 30 T, 1130.1,1130.4,111 1.4,1112,1116.20,111 11.1,111 12.1, III 15.2, III 18.3,

III 29, III 34.2

praetor , Pretore, I 5.2, II 4.2 (2x), II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1, II 15.2, II 21 T, II 21.2 (2x), II 22.1, II
22.2; praetorian, pretoriant, I 10.4, III 6.10

praise (v.), laudare, lodare , DL (2x), 1 Pr.l, I 10.1 (4x), I 10.2,1 10.3,1 28, I 37.3, I 44.2, I 58.2,
1 Pr.l (2x), 1 Pr.2 (5x), 1 Pr.3 (2x), III 2, III 6.3, III 20, III 22.4 (2x), III 40.1 (2x); praise (n.),
laude, laus (L), 1 Pr.l, I 1.4,1 2.6 (2x), 14.2,1 8.1, I 10.1 (2x), I 10.3, I 10.4, 1 Pr.2, II 4.2, II

29.1, II 33, III 10.1, III 13.3, III 18.1, III 19.1, III 38.1 (L); praiseworthy, laudabile, I 9.4, I 10
T, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 21.4 (2x), III 22.4 (2x), III 40.1, III 41, III 42

prayers, prieghi, I 22
precept, precetto, 130.1
prelates, prelati, I 27.2, III 1.4

pride, orgoglio, II 24.2, III 16.1; pride, superbia, superbia (L), I 3.2, I 40.3, I 40.3 (L), I 40.4, I 41
T, I 47.2, II 14 T, III 23 (2x), III 43; proud, superbo, 141,1 47.2, III 4 (2x), III 5 (2x), III 19.1,
III 20, III 23; to become proud, insuperbito, I 46, II 26, II 27.2, II 27.3; proudly, superbamente,
superbe (L), I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2x)
priest, prete, I 12.2, III 6.14; priest, sacerdote, I 15,1 25, III 6.2

prince, principe, passim , principality, principato, DL, I 2.1,1 2.2 (2x), I 2.3,1 2.5,1 2.6,1 2.7,1 6.2,

I 16.4 (2x), I 26, I 55 T, I 55.5, I 55.6, I 59, II 1.3, II 9, III 4 T, III 4, III 5, III 6.18, III 6.19
(2x), III 9.2, III 34.3; principate, principato, I 10.6 (2x), I 27.1,1 52.3, III 6.3

private, privato, DL, I 1.6, I 2.3 (2x), I 7.2 (4x), I 8.1 (2x), I 10.2 (2x), I 26, I 36, I 37.2, I 46
(2x), I 47.3, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 6.1, II 19.1, II 28 T, II 28.1, III 1.6, III 5 (2x), III 6.1 (3x), III 6.2,
III 22.4 (2x), III 25, III 28 (7x), III 34.2, III 47 T, III 47; privately, privatamente, III 8.1, III 28
prodigies, prodigi, I 13.1,1 56

profit, profitto, profittare, I 43, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 4.2, II 33, III 11.2, III 23
progress, progressi, III 21.2

property, roba, I 37.3 (2x), III 6.2 (2x), III 6.3, III 6.20, III 19.1, III 27.2. C/belongings
proportion, proporzione, I 55.5,1 55.6, III 22.1, III 22.2 (2x); disproportion, disproporzione, I 6.1;
sproporzione. III 22.1

proverb, proverbio, I 47.3, II 16.1, III 34.3

province, provincia, provincale, 1 Pr.2,1 12.1,1 12.2 (4x), I 26 T, I 26 (3x), I 37.1,1 53.3,1 53.4, I
55.2 (4x), I 55.3,1 55.4 (5x), I 55.5, I 56 T, I 56 (2x), I 58.2, I 59, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2 (5x), II 1.3
(3x), II 2.1 (6x), II 2.3, II 4.1 (5x), II 4.2, II 5.2, II 8.1 (3x), II 8.2 (3x), II 12.1, II 12.4, II 17.1,

II 18.3, II 18.5, II 19.2 (5x), II 20, II 21.1, II 21.2, II 24.1, II 24.2, II 28.2, II 29.1, II 30.4, II

31.1, III 10.2, III 13.1, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.2 (2x), III 25, III 43 T, III 43
prudence, pmdenza, prudenzia, I 6.1,1 11.3,1 14 T, I 19.4, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 30.1, I 33.3, I 37.3, I

38.1.138.2.139.2.144.2.145.2.149.1.1 51,1 53.2,1 58.3,1 60, 1 Pr.3, II 1.2,116.1, II 10.1,
II 11.2,11 15.2 (2x), II 19.2 (2x), II 24.1,11 24.2 (2x), II 26,111 1.2,111 2, III 3, III 6.3 (2x), III
6.4,1116.5,1116.9,1116.12,1116.14 (2x), III 6.16, III 6.18 (2x), III 10.1, III 11.2, III 12.2, III

15.2, III 23, III 24, III 33.1 (2x), III 34 T, III 38.1, III 38.2; prudent , prudente, I 1.5, I 2.1 (2x),

I 2.3,19.2 (2x), I 11.3,1 12.1 (2x), I 18.4, I 21.1, I 21.2, I 27.1, I 38.2, I 47.3, I 49.3, I 50, I

51.153.4.1 55.4,1 58.3 (2x), II 10.1, II 10.3, ii 11 T, II 14, II 23.4, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 26 (2x),

II 27 T, II 27.1, II 27.4, III 1.2, III 2, III 4, III 5, III 6.4, III 6.6, III 6.8, III 6.15, III 12 T, III

12.1, III 12.2, III 12.3, III 22.2, III 23, III 37.4 (2x), III 43, III 49.3; prudently, prudentemente, I
2.5, I 5.1, I 11.4, I 11.5, I 14.3, I 46, II 33; imprudence, imprudenza. III 6.6; imprudent,
imprudente, 141 T, I 58.3; imprudently, imprudemente, I 35,140.5

449

public, publico, I 1.6 (2x), I 2.3 (2x), I 4.1, I 7.2, I 8.1 (2x), I 16.2 (2x), I 18.3, I 24.2, I 27.2, I

32.1 34.1 (2x), I 35 T, I 36 (3x), I 37.1,1 37.2 (2x), I 40.3, I 47.3, I 49.2, I 50, I 51, I 52.2, I

53.2.1 55.1,1 55.2,1 57,1 58.2, II 2.3, II 6.1 (2x), II 6.2, II 7, II 15.1, II 19.1, II 28 T, II 28.1,
I II 5, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 22.4 (3x), III 23, III 24 (2x), III 25, III 28 ( 6 x), III 30.1 (2x), III 31.4,
III 34.2 (2x), III 42, III 47; to make public, publicare, I 40.4, III 6.20, III 34.4; publicly,
publicamente, III 8.1

punish, gastigare, I 7.1,1 8.2,1 31.2 (2x), I 39.2,147.2,147.3,149.3, II 23.3 (2x), II 28.1 (2x), II
28.2, III 1.4, III 23, III 27.4, III 49.1 III 49.2; punish, punire, I 8.2 (2x), I 8.3,1 8.4 (4x), I 14 T,

I 24.1, I 30.1, I 31 T (2x), I 31.1 (2x), I 31.2 (2x), I 34.2, I 40.3, I 49.3 (2x), II 28.1, III 1.2
(2x), III 1.3, III 6.20, III 22.3, III 28, III 29, III 33.1 (3x), III 36.2, III 49.2 (5x), III 49.3;
unpunished, impunito. III 1.5, III 28, III 49.2 (2x); punishment, pena, poena (L), I 24 T, I 24.1
(2x), I 24.2, II 23.2 (L), II 26 (3x), III 1.3, III 6.4, III 6.9, III 12.1 (2x), III 12.2, III 19 T, III

19.1 (2x), III 19.1 (L), III 19.2, III 22.1 ; punishment, punizione, I 2.3, I 29.3, 131.1,1 31.2, III

1.4, III 22.3 (2x), III 29, III 49.2. For pena, see also penalty
purge, purgarsi, purgazione, I 14.2, II 5.2 (2x)

pusillanimous, pusillanimo, II 32.1. O’animus; intent; magnanimous; mind; spirit
queen, regina, II 12.1, III 4

race, generazione, I 10.1, II 5.2 (2x); gente, I 1.3, II 1.1, II 8.1. For generazione, see also generation;

kind; for gente, see also arms, men-at-; men, new; people; troops; cf law; nation
rank, grado, DL, I 2.7,1 5.2,1 5.4,1 6.2 (3x), I 8.1 I 10.1 (2x), I 10.6,1 11.2,1 16.5,1 18.3 (2x), I

26.1 29.2,1 33.3,1 34.1,1 36 (2x), I 37.1,1 38.2,1 39.2,1 46 (2x), I 47.1,1 47.2 (2x), I 47.3, I

52.1.1 53.3,154,1 55.6,1 56,1 58.2,160 (2x), II 4.1 (2x), 114.2,11 12.4,11 13.1 (2x), II 13.2,

II 14, II 23.3, III 6.3, III 14.1 (2x), III 16.2 (2x), III 16.3, III 22.1, III 25 (2x), III 30.1, III 33.1,
HI 34.4 (4x), III 38.1 (2x); rank, ordino, II 16.1 (7x), II 17.5, II 18.3, II 18.4, II 29.1. See also
condition; degree; favor

read, leggere, DL, 1 Pr.2 (2x), 1 1.1,14.1,1 8.3,1 10.2,1 16.1,1 23.4,1 28,1 29.1,1 39.1,1 40.3, I

52.1, 1 Pr.3, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 5.1, II 8.2, II 13.1, H 18.3,1120,11 29.1 (2x), II 30.2, II 33, III 3,

III 6.10, III 6.19, III 7, III 12.2, III 22.6, III 30.1, III 31.4, III 35.1, III 40.1, III 42, III 43 (2x),
III 46 (2x); reading, lezione, DL, I 10.4, II 2.1. Cf write

real, giusto, III 10.2. See also just

reason (n.), ragione, 14.1,1 5.2 (2x), I 6.4 (2x), I 11.3, I 12.2 (2x), I 18.1, I 23.4, I 24.1, I 28, I

31.2.1 34.1,1 34.2,1 38.2,1 40.5,146 (2x), I 49.3,1 53.2,1 55.4 (2x), I 55.6,1 58.1, 1 Pr.2, II

1.1, II 2.1 (2x), II 12.1, II 12.3, II 16.1, II 17.1, II 17.5 (2x), II 18.1, II 18.2, II 22.2, II 23.3
(2x), II 24.1, II 27.1, II 32.1, III 5, III 8.1, III 10.2, III 16.1, III 21.2, III 33.1, III 33.2; reason
(v.), ragionare, I 2.1,1 3.1,1 5.3,1 14.1,1 16.2,1 18.5,1 31.2, I 58.4 (2x), 1 Pr.l, II 8.1 (2x), II
8.3, II 11.2, II 31.1, III 5, III 6.1, III 6.2, III 6.20, III 19.1 (2x), III 25; reasonable, reasonably,
ragionevole, ragionevolmente, I 5.2,1 16.1,1 33.2,1 36,1 46,1 47.1, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 5.2,

II 7, II 9, II 22.1, II 23.2, III 1.2, III 6.2, III 6.15, III 28, III 35.2, III 48.1 (2x), III 48.2;
reasoning, ragionamento, I 6.4,1 16.2, 1 Pr.3, III 6 . 6 . For ragione, see also account; just; type; for
ragionamento, see also argument; discuss

rebel (v.), ribellarsi, ribello, rebello (L), I 6.4, I 38.3, II 1.1, II 3 (2x), II 17.1, II 19.2, II 23.3, II

23.4, II 24.2 (3x), II 24.3, II 30.4, III 11.2, III 12.1, III 15.1, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22.1, III 32,

III 44.1 (L); rebel (n.), ribello, II 31.2, III 6.16; rebellion, ribellione, rebellion, I 6.4, II 1.1, II
16.2, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 24.3 (3x), III 5, III 12.1, III 31.3, III 32, III 44.3

reborn, rinascere, I 17.3, II 24.1, III 1.2 (2x)
reform, riformare, I 9 T, I 9.2,1 17.1,1 25 T, I 25,1 49.2

450

reign, regnare, I 7.5,1 17.1,1 27.1,1 27.2,1 29.2,1 55.2,1 58.4, 1 Pr.3 (2x), II 2.1, III 2, III 4, III

14.1. See also rule; cf king

relative,* parente, I 35, III 2, III 6.7, III 6.17, III 8.1, III 34.2

religion, religione, religio (L), 1 Pr.2, I 9.1, I 10.1 (2x), I 11 T, I 11.1 (2x), I 11.2 (3x), I 11.3, I
11.4 (2x), I 12 T, I 12.1 (1 lx), I 12.2 (4x), I 13 T, I 13.1 (4x), I 13.2 (4x), I 1.4 T, I 14.1 (2x),

I 14.2,1 15 T, I 15 (3x), I 55.1,1 55.2 (2x), 1 Pr.2, II 2.2 (6x), II 4.2, II 5.1 (2x), II 5.2, II 29.1,
III 1.2 (3x), III 1.4 (3x), III 29 (L), III 33.1 (2x), III 33.1 (L); religious, religiosa, I 12.1, I 19.1,
III 1.2. Cf sect

remedy (n.), rimedio, 1 Pr.2, I 2.2, I 4.1, I 6.2, I 7.5, I 13.1, I 13.2, I 15 T, I 15, I 16.4 (2x), I

16.6.1 26,1 30.2 (2x), I 32, I 33.1 (2x), I 33.2, I 33.4 (2x), I 33.5, I 34.2, I 34.3 (2x), I 37.2
(2x), I 39.1,1 46 (2x), I 49.1,149.3,1 50,1 53.5 (2x), I 54,1 57,1 58.4 (2x), II 1.2, II 9, II 12.4
(2x), II 16.2, II 17.3 (2x), II 17.5, II 18.1, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 23.3, II 26, II 27.4 (2x), II 29.1
(2x), II 30.3, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 1.6, III 6.6, III 6.8 (2x), III 6.9, III 6.17, III 6.18 (2x), III 6.19,
III 10.1 (2x), III 11.1, III 11.2 (3x), III 16.2, III 17, III 24, III 25, III 26.2, III 27.2, III 30.1, III
32, III 35.3, III 46, III 49.4; remedy (n.), rimediare, II 29.1; remedy (v.), rimediare, I 16.4, I

33.1 (2x), I 33.2,1 34.3,1 37.2,1 47.3,1 53.2,1 57, II 4.1, III 6.17, III 15.1, III 21.4, III 26.2
remembrances, memorie, I 16.1. See also memory

renew, rinnovare, I 9.4,1 18.2,1 18.4 (2x), I 25, II 16.1, II 18.1, III 1.1 (2x), III 1.2 (2x), III 1.3,
III 1.5 (2x), III 22.3, III 34.2; renewal, rinnovazione. III 1.1, III 1.4 (2x). Cf innovate
repent, ravvedersi, II 18.5; repent, pentirsi, I 16.5,158.3, III 6.7
republic, republica, respublica (L), passim, republic, res* (L), II 23.2

reputation, riputazione, I 3.2,1 6.1, I 7.5, I 8.1, I 9.4, I 19.3, I 19.4, I 24.1, I 29.1 (2x), I 29.3, I

33.1.1 33.3 (2x), 140.5,145.2 (2x), I 46,1 52.2 (3x), I 52.3,1 55.6, II 1.2, II 5.1, II 5.2, II 6.1,

II 9, II 13.2 (2x), II 18.3 (4x), II 18.5 (3x), II 19.2, II 22.2, II 29.2, II 30 T, II 30.2, II 32.2, III
1.2, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 3, III 6.19, III 15.2, III 16.1 (2x), III 16.2, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.4, III
22.6, III 24, III 28 (5x), III 30.1, III 33.1, III 34.2 (4x), III 34.3 (2x), III 37.2 (2x), III 37.3, III
37.4, III 38.1, III 43; reputation, reputato, II 18.3, III 6.3; reputation, opinion* II 11 T; repute,
reputazione, I 6.2; reputed, riputato, I 29.3, I 48, I 54, II 5.1, II 24.2, III 6.8, III 13.3, III 16.1,

III 16.2, III 21.3, III 28 (2x), III 30.1 (2x), III 34.2, III 37.2. For opinione, see also believe;
opinion

respect, rispetto, 1 Pr.l, I 2.3 (2x), I 2.6,1 7.1, I 8.2, I 24.2, I 27.1, I 46, I 58.2, I 58.3, I 60 T, I
60 (2x), II 1.2, II 9, II 17.2, II 24.1, II 24.2, III 3 (2x), III 6.16, III 6.19 (3x), III 8.1 (2x), III
35.2; respectfully, rispetttvamente, III 9.1. See also hesitate; thank
reveal, rivelare, III 6.5, III 6.16; revelations, revelazioni, 156
revenge, vendetta, II 2.1 (2x), II 26, III 6.18. See also vengeance; (/avenge
reverence, reverenza, riverenzia, I 2.3,1 10.5,1 11.5, I 12.1, I 36, I 53.1, I 54 (2x), II 20, III 6.14
(2x), III 6.15, III 22.6; reverent, reverente, III 22.1, III 25; reverend, riverendo, I 54 (2x)
review (v.), discorrere, I 11.1,1 58.3, II 20, III 13.1, III 29. See also discourse; discuss
reward (n.), premio , praemium (L), 1 Pr.l, I 16.3,1 24 T, I 24.1, I 24.2 (2x), I 29.1, I 29.2 (2x), I
60 (2x), I 60 (L), II 30.2, III 3, III 28 (2x), III 35.1; reward (v.), premiare, I 8.4,1 10.5,1 24.1, I

29.1 (2x), I 29.3,1 30.1,1 31.1; reward (v.), rimunerare, I 16.3, III 23

rich, ricco, I 10.5, I 26 (2x), I 34.2, I 37.1, I 53.1, II 6.2 (2x), II 19.1, III 26.1, III 28, III 29; to
become rich, arricchire, I 37.2, II 6.2, III 25; enrich, arricchire, I 27.1, I 53.1, II 6.1, III 25;
riches, ruchezze, DL, I 2.3, I 5.4, I 10.5 (2x), I 16.3, I 29.1, I 35, I 55.6, II 2.1 (2x), II 2.3, II

12.1, III 16 T, III 16.2, III 25 (2x). See also wealth
right,* rightly, diritto, * dirittamente, DL, I 2.1,1 2.7,1 35
rites, riti, I 12.1. (/ceremony

451

royal, regio, III 3 . See also king

rule (v.), imperare, II 21.2; rule (n.), imperio, imperium (L), I 6.2 (2x), II 21.2 (3x), II 23.2 (L), II
23.3; rule (v.), reggere, rego (L), I 6.1,1 10.3,1 19.3, II 4.1, II 25.1, III 5 (2x), III 19 T, III 19.1,
III 19.1 (L); rule (n.), regola, I 9.2,1 18.1, II 18.2, II 33, III 22.1; rule (v.), regnare, III 8.1. For
imperare and imperio, see also command; empire; for regnare, see also reign; cf king
rumor, romore* I 40.3 \ farm, II 12.2. See also fame; noise; (/infamy

sacrifice (n.), sacrificio, I 12.1 (2x), I 15.1 (2x), I 25 (3x), II 22.2 (2x); sacrifice (v.), sacrifcare, III
45; sacrificing, Sacrificulo, I 25

safety, salute, I 8.1,1 11,5,1 53.2,1 57, I 58.2, III 1.1 (2x), III 3, III 11.2, III 18.1 (2x), III 30.1,
III 30.2, III 41. See also greetings; health; salvation; (/salutary
salutary, salutifero, I33T, 133.5. Cf safety; salvation

salvation, salute, salus (L), II 8.1, III 6.15, III 39.2 (L). See also greetings; health; safety; (/salutary
satisfy, soddisfare, sodisfare, satisfare, DL, I 4.1,1 5.2,1 16.5 (4x), I 25,1 29.1,140.5,1 44.2 (2x), I
50, I 55.1, II 23.4, II 29.3, III 2, III 23, III 28, III 30.1, III 32; satisfaction, soddisfazione,
sodisfazione, satisfazione, DL, I 10.1,1 16.5,1 25,1 37.1,1 55.1, II 27.4, II 28.1 (2x), III 5 (2x)
scandal, scandolo, I 3.2,1 5.2,1 7.4, 1 8.3,1 16.4,1 17.3 I 37 T, I 37.2,1 37.3,1 39.1, I 54, I 55.3,

II 19.2, III 27.2, III 30.1 (2x); scandalous, scandoloso, I 37 T, I 37.1,1 52 T, I 52.1, II 23.3
science, scienza, III 39.1, III 39.2

secret, secreto, segreto, I 52.2, III 6.2, III 6.5 (2x), III 6.7

sect, setta, I 7.3, 1 8.3 (2x), I 12.1, 1 Pr.2 (2x), II 5 T, II 5.1 (7x), III 1 T, III 1.1, III 1.2, III 1.4,

III 1.6, III 25. Cf religion

secure (v.), assicurare, I 1.4,1 16.4 (4x), I 16.5 (3x), I 29.1,1 30.1,1 32 (2x), I 37.1,1 40.6,1 45.2,
145.3, II 23.2 (2x), II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.4, II 30.2, III 4, III 6.4, III 6.10, III 6.11, III 6.18, III
22.6 (2x), III 37.3, III 38.1; secure (adj.), sicuro, securo, I 10.5 (2x), I 10.6,1 16.4,1 16.5 (4x), I

18.3.133.2.140.6.1 52 T, II 3, II 4.2, II 6.1, II 17.2 (2x), II 17.3, III 2, III 4 T, III 4, III 6.18,
III 6.19, III 10.1, III 10.3, III 18.2, III 18.3, III 27.2, III 45; securely, sicuramente, sicuro, I 1.1, I

1.3.1 2.1,1 5 T, I 5.4, II 2.2, II 4.2, II 24.2, III 2, III 5; security, sicurtd, I 3.2, I 10.1, I 10.2, I

10.4.1 10.5,1 16.5 (2x), I 18.3, II 21.2, II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.2, III 5, III 33.1
sedition, sedizione, I 10.5,1 13.2,1 24.2, II 26 (2x), III 26.1 (2x)
sempiternal, sempiterno, I 10.6. Cf eternal

Senate, Senato, I 2.7 (4x), I 3.2 (2x), I 4 T, I 4.1 (2x), I 6 T, I 6.1 (2x), I 6.2, I 6.3 (2x), I 6.4, I

7.1 (2x), I 7.5 (2x), I 8.1 (2x), I 9.2 (2x), I 10.4,1 10.5,1 11.1 (2x), I 11.2,1 13.2 (2x), I 18.2, I
32 (2x), I 34.2,1 35 (3x), I 37.2, I 37.3, I 38.1, I 38.2 (2x), I 40.1, I 40.3, I 40.4 (4x), I 40.7
(2x), 144.1 (3x), 147.2 (4x), 147.3 (2x), I 48, I 49.1, I 50 (3x), I 51 (3x), I 52.3 (3x), I 53.1
(3x), I 53.3 (2x), I 53.4,1 54,1 55.1 (4x), I 55.2,1 56, I 57, II 20, II 23.2 (3x), II 23.4 (3x), II

25.1, II 27.1 (2x), II 28.1, II 29.1, II 33 (8x), III 1.2. Ill 4, III 5 (3x), III 6.15, III 6.16, III 6.19
(4x), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 11.1, III 11.2, III 17, III 22.6, III 24 (5x), III 25 (2x), III 28, III 30.1
(2x), III 31.2, III 32, III 42 (2x), III 46, III 47; senator, Senatore, I 40.4 (2x), I 47.2 (5x), II
23.4, III 47; senatorial, senatorio, I 31.2,1 35,147.2,1 53.3. Cf father

sentence, sentenza, sentenzia, I 29.1,140.4,1 45.2,146, II 10.1 (2x). See also judge; verdict
sermons, predicazione, 145.2, III 1.4; prediche, III 30.1

serve, servire, servio (L), I 11.2,1 13 T, I 13.1,1 13.2,1 21.3,1 36,1 58.1 (L), 158.2, II 2.4 (2x), II

15.2, II 16.2, III 12.1, III 23; servile, servilely, servo, I 16.5,1 22,1 34.1,1 37.3,1 40.5,149 T, I

49.2.1 49.3,1 55.4, II 2.3, II 13.2 (2x), II 16.1 (2x), II 18.3, II 27.4, III 8.2 (2x), III 12.2, III 24
T, III 24; servitude, servitu, servitus (L), I 2.1,1 16.1,1 16.4,1 21.3,1 28,1 37.3,1 40.4 (L), I 46,

452

II 2.1, II 2.4 (3x), II 13.2 (L), II 21.2, II 22.1, II 23.4 (L), II 26, III 7 T (2x), III 13.3, III 24, III

26.2. See also slave; (/military

shade, ombra, II 30.2; shadow, ombra, umbra (L), I 25 T, I 25,1 28,1 30.2,146, II 13.2 (L)
shame, vergogna, vergognare, I 11.2, I 34.4, I 38.3, I 58.1, II 9, II 15.1, II 23.3, II 31.2 (2x), III

10.2, III 14.3, III 41, III 42; shameful, vergognoso, II 24.2, II 26, III 30.1, III 42; to be
ashamed, vergognarsi, I 21.1,1 36,1 38.1,1 47.1,148 (2x), II 4.2, II 27.4, III 1.3

shepherd, past ore, III 40.2, III 48.1

signoria, Signoria, I 39.2,1 45.2 (2x). Cf lord; master

silent, to keep or to be, tacere, III 10.1, III 15.2, III 35.2 (2x), III 42, III 47; silence, tacere, III 6.6
silver, argento, ariento, II 6.2, II 10.1, III 25 (2x)

sin, peccare, peccato, I 7.1, I 10.5, I 29.1, I 31.2, I 58.3, II 18.3, II 23.3, II 28.1, III 29 T, III 29
(3x), III 49.3

sister, sorella, I 7.5,1 22,1 24.1,1 27.1, III 6.15

site, sito, I 1.1,1 1.2,1 1.4 (5x), I 1.5,121.1,1 23.3, I 53.1, II 3, II 10.1, II 11.1, II 17.3, II 17.5,

II 24.2, II 32.1, III 39 T, III 39.1

slave, schiavo, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 27.2; slave, servo, semens (L), I 10.5, I 13.2, II 26, III 6.5 (3x), III

6.7, III 6.14, III 13.3, III 31.2, III 44.1 (L). See also serve
slay, slayer, uccidere, ucciditore, II 2.1, III 6.14, III 32. Cf kill

son, figliuolo, filius (L), I 2.3,1 11.1, I 16.4, I 16.6, I 19.2 (3x), II 2.3, II 8.2 (L), II 12.2, II 16.1
(2x), II 24.2 (3x), II 28.2, III 1.3 (2x), III 3 T, III 3 (3x), III 4 (4x), III 5 (3x), III 6.2, III 6.5, III

6.8, III 6.18 (2x), III 6.20, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 31.3, III 34.2 (2x), III 44.3; son-in-law, genero,
gener (L), II 28.2, III 4, III 6.2 (L), III 6.2, III 25. See also child; daughter

sort,* sorte, sorta, I 37.2,1 40.6, II 6.2, II 19.1, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 7 (2x). See also fate; lot; luck
spare, perdonare, I 8.2, II 24.2, II 26. See also pardon
species, spezie, I 2 T, I 28,1 55.4, III 28. See also appearance

spirit, animo, animus (L), I 2.3,13.1,1 3.2,1 5.2,1 15,1 27.2,1 29.3,131.1,141,143,1 45.2 (2x),
I 45.3 (3x), I 47.1 (2x)(L), I 55.4, I 55.5, I 57, I 60, 1 Pr.3, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 12.3, II 12.4, II

15.1 (3x), II 16.1 (2x), II 18.2, II 19.2 (L), II 21.2, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, II 23.4 (L), II 24.1, II
26, II 29 T, II 29.1 (L), II 32.1, III 1.3, III 5, III 6.2 (6x), III 6.6 (3x), III 6.8, III 6.12 (2x), III
6.13, III 6.14 (2x), III 6.15 (2x), III 6.15 (L), III 6.16, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.3, III 12.1, III

14.1, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 20, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.5, III 23, III 25 (3x), III 28, III 30.1, III
31 T, III 31.1, III 31.1 (L), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3 (4x), III 31.4, III 32, III 33.1 (L), III 36.2 (3x),

III 37.2, III 37.3 (2x), III 38.1, III 48.1, III 49.2; spirit, spirito, II 29.2, III 31.4; to give spirit,
inanimare. III 31.4; spirited, anitnoso, I 53.2 (2x), 1 Pr.3, II 14, II 18.2 (2x), III 6.15, III 6.19,
III 33.1; spiritedly, animosamente, I 30.1, II 24.2, III 1.3, III 34.3; spiritedness, animosita, I 7.3.
For animo, see also animus; intent; mind; cf magnanimous; pusillanimous; for inanimare, see also
inspire; cf animate

spokesmen, oratori, I 38.3, II 2.4, II 10.1, II 15.2, II 27.1, II 27.2, II 28.1 (2x), II 29.1, II 30.4, III

31.2, III 32. Cf oration

stable, stabile, I 2.5, I 7.1, I 58.3 (2x), I 59, III 32; stability, stabilita, I 58.3, I 59; stabilize,
stabilire, I 2.7,140.1,140.2
state, stato, status (L), passim

steel, ferro, I 10.5,1 11.1,158.4 (2x), II 10.1 (2x), II 10.2 (2x), II 17.4, II 30.2, III 6.15, III 6.20,
III 12.3, III 14.1

storm, storming, espugnazione, espugnare, I 38.3, II 17.1, II 32.1 (4x), II 32.2. See also capture
strength, fortezza, I 15, II 2.2 (2x), II 10.1, III 6.6, III 22.3 (2x); strength, forze, I 6.3,1 9.4 (2x), I

33.1.1 33.2 (2x), I 33.5 (2x), II 2.1, II 4.1, II 12.2, II 30 T, III 6.20, III 13.1, III 22.4, III 28.

453

For fortezzci, see also fortress; for forze, see also force
stroke, tratto, 12.1,1 16.5,1 18.3,1 18.4 (2x), I 21.1, I 27.1, I 45.3, I 50, I 52.2, II 4.1, III 6.19,
III 12.3, III 31.3, III 43, III 44.3

strong, strongly, forte* I 1.4, I 1.5, I 6.4, I 17.1, I 33.3, II 2.2 (3x), II 6.1, II 10.1, II 16.2, II

17.4, II 19.1, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 30.1, III 6.6, III 18.3, III 22.1 (3x), III 22.2, III 22.3 (2x), III

30.1, III 31 T; strongholds,* luoght forti* III 10.1, III 10.3

struggle, fazione I 29.1, II 18.3, II 32.1, III 33.1, III 39.1, III 45. See also faction
stupidity, stultizia, I 44.2, III 2

succession, successione, I 2.3,1 9.2,1 11.4,1 17.1,1 17.3,1 20 T (2x), I 20 (3x)

suitable, conveniente, III 9.1 (2x), III 11.2. See also convenient; fitting

sun, Sole, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 30.2, II 30.5, III 23

superintendents, prow edit on, II 33, III 31.3

supernatural, soprannaturale, 156. Cf nature

suspect (v.), dubitare, I 45.3, III 6.16, III 6.19, III 22 2; suspect (v.), sospettare, I 28 (2x), I 29.3, I

33.2, III 22.6; suspect (adj.), suspicion, sospetto, suspizione, I 4.1,1 6.3,1 16.3,1 28, I 29.1 (3x),

129.2.129.3 (5x), 130.1 (2x), I 30.2,1 31.1,1 40.3,1 52.2 (2x), H 2.1, II 13.2,111 6.9, III 6.20
(2x), III 8.1, III 22.4, III 22.6 (2x), III 35.3; suspicious, sospettoso, I 28, I 29.1. For dubitare, see
also doubt; fear; hesitate

swear, giurare, I 11.1 (3x), I 13.2,1 15 (4x), I 17.1, III 2, III 6.7 (2x), III 34.3. Cf conspire; oath

tax (v.), taglieggiare, II 27.3; taxes, tributi, I 8.1, I 51 (2x), I 52.1, II 6.2; tax, gabelle, I 32; tax,
gravezze, I 39.2 (2x)

teach, insegnare, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 18.2, III 38.1, III 39.1
temple, tempio, templo, I 10.5,1 12.1 (4x), II 1.1, II 28.2, III 6.2
temporal, temporale* I 12.2 (2x)

temporize, temporeggiarsi, I 33 T, I 33.2, I 33.5 (2x), I 37.2, I 37.3, III 11.2 (3x) terror, terrore, I
13.2,1 23.2, II 22.2, III 1.3, III 14.3, III 21.4, III 37.2 (2x), III 37.4, III 38.1; terrible, terribile,
II 2.2, III 49.2; terrify, terrified, sbigottire, dare sbigottimento, sbigottito, I 10.6, I 11.1, I 11.5, I

13.1, I 15, I 23.4, I 31.1, I 40.3, I 55.5, II 10.1, III 3, III 6.14 (2x), III 7, III 9.1, III 14.1, III

14.3 (3x), III 25, III 31.2, III 31.4, III 33.1, III 37.3

testimony, testimonio, tesiimone, testimonanza, I 3.2,1 58.3, I 60, 1 Pr. 1, II 18.4, III 34.4, III 36.2.
See also witness

text, testo, I 8.2, 140.5, I 54 (2x), I 57, I 58.3, II 11.1, II 14, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 20, II 23.4, II

29.2, III 26.2, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 36.2, III 39.2

thank, ringraziare, I 31.2 (2x); thanks to, rispetto a, II 17.2, II 19.2. See also hesitate; respect
theology, teologia, II 5.1
think, pensare, passim
thrift, parsimonia, II 19.2

thrust, impeto, empito, I 1.1, I 33.5, I 53.2, I 57, II 12.4, II 17.1 (4x), II 17.5, II 19.1, II 24.2, II

24.4, II 29.1, III 11 T, III 11.2, III 31.4 (2x), III 36.2, III 43, III 45 T, III 45 (3x). See also
impetuosity; vehemence

title, titolo* I 34.1 (2x), II 4.1 (3x), II 19.2, III 10.1, III 38.1 (2x)
tongue, lingua, III 12.1. See also language

town, terra, I 12.2,1 13.1, I 27.1, I 37.2, I 38.3, I 39.2, 1 51,1 55.2, I 55.4, I 55.6, II 2.1, II 2.3
(2x), II 12.3, II 17.1 (7x), II 17.2 (5x), II 17.3, II 17.4 (3x), II 18.3, II 19.2, II 20 (2x), II 21.1,
II 23.2 (4x), II 24.3 (5x), II 26, II 27.2 (2x), II 29.1, II 30.4, II 31.2, II 32 T, II 32.1 (4x), II
32.2,11 33,1116.2,111 6.20 (2x), III 10.2,111 10.3,111 10.4 (2x), III 11.2, III 12.1 (3x), III 12.2

454

(2x), III 14.1, III 15.1, III 20 (4x), III 21.4, III 26.1, III 27.3 (2x), III 27.4 (3x), III 29, III 32,
III 37.3, III 44.1, III 49.1; fortified town, castello* III 27.4. See also earth; ground; land
traitor, traditore, III 6.15, III 35.3

treasure, tesoro, I 8.1 (2x), II 10.1 (4x), II 10.2; treasury, erario, II 6.2 (2x), II 10.1
treatise, trattato , II 1.3, II 2.1, III 19.1, III 42. See also treatment; treaty
treatment,* trattato , I 43. See also treatise; treaty
treaty, capitolo, II 9; trattato, II 32.1. See also chapter; treatise; treatment
tribunals, tribunali, 1 Pr.2, III 3

tribune, tribune, tnbunus (L), I 2.7, I 3 T, I 3.2, I 4.1, I 4.2, I 5.2, I 6.4, I 7.1 (2x), I 11.1 (2x), I

13.1 (4x), I 13.2 (6x), I 18.2,1 18.3,1 35 (4x), I 37.1,1 37.2 (2x), I 39.2 (3x), I 40.2, I 40.3, I
40.4 (2x), I 40.7,144.1 (2x), 145.3,146,147.1 (2x), 148,1 50 (2x), 151, I 52.1, I 57, I 58.3,

II 28.1, II 29.1, III 1.2 (2x), III 1.3, III 6.8 (2x), III 8.1 (2x), III 11.1 (2x), III 11.2, III 12.2, III

15.1, III 15.1 (L), III 22.1, III 24, III 30.1 (4x), III 33.1, III 34.1 (2x), III 39.2, III 39.2 (L), III
46; tribunate (n.), Tribunate, I 13.1, I 50; tribunate (adj.), tribunizio, I 6.4, I 39.2, I 40.5, III

11.1

triumph (n.), trionfo, II 6.2, III 22.1, III 23, III 25, III 28, III 34.2, III 34.3 (2x); triumph (v.),
trionfare, I 10.5,1 60, II 6.2 (2x); triumphal, trionfale. III 23
troops, genti, gente, I 23.2, I 23.4, I 27.1, I 38.3 (3x), I 53.5, I 59, II 15.2, II 16.2 (3x), II 18.4
(2x), II 19.1, II 20, II 22.1 (2x), II 24.2, II 27.2, II 31.1, III 10.2, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 15.2, III
18.3 (3x), III 35.1, III 43, III 44.2, III 44.3, III 47, III 48.2. See also arms, men-at; men, new;
people; race

trouble,* guerra, III 6. 2. See also war

trust (v.), confidare, confidarsi, I 1.3, I 5.4, I 23.2, I 32, I 38.3, I 55.1, I 59 T, II 11.1, II 18.1, II

18.4, III 6.6, III 6.8, III 6.20, III 13 T, III 13.3, III 33.1 (4x); trusted, confidente, II 25.1, III
6.16; trust (v.), fidarsi, I 38.3,1 57, 1 59 T, I 59, II 11.1 (2x), II 17.1,11 17.5, II 20, III 6.4 (2x),

III 31.4, III 40.1, III 43; entrust oneself, fidarst, III 10.1; trust (n.), fidanza, III 33.2; distrust,
dijfidare, I 38.3. For confidare and confidente, see also confident; for fidarsi, (/faith; vouch

truth, vero, * verum (L), 14.1,1 58.3, II 6.1, II 23.4, II 26 (L), III 6.5, III 6.14; truth, venta, 13.1,1
4.1,1 8.2,1 12.2,1 21.1,1 56,1 58.3, 1 Pr.l (2x), 1 Pr.2, II 2.2, II 7, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 22.2, III

27.4, III 34.4

tumult, tumultuare, tumulto, tumultuartamente, I 2.1, I 4.1 (6x), I 4.2, I 5 T, I 5.4, I 6.1 (3x), I 6.2
(2x), I 6.3 (2x), I 6.4,1 7.1,1 7.2, 1 8.1,1 12.1,1 13 T, I 13.2,1 17.2,1 17.3,1 40.4, I 46, I 47.2
(2x), I 52.1 (2x), I 53.3, I 54 (3x), II 2.1, III 1.3, III 8.1, III 12.2, III 22.6, III 24, III 26.1, III

27.1, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 46; tumultuous, tumultuously, tumultuouso, tumultuario,
tumultuosamente, tumultuariamente, 14.1 (2x), I 58.4, II 3, II 25.1, II 29.1, III 13.3, III 14.1, III
30.2 (2x)

type, ragione, I 2.2,1 10.1, 1 Pr.2, II 17.3, III 21.1, III 36.2. See also account; just; reason
tyrant, tiranno, tirannus (L), I 2.3,1 16.5 (2x), I 27.1 (2x), I 34.1, I 35, I 37.2, I 40.5 (3x), I 40.6
(2x), I 58.2, I 58.4, II 2.1 (3x), II 15.2, III 6.2 (2x), III 6.2 (L), III 6.7 (2x), III 6.16 (6x), III
6.19 (3x), III 6.20, III 26.2; tyranny, tirannide, I 2.3 (2x), I 2.6, I 9.4, I 10 T, I 10.1, I 12.2, I
16.3, I 17.1, I 25, I 29.3, I 34.1 (2x), I 40.1, I 40.5 (lx), I 40.7, I 41, I 42, II 2.1 (3x), III 3
(3x), III 6.2, III 6.7 (2x), III 6.19 (3x), III 8.1, III 8.2 (2x), III 22.6, III 28 T, III 28; tyrannical,
tyrannically, tirannico, tirannicamente, I 2.2, I 9.2, I 16.3, III 3.1, III 5, III 7; tyrannize,
tiranneggiare, 140.5, II 2.1; tyrannicides, tirannicidi, II 2.1

uncle, zio, II 13.1 (2x), II 31.1. Cf cousins; nephew

455

union, unione, I 3.2,1 6.2,1 6.3,1 47.2, II 25.1 (2x); disunion, disunione, I 2.7 (2x), I 4 T, I 4.1, I
12.2, II 25 T, II 25.1 (4x)

unite, united, unire, unito, I 1.1,1 1.4,1 6.1,1 6.2 (2x), I 12.1 (2x), I 12.2, I 33.5, I 47.2, I 55.2, I
57, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 16.1, II 19.2, II 25.1 (2x), III 8.1, III 11.1, III 21.4, III 27 T, III 27.4, III
33.1; disunite, disunire, I 50, II 25 T, II 25.1 (4x), III 11.1, III 15.1; disunite, disgiungere, II 2.1,

II 4.2, II 24.1, III 11.2

universal, universally, universale, universalmente, universus (L), I 1 T, I 6.4, I 16.5, I 18.1, I 47.1
(L), 1 53.5,1 58.3, II 5.2, II 6.1, II 17 T, II 17.1, III 6.2 (3x). See also collectivity
upset (v.), alterare, I 39.2, II 23.4, III 14.2. See also alter

usage, uso* DL, I 12.1,1 55.3, II 3, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 16.1; usage, usanza, I 34.3, II 18.3
useful, utile, I 1.4,17.1 (3x), I 7.5,1 8 T, I 9.4,1 16.3,133.1 (2x), 145.2 (2x), I 50 (3x), I 52.3, I

53.1, I 53.2, I 54, I 58.3, I 59, II 6.1 (3x), II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.6, II 18.2, II 19.1, II 20, II
23.4, II 24 T, II 24.1 (3x), II 24.2 (3x), II 24.4, II 32.1, III 2, III 3, III 10.2 (2x), III 12.1, III

18.1, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.4, III 22.6 (2x), III 23, III 25, III 30.1, III 35.2, III 39.2 (2x), III
45; usefulness, utile, II 4.2 (2x), II 6.2, III 30.1; usefully, utile, utilmente, I 7.5, I 38.3; useless,
disutile, II 24.1, III 14.2; useless, inutile, inutilis (L), I 7.5, I 36, I 41 T, I 44 T, I 53.1, II 4.1
(2x), II 4.2 (3x), II 17.2, II 17.5 (2x), II 17.6, II 20, II 24.1, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 24.4 (3x), II

29.1 (2x), II 32.2, III 14.3, III 15.1 (L), III 27.1, III 27.2, III 30.2, III 35.3, III 36.2, III 37.4;
uselessly, inutilmente, II 25.1; uselessness, inutilita, I 18.4,1 43, I 44.1 II 18.2, II 24.2, III 15.1,

III 27.3. See also utility

usurp, usurpare, I 5.2 (2x), I 8.1, III 4, III 11.2; usurpation, usurpazione, I 2.3

utility, utile, I 59 (3x), II 12.4, II 30.2, III 25; utility, utilita, 1 Pr.l, 1 Pr.2,1 8.1,1 10.1,1 42, I 50,

I 53.2,1 59 (2x), II 2.1, II 6.1, II 17.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 26 T, II 32.1, III 8.1, III 22.4, III 23,
III 24, III 30.1. See also common benefit; useful

vehemence, impeto, II 2.1. See also impetuosity; thrust
venerate, venerare, I 12.1; veneration, venerazione, I 12.1

vengeance, vendetta, III 5, III 6.2 (2x), III 6.3, III 6.18, III 7. See also revenge; cf avenge
vent, sfogare, isfogare, I 4.1,1 7.1 (4x), I 7.3,1 7.4,1 7.5,1 14.2,1 37.3, II 28.2, III 6.2, III 6.20
verdict, sentenza, sentenzia, 1 Pr.2,1 37.1,1 58.2, III 1.5, III 6.1. See also judge; sentence
vice, vizio, I 2.2,1 29.1,1 29.3,1 30 T, I 30.2, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, III 20, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 43
victor, vincitore, I 22, 1 Pr.l, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 22.1 (3x), II 22.2 (3x), III 18.2; victory, vittoria,
victoria (L), I 1.5, I 14.1, I 14.2, I 14.3, I 15 (L), I 22, I 29.1 (3x), I 29.2 (2x), I 29.3, I 30.1
(2x), I 30.2, I 31.2, I 53.5 (2x), 1 Pr.l, II 1.1 (2x), II 1.2, II 13.2, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 16.2, II

17.1, II 17.5, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 22.1 (2x), II 22.2 (3x), II 26, II 27.1 (5x), II 27.4 (4x), II 33
(3x), III 12.2, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 18.2, III 18.3, III 19.1, III 20 (2x), III 21.1, III 22.1 (L), III
22.4 (3x), III 24, III 31.2, III 33.1 (2x), III 33.2 (2x), III 34.2 (2x), III 36.2, III 37.3, III 40.2,
III 42, III 45 (2x) victorious, vittorioso, 143, 1 Pr.l, II 19.2, III 14.1, III 18.1, III 18.2. See also
conquer

vindictive, vendicativo, III 16.2. O'avenge

vile, vile, I 48 T (2x), I 48,1 53.3, III 14.3. See also cowardice

violate, violare, I 7.5,1 45.1 (2x), 146, III 26.2

violence, violenza, 14.1,1 18.4 (2x), I 28,1 35,1 38.4,1 40.4, I 40.5, I 40.6, I 52.1, II 4.1, II 8.2,

II 8.3, II 16.3, II 24.1, II 24.2 (2x), II 24.3 II 32.1 (3x), III 7 (2x), III 21.1, III 22.2 (3x), III

30.1 (2x); to do violence, violentare, III 22.2 (2x); violent, violento, I 9.2 (2x), I 10.1, I 17.2, I
20,130.1,11 24.1,111 20,111 34.1

456

virtue, virtu, virtute, virtus (L), passim, virtuous, virtuoso, DL, 1 Pr.2,1 1.4 (2x), 12.3, I 9.2, I 17.3,

I 18.3,1 20 T (2x), I 20 (3x), I 23.4,1 30.1,1 30.2,1 43,146, II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.6, II 22.1, II

24.1, II 24.4, II 27.4, III 1.2, III 1.3, III 10.1, III 11.2, III 16 T, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 22.5, III

30.1, III 42, III 43; virtuously, virtuosamente, I 9.2,1 29.1,1 29.2,1 31.1, II Pr.l, II Pr.2, II 17.1,

II 18.3 (2x), II 18.4, II 29.1, III 34.2

voice, voce* vox (L), I 56,1 58.3, II 23.4 (L), III 14 T, III 14.1 (2x), III 14.2 (2x), III 41. See also
word

vote, suffragio, I 20,1 34 T, I 34.2,1 35 T, I 35 (2x), I 49.2, III 49.4

vouch, fare fede, I 2.1, II 2.4, II 14 (2x), II 19.2, II 23.2, III 3, III 6.8, III 27.3. See also credit;

faith; pledge; entrust
vow, voto, I 55.1, III 23 (2x)

war, guerra, passim, war, bellum (L), I 15, II 23.1, III 10.1, III 12.2, III 15.1, III 37.1, III 37.3, III
44.1 ; war machines, machine belliche, II 32.1. See also trouble
way,* via* I 6.1, I 6.2, I 6.3 (3x), I 7.1, I 7.3 (3x), I 10.4, I 10.6, I 16.4 (3x), I 16.5, I 18.4, I

18.5.1 19.3,1 19.4,1 23.4 (2x), I 25 (3x), I 26 (2x), I 29.1, I 30.1, I 34.1 (2x), I 35, I 37.2, I

37.3.146.1 52 T, 152.1, I 52.2 (4x), I 53.5, I 55.1, I 55.4, I 55.5, I 58.3, I 58.4, II 3 (2x), II

4.1, II 6.1, II 8.3, II 9, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 18.1, II 19.1 (3x), II 19.2, II 21.2 (2x), II 23.2 (2x), II
25.2, II 29.2, II 29.3, III 2 (2x), III 6.19 (3x), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 12.1, III

12.2 (3x), III 12.3, III 17, III 21.3, III 22.6, III 25, III 28 (8x), III 29, III 30.1, III 32, III 33.1
(2x), III 34.2, III 35.2, III 39.2 (3x), III 40.2, III 44.3 (3x), III 49.1; middle way, via del mezzo,
I 6.4,1 26,147.1, II 23 T, II 23.2, II 23.3, II 23.4 (2x), III 2, III 21.3, III 40.2; true way, vera
via, II 2.2, II 19.1, III 9.1, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 28. See also middle; path; cf life, way of

weak, debole, debile, I Pr.l, I 2.3,1 6.4 (2x), I 12.2,1 14.2,1 17.1,1 19 T (3x), I 19.2 (4x), I 19.4,
I 20,1 26,1 38 T, I 38.2 (2x), I 57 T, I 57
wealth, ricchezza, I 26,1 40.5, III 6.3. See also rich
wedding, pcirentado. III 26.1; lenozze, II 28.2, III 6.19 (2x)
well-being, bene essere, I 12.2,1 14.1, II 27.4

wicked, cattivo* I 10.6,1 12.2,1 24.2, I 26, I 27 T, I 27.1, I 35, I 41, I 45.1, I 48 T (2x), I 58.4
(3x), II Pr.2 (2x), III 1.3, III 5, III 6.19, III 27.3; wickedness, cattivitd, III 6.3, III 6.14; wicked,
reo* I 10.4,1 11.2,1 12.2,1 18.1,1 18.4; wicked, tristo, I 10.1, III 8.1 (2x), III 8.2 (2x), III 29;
wickedness, tristitia. III 29. See also bad

wife, moglie, III 4, III 6.2, III 6.17, III 6.18, III 20, III 34.3; wife, donna, I 16.3. See also woman
will,,* arbitrio, I 2.1, III 31.2; will,* voglia* I 9.4,1 13.2,1 23.4,1 44.1,1 53.4,1 59, II 14 (2x), II

15.1, II 19.1, III 5, III 6.20, III 22.1, III 35.2, III 46; will,* volontd ,* I 5.2, I 38.2, I 53.5, II

24.2, II 32.2, III 6.3, III 11.1, III 46. For arbitrio, see also judge; liberty
wine, vino, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 28.2

wise, savio, I 1.4, I 2.2, I 9.2, I 10.1, I 11.3, I 12.1, I 22, I 23.1, I 29.3, I 33.5, I 40.5, I 53.1, I

53.4.1 53.5,1 58 T, I 58.2 (2x), I 58.3, I 58.4, II 6.2, II 12.2, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.1 (2x), II

24.2 (3x), II 24.4 (2x), II 25.1, II 27.1, III 2, III 3, III 10.1, III 11.2, III 24, III 27.2, III 30.1
(2x), III 30.2, III 33.1, III 34.2, III 37.2, III 49.1; wise, sapiente. III 2 T; wisely, saviamente, I
34.4, II 27.1, III 5, III 30.1, III 33.2, III 37.4; to have wisdom, savio, I 1.4

witness, testimone, I 8.2,1 33.4,1 55.2, II 4.2, II 10.3, II 22.1, III 14.3. See also testimony
woman, donna, I 2.3, II 24.4, II 29.1, III 6.2, III 6.5, III 18.3, III 26.2 (2x), III 49.1 (2x) woman,
femina, III 6.9, III 26 T, III 26.1, III 36 T, III 36.1. See also wife
word, parola, I 8.1,1 13.2 (2x), I 15,1 21.3,1 34.4,146,147 (2x), I 54, I 57 (2x), I 58.1, I 58.4,
113,114.2,11 11.1, n 11.2,11 13.2, II 14, II 15.1 (4x), II 17.1, II 19.2, II 23.2 (3x), II 23.4, II

457

26 (4x), II 27.1, II 29.1, III 6.7, III 6.8, III 6.15 (2x), III 6.16, III 8.2, III 12.2, III 12.3, III

14.1, III 15.1, III 15.2, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 25 (2x), III 29, III 30.1 (2x), III 31.1, III 31.2, III

31.4, III 33.1 (3x), III 35.3, III 36.2, III 37.4, III 38.1 (3x), III 39.2 (2x); word, voce* III 27.4,
III 34 T, III 34.2. For voce, see also voice

work (n.), opera, DL, I Pr.2, I 2.3, I 5.2, I 24.1 (4x), I 24.2 (2x), I 33.2, I 49.1, I 53.5, II 5.1, II

11.2, II 20, II 29.1, III 1.2 (2x), III 1.3, III 3, III 8.1 (2x), III 9.1, III 12.1 (2x), III 15.2, III 28 T
(2x), III 28 (2x), III 30 T, III 34.2 (3x), III 34.4, III 36.2, III 43; work (n.), operazione, I Pr.2, III
2, III 34.2; work (v.), operare, I Pr.l, I 1.4,1 1.6, I 3.2 (2x), I 7.4, I 14.2, I 18.3, I 18.4, I 24.1
(2x), I 31.1,1 32,133.2,134.3, II Pr.l, II Pr.3 (2x), II 12.4, II 17.1, II 17.3, II 17.5, II 27.1, II

29.1, II 29.2, II 33, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 6.11, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 12.1, III 22.3, III 28
(2x), III 30.1, III 34.2, III 37.1 (3x), III 37.4, III 39.1, III 43; to put to work, adoperare, I 6.1, I

6.3. 1 8.3, 1 30.2, 1 60, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 17.5 (3x), II 20, II 21.2, III 5, III 6.15, III 18.1, III 23,
III 32, III 37.3, III 38.2. For opera, see also deed; for operare, see also do

world, mondo, I Pr.2, 1 1.3, 1 2.3, 1 10.5 (3x), I 10.6, 1 12.1, 1 20, 1 55.3, II Pr.2 (4x), E 1.1, II 2.2
(5x), II 5.1, II 5.2 (2x), II 10.2, II 12.2, II 27.2, II 30.4, III 6.8, III 11.2, III 30.1, III 31.3, III

36.2, III 39.1; worldly, mondano, II 2 2; worldly things, cose del mondo, DL, I 38.3, III 1.1, III

43

worthy,,* degno, dignus (L), I 1.5,1 1.6,14.1, I 6.1, I 18.3 (2x), I 29.3, I 31.2, I 45.1, II 11.2, II
20, II 23.4 (L)(2x), II 29.1 (2x), III 5, III 12.2, III 18 T; unworthy, indegno, I 47.2, III 16.2. Cf
dignity; disdain; indignation

write, scrivere, DL (4x), I Pr.2, I 2.2, I 21.3, I 26, I 40.3, II 5.1 (2x), II 5.2, II 8.2 (2x), III 6.8
(3x), III 6.10, III 6.11 (2x), III 6.20, III 15.1, III 18.3, III 22.4, III 22.5, III 31.3, III 40.1;
written above, soprascritto, I 2.2, I 2.7, I 7.4, I 7.5, I 9.3, I 16.3, I 16.4, I 18.1, I 18.5, I 22, I

29.1. 1 43, I 46, I 52.1, I 57, II Pr.2, II 4.1, II 6.2, II 7, II 16.2 (2x), II 17.1, II 25.1, II 26, II
28.1, III 1.3, III 2, III 6.3, III 6.9, III 6.19, III 12.1, III 17, III 21.1 (2x), III 34.4, III 35.3;
writing, scrittura, III 6.8; writings, scritti, I 9.4, 1 45.2, II Pr.3; writer, scrittore, DL, I 10.3 (3x), I

28. 1 34.1, 1 37.1, 1 58.1, I 58.2 (2x), II Pr.l (2x), II 1.1, III 6.16, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.4, III
22.4 (2x), III 39.1. See also enroll; heading; cf read

young, giovane, I 16.4, I 46, I 60 (2x), III 4, III 6.16, III 9.1, III 20, III 34.3; young, fresco* III
30.1; youth, giovane, I 33.2 (2x), I 60 (2x), II Pr.3, II 28.2; youth, giovanezza, II Pr.l; youth,
gioventu, juventus (L) I 29.3, 1 40.4, 1 40.4 (L), 1 42, 1 46, II Pr.3 (3x), III 34.2. Cf boy

458

Notes

Introduction

1. Francesco Petrarca, Opere Latine, 2 vols., ed. A. Bufano (Turin: UTET, 1975), II 1046, 1106-42.

2. Baruch Spinoza, Political Treatise, V 7; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract, III 6.

3. Livy, II 18, 30; III 20.8; IV 17.8, 26.6, 56.8; V 46; VI 38.3; VIII 32.3; XXII 31. Cicero, Republic, I 40; II 32; Laws, III 39. Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, V 70-74. Polybius, VI 18.4.

4. Aristotle, Politics, VI 1321b41-22a2.

5. Aristotle, Physics, II 197al-8, 197b33-37.

A Note on the Translation

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), 41.

Niccolo Machiavelli to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai, Greetings:

1. Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai were friends of NM and participants in discussions held in a garden in Florence, the Orti Oricellari One
of these discussions is reported in NM’s dialogue AW, published in 1521, in which both men appear as interlocutors. At the beginning of the dialogue NM
tells of the subsequent death of Cosimo in 1519. NM also dedicated his Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca (1520; published 1531) to Zanobi and to
Luigi Alamanni, another friend in the circle.

2. Modo will be translated “mode,” as distinct from via, “way” or “path,” and mezzo, “means,” except for in modo eke, “so that.”

3. For Hiero, see P6, 13, and Livy, XXII 37; XXIII 30; XXIV 4-5, 22; XXV 24. For “the writers,” see Justin, XXIII.4; Polybius, VII 8.

4. For Perseus, see Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 8.

First Book

Preface

1. Terre, sometimes “lands,” sometimes “towns.”

2. This first paragraph of the proemium does not appear in the first two editions of the Discourses but can be found in polished form in Machiavelli’s
hand, the only surviving autograph fragment of the Discourses Opinion is divided as to whether it is provisional or definitive; see Carlo Pincin, “La
prefazione alia prima parte dei Discorsi,” Atti dell’ Accademica delle Scienze di Torino 94 (1959-60): II, 506-18, and “Le prefazione la dedicatoria dei
Discorsi di Machiavelli,” Giomale storica della letteratura, italiana 143 (1966): 72-83, and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 25n.

3. Lit.: “worked.”

4. Lit.: “bearers of laws.”

5. One version adds “nor captain” here.

6. “The present education” is another version.

7. Accidenti will usually be translated “accidents,” occasionally “incidents.”

8. One could say that only the first ten books of Livy were not “intercepted by the malignity of the times,” as the first interception occurs at the end of
book X. But other books and fragments do exist, and NM both uses and cites them.

l

What Have Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and What Was That of Rome

1. Lit.: “bearers of laws”; “givers of laws” is an alternate reading.

2. Or “chance.”

3. See P 6, 26; Plutarch, Theseus, 24-25; Thucydides, II 15.

4. On the beginnings of Venice, see FH I 29 and Livy, I 1.

5. Lit.: “heads.”

6. On the beginnings of Florence, see FH II 2.

7. A city founded as Rausa (or Ragusium) in the seventh century by Roman refugees fleeing the sack of Epidaurus; now Dubrovnik.

8. The Mamelukes were a military order that dominated Egypt from 1250 to 1517.

9. The story of Deinocrates and Alexander is told in Vitruvius, preface and II 1-4, and repeated by Thomas Aquinas in On Kingship, II 7; see also
Plutarch, Alexander, 26.

10. Livy, I 1-3.

11. Livy, I 4-6; Plutarch, Romulus, 4, 6-9.

12. Livy, I 18-21; Plutarch, Numa, 3, 5-8.

2

Of How Many Species Are Republics, and Which Was the Roman Republic

1. Plutarch, Lycurgus, 5-6; Polybius, VI 10.

2. Plutarch says that Lycurgus’s laws were kept for five hundred years {Lycurgus, 29), to which NM adds the three centuries until Sparta was absorbed
by Rome under Augustus. For the same total of eight hundred years, see AW I. See also Thucydides, 118.

3. A reference to two outside events that began and ended the tenure of NM’s employer, Piero Soderini, as gonfalonier for life in the Florentine
republic.

4. Here begins a discussion of Rome’s regime in which NM closely follows Polybius, VI, yet introduces significant differences. Of the considerable
literature, see Gennaro Sasso, Studi su Machiavelli (Naples: Morano, 1967), chs. 4, 5; and Mansfield, Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders, 34-40.

5. Stato for NM means both “status” and “state,” as today, but the meanings are more closely connected: stato is the status of a person or a group while
dominating someone else.

6. See Plato, Statesman, 302e; Aristotle, Politics, 1279a25-bl0.

459

7. NM uses two words for conspiracy, conspirazioni and congiure, the latter, used for the title of III 6, the chapter on conspiracies, means literally
“swearing together.”

8. Ammo refers to the “spirit” with which human beings defend themselves, never to a capacity for self-detachment ( anima , “soul,” does not occur in
the Discourses). It can also mean “mind” in the sense of “intent,” but not in the sense of “intellect.”

9. Plutarch, Lycurgus; Polybius, VI 10-11; Aristotle, Politics, 1273b33.

10. Plutarch, Solon, 18-25, 32; Aristotle, Politics, 1273b34-74a21.

11. Lit.: “the universality.”

3

What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be Created in Rome, Which Made the Republic More

Perfect

1. Livy, 158-60.

2. Livy, H 5, 9.

3. Livy, n 21.

4. Livy, II 33.

4

That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That Republic Free and Powerful

1. Livy, 1123-24, 27-33.

2. Among the “many” who condemn the tumults in Rome were Sallust, Bellum Cadlinae, 10-12; Bellum Jugurthinum, 5; Histories, I 55, 77; III 48.
Also Cicero, Republic, II 33, and In Catilinam, II 13, III 10; St. Augustine, City of God, III 16-17.

3. See P9,FHJ1 12,1111.

4. Lit.: “man of (or from) good.”

5. Cicero, De amicitia, XXV 95.

5

Where the Guard of Freedom May Be Settled More Securely, in the People or in the Great; and Which Has
Greater Cause for Tumult, He Who Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain

1. See Plutarch, Marius, 1,9.

2. Livy, IX 26. Livy says C. Maenius and M. Folius.

6

Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered in Rome That Would Have Taken Away the Enmities between

the People and the Senate

1. Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 10-21; Gains Gracchus, 4-6, 9-17.

2. D\ 5.1.

3.191 1.2.

4. See FH I 29.

5. Lit.: “substances.”

6. Lit.: “empire.”

7. Thucydides, I 144; Aristotle, Politics, II 9; Plutarch, Lycurgus, 27: Polybius, VI 48.

8. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 24.

9. P 12; FH I 29.

10. Uno

11. Uno

12. FH V 1.

7

How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in a Republic to Maintain It in Freedom

1. Livy, II 34-40; AW VI.

2. Lit.: “transcend.”

3. Lit.: “transcend.”

4. Apparently a reference to the downfall and expulsion of NM’s employer, Piero Soderini, in 1512.

5. A reference to the magistracy of Eight (Otto di Guardia), responsible for the administration of justice in Florence.

6. Lit.: “circle.”

7. Livy, V 33, where it is Arruns’s wife—not his sister—who is involved.

8

As Much As Accusations Are Useful to Republics, So Much Are Calumnies Pernicious

1. Livy, V 44-46, 49.

2. Or “salvation.”

3. Livy, V 47; VI 11, 14-20.

4. The captain of the people, the chief executive officer in Florence.

5. FH IV 25.

460

9

That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether

outside Its Ancient Orders

1. Remus. Livy, I 7; cf. St. Augustine, City of God, III 6; XV 5.

2. Livy, I 14.

3. Or “talent” (ingegno).

4. Cf. Livy, 18, 15-16; Plutarch, Romulus, 27.

5. Livy, 158-60.

6. Plutarch, Agis, 7-20.

7. Plutarch, Cleomenes, 1-10, 26-29.

10

As Much As the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a Tyranny

Are Worthy of Reproach

1. Tacitus, Histories, I 1.

2. For blame of Catiline, see above all Cicero, In Catilinam; Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 15 (but also the report of exaggeration, 22); Plutarch, Cicero,

10 .

3. This usage follows the British Museum manuscript (not in Machiavelli’s hand) rather than the printed versions, which have “blameworthy.”

4. Plutarch, Marcus Brutus, I, but cf. Dion and Brutus

5. P 19; NM appears to count Julius Caesar as an emperor.

6. Tacitus, Histories, I 2.

7. Or “principality.”

n

Of the Religion of the Romans

1. Livy, I 8.

2. Livy, I 18-20.

3. Lit.: “discourses of.”

4. Polybius, VI 56; AWIV.

5. Livy, XXII 53.

6. Livy, VII 4-5.

7. Livy, I 8; cf. 7, 10, 12, 15-16.

8. Livy, 119, where the nymph is named Egeria.

9. Plutarch, Lycurgus, 5.

10. Plutarch, Solon, 14.

11. Dante, Purgatorio, VII 121-23. Dante’s text says that human probity rarely rises (risurge) by the branches.

12. See P 6 and NM’s letters to Ricciardo Bechi of 9 March 1498, to Francesco Vettori of 26 August 1513, and to Francesco Guicciardini of 17 May
1521.

12

Of How Much Importance It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How Italy, for Lacking It by Means of the

Roman Church, Has Been Ruined

1. Lit.: “opinion.”

2. Lit.: “faith.”

3. Quoted in Latin inexactly from Livy, V 22.

4. An alternative reading accepted by Casella is “the rest of Italy.”

5. FH I 9-1 I.

6. A reference to the formation of the League of Cambrai and its defeat of Venice at Agnadello in 1509.

7. In 1512, after the defeat of the Holy League in the Battle of Ravenna, which was fought without the Swiss.

13

How the Romans Made Religion Serve to Reorder the City and to Carry Out Their Enterprises and to Stop

Tumults

1. Lit.: “new.”

2. Livy, V 14.

3. Livy, V 15-16.

4. D I 39.2.

5. Livy, III 9-10.

6. Livy, III 15-21.

7. There is no such person in Livy. See Livy, III 17-18, for mention of Publius Valerius in this regard.

8. In Livy it is Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then (460 B.C.) made consul for the first time.

9. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 20.

10. Lit.: “reason about.”

14

The Romans Interpreted the Auspices according to Necessity, and with Prudence Made a Show of

461

Observing Religion When Forced Not to Observe It; and If Anyone Rashly Disdained It, They Punished

Him

1. Livy, X 40-41.

2. In Livy it is Publius Claudius Pulcher.

3. Cicero, De natura deorum, II 3; Valerius Maximus, 1.5.3.

15

The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting Them, Had Recourse to Religion

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 31.

2. Livy, X 38.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 39.

4. Livy, X 38-39.

5. Lit.: “extrinsic.”

16

A People Used to Living under a Prince Maintains Its Freedom with Difficulty, If by Some Accident It

Becomes Free

1. Livy, II 3-5.

2. Lit.: “the above-written.”

3. Justin, XVI 4.

4. Lit.: “of the popular.”

5. Lit.: “of the popular.”

17

Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt People Can with the Greatest Difficulty Maintain Itself Free

1. Marcus Junius Brutus, Caesar’s assassin.

2. Lucius Junius Brutus, founder of the Roman republic.

3. FH VI 13, 20-24.

4. Polybius, IV 32-33; VI 43.

5. £> I 55.3-5.

18

In What Mode a Free State, If There Is One, Can Be Maintained in Corrupt Cities; or, If There Is Not, in

What Mode to Order It

1. The lex Julia de adulteriis of Emperor Augustus of 18 B.C.

2. Laws regulating luxuries were passed first in 215 B.C. (Livy, XXXIV 4), then at various dates until the lex Julia sumptuaria of Julius Caesar in 46
B.C..

3. A series of laws “on ambition”—from the lex Poetelia in 358 B.C. (Livy, VII 15) through lex Cornelia Baebia de ambita in 81 B.C. and the lex
Calpumia of 67 B.C. to the lex Julia of 18 B.C.—controlled electoral corruption.

4. D I 9.4.

19

After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince Can Maintain Himself, but after a Weak One No Kingdom Can

Be Maintained by Another Weak One

1. 1 Kings 12:17; cf. 12:21; 2 Chronicles 10:17, where it is said that Rehoboam inherited only a twelfth of David’s kingdom.

2. Livy, 122-31.

3. Livy, I 32-35.

20

Two Virtuous Princes in Succession Produce Great Effects; and That Well-Ordered Republics Have of
Necessity Virtuous Successions, and So Their Acquisitions and Increases Are Great

1. Livy, 160.

2. DI 19.

3. Lit.: “empire.”

21

How Much Blame That Prince and That Republic Merit That Lack Their Own Arms

1. Livy, 122-31.

2. King Henry VIII invaded France in June 1513 and defeated the French at the Battle of the Spurs on 16 August. England had, however, fought to
defend the independence of the dukedom of Brittany in 1492, less than thirty years earlier.

3. Apparently Plutarch, Pelopidas, 17.

4. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, Aeneid, VI 813-814. NM substitutes desides for Virgil’s resides without changing the meaning.

462

22

What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the Three Alban Curiatii

1. Livy, I 23-26, where Mettius was dictator, not king, of the Albans.

2. Livy, I 27-30.

23

That One Should Not Put All One’s Fortune in Danger, and Not All One’s Forces; and Because of This, the

Guarding of Passes Is Often Harmful

1. Livy, XXI 32-38.

2. Livy, XXI 58.

3. Livy, XXI 45-46.

4. Livy, XXII 2-5.

5. Francis I, king of France (1515-47), invaded Lombardy in 1515 through an unexpected route, bypassing the Swiss, who were waiting for him in the
mountains, and then defeating them near Milan at the Battle of Marignano.

24

Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards and Punishments for Their Citizens and Never Counterbalance

One with the Other

1. Lit.: “to dispute.”

2. Livy, II 10-11.

3. Livy, II 12-13.

4. Cf. Livy, II 10.12, where it is said that a statue of Horatius was put up, and he was given as much land as could be plowed around in one day; and
Livy, II 13.5, which says that Mucius received a field across the Tiber that came to be known as the Mucian Fields. NM’s staio is a Tuscan measure of
uncertain extent, perhaps equivalent to one Roman jugenmi, the amount two oxen could plow (not plow around) in one day.

5. Livy, V 47. NM omits the small measure of wine also given to Manlius.

6. Livy, VI 20.

25

He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated State in a Free City May Retain at Least the Shadow of Its

Ancient Modes

1. Livy, I 8.

2. Livy, H 2.

3. See Plato, Republic, 565e-66a, and Statesman, 276e; Aristotle, Politics, 1279bl6, 1285b29-32; Polybius, V 11; Cicero, Republic, I 33; Thomas
Aquinas, On Kingship, I 1.11.

26

A New Prince Should Make Everything New in a City or Province Taken by Him

1. Luke 1:53. Said of God, not of David.

2. Justin, Vin 5. Cf. Polybius, VIII 8-11.

27

Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be Altogether Wicked or Altogether Good

1. Or “principality.”

2. Or “conspired.”

3. Lit.: “reason.”

4. Including NM himself, who in an official dispatch attributed Baglioni’s restraint to “his good nature and humanity”; see letter of 13 September 1506,
Legazioni e commisari, ed. Sergio Bertelli, (Milan, 1964), II 980.

28

For What Cause the Romans Were Less Ungrateful toward Their Citizens Than the Athenians

1. See NM’s poem, “Of Ingratitude,” 130-32.

2. See Cicero, De officiis, II 7.24, and cf. FH II 37.

3. Livy, H 2.

4. Livy, n 7.

29

Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince

1. See NM’s poem, “Of Ingratitude,” 25.

2. Quoted in Latin from Tacitus, Histories, IV 3.

3. Lit.: “mode.”

4. Tacitus, Histories, II 6, 8; III 2-3, 8, 15-26, 46-49, 52-53, 58-65, 78; IV 39, 80.

5. Guicciardini rightly protests that Gonsalvo Ferrante died rich and honored; Francesco Guicciardini, Considerazioni intemo ai Discorsi del Machiavelli
in NM, Discoursi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, ed. C. Vivanti (Turin: Eunaudi, 1983), 557. See also NM’s poem, “Of Ingratitude,” 163-65.

463

6. D 130.2.

7. Plutarch, Julius Caesar, 29, 46-47.

8. D I 28.

9. Livy, XXXVIII 50-60.

10. Livy, II 33-35.

11. Livy, V 32, 46, 49.

12. Hannibal.

30

Which Modes a Prince or a Republic Should Use So As to Avoid the Vice of Ingratitude; and Which a
Captain or a Citizen Should Use So As Not to Be Crushed by It

1..DI 27.

31

That the Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for an Error Committed; nor Were They
Ever Punished When Harm Resulted to the Republic through Their Ignorance or through Bad Policies

Adopted by Them

1. Cf. 19124,28,29.3, 30.2.

2. Crucifixion of unsatisfactory generals was not a Roman practice. Polybius notes instances of such punishment by the Carthaginians (I II, 24) but
none of its use by the Romans. The crucifixion of a Carthaginian general named Hannibal by his own soldiers after the defeat of the fleet he commanded
is mentioned in the Summary of Livy, XVII.

3. Livy, V 8-12.

4. Livy, XXII 61.

5. Livy, VIII 30-35.

32

A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer Benefiting Men in Their Necessities

1. Livy, II 9.

33

When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either in a State or against a State, the More Salutary Policy Is to

Temporize with It Rather Than to Strike at It

1. Livy, II 18, where the first is said to have probably been Titus Largius.

2. Lit.: “worked.”

3. See FH IV 26-33.

4. Cicero, Letters to His Friends, XVI 11.

34

The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and That the Authorities
Citizens Take for Themselves, Not Those Given Them by Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life

1. Livy, II 18.

2. The writer or writers have not been clearly identified.

3. Presumably Sulla.

4. Livy, III 29; IX 34.

5. Presumably the Council of Ten, instituted in 1310 as an extraordinary measure to deal with a revolt, then regularized in 1355.

6. Quoted in Latin. Cf. Livy, III 4; VI 19.

35

The Cause Why the Creation of the Decemvir ate in Rome Was Hurtful to the Freedom of That Republic,
Notwithstanding That It Was Created by Public and Free Votes

1. Livy, III 31-55.

2. Dl 34.

3. Lit.: “offends.”

36

Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors Should Not Disdain Lesser Ones

1. Livy, II 43-47, where some editions have Manlius, not Manilius.

37

What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave Birth to in Rome; and That to Make a Law in a Republic That
Looks Very Far Back and Is against an Ancient Custom of the City Is Most Scandalous

464

1. These words have not been identified in the ancient writers, but their “verdict” refers to their cyclical, pessimistic outlook, as opposed to modern
progressivism; see Plato, Laws, 687c; Aristotle, Politics, 1316al-b26; Polybius, VI 9.

2. Lit.: “substances.”

3. Livy, II 41. The first Agrarian law was promulgated by the consul Spurius Cassius in 486 B.C. after a war with the Hemici. It gave land taken from
the enemy to the Roman plebs.

4. On the danger of “looking back,” see FH III 3.

5. Livy, 1141-43.

6. Livy, VI 35. On the jugerum, see D I 24 n. 4.

7. Livy, IV 47; VI 16.

8. Livy, III 1.

9. Livy, II 65.

10. Lit.: “humor.”

11. Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 8-19.

12. Plutarch, Sulla, 6; Marius, 10.

13. Plutarch, Caesar, 6. Aquinas, On Kingship, IV 1.

14. DI4.

15. DI4.1.

16. D I 33.

38

Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and Do Not Know How to Decide; and If They Ever Take Up Any
Policy, It Arises More from Necessity Than from Choice

1. Livy, III 6.

2. Lit.: “its own” (i suoi).

3. Livy, II 30.

4. See P21.

5. In 1501 Cesare Borgia was becoming master of the Romagna. On this incident see NM’s Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio (March
1503) in Tutte le opere di Niccold Machiavelli, ed. Mario Martelli (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), 11-13. See also PI.

6. On this incident see NM’s Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati (Mode of treating the rebel peoples of the Valdichiana), in Tutte le
opere, ed. Martelli, 13-16. The king of France was still Louis XII.

7. Lit.: “faith.”

39

In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be Seen

1. “’94” refers to the invasion of Italy by the French King Charles VIII in 1494.

2. Potest a

3. Potest a

4. Livy, III 9.

5. Livy, IV 6.

6. Potest a

7. Livy, VI 35.

40

The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and What Is to Be Noted in It; Where It Is Considered, among
Many Other Things, How through Such an Accident One Can Either Save or Crush a Republic

1. Livy, III 31-33, according to which the two other citizens sent with Spurius Postumius were Aulus Manlius and Sulpitius Camerinus.

2. Livy, III 33. The kings were accompanied by twelve lictors who carried the rods that symbolized their authority and that were employed together
with axes in capital punishment; the consuls had only twelve lictors between them so as not to double their terror (Livy, II 1).

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 35; NM adds “they believed.”

4. Quoted in Latin with variations from Livy, III 35.

5. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 36.

6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 37.

7. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 37.

8. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 37.

9. Not the Volsci but the Aequi in Livy, III 38.

10. Livy, III 38-54.

11. Giorgio Inglese changes “enemy” to “friend” against all the manuscripts, saying that the sense requires it; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio
(Milan: Rizzoli, 1984), 260. But does it? Appius could perhaps have sought to make friends of the nobility without succeeding, since the part of the
nobility outside the tyranny (NM says) is always enemy to the tyrant.

12. Lit.: “intrinsic.”

13. On Nabis, see P 9.

14. Lit.: “intrinsic.”

15. D I 34.

16. The saying is otherwise unknown. Inglese thinks that the king may be Ferdinand I of Aragon, king of Naples from 1458 to 1494 (see D II 12), but
most others agree that it is Ferdinand the Catholic (Ferdinand II of Aragon).

41

To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is Something Imprudent

and Useless

465

1. Livy, III 567.

42

How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted

1. Cf. Aristotle, Politics , 1308b 14.

2. Livy, III 41.

43

Those Who Engage in Combat for Their Own Glory Are Good and Faithful Soldiers

1. Livy, III 40.

2. See P 12; AW 1.

3. Livy, III 61-63, 69-70.

44

A Multitude without a Head Is Useless; and That One Should Not First Threaten and Then Request

Authority

1. Livy, III 44-53.

2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 53, but Livy’s Valerius and Horatius say by way of excuse that from hatred of cruelty the plebs rush into cruelty.

3. Uno

45

Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been Made, and Especially by Its Author, Is a Thing That Sets a Bad
Example; and to Freshen New Injuries Every Day in a City Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It

1. Livy, III 54-56.

2. In 1494 the Medici were expelled from Florence and the republic dominated by Savonarola established.

3. In 1497 Bernardo del Nero, Niccolo Ridolfi, Lorenzo Tomabuoni, Giannozzo Pucci, and Giovanni Cambi, five of the most prominent ottimati in
Florence, were exposed in a plot to restore Piero de’ Medici to power. At the urging of Francesco Valori, leader of Savonarola’s party (D I 7.3.), they
were summarily executed. Savonarola himself, as NM says, did not intervene to secure their right of appeal under the law that had been passed at his own
instance. See Girolamo Savonarola. Trattato circa il reggimento e govemo della citta di Firenze, in Prediche sopra Aggeo, ed. Luigi Firpo, (Rome, 1965),
III 1-2.

4. Or “damned” both times in this sentence.

5. Livy, III 59.

6. P8.

46

Men Ascend from One Ambition to Another; First One Seeks Not to Be Offended, and Then One Offends

Others

1. Livy, III 54.

2. Livy, III 65.

3. Lit.: “mode.”

4. In Latin, though, Sallust says that “all bad examples have arisen from good things” (De coniuratione Catilinae, 51.27).

5. DI33.

6. Dill 28.

47

However Deceived in Generalities, Men Are Not Deceived in Particulars

1. 75 I 39.

2. Livy, IV 6, where Livy says three tribunes.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IV 6, though NM changes “dignity” to “honor.”

4. Upper limbs, not weapons.

5. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IV 6.

6. Livy, XXIII 2-4.

7. Pacuvius Calavus in Livy.

8. This speech is NM’s invention.

9. Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici was expelled from Florence on 9 November 1494 because of popular indignation provoked by his cession of the
Florentine territories of Sanzana, Pietrasanta, and Livorno to Charles VIII, the French king who was invading Italy.

48

He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be Given to Someone Vile or Someone Wicked Should Have It
Asked for Either by Someone Too Vile and Too Wicked or by Someone Too Noble and Too Good

I. Livy, IV 56-57.

466

49

If Those Cities That Have Had a Free Beginning, Such as Rome, Have Difficulty in Finding Laws That Will
Maintain Them, Those That Have Had One Immediately Servile Have Almost an Impossibility

1. Livy, IV 8.

2. Livy, IV 23-24.

3. FH II 5.

4. FH IV 29; V 4.

5. The Council of Ten, instituted in Venice in 1310.

50

One Council or One Magistrate Should Not Be Able to Stop the Actions of Cities

1. Livy, IV 26.

51

A Republic or a Prince Should Make a Show of Doing through Liberality What Necessity Constrains Him

to Do

I. Livy, IV 59-60.

52

To Repress the Insolence of One Individual Who Rises Up in a Powerful Republic, There Is No More
Secure and Less Scandalous Mode Than to Anticipate the Ways by Which He Comes to That Power

1. Livy, V 4, 12.

2. FH IV 27-33.

3. Marcus Tullius Cicero.

4. Cicero, Philippics, V 18; X 8.

53

Many Times the People Desires Its Own Ruin, Deceived by a False Appearance 1 of Good; and That Great

Hopes and Mighty Promises Easily Move It

1. Lit.: “species.”

2. Livy, V 24-25.

3. The quotation is not from Dante’s On Monarchy (now known as Monarchia) but from his Convivio, Ill.

4. See D 16. NM could also have referred to what he says “below” in D III 31.

5. Lit.: “conspiracy.”

6. The League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 to oppose the Venetians by Pope Julius II, the Emperor Maximilian, King Louis XII of France, King
Ferdinand of Spain, Margaret of Austria, regent for the duke of Savoy, Duke Alfonso d’Este of Ferrara, and Francesco Gonzaga IV, marquis of Mantua.

7. Livy, XXII 25-30.

8. Livy, XXII 34-35, 38-39.

9. Livy, XXII 46-49.

10. Livy, XXV 19.

11. Thucydides, VI 8-9; Plutarch, Nicias, 12.

12. Livy, XXVIII 40-45.

13. The Florentine attack on Pisa in 1505 after the victory at San Vincenzo was ordered by the Council of Eight and the Great Council and favored by
the gonfalonier Piero Soderini. NM was sent to Bentivoglio and Giacomini with instructions for executing the siege, which failed.

54

How Much Authority a Grave Man May Have to Check an Excited Multitude

1. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, Aeneid, I 151-52.

2. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola (the frate, or friar) in the period 1494-98, when he was a powerful political force in Florence; their
opponents were called Arrabbiati (“the rabid”).

3. Livy, V 51-55.

55

How Easily Things May Be Conducted in Those Cities in Which the Multitude Is Not Corrupt; and That
Where There Is Equality, a Principality Cannot Be Made, and Where There Is Not, a Republic Cannot Be

Made

1. DI 16-18.

2. Livy, V 23-25.

3. See P 10. NM wrote three short reports on the free German cities. In December 1507 he was sent on a mission to the Emperor Maximilian, after
which he wrote his Rapporto delle cose della Magna in 1508. The following year he wrote a Discorso sopra le cose della Magna e sopra I’imperatore for the
use of the Florentine ambassadors. In 1509 a second legation took NM to the camp of Maximilian at Mantua, and on his return he wrote Ritratto delle
cose della Magna For these three works, see Tiitte le opere, ed. Martelli, 63-71.

4. Lit.: “conversations.”

467

5. Lit.: “conversation.”

6. In Ritratto delle cose della Magna, NM speaks of commerce between the Venetians and German cities. See Tutte le opere, ed. Martelli, 70.

7. Lit.: “been beaten by.”

8. See NM’s Discursus Florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices written in 1520 in Tutti le opere, ed. Martelli, 24-31. “Belongings” is
literally “substances.”

9. Lit.: “populars.”

10. DI6.1.

56

Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast Them, or Men Who

Predict 1 Them

1. Or “preach.”

2. In his sermons during Advent of 1492 and thereafter, Savonarola predicted the coming of a new Cyrus from beyond the mountains who would be the
“sword of God” to punish Florence and whom nobody would oppose. Charles VIII, invading from France in 1494, met no opposition and reached Tuscany
in October.

3. On such signs at the time of Charles VIII’s invasion, see Francesco Guicciardini, History of Italy I 9.

4. FH VIII 36.

5. The Palazzo della Signoria, struck by lightning in 1511; Piero Soderini was expelled in 1512.

6. Livy, V 32, who says the voice was “clearer” (clarior) than human.

7. Cicero, De divinatione, I 30.64; Pietro Pomponazzi, Tractatus de immortalitate animae, 14.

57

The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself Weak

1. Quoted in Latin with variations from Livy, VI 4.

2. Livy, III 50-51.

58

The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince

1. Livy, VI 7.

2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 20, omitting the phrase “remembering only his virtues.”

3. Livy, XXIV 4-7, 21.

4. Quoted in Latin with minor variation from Livy, XXIV 25.

5. Lit.: “province.”

6. Diodorus Siculus, I 70-71.

7. Livy, VI 14-20.

8. Plutarch, Alexander, 16, 50-52; Clitus had saved Alexander’s life in battle, but when drunk at a banquet he disparaged Alexander and was
immediately killed by him. Afterward Alexander repented and tried to kill himself. See Diodorus Siculus, XVII.21.57.

9. Josephus, The Jewish War, I 22.1-5; III 5-9; VII 2-7. Marianne, the granddaughter of Aristobulus II, king of Judea, was married to Herod the
Great in 38 B.C. Out of jealousy Herod had her killed, then desperately regretted doing so. See Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, XV 7.4-7.

10. D I 29.

11. DI53.

12. Lit.: “discoursed on.”

13. You plural.

59

Which Confederation or Other League Can Be More Trusted, That Made with a Republic or That Made

with a Prince

1. Plutarch, Demetrius, 30

2. Plutarch, Pompey, 77-79. Pompey was killed by Ptolemy’s son.

3. “Party” in this vicinity is literally in the plural.

4. In the war between the French king and the Spanish over Naples in 1503-4, a number of barons on the French side were imprisoned by Gonsalvo
da Cortona, the Spanish captain. In the truce that followed Gonsalvo’s victory they were left to their fate.

5. Saguntum, ally of Rome, was conquered and destroyed by Hannibal in 218 B.C. See Livy, XXI 5-16.

6. Florence, ally of the French, was attacked after the battle of Ravenna by Spanish forces, who restored the Medici to power in 1512.

7. Or “the useful” here and in the previous sentence, though not later in this sentence.

8. Lit.: “armed might.”

9. Plutarch, Themistocles, 20; Cicero, De officiis. III 11.

10. Or “the useful.”

60

That the Consulate and Any Other Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was Given without Respect to Age

1. Livy, VII 26.

2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 32, though NM substitutes “blood” for “birth.”

3. DI6.

4. Z> I 6.

5. Livy, XXV 2.

6. Plutarch, Pompey , 13-14.

468

Second Book

Preface

1. Cf. Plutarch, Moralia, de fortuna Romanomm, 317f-18a.

2. A supporter of powers beyond the mountains, such as the French.

3. Lit.: “every filthy reason.”

l

Which Was More the Cause of the Empire the Romans Acquired, Virtue or Fortune

1. Plutarch, Moralia, de fortuna Romanomm, 318d-19b.

2. Lit.: “giver of laws.” See Inglese, 40-41.

3. Plutarch, Moralia, de fortuna Romanomm, 32 If.

4. Livy, VII 32-37; VIII 1-6.

5. The Romans subjugated the Latins (Livy, VIII 13-14) and defeated the Samnites before combating the Etruscans (IX 27-29, 31-32) but had to
continue to fight the Samnites along with the Etruscans (IX 38-41, 43-44). They fought the Etruscans again after making peace with the Samnites (IX
45; X 3-5) but then had to fight both (X 12, 14, 19-21). The Samnites were not yet entirely worn out (X 31-45).

6. Cf. Livy, X 27, 45.

7. The Romans repeatedly fought the Volsci and Aequi while also fighting the Etruscans, the Latins, and the Hernici (Livy, VI 2, 7-9, 11-12, 32; VII
19). Note the explanation of the wars with the Volsci, the Latins, and the Hernici offered by Manlius Capitolinus (VI 15).

8. Livy, VII 27, 29-31.

9. Livy, VIII 6, 10-11.

10. Livy, VIII 14, 23.

11. Polybius, I 6.

12. Polybius, I 7-12.

13. Polybius, 162; 1121-31.

14. In 225 B.C.

15. Polybius, II 32-34.

16. From 218 to 202 B.C. (Livy, XXI-XXX).

17. Livy, XXXI 1; XXXIII 24-25; XXXV-XXXVII.

18. Philip V of Macedon.

19. P'S.

20. Livy, VII 29-32.

21. Livy, IX 36.

22. Polybius, 17-12.

23. Livy, XXI 6.

24. Livy, XXVIII 16.

25. Livy, XXVI 24.

26. Livy, XXXV 13.

27. Livy, Summaries, LX, LXI.

2

What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat, and That They Obstinately Defended Their Freedom

1. Presumably Germany; cf. D I 55.2-3; II 19.

2. Lit.: “alps,” though here referring to the Apennines.

3. Calabria, the toe.

4. Lit.: “reasoned.”

5. Livy, II 9-14.

6. Livy, V I.

7. Herodotus, V 78.

8. Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 7.

9. Xenophon, Hiero or Tyrannicus, II 12-17; IV 3-5; V 1-3; XI.

10. Livy, XXIV 7, 21-22.

11. Thucydides, III 70-85; IV 46-48.

12. John 8:32, 14:6.

13. Livy, X 31, 38-42.

14. In this chapter.

15. Earlier in this chapter, or in D I 28-30.

16. Lit.: “gives faith.”

17. Or “pray.”

18. Livy, XXIII 41-42.

3

Rome Became a Great City through Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Easily Admitting Foreigners to Its

Honors

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, I 30, with some alteration.

2. Servius Tullius; Livy, I 44.

3. Inglese emends to eighty thousand.

4. Lit.: “converse.”

5. Lit.: “conversations.”

6. Seneca, De beneficiis, V 14; Xenophon, Lacedaemonian Constitution, VII 5-6; Plutarch, Lycurgus, 9, 27; Polybius, VI 49.

469

7. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 24; Polybius, VI 50.

8. Quoted in five words of Latin from Livy, I 30, with the same alteration as at the opening of this chapter.

4

Republics Have Taken Three Modes of Expanding

1. Livy, V 33-35, for this and much of the following about the Etruscans and the Gauls, called respectively Tuscans and French by NM.

2. Lit.: “alps,” here referring to the Alps.

3. Livy, IV 23; V 1.

4. Lit.: “circle.”

5. Lit.: “reasoned.”

6. Livy, XXXII 32-34.

5

That the Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates the

Memories of Things

1. Aristotle, Physics, VIII; Metaphysics, XII 6-7; On the Heavens, I 9 279a 12-28. Also Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I 28.

2. Lucretius, De rerum natura, V 324-44.

3. John of Salisbury, Policraticus, VIII 19 (The Statesman’s Book of John of Salisbury, trans. John Dickinson [New York: Russell & Russell, 1963],
364).

4. The Romans were far from doing so to the language, writings, and religion of the Etruscans according to Livy, I 35, 55; V 21-22; VII 3; IX 36.

5. Lit.: “generation.”

6. Plato, Timaeus, 22a-23c, and Laws, 676b-78a; Aristotle, Politics, 1269a4-8, and Metaphysics, XII 8 1074b 1—14; Polybius, VI 5.

7. Lit.: “generation.”

8. D II 4.

6

How the Romans Proceeded in Making War

1. The siege of Veii look ten years (Livy, V 22); for examples of such short wars, see Livy, II 26-27; III 26-29; IV 31-34, 45-47. For examples of
longer wars, see III 2, 23. Livy does not specify the lengths of most Roman wars, though his narration often gives the impression that they were short.

2. Lit.: “uncovered.”

3. Livy, II 31; III 1;X 1. AlsoP3.

4. Lit.: “from hand to hand.”

5. Livy, IV 59-60.

7

How Much Land the Romans Gave per Colonist

1. A blank is left in the text; the Latin jugerum was equal to about twenty-eight thousand square feet, or two-thirds of an acre.

2. Livy, V 30.

8

The Cause Why Peoples Leave Their Ancestral Places and Inundate the Country of Others

\.Dll 4,6.

2. Lit.: “particularly.”

3. Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 114. Cf. Polybius, II 21.

4. D114.

5. Livy, V 33-34.

6. D II 4.

7. Polybius, II 21-31.

8. Livy, Summaries, LXIII, LXV, LXVII-LXVIIL Plutarch, Marius, 16-27.

9. Quoting in Latin from Procopius’s Greek, De bello Vandalico, IV 10; the Latin word used for Joshua is lesu, used also for Jesus.

9

What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise among Powers

1. Livy, VII 29-32.

2. Livy, Summaries, XVI; Polybius, 18-12.

3. Livy, XXI 5-19.

4. Livy, IV 37-40.

5. FH II 24-31.

10

Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is according to the Common Opinion

1. Plutarch, Agis and Cleomenes, 27.

2. Quintus Curtius does not make this statement in his account (VI 1) of the war between Antipater and the Spartan king Agis III, which took place
eight years before the death of Alexander the Great, nor does he say Agis was compelled to do battle from lack of money.

470

3. In August 1516 the Medici Pope Leo X deprived Francesco Maria della Rovere, nephew of the preceding pope, Julius II, of the duchy of Urbino on
the grounds that while in the pay of the church he had conspired with its enemies and was complicit in the murder of the cardinal of Pavia; instead, Leo
gave the duchy to his own nephew, Lorenzo de’ Medici (to whom The Prince is dedicated). Francesco, however, returned and recaptured Urbino from the
pope and the Florentines in February 1517 and held it until September 1517.

4. Lucian, Charon, 12.

5. Justin, XXV 1-2. The king of Macedon was Antigonus.

6. P 12.

7. Livy, XXVII 48. The other consul was Marcus Livius.

8. Thucydides, I 141-43.

9. Livy, IX 17-19.

10. Livy, VII 29-31.

n

It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a Friendship with a Prince Who Has More Reputation Than Force

1. Quoted in Latin with alterations from Livy, VII 29.

2. NM shifts from the plural to the singular.

3. Pope Sixtus IV; Ferdinand of Aragon, king of Naples; King Louis XI of France. See FH VIII 10-18.

4. Here and in the next sentence quotes again in Latin adapted from Livy, VII 29.

5. P23.

6. Lit.: “find.”

7. In Livy, IX 14, the consul Papirius Cursor does not laugh but says that the chicken-man announced favorable auspices and the sacrifice was
propitious so the Tarentines could see that the authority of the gods supported the Roman action.

12

Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It Is Better to Bring On or Await War

1. Herodotus, I 205-15.

2. Livy, XXXIV 60.

3. Justin, XXII 4-7; Livy, XXVIII 43.

4. Livy, XXVIII 43-44.

5. Thucydides, VI-VII.

6. See Pindar, Isthmian Ode, 4; Lucan, Pharsalia, IV 609-53; Ovid, Metamorphoses, IX 183-84. Also Dante, Convivio, III 3.7, Monorchia, II 7.10.

7. Lit.: “honest.”

8. NM switches from plural to singular and back.

9. Or “intend.”

10. Or “sold out.”

U.FHll 29-30.

12. Following the printed text rather than the manuscript not in NM’s hand, which has “hope.”

13. The Florentines waged war “caused by the ambition of the archbishop,” Giovanni Visconti of Milan, around 1353, about twenty-five years after
Castruccio’s death in 1328 {FH II 42); they conducted a “spirited and admirable” defense from 1390 to 1402 against the efforts to seize Tuscany by
Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti, called the “Count of Virtue” and the first to have the title of duke, who also aspired to be king of Italy {FH I 27, 33; III 25,
29).

14. Presumably Ticinus, Lake Trasumennus, and Cannae; see Livy, XXI 45-46; XXII 4-7, 43-50.

15. Inglese suggests emendation to eight hundred thousand on the basis of Polybius, II 24. Livy, Summaries, XX, as amended by Mommsen, gives
eight hundred thousand as the number the Romans had under arms against the Gauls at this time.

16. Plutarch, Marius, 16-27.

13

That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More through Fraud Than through Force

1. Philip II of Macedon; Justin, VII-IX.

2. Justin, XXII-XXIII; P 8.

3. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, I 6; II 4—III 1; IV I, 5; V 5.

4. FH I 27.

5. D II 4.1.

6. Or “felt.”

7. Livy, VII 38, 42; VIII 1-6.

8. MI 9.

9. Quoted precisely in Latin, except for “etc.,” from Livy, VIII 4.

14

Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing That through Humility They Will Conquer Pride

1. Lit.: “makes faith.”

2. Livy, VIII 2.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 4, with two substantial omissions.

4. Or “uncovered.”

15

Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in Their Resolutions; and Slow Decisions Are Always Hurtful

1. Lit.: “individual.”

471

2. Livy, VIII 3-4; Livy says the Romans summoned ten of the leading Latins.

3. Lit.: “having conscience.”

4. Quoted in Latin (with the addition of “for you to consider”) from Livy, VIII 4.

5. Livy, XXIV 28.

6. Quoted in Italian from Livy, VIII 11.

7. Ludovico Storza in 1499.

8. Or “damned.”

9. D I 38.2-4.

16

How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do Not Conform to the Ancient Orders

1. Livy, VIII 6-11.

2. Lit.: “wills” or “wishes.”

3. Dl 14-15.

4. Livy, VIII 7.

5. Livy, VIII 9.

6. That is, “lines.”

7. The Italian means “princes.”

8. In Latin adapted from Livy, VIII 8.

17

How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed by Armies in the Present Times; and Whether the Opinion

Universally Held of It Is True

1. Not literally a French word but a gallicism, the Italian word giomate used on the model of the French joumees, which elsewhere we translate along
with battaglie as “battles.”

2. The terms translated as “embankments” and “barricades” in this chapter are rendered as “dikes” and “dams” in P25.

3. Upper limbs ( braccia ), not weapons ( arrne ).

4. Lit.: “respect.”

5. Presumably counting from the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII in September 1494 to 1517or 1518.

6. In 1509; AW VII.

7. In 1503; AWIV. This duke of Nemours is Louis d’Armagnac, not Gaston de Foix, whose death is mentioned later in the sentence.

8. Guiccardini, History of Italy, X 13.

9. Lit.: “offend.”

10. Lit.: “offends.”

11. Lit.: “shoulders.”

12. Selim I defeated Ismail I, the shah of Persia, at Chaldiran in 1514 and the Mameluke sultans of Egypt at Aleppo in 1516 and near Cairo in 1517.
The term Sophy derives from the family name of the dynasty ruling Persia from 1500 to 1736.

18

How by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of the Ancient Military Infantry Should Be

Esteemed More Than Horse

1. Livy, H 20.

2. Quoted from Livy, XXII 49, except that whereas Livy’s Latin means “How I would prefer that he give them to me bound,” NM’s Latin means, “How
I would prefer that they give the cavalry to me bound.”

3. Ventura, not fortuna

4. Livy, IX 22.

5. Plutarch, Antony, 37-50; Crassus, 19-31. Crassus has four thousand cavalry according to Plutarch (20) and Antony at least sixteen thousand (37).

6. Lit.: “persuading.”

7. At the Battle of Marignano.

8. Polybius, I 33-34.

9. Gilbert gives Carmignuola another three thousand cavalry on the basis of the 1531 Florentine edition and because “one thousand seems too few for
sixteen thousand enemies.”

10. At the Battle of Arbedo in 1422.

11. NM shifts from plural to singular.

19

That Acquisitions by Republics That Are Not Well Ordered and That Do Not Proceed according to Roman

Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not Their Exaltation

1. fln 17.5, 18.4.

2. Plutarch, Lucullus, 24-28.

3. Following Inglese, we detach the first clause of this sentence from the previous sentence and attach it here.

4. D 16.

5. Lit.: “respect.”

6. Or “luxuries.”

7. Lit.: “conversation.”

8. Livy, VII 38-41; XXIII 18.

9. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 38.

10. Quoted in Latin from Juvenal, Satires, VI 293, except that NM adds “gluttony.”

472

20

What Danger That Prince or Republic Runs That Avails Itself of Auxiliary or Mercenary Military

1. P 12-13.

2. Livy, VII 32-33, 37.

3. Livy, VII 38-41.

4. D III 6.20.

5. The inhabitants of Rhegium. Polybius, I 7; Livy, XXVIII 28, and XXXI 31.

6. NM shifts from singular to plural.

21

The First Praetor the Romans Sent Anyplace Was to Capua, Four Hundred Years after They Began to

Make War

ion 4.

2. Livy, IX 20.

3. Quoted in Latin with some alterations from Livy, IX 20.

4. Lit.: “reason.”

5. Lit.: “sentence.”

6. The French king is Francis I, the Genoese governor Ottaviano Fregoso.

7. Since 1328; FH II 30.

22

How False the Opinions of Men Often Are in Judging Great Things

1. Z3III 16.

2. Livy, VIII 11.

3. In 1515.

4. In 1512.

5. In 1513.

6. In two letters of 20 December 1514 to Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassador to Rome, NM recommended that the pope ally himself with
France.

7. The Battle of Marignano.

8. Livy, VIII 11.

23

How Much the Romans, in Judging Subjects for Some Accidents That Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled

from the Middle Way

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 13, except that “war” and “peace” are reversed.

2. D II 10.

3. Lit.: “broke” (both times in this sentence).

4. Upper limbs ( braccia ), not weapons ( arme ).

5. Livy, VIII 11-13.

6. Lit.: “thing” or “affair.”

7. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 13, with substantial omissions. Our translation makes use of NM’s in his Del modo di trattare i popoli della
Valdichiana ribellati (Mode of treating tlie rebel peoples of the Valdichiana), Martelli, Opere, 14.

8. Livy, VIII 14.

9. Lit.: “the city.”

10. In the tide of this chapter.

11. See NM’s Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati

12. Livy, VIII 19-21.

13. This quotation is given in Latin precisely, and the next two quotations are given with the omission of “he said,” from Livy, VIII 21.

14. This and the next quotation are quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VIII 21.

15. Quoted in Latin precisely from Livy, VIII 21, where these words are said by the consul Gaius Plautius.

16. P3.

17. Livy, IX 2-3.

18. Dill41-42.

24

Fortresses Are Generally Much More Harmful Than Useful

1. Livy, VIII 20.

2. Lit.: “in faith.”

3. P20.

4. Inglese suggests a possible emendation: “it never saved”; but note the word “generally” in the chapter title.

5. Quoted in Latin from Juvenal, Satires, VIII 124.

6. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, Aeneid, I 150.

7. Inglese proposes an emendation of “useless” rather than “useful,” but he may forget NM’s willingness to advise those who would do evil.

8. D II 17.1.

9. Lit.: “pardon.”

10. Lit.: “mode.”

11. The French took Milan away from the Sforzas in 1500 and again in 1515.

473

12. Lit.: “assassinated.”

13. Francesco Alidosi, papal legate to Bologna.

14. Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli; P 8, 12.

15. Charles VIII of France, who invaded Italy in 1494.

16. Or “power” (potere)

17. Livy, XXV 7-11; XXVI 39; XXVII 15-16, 20, 25.

18. Lit.: “head.”

19. Plutarch, Sayings of Spartans, 215DE (said by Agis about Corinth), 190A, and 212E (said by Theopompus and Agesilaus about unspecified cities).

20. Francesco Maria della Rovere.

25

To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize It by Means of Its Disunion Is a Contradictory Policy

1. Livy, II 44-47, where some editions have Gnaeus Manlius, not Gaius Manilius.

2. D II 22.

3. D II 21.2.

4. Upper limbs (braccia), not weapons (arrne).

26

Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred against Those Who Use Them, without Any Utility to Them

1. Lit.: “pardon.”

2. Procopius, De bello Persico, I 7.

3. Livy, II 43-45.

4. D III 6.20.

5. Livy, VII 38-42.

6. Livy, XXIII 35; see also XXII 57; XXIV 14-16.

7. In Latin adapted from Tacitus, Annals, XV 68.

27

For Prudent Princes and Republics It Should Be Enough to Conquer, for Most Often When It Is Not

Enough, One Loses

1. Livy, XXIII 11-13.

2. Quintus Curtius, IV 2-4.

3. The Florentine republic, of which Piero Soderini was gonfalonier for life and NM secretary of the chancery.

4. Livy, XXX 9, 19-20, 29-31.

28

How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a Prince Not to Avenge an Injury Done against the Public or against

a Private Person 1

1. Lit.: “the private.”

2. Livy, V 35-38.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.

4. Lit.: “the private.”

5. Lit.: “solemn.”

6. Lit.: “solemn.”

7. Justin, IX 6.

29

Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans

1. Livy, V 32-33.

2. Livy, V 37-40, for this and the next six sentences.

3. Lit.: “orders.”

4. Quoted in Latin almost exactly from Livy, V 37.

5. Dill 1.2.

6. Lit.: “head.”

7. Lit.: “abandon themselves” (also later in this sentence).

30

Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy Friendships Not with Money but with Virtue and the

Reputation of Strength

1. Livy, V 48.

2. In Latin adapted freely from Livy, V 49, where it is attributed to gods and men rather than to Fortune.

3. Plural.

4. Livy, XXI 26.

5. Livy, Summaries, LXI.

6. Livy, XXXVII 22-24; XXXVIII 39; XLIV 15.

7. Livy, Summaries, XVI.

474

8. Livy, XXXV 13.

9. Livy, XXVIII 16.

10. The English king was Henry VIII, the French Louis XII.

11. Cannae, Ticinus, and Lake Trasumennus.

12. Livy, XXIII 11-13.

13. Quoted in Italian from Livy, XXIII 13.

31

How Dangerous It Is to Believe the Banished

1. Lit.: “presupposition” (not the same Italian word used near the start of this sentence and near the end of the chapter). Livy, VIII 24.

2. Plutarch, Themistocles, 27-31; Thucydides, I 137-38. According to these sources, it was not Darius but Xerxes or Artaxerxes.

3. A different word from that used in the title and earlier in this chapter, related to the term we have translated as “borders.”

32

In How Many Modes the Romans Seized Towns

1. In Latin.

2. Livy, XXVI 42-46.

3. Livy, V 19.

4. Livy, XXIX 34-35; XXX 8.

5. Livy, VIII 25-26.

6. NM’s “either” is followed in the next sentence with “But," not “Or.”

7. Plutarch, Aratus , 7-10, 21-23.

8. D II 1,4.6.

33

How the Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies

1. Livy, 149.

2. Livy, IX 35-36.

3. Lit.: “from hand to hand.”

Third Book

1

If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Live Long, It Is Necessary to Draw It Back Often toward Its

Beginning

1. Quoted in Latin; the source has not been found.

2. Livy, V 38.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.

4. Livy, V 37.

5. Lit.: “extrinsic.”

6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.

7. Livy, V 39-41, 46.

8. Livy, V 32-50.

9. Livy, H 3-5.

10. According to Livy, III 56-58, two killed themselves in prison and eight were exiled.

11. Livy, IV 13-16.

12. Livy, VI 11-20.

13. Livy, VIII 7-8.

14. Livy, VIII 30-36.

15. Livy, XXXVIII 50-60: Scipio Africanus and his brother Scipio Asiaticus.

16. See FH V I, 4. The Medici governed Florence during this period.

17. Livy, II 10.

18. Livy, II 11-13.

19. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 20.

20. Livy, VIII 9-10; X 26-29.

21. Livy, Summaries, XVIII.

22. Plutarch, Cato the Younger, 4, 18, 21, 78.

23. On the corruption of the Franciscans and the Dominicans, cf. Dante, Paradiso, XI-XII.

24. See P 19.

25. Lucius Junius Brutus.

2

That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Craziness at the Right Time 1

1. Lit.: “in time.”

2. Livy, I 56.

3. Livy, I 58-59.

475

3

That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain a Newly Acquired Freedom

1. See Savonarola, Sermons on the Psalms, 11 October 1495.

2. Dl 16.4-5

3. In August 1502, the Florentines extended the term of the office of gonfalonier (head of the Signoria) from two months to life and gave it to Piero
Soderini, NM’s employer. See also NM’s Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio (1503; see end of text) and Decennaleprimo (1504; see 370-79)
for further, enigmatic comment.

4

A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a Principality While Those Who Have Been Despoiled of It Are Living

1. Lit.: “merit.”

2. Lit.: “merits.”

3. Cf. PI

4. Livy, I 35, 40-42, 46-49.

5

What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a Kingdom Lose It

1. Livy, 158.

2. Livy, I 56, 59.

3. Livy, I 59-60.

4. Plutarch, Timoleon, 4-5, 36-39.

5. See Plutarch, Aratus, especially 53; also Polybius, IV 8.

6. Or “deprived individuals.”

6

Of Conspiracies

1. NM translates into Italian, with divergences, a passage from Tacitus, Histories, IV 8.

2. D II 32.1.

3. Some manuscripts say “public charges,” but Casella’s choice of “private” fits the sense better.

4. D II 24.1-2, 28; P 19.

5. Lit.: “war.”

6. See P3.

7. Some manuscripts have “to the dead.”

8. Justin, IX 6.

9. Casella has Luzio and Giulio Belanti later in the chapter (see D III 6 n. 57). Guicciardini does not mention the Belanti conspiracy in his histories;

Pandolfo was “tyrant” or “prince” of Siena from 1498 to 1512 (see FH VIII 35; P 20, 22).

10. See FH VIII 1-3.

11 See Plutarch, Brutus, 8-10.

12. See Cicero, De officus, II 7, according to whom Phalaris was slain by the “general multitude” of Agrigentum

13. See Cicero, De officus, II 7; Plutarch, Dion, 6; Aristotle, Politics, 1312a4-6. There were in fact two Dionysiuses, both tyrants of Syracuse

14. Juvenal, Satires, X 112-13; quoted in Latin.

15. Earlier in the paragraph and in D II 28.

16. The incident occurred on 7 December 1492. See jP 21 for NM’s assurance that Ferdinand was alert to possible conspiracies.

17. Bajazet II, sultan from 1481 to 1512 and father of “the present Turk,” Selim I, suffered this attack in 1492.

18. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1311a8-21.

19. See Herodian, I 9. The year was 185.

20. See Herodian, III 11-12. This happened in 205.

21. See Tacitus, Annals, V 6-8; Suetonius, Tiberius, 65. The year was 31.

22. Jacopo killed Piero Gambacorti in October 1392.

23. Coppola was executed by Ferdinand in 1487; see FH VIII 32.

24. Lit.: “pleasures.”

25. See P 17.

26. See Tacitus, Annals, XV 48-54, for the conspiracy of Gaius Piso against Emperor Nero in 65.

27. See FH VIII 2-7.

28. See Livy, II 4.

29. See Quintus Curtius, VI 7-11.

30. Lit.: “reasoning.”

31. See Tacitus, Annals, XV 48, 54-56.

32. See Livy, XXIV 5, where the conspirator’s name is given as Theodotus. The year was 215B.C.

33. See Justin, XXVI I, where the conspirator’s name is given as Hellanicus. The year was 272 B.C.

34. See Herodotus, III 61-79.

35. See Livy, XXXV 35.

36 See Tacitus, Annals, XV 48, 52.

37. See Herodian, III 10-12. This happened in 205.

38. See Tacitus, Annals, XV 51, 57.

39. See Herodian, I 16-17. This took place in 192.

40. See Herodian, IV 12-13. The year was 217.

41. See P3.

42. See FH VIII 5. The Pazzi conspiracy was in 1478.

43. Plutarch, Caius Marius, 37-39. This took place in 88 B.C.

476

44. Lit.: “offend.”

45. Sitalces was king of Thrace from 440 to 424 B.C., but NM appears to have invented this conspiracy against him.

46. The two brothers, Ferdinando and Giulio, conspired against Duke Alfonso in 1506; the priest was Jean d’Artiganova. See Guicciardini, History of
Italy VII 4.

47. In this chapter and in D I 10.2, 40.6.

48. Quoted in Latin with a slight variation from Livy, XXXV 35.

49. See Herodian, I 8.

50. The Pazzi conspiracy in 1478.

51. Some manuscripts say “places” rather than “countries.” See Herodian, III 11-12, where Severus and Antoninus are said to have been in separate
rooms of the same palace.

52. See Thucydides, VI 54-59, where Hipparchus, not Diodes, is given as the victim of the conspiracy against these sons of Pisistratus in 514 B.C.;
for the error see Justin, II 9.

53. See Justin, XVI 5; the year was 352.

54. See FH VIII 6.

55. See Plutarch, Pelopidas, 7-13.

56. See Plutarch, Brutus, 16.

57. See D III 6 n. 9.

58. See FH VII 34; the conspiracy took place in 1476.

59. See FH VIII 34; P20.

60. See Plutarch, Caesar, 68-69.

61. See Sallust, Bellurn Catilinae, 31, and Cicero, In Catilinam, I 1; the year was 63 B.C.

62. See Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 46-47; Plutarch, Cicero, 16-19.

63. See Hanno’s conspiracy of 350 B.C. narrated by Justin, XXI 4.

64. See Plutarch, Caesar, 32.

65. See Justin, XXII 1; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 14; P 8.

66. See Plutarch, Cleomenes, 4.

67. See Plutarch, Solon, 30; Herodotus, 159.

68. Pandolfo returned to Siena from exile in 1487. See Guicciardini, History of Italy, TV 3.

69. See Plutarch, Cicero, 22; Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 60.

70. See Justin, XXI 4.

71. See Justin, III 6; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 5. The conspiracy occurred in 382 B.C.

72. In this chapter and in D III 4, 5.

73. See Herodian, 117.

74. D II 20, 26.

75. Livy, VII 38-41.

76. Walter de Brienne, duke of Athens, was invited to Florence as captain in 1342 and overthrown by conspiracy in 1343; see FH II 30, 33-37.

77. For a contemporary account see Guicciardini, History of Italy, V 8. The bishop was Cosimo de’ Pazzi.

78. See FH II 36.

79. See Plutarch, Dion, 54-57.

7

Whence It Arises That Changes from Freedom to Servitude and from Servitude to Freedom Are Some of

Them without Blood, Some of Them Full of It

1. Livy, 159-60.

2. Piero, Giovanni, and Giuliano de’ Medici were banished from Florence when the French King Charles VIII entered the city in November 1494.

8

Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic Should Consider Its Subject

1. See D I 18, 55; IE 6.19.

2. Livy, 1141.

3. Livy, VI 14-20.

4. Quoted precisely in Latin from Livy, VI 20.

5. DIII1.

9

How One Must Vary with the Times If One Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune

1. Livy, XXII 12, 18; XXVIII 40-42.

2. Lit.: “temporal [things].”

3. DI7.14, 52.2, 56; III 3.

4. For a similar view of the events of 1512 in Florence, see Guicciardini, History of Italy, XI 4.

5. See P 25 for a fuller treatment of Pope Julius II on this point.

6. D I 18.

10

That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When the Adversary Wishes Him to Engage in It in Any Mode

1. Quoted in Latin and freely adapted from Livy, VII 12.

2. D I pr.2; II pr.3, 4.2, 16, 18.1-3, 19.

3. See P 3 for the remark of the cardinal of Rouen, quoted by NM, that “the Italians do not understand war.”

4. A possible reference to NM’s dialogue, AW, or to D II 16-18.

All

5. The manuscripts say alcuno modo (“some mode”) rather than nessuno modo (“not in any mode”), as the sense seems to demand.

6. See AWN.

7. Philip V. Livy, XXXIII 7-10.

8. Livy, VII 12-15.

9. Quoted in Latin and adapted from Livy, VII 11.

11

That Whoever Has to Deal with Very Many, Even Though He Is Inferior, Wins If Only He Can Sustain the

First Thrusts

1. D I 3-6, 50; III 1.3, 8.1.

2. The following is not said exactly elsewhere, but see D 13, 6.3-4, 18, 34.3, 37.1, 49; III 1.2.

3. Appius Claudius Crassus; Livy, VI 37-42.

4. Ludovico Sforza

5. “All Italy”—consisting of Pope Sixtus IV, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan (for whom “Signor Ludovico” the Moor was regent), the
Florentines, and the duke of Ferrara—formed a league against the Venetians. But the Venetians made the Peace of Bagnolo separately with Ludovico in
1484, to which the others were forced to accede.

6. In 1495, after the French King Charles VIII conquered the kingdom of Naples, the “whole world”—consisting of the duke of Milan, the Emperor
Maximilian, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, Pope Alexander VI, and Venice—combined against him in the League of Venice. But the king of Spain
made a separate peace with France in 1497, dividing the kingdom of Naples. Or the possible reference may be to the Holy League formed in 1511,
which also ended with a separate peace between Spain and France; see NM’s letter of 10 December 1514.

7. Uno

8. Uno

9. The League of Cambrai was formed against the Venetians in 1508 and defeated them in 1509 at the Battle of Agnadello.

12

That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose Every Necessity to Engage in Combat on His Soldiers and Take

It Away from Those of Enemies

1. Dl 1.4-5, 3.2; II 12.3.

2. The reference has not been found. For opposing views see Plato, Laws, 628c—d; Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 10-19; Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, I

1.

3. An apparent reference to the return of the Medici in 1512.

4. See Plutarch, Marcus Crassus, 26-31.

5. Quoted with slight variation in Latin from Livy, IX I.

6. Livy, II 47, where it is Gnaeus Manlius, not Gaius Manilius.

7. Quoted in Latin with slight variation from Livy, IV 28.

8. Livy, V 21.

13

Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good Captain Who Has a Weak Army or a Good Army That Has a Weak

Captain

I. Livy, 1135, 39-40.

2 Livy, XXV 36-39.

3. Lit.: “discoursing.”

4. Quoted in Latin with omission and variation from Suetonius, Julius Caesar, 34

5 See Plutarch, Lucullus, 7.

6 Livy, XXII 57; XXIV 14-16

7 DI 21.3.

8. See Diodorus Siculus, XVIII.9; Plutarch, Alexander, 68; Justin, XIII.2.

9 Livy, Summaries, CXXXI

14

What Effects New Inventions That Appear in the Middle of the Fight and New Voices That Are Heard May

Produce

1. Livy, n 64.

2. See Guicciardini, History of Italy, III 2, for an account of the incident, which occurred in 1495.

3. Livy VII 14; see also AWIW.

4. Lit.: “formed.”

5. See Diodorus Siculus, II 16-19.

6. Quoted in Latin without change from Livy, IV 33.

15

That One Individual and Not Many Should Be Put over an Army; and That Several Commanders Hurt

1. Aemilius Mamercus; see D III 14.3.

2. Quoted in Latin with alteration from Livy, IV 31.

3. See Guicciardini, History of Italy, VI. NM accompanied the Florentine mission to Pisa personally as secretary of the republic.

4. Quoted in Latin and freely adapted from Livy, III 70.

478

16

That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find True Virtue; and in Easy Times Not Virtuous Men but Those

with Riches or Kinship Have More Favor

1. Thucydides, VI 8-24.

2. Lit.: “sufficiency.”

3 .DI 18.3; II 1.1.

4. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 6, 9-11. This was the Third Macedonian War, 172-167 B.C.

5. For NM’s opinion of Giacomini’s virtue, see his Decennale secimdo, V 32-36, and his Nature di uomim fiorentim Giacomini resigned the office of
commissioner in 1506 after an unsuccessful assault of Pisa; the three commissioners were in office in 1508-9; Pisa surrendered on 6 June 1509. As
Florentine secretary, NM was present at these events.

17

That One Individual Should Not Be Offended and Then That Same One Sent to an Administration and

Governance of Importance

1. Livy, XXVI 17. The other consul was Marcus Livius.

2. Livy, XXVII 44-51.

18

Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain Than to Foretell the Policies of the Enemy

1. In Plutarch’s Sayings of Kings and Commanders, 187D, this remark is attributed to Chabrias, not to Epaminondas.

2. See Plutarch, Brutus, 42-43.

3. NM describes the Battle of Marignano on 13-14 September 1515. See Guicciardini, History of Italy, XII 15. The pope was Leo X.

4. Livy, IV 37-41, according to which it was the Volsci, not the Aequi.

5. This particular is missing from Guicciardini’s account, History of Italy, IV 3-4.

19

Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment

1. Livy, n 55-60.

2. “He says” is written in Latin.

3. The passage quoted in Latin does not occur in Tacitus; cf. Annals, III 55.5.

4. See P 17; Aristotle, Politics, 1315a26-31.

20

One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do More with the Falisci Than Any Roman Force

1. Livy, V 27.

2. Plutarch, Pyirhus, 21; Cicero, De qfficiis, 113; Livy, Summaries, XIII.

3. Livy, XXVI 46, 50.

4. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, I 1.3; ID 1.41-2.0, 3.2; IV 2.34; V 1.19, 3.46, 4.24; VI 1.46; VIII 2.23, 6.23; cf. I 1.5. See also P 14.

21

Whence It Arises That with a Different Mode of Proceeding Hannibal Produced Those Same Effects in

Italy as Scipio Did in Spain

1. Livy, XXVII 20. On the comparison between Hannibal and Scipio, see P 17.

2. Livy, XXII 54, 61.

3. D137.1.

4. See P 17, 19.

5. Lit.: “offense.”

6. Livy, XXVIII 24-29, 32-34.

7. Livy, XXI 1.

8. Livy, XXXIX 51.

22

That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Kindness of Valerius Corvinus Acquired for Each the

Same Glory

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 7.

2. Livy, VII 4, 9-10; quoted in Latin with changes from 10. According to Livy, it was not the consul but the dictator, Titus Quintius Poenus.

3. The prudent man has not been identified. Aristotle, Politics, 1286b27-31, cited by Walker, does not refer to a proportion. On “proportion,” see D I
55 and P 14; see also D 140.

4. Dill 1.3; cf. Ill 17.

5. Dill 20, esp. n. 4.

6. Quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VII 33.

7. Livy, VIII 7-10.

8. See D I 16.3, 34.2, 43.

9. Livy, II 2, 6-8.

479

10. See Dill 20.

11. This episode or practice is otherwise unknown.

23

For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled from Rome

1. Quoted in Latin with some alteration from Livy, V 26.

2. Livy, V 22-23, 32; see Plutarch, Camillus , 7.

3. Or “someone useful” ( uno utile )

4. See P 17, 19; cf. Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 3.

24

The Prolongation of Commands Made Rome Servile

1. Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus is not given his family name in this chapter, unlike the next.

2. Livy, III 21.

3. Publilius according to Livy, VIII 26.

25

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of Many Roman Citizens

1. See D I 37.1; II 6, 19.1; III 16.2.

2. Quoted in Latin with some changes from Livy, III 26.

3. Three and one-third acres. See D I 24.2 n. 4.

4. Quoted in Italian from Livy, III 29.

5. Quoted in Italian from Livy, III 29, where Cincinnatus says, “Until you begin to have the spirit [animum] of a consul, lead these legions as a legate.”

6. Livy, Summaries, XVIII. See AWL

7. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 28.

8. Valerius Maximus, IV 4. See also Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacts, II 11-14; cf. Plato, Laws, 737d, and Aristotle, Politics, 1265a28-33,
1267a21-28.

26

How a State Is Ruined Because of Women

1. Livy, IV 9-10.

2. See D III 2, 5. Livy. 1 58-59.

3. See D I 40.4. 44, 57. Livy, III 44-58.

4. See D III 6. Aristotle, Politics , 1314627; see also 1303bl7-4al8.

27

How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and How That Opinion Is Not True That to Hold Cities One Needs

to Hold Them Divided

1. Livy, IV 10.

2. Lit.: “conversation.”

3. The reference is to events from August 1500 to April 1502 in Pistoia, a city subject to Florence The Panciatichi were allied to the Medici, then in
exile, and the Cancellieri were supporters of the Florentine republic. NM was present in Pistoia on several occasions in 1501 and wrote his brief article
De rebus pistoriensibus in 1502. See also P 17, 20. For another contemporary account, see Guicciardini, Storia Fiorentina, 22, 24.

4. See D I pr.2.

5. See P 20.

6. See D II 24.

7. Flavio Biondo, Historiae decades tres, II 9; quoted by NM in Italian, loosely based on Biondo’s Latin.

8. NM would have heard this remark himself while accompanying “Monsieur de Lant” (Antoine de Langres); it is not otherwise recorded.

28

That One Should Be Mindful of the Works of Citizens Because Many Times underneath a Merciful Work a

Beginning of Tyranny Is Concealed

1. Livy, IV 13-14; the dictator was Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus.

2. Or “damned.”

3. Lit.: “favors.”

29

That the Sins of Peoples Arise from Princes

1. Lit.: “will discourse of.”

2. See PI, 17.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 28, but changing the word order and omitting “almost” before “always” and “just” before “religion.”

4. Lorenzo de’ Medici, La rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paulo, in Opere, ed. A. Simioni, (Bari: G. Laterza & Figli, 1914), II 100.

480

30

For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by His Authority, It Is Necessary
First to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City

1. Or “he.”

2. Quoted in Latin with slight changes from Livy, VI 6, 10-15. Livy also mentions that Camillus shared the command of his army with Publius
Valerius and that Cornelius was also to guard over religion.

3. Lit.: “written” or “inscribed,” as elsewhere in the chapter.

4 Exodus 32.25-28

31

Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Spirit and Their Same Dignity in Every Fortune

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 7, with a slight alteration.

2. The third defeat after those at Ticinus in 218 B.C. and at Lake Trasumennus in 217. Livy, XXI 45-46; XXII 4-7, 43-50.

3. Livy, XXII 57-61.

4. D II 30.

5. Livy, XXIII 12-13.

6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, XXXVII 34-45, and adapted loosely from 45, where Scipio also invokes fortune and distinguishes our spirits subject to
our own minds from the things under the power of the immortal gods.

7. For a contemporary account, see Guicciardini, History of Italy, VIII 4-7.

8. See D 14.1, 21; also P 12.

9. Dill 30.1.

10. Quoted in Latin with a slight variation from Livy, VI 7.

11. Spirito, not the animo translated elsewhere in the chapter as “spirit.”

32

What Modes Some Have Held to for Disturbing a Peace

1. Livy, VI 21

2. Livy, VI 13.

3. Lit.: “reasoning.”

4. Actually Gesco.

5. See P 12; Polybius, I 65-88.

33

If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is Necessary to Make the Army Confident Both among Themselves and in

the Captain

1. Publius Claudius Pulcher; Cicero, De natura deorum, II 3.

2. Quoted in Latin with slight change from Livy, VI 41, where the speaker is Appius Claudius Pulcher, grandson of the decemvir.

3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 29, where the dictator is Titus Quintius Cincinnatus and the master of the horse is Aulus Sempronius Atratinus. NM
omits the dictator’s statement, “Nor have they been given by the immortal gods any surer trust or greater help.”

4. Quoted precisely in Latin from Livy, VI 30. The Manlii were Publius and Gaius.

5. Livy, IX 37. Fabius is Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

34

What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the People Begin to Favor a Citizen; and Whether It Distributes

Magistracies with Greater Prudence Than a Prince

1. See D 111.1; HI 22.1. Livy, VII4-5.

2. See D I 47.3, 58.

3. Livy, VI 42; VII 9-11; VIII 7-8.

4. Livy, XXI 46.

5. Livy, XXII 53.

6. Livy, XXVI 49-50.

7. Livy, XXIV 7-9.

8. Lit.: “countersigns.”

9. Lit.: “favors.”

35

What Dangers Are Borne in Making Oneself Head in Counseling a Thing; and the More It Has of the
Extraordinary, the Greater Are the Dangers Incurred in It

1. Apparently NM never found the more convenient place, unless it is P 6.

2. See Guicciardini, History of Italy, XIII 9.

3. Livy, VI 35-42; VII 1. '

4. Livy, VII 6; the defeated plebeian consul was Lucius Genucius.

5. Plutarch, Aemilins Paulus, 23; the words quoted appear to be NM’s invention.

481

36

The Causes Why the French Have Been and Are Still Judged in Fights at the Beginning As More Than Men

and Later As Less Than Women

1. Livy, VII 9-10.

2. Livy, X 28; he says it only once.

3. See Polybius, II 35.2-4.

4. Quoted in Latin with a slight change from Livy, VIII 34. Fabius is Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

37

Whether Small Battles Are Necessary before the Main Battle ; 1 and If One Wishes to Avoid Them, What

One Ought to Do to Know a New Enemy

1. In this chapter giomata is translated as “main battle” to distinguish it from battaglie

2. See D I 6.3.

3. Quoted in Latin with some omissions from Livy, VII 32.

4. See D I 23.2-4.

5. Quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VII 32, where Valerius after some light fighting exhorts his soldiers with remarks quoted by NM in
the next chapter.

6. Philip V. Livy, XXXI 14, 26; XXXII 13.

7. Livy, XXIII 5.

8. See Plutarch, Marins, 13-16.

9. Quoted in Latin adapted from Livy, VII 11, with the addition of “by a thing of small importance.”

38

How a Captain in Whom His Army Can Have Confidence Ought to Be Made

1 In the preceding chapter, see also D I 60; II 26; III 22, 23.

2 Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 32, omitting “not by faction or by the intrigues used by the nobility, but” before “with this right hand.” The passage
shifts from indirect to direct discourse.

3. See D I 21; II 26; III 13.

4. See P 14.

39

That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of Sites

1. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, II 4, 22-29. Xenophon’s work is not called the “Life of Cyrus.” See P 14.

2. The three quotations are in Latin from Livy, VII 34, omitting “with his centurions dressed as privates” after “cloak.” Only the first sentence of the
last one, of course, is actually put in the mouth of Publius Decius by Livy.

40

That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a Glorious Thing

1. See D II 13; P 18.

2. Lake Trasumennus.

3. Livy, XXII 4, 16-17. See also Plutarch, Fabius Maximus, 6; Polybius, III 83-84, 93. Hannibal did not simulate flight according to Livy or Polybius.

4. Livy, IX 2-3.

5. Actually Lucera.

6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IX 3. The consuls were Titus Veturius Calvinus and Spurius Postumius.

7. See D II 23.4.

41

That the Fatherland Ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with Glory; and It Is Well

Defended in Any Mode Whatever

1. In the preceding chapter.

2. Livy, IX 4.

3. Lit.: “respect.”

42

That Promises Made through Force Ought Not to Be Observed

1. Livy, IX 8-12.

2. P 18; the title is given in Latin.

43

That Men Who Are Born in One Province Observe Almost the Same Nature for All Times

1. In 1494 Piero de’ Medici ceded by treaty the fortress of Pisa to the king of France on the condition that it be returned to Florence after Charles had
conquered the kingdom of Naples. The king instead left it in the hands of the Pisans, an act that led to the downfall of Piero in Florence.

2. Lit.: “working.”

482

3. Lit.: “causing.”

4. See FH III 25.

5. Livy, X 10.

44

One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and Audacity What One Would Never Have Obtained through

Ordinary Modes

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 16.

2. On these events in 1506, see Guicciardini, History of Italy, VII 3. The king of France was Louis XII.

3. On this episode in 1512, see Guicciardini, History of Italy, X 10. The king of France was Louis XII, the marquis Francesco Gonzaga, the pope
Julius II.

45

What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to Resist the Thrust of Enemies and, Having Resisted It, to Charge
Them; or Indeed to Assault Them with Fury from the First

1. Livy, X 27-29. The consuls were Publius Decius Mus the Younger and Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

46

Whence It Arises That One Family in One City Keeps the Same Customs for a Time

1. Livy, IX 33-34. This is said by Publius Sempronius in his oration against Appius Claudius, descendant of the decemvir.

47

That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget Private Injuries for Fove of His Fatherland

1. Livy, 1X38.

48

When One Sees a Great Error Made by an Enemy, One Ought to Believe That There Is a Deception

Underneath

1. Livy, X 4.

2. Livy, V 39.

3. For these events see Guicciardini, History of Italy, VIII 8.

49

A Republic Has Need of New Acts of Foresight Every Day If One Wishes to Maintain It Free; and for
What Merits Quintus Fabius Was Called Maximus

1. See £>1 33-34,49.

2. Livy, VIII 18.

3. Livy, XXXIX 8-18.

4. Livy, XXIII 25; XXV 5-7. Livy does not mention their not lodging in town or their eating standing up.

5. Livy, II 59. See also Polybius, VI 38.

6. Lit.: “civility.”

7. Lit.: “civility.”

8. Livy, IX 46.

483

Index of Proper Names

Names in italics are referred to but not used by NM; portions of names in italics are omitted by NM;
locations in italics indicate a reference without actual use of a name used elsewhere. All names have
only one explanatory entry listing instances, with variants referring to it. Roman names are generally
given according to the practice followed by the Oxford Classical Dictionary, except for those of very
famous persons, such as Mark Antony, which have become sufficiently anglicized. Multiple
references within paragraphs are not indicated, except in the entry for Livy. In that entry a locator for
every instance is given. Writers are referred to (1) when named (I 1.1); (2) when named and quoted (I
1.1 (Q)); (3) when unnamed and unquoted (Ill ); and (4) when unnamed and quoted (111 (Q)). DL
refers to the dedicatory letter, Pr to the prefaces, and T to a chapter title.

Achaeans, ancient Greek league: II 4.1-2

Adria, Etruscan colony at the head of the Adriatic Sea: II 4.1

Adriatic Sea I 1.2, II 4.1

Aedui, ancient people who invaded Gaul: II 1.3, II 30.2

Aeneas, hero of Virgil’s Aeneid, one of two alternative founders of Rome: I 1.4-5, II 8.3
Aequi, central Italian tribe, crushed by Rome c. 304 B.C.: I 13.2, I 38.1, 1 40 4, II 1.1, II 1.2, III
12.3,11115.2,11118.2,11125

Aetolia, Aetolians, region of Greece: II 1.3, II 4.1, II 4.2, III 6.7

Afranius, Lucius, Roman general who lost to Julius Caesar at Ilerda in Spain in 49 B.C.: III 13.2
Africa: I 18.3,1 53.4, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 8.2, II 12.1, II 32.1, III 9.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 25, III 32,
III 34.3

Agathocles (361-289 B.C.), tyrant of Syracuse: II 12.1, II 12.4, II 13.1, III 6.19
Agesilaus, nineteenth king of Sparta (398-360 B.C.): I 10.2, 1124 4
Agis III, king of Sparta who lost war with Antipater (331 B.C.): II 10.1, II 24.4
Agis IV, king and unsuccessful refounder of Sparta (244-240 B.C.): I 9.4
Agnadello, site of Venetian loss (1509) to the League of Cambrai: I 12.2

Agrarian law, initially 5th century B.C. Roman law limiting land ownership: I 37 T, I 37.1, III 24, III
25

Agrippa, Furius, consul and colleague of Titus Quintius Capitolinus in 446 B.C.: III 15.2
Alamanni, Luigi, see Buondelmonti, Zanobi, and Rucellai, Cosimo
Alba, Albans, city in Latium: I 22 T, I 22, 123 1,113

Albanus, Lake, lake in Latium, overflowed banks when Camillus took Veii in 392 B.C.: I 13.1
Albizzi, Luca di Antonio degli, Florentine counselor in 1500: III 15.2

Alcibiades (c. 450-404 B.C.), Athenian, sponsored disastrous Sicilian expedition in 415 B.C.: III
16.1

Alexamenus, Aetolian, killed Nabis in 192 B.C.: III 6.7, III 6.15

Alexander VI (Rodrigo Cardinal Borgia) (1431-1503), pope (1492-1503), father of Cesare Borgia,
eliminated lords of Romagna. II 24.2, 111 112, III 29
Alexander of Epirus, king of Epirus (336-326 B.C.), uncle of Alexander the Great: II 28.2, II 31.1,
II 31.2, 1116 2

Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.), king of Macedon, took throne in 336 B.C., conquered Greece
and Asia: I 1.3,1 1.4,1 1.5,1 20,1 26.1,1 58.2, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 10.3, II 27.2, II 27.4, II 28.2,
II 31.1, 1U6 2, III 6.5, III 13.3

Alexandria, Egyptian city built by Alexander the Great: I 1.3,1 1.5
Alfonso 1 d’Este (1476-1534), duke of Ferrara: 1531, III 6.14, 111 11 2

Alfonso 11 (1448-95), king of Aragon and Naples, lost his army and his state in Romagna: II 12 2

484

Alidosi, Francesco, papal legate of Julius II to Bologna: II 24.2

Allia, river in Latium, site of Gauls’ victory over Rome (386 B.C.): II 29.1, II 29.2, III 33.1, III 48.2
Allncius, Celtiberian chieftain whose beloved was returned by Scipio Africanus: III 20, III 34.3
Alps, mountains dividing Italy from the rest of Europe: II4 1, III 43

Alviano, Bartolommeo d’ (c. 1455-1515), Venetian commander, invaded Florence (1515), defeated
by Bentivoglio and Giacomini: 153.5
Amida, Asian site of siege by Gabades: II 26
Ancus (Marcius), fourth king of Rome (640-616 B.C.): I 19.3, III 4
Anio, river in Latium, site of exemplary duel in 361 B.C.. Ill 36.1
Annius; see Setinus, Annius Lucius

Antaeus, fabulous Libyan giant, son of Poseidon and Gaia (Earth), combatant of Hercules: II 12.2
Antigonus (382-301 B.C.), general of Alexander the Great, who became king of Macedon after his
death: II 10.1

Antiochus the Great, king of Syria (223-187 B.C.): II 1.1, II 12.1, II 12.4, III 16.2, III 31.2
Antipater, Macedonian general (397-319 B.C.), defeated Agis III of Sparta: II 10.1
Antoninus Caracalla, son of Severus, Roman emperor (211-17), murdered by Macrinus: III 6.8, III
6.11,1116.15

Antonius Pius, Roman emperor (138-61), lived as a good prince: 110 4

Antonius Primus, Marcus, Roman general, fought under Vespasian, defeated Vitellius in 69, died
almost in despair in Asia. I 29.2

Antony, Mark (c. 83-32 B.C.), part of triumvirate that ruled (43-38 B.C) after Julius Caesar’s
assassination I 52.3, II 18.3

Anzio, Anzianti (Antium), on the coast of Latium, where Rome attempted to establish a colony: I
37.2,1121.2

Apollo, Greek and Roman god, identified with youth, music, and medicine: I 13.1, I 55.1, III 2, III
23, III 29

Apollonides, prudent Syracusan during Second Punic War (214 B.C.): II 15.2
Apennines, mountains in Italy: II 2.1

Appiano, Jacopo I d’ (1322-98), lord of Piombino, ungrateful but successful conspirator against
Piero Gambacorti: III 6.3

Appiano, Jacopo IV d’, head of a Florentine army that defeated the Venetians in 1498 near Marradi
through knowledge: III 18.3
Appii: III 46

Appius Claudius, consul, colleague of Titus Quintius Capitolinus (472 B.C.): III 19.1
Appius Claudius, head of Decemvirate in 451-450 b.c., known for his harshness and ambition,
killed himself (449 B.C.): I 35,1 40.1-7,141,1 42,145.1. See also Decemvirate, decemvirs
Appius Claudius Caecus, Roman censor who refused to resign (310 B.C.): III 46
Appius Claudius Crassus, grandson of the decemvir, dictator and opponent of the tribunes (368 B.C.):
III 11.1, IB 33.1

Appius Claudius Pulcher; see Claudius Pulcher, Publius

Appius Erdonius, Sabine who seized the Capitol in 460 B.C.: I 13.2

Aquilonia, between Apulia and Lucana, site of battle between Romans and Samnites: 115

Aragon, Spanish kingdom: I 29.2

Aratus (271-213 B.C.), Sicyonian man of hidden virtue: II 32.1, III 5
Arbedo, battle of, between Milan and the Swiss (1422): II 18.4

Ardea, Ardeans, coastal town in Latium, temporaiy home of Camillus (386 B.C.) and site of a
plebeian/patrician dispute over marriage (443 B.C.): II 29.1, II 29.2, III 26.1, III 26.2, III 27.1
Arezzo, Aretines ( Arretium ), town in Tuscany, part of the ancient Etruscan league, site of portents of
the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici, rebelled against Florence in 1502, decisive for Soderini: I 2.1, I
23.3,1 38.3,1 39.2,1 56, II 4.1, II 23.3, III 6.20, III 27.4

485

Aristides the Just (?-c. 467 B.C.), Athenian: I 59
Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus: III 6.7
Aristotle, Greek philosopher: II5 1, III 26.2

Armagnac, Louis d\ duke of Nemours, killed by artillery during battle with Spaniards at Cirignuola in
1503:11 17.4

Armenia, king of, attacked by Cyrus: II 13.1, III 39.1
Amo, river in Tuscany flowing through Florence: I 1.3

Arrabbiata, Arrabiati (“the rabid”), Florentine faction that defeated the Frateschi in 1498: 1 54
Arruns, of Chiusi, avenged the seduction of his sister (according to NM) or his wife (according to
Fivy) by Fucumo (c. 390 B.C.): I 7.5
Artaxerxes, king of Persia (464-424 B.C.), NM calls him Darius: II 31.2

Artiganova, Jean d ’, priest who in 1506 unsuccessfully conspired against Alfonso d’Este, duke of
Ferrara: III 6.14

Asia: I 18.3,11 1.1,11 1 3,11 10.1,11 26,1131.1,1131.2
Assyria, ancient Middle Eastern empire: II Pr.2

Athens, Athenians: I 1.2,1 2.6,1 28 T, I 28,1 40.2,1 53.4,1 53.5,1 58.3,1 59, II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1, II
10.1, II 10.3, II 12.2, II 24.4, II 31.2, III 6.16, III 6.19, III 16.1
Athens, Walter de Brienne, duke of, ruled Florence (1344-45): III 6.20
Athos, Mount, in northeast Greece: I 1.5
Attalus, adviser to King Philip II of Macedon: II 28.2

Augustus, Gaius Octavius ( Octavian) (63 B.C.-A. D. 14), the first Roman emperor (27 B. C.-A.D..
14): I 1.3,1 52.3

Aulius Cerretanus, Quintus, master of the horse at Sora (316 B.C.): II 18.3
Austria: II 19.2
Austria, duke of: II 19.2

Bacchanals, conspiracy at Rome during the Third Macedonian War (193-188 B.C.): III 49.1, III
49.3

Baglioni, family party in Perugia: III 14.1

Baglioni, Giovampagolo, tyrant of Pemgia, expelled in 1505 by Pope Julius II: I 27.1
Bagnolo, Peace of; peace between Venice and Fudovico Sforza in 1484: III 11.2
Bajazet/7, peaceful Turkish sultan (1481-1512), son of the warlike Mahomet, father of the warlike
Selim, survived a conspiracy: I 19.2, III 6.2
Beaumont, Jean de, French captain trusted by the Florentines: I 38.3
Belanti, Giulio, plotter against Pandolfo Petrucci: III 6.2, III 6.17
Belisarius (c. 505-c. 565), captain for Emperor Justinian: II 8.2
Bellovesus, led Gauls into Italy (616-579 B.C.): II 4.1, II 8.1
Bentivogli, family, powers in Bologna: I 27.1, II 24.2, III 44.2

Bentivoglio, Ercole, Bolognese commander of Florentine forces, helped defeat d’Alviano’s attack in
1515:153.5

Bernabo, Messer; see Visconti, Bernabo
Bersighella (Brisighella), town near Faenza: III 18.3
Bible: III 30.1

Biondo, Flavio (1388-1463), papal secretary of state and historian, III 21.3 (Q)

Bologna: I 27.1,1 38.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, III 44.2, III 44.3

Bonromei, Giovanni, Florentine whose patrimony was taken from the Pazzi: III 6.2
Borgia, Cesare, Duke Valentino (1476-1507), illegitimate son of Pope Alexander VI, made cardinal
in 1493 and duke of Romagna in 1501, after conquering it: I 38.2, II 24.2, III 27.4
Brescia, town in Fombardy: II 17.1, II 24.3, III 44.3
Britannia, ancient name for England: II 8.2

486

Brutus, Lucius Junius, one of Rome’s first consuls (509 B.C.), founder of republic: I 16.4, I 17.1, III

I. 6,1112,1113,1115

Brutus, Lucius Junius, sons of: I 16.4,1 16.6, III 1.3, III 3 T, III 3, III 5, III 6.5
Brutus, Marcus Junius (85-42 B.C.), one of Julius Caesar’s assassins (44 B.C.), later defeated at
Philippi (42 B.C.) by Antony and Octavian, committed suicide: I 10.3,1 17.1, III 6.2, III 6.16, III
6 75,11118.1

Buondelmonti, Zanobi (1491-1527), friend of NM in the Orti Oricellari DL
Caelian Hill, in Rome: I 28

Caesar, Gaius Julius (100-44 B.C.), ruled Rome after defeating Pompey, assassinated 44 B.C. by
Marcus Brutus, called by NM the first Roman emperor: I 10.2, I 10.3, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 10.6, I
17.1,129.3,133.4,134.1,137.2,146,152.3,159,1116.2,1116.16, III 6.18, III 6.19, III 13.2,

III 24

Calabria, region at the toe of Italy: II 2.1

Caligula, Gaius, Roman emperor (37-41), assassinated by his own troops: I 10.4,117 1
Callippus (d. 351 B.C.), tyrant of Syracuse after having assassinated Dion in 353 B.C.: III 6.20
Calvinus, Titus Veturius, one of the consuls at the Caudine Forks (321 B.C.): III 41, III 42
Cambrai, League of, formed in 1508 among Pope Julius II, the Emperor Maximilian, the king of
France, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, the duke of Ferrara, and the marquis of Mantua to
defeat Venice in 1509: 1 12.2,153.1, III 11.2
Camerinum, Camertines, ancient Umbrian city that helped Romans invade Etruria: II 1.3
Camillus, Lucius Furius, grandson of Marcus Furius Camillus: II 23.2

Camillus, Marcus Furius, Roman general and dictator (396-365 B.C.), defeated the Gauls after the
sack of Rome: I 8.1,1 12.1,1 13.1,1 29.3,1 55.1, II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.1, III 1.2, III 8.1, III 12
3, III 20, III 22.6, III 23 T, III 23, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 31.1, III 31.4
Campania, Campanians, Italian region around Naples: II 9, II 11.1, II 13.2, III 37.1, III 37.4
Cancellieri, a faction in Pistoia: III 27.2

Cannae, town in Apulia, where Hannibal won a great victory in 216 B.C.: I 11.1, 131.2, I 47.2, I
53.2, II12 4, II 18.2, II 27.1, II 30.4, III 31.2, III 34.3, III 37.4, III 49.1
Capitol, hill and building in Rome: I 8.1,1 10.5, I 13.2, I 24.2, II 28.1, II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.1, II
32.1

Captain of the people, chief executive officer in Florence: I 8.3,1 49.3

Capua, Capuans, luxurious Campanian city: I 5.4, I 47.2, I 47.3, II 1.3, II 9, II 10.3, II 11.1, II

II. 2, II 19.2, II 20, II 21 T, II 21.2, II 24.3, II 26, II 32.1, II 32.2, III 6.20
Caracalla, Antoninus; see Antoninus Caracalla

Carmignuola, Francesco Bussone (1390-1432), captain for Filippo Visconti: II 18.4
Carthage, Carthaginians: I 14.3, 1 31 1,1 53.4, I 53.5, II 1.1, II 1.2, II 2.4, II 8.1 II 8 3, II 9, II
12.1, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 6.19, III 10 3, III 16.2, III 20, III 31.2,
III 32

Casaglia, town in the Apennines: III 18.3
Cascina, Tuscan town near Pisa: I 38.3

Cassius Longinus, Gaius, helped murder Caesar, committed suicide after Phillipi (42 B.C.): III 6.2,
III 6 18, III 18.1

Cassius Vecellinus, Spurius, proposed Agrarian law in 486 B.C.: III 8.1
Castello, citta di, Castellans, Italian town: II24 2, II 30.2
Castello, Niccolo Vitelli da (1414-86), condottiere, father of the Vitelli: II 24.2
Castiglione, town besieged by Venetians: III 18.3

Castruccio Castracani (1281-1328), lord of Pisa and Fucca, defeated Florence in 1316: II 9, II 12.4
Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catalina) (109-62 B.C.), Roman conspirator: I 10.3, III 6.19
Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Younger (95-46 B.C.): III 1.3

487

Cato, Priscus, NM’s name for Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Elder (234-149 B.C.), the censor: I 29.3, III

1.3

Caudine Forks, Caudium, valley in Campania, site of Roman defeat by Samnites (321 B.C.): II 23.4,
III 40.2, IU 41, III 42
Cebalinus, Nicomachus’s brother: III 6.5
Cedicius, Marcus, plebeian, heard a superhuman voice: 156
Ceres, Roman goddess of agriculture: III 6.2
Charlemagne (742-814): I 12.2

Charles VIII, king of France (1470-98), invaded Italy in 1494: I 39 2,1 56, II 11, 1, II 12.2, II
16.2, U 17 4, II 24.3, IU 11 2, III 43
Charles the Bold (1433-77), duke of Burgundy: II 10.1, III 10.4

Charon, counselor of Theban tyrants who assisted Pelopidas’s conspiracy in 379 B.C.: III 6.16
Chion, disciple of Plato, conspired with Leonides against Clearchus of Heraclea in 353 B.C.: III 6.16
Chiusi (Clusium), town in Tuscany: I 7.5, II 4.1, II 28.1
Christ: III 1.4

Cicero, Marcus Tullius (Tully) (106-43 B.C.), Roman writer and politician, opponent of the caesars:

14.1, 7 28, 1 33.4,1 52.3, 156, II5 1

Cimbri, ancient people who invaded Italy, defeated by Marius: II 8.1, II 12.4, III 37.4
Ciminian forest, forest between Latium and Tuscany: II 33
Cincinnatus; see Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (1)

Circeu, a rebellious Roman colony: III 32

Ciriaco del Borgo Sansepolcro, Florentine head of infantry: II 16.2

Cirignuola, town in Apulia, where Louis d’Armagnac, duke of Nemours, was killed in a battle
(1503): II 17.4

Claudius Nero, Gaius, consul (207 B.C.), fought in Second Punic War and defeated Hasdrubal: II

10.2, III 17

Claudius Pulcher, Publius, consul (249 B.C.) who mocked portents and lost naval battle against
Carthaginians; called by NM Appius Pulcher and Claudius Pulcher: I 14.3, III 33.1
Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, assassinated 353 B.C.: I 16.5, III 6.16
Cleomenes III, king of Sparta (236-221 B.C.): I 9.4,1 18.5, III 6.19

Clitus Melas, killed by Alexander the Great in 328 B.C.; had saved Alexander in 334 B.C. at the
Battle of Granicus: I 58.2

Codefa, fortress built in 1507 by Louis XII, king of France, at Genoa: II 24.2

Collatinus, Lucius Tarquinius, one of Rome’s first consuls (509 B.C.), led revolt against his relative
Tarquin the Proud: I 28, III 5

Commodus, Roman emperor (180-92), wrote death list and was assassinated: III 6.3, III 6.10, III
6.15,1116.20

Coppola, Francesco (1420-87), count of Sarno, executed 1487 by Ferdinand of Aragon: III 6.3
Corcyra (modern Corfu), Greek island, site of bitter factional fighting during Peloponnesian War
(425-424 B.C.): II 2.1
Corinth, Greek city: II 24.4

Coriolanus, Gnaeus Marcius, Roman general accused for actions against the plebs, led Volsci against
Rome in 491 B.C.: I 7.1,1 7.2,129.3

Cornelius Cossus, Aulus, consul during First Samnite War (343 B.C.), advised by Publius Decius Mus
the Elder: III 39.2

Cornelius Maluginensis, Servius, consular colleague of Camillus (386 B.C.): III 30.1
Corvinus, Valerius; see Valerius Corvinus Publicola, Marcus

Ciassus, Marcus Lucinius (115-53 B.C.), consul, deceived by Parthians and defeated in 53 B.C.: II
18.3,11112.2

488

Croesus, last king of the Lydians (560-546 B.C.), fabled for wealth, overthrown by Cyrus: II 10.1, II

12.1

Curiatii, Alban triplet brothers, fought Roman Horatii triplets and were defeated (670 B.C.): I 22 T, I

22.124.1

Curtius Rufus, Quintus (first century A.D.), historian: II 10.1

Cyaxares, king of the Medes (625-585 B.C.), deceived by his nephew Cyrus: II 13.1

Cyrus, king of Persia (559-529 B.C.) and founder of the Persian Empire: II 12.1, II 13.1, III 20, III

22.4.11122.5.11139.1

Dante: I 11.4 (Q), I 53.1 (Q)

Darius I, king of Persia (521-485 B.C.): II 31.2 (actually referring to Artaxerxes), III 6.7
Darius III, last king of Persia (336-330 B.C.), defeated by Alexander the Great: II 10.1
David, king of Israel (1012-972 B.C.), succeeded Saul, captured Jerusalem: I 19.2,1 26
Decemvirate, decemvirs (the Ten), extraordinary council, headed by Appius Claudius, ruled Rome in
451-450 B.C.: 135 T, 135,140 T, I 40.1-7,141,1 42,143,144.1-2,1 45.3, I 49 1, I 58.2, Ill
1 3, III 26.2
Decii: III 1.3

Decius Mus, Publius, the Elder, tribune under Cornelius (343 B.C.), sacrificed himself when coconsul
with Torquatus (340 B.C.): II 16.1, III 1.3, III 39.2
Decius Mus, Publius, the Younger, sacrificed his life at Sentinum in 295 B.C.: III 1.3, III 45
Deinocrates, architect of Alexandria: I 1.5
Delos, Greek island in the Aegean, site of an oracle: I 12.1
Demetrius I (336-283 B.C.), king of Macedon: I 59
Dido, Phoenician princess and founder of Carthage: II 8.3

Diodes, NM following Justin calls Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens (6th century B.C.), assassinated,
avenged by Hippias: III 6.16
Diodorus Siculus (80-21 B.C.), historian: II 5.1

Dion (410-353 B.C.), friend of Plato, freed Syracuse from tyranny of Dionysus the Younger,
murdered by Callippus in 353 B.C.: I 10.2,1 17.1, III 6.20
Dionysius, the name of two tyrants of Syracuse, both hosts to Plato, the Elder (405-367 B.C.) and
the Younger, his son (346-344 B.C.): I 10.2, III 6.2
Dominick, Saint (1170-1221), established Dominican order in 1218: III 1.4
Duellius, Marcus, tribune (449 B.C.): I 45.3

Dymnus, lover of Nicomachus, failed in plot to kill Alexander the Great: III 6.5

Egeria, nymph consulted by Numa: I 11.2

Egypt, Egyptians: I 1.4,1 58.2,1 59, II 12.2, II17 5, III 35.1

Eight, the, Florentine judicial institution: I 7.4,1 45.2,1 49.3

Elettus, conspired with Letus and Marcia against Commodus (192): III 6.10, III 6 20

England, English: I 21.2, II 8.2, II 30.4

England, king of: I 21.2, II 30.2. See also Henry VIII

Epaminondas, put an end to Spartan tyranny over Thebes in 379 B.C., killed in battle in 362 B.C.: I
17.3,121.3, III 13.3, III 18.1, III 38.1
Ephors, Spartan council of elders, disputed Agis and Cleomenes: I 9.4,1 18.5
Epicharis, plotted to kill Nero: III 6.9
Etruria, Etruscans: I 36, II 25.1. See also Tuscany, Tuscans
Eumenes, king of Pergamum (197-159 B.C.), ally of Rome: II 1.3, II 30.2

Fabii, three sons of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, sent as ambassadors to the Gauls: II 28.1, II 29.1, III

1.2

Fabius, Quintus, brother of Marcus Fabius Vibulanus, former consul, killed in 480 b.c.: I 36

489

Fabius Maximus Cunctator (the Delayer), Quintus (275-203 B.C.), consul five times (233-209 B.C.),
appointed dictator (217 B.C.) during Second Punic War: I 53.2,1 53.4, II 24.3, III 9.1, III 9.4, III
10.1-3,11134.4,11140.1

Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Quintus, master of the horse under Papirius Cursor in 325 B.C., dictator
in 315 B.C., consul in 310 B.C.: 131.2,1133, III 1.3, III 33.2, III 36.2, III 45, III 47, III 49 T, III
49.4

Fabius Vibulanus, Marcus, consul twice (483, 480 B.C.): I 36, II 25.1

Fabius Vibulanus, Quintus, consul (459 B.C.), son of Marcus Fabius, member of Decemvirate (450
B.C.), exiled: 142

Fabricius, Gaius Luscinus, consul three times (282-275 B.C.): III 1.3, III 20
Faenza, town in Romagna: I 38.2, III 18.3

Faliscians, inhabitants of Falerii, Etruscan community that attacked Rome in 401 B.C.: I 31.2, III

19.2, III 20 T, III 20

Federico da Montefeltro, father of Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino: II 24.2
Ferdinand 7, very wise king of Naples (1458-94): 77 77 1, II 12.2

Ferdinand the Catholic, king II of Aragon and V of Castile (1474-1516), married Queen Isabella I of
Castile, drove the Moors (1492) and Marranos (1501-2) out of Spain, the French (1504) out of
Naples, of which he became king (Ferdinand III) in 1505: I 29.2,1 40.7, 1 53 1, 159, II 22 1, III

6.2, m 6.3, 777 112, UI31 3

Ferrante (Fernandez de Corduba), Gonsalvo, (1453-1515), captain for Ferdinand the Catholic: I 29.2
Ferrara, town in Romagna: II 17.4, III 11.2
Ferrara, duke of; see Alfonso I d’Este

Fidenae, Fidenates, town in Latium, conquered by Romulus (c. 750 B.C.), later a Roman colony
quieted by Mamercus (437 B.C.): III 14.3, III 15.1
Fiesole, town above Florence: I 1.3, II 4.1

Flaminius, Gaius, consul enclosed by Hannibal at Lake Trasumennus (217 B.C.): III 40.1
Flaminius, Titus Quintius, consul (198 B.C.), defeated Philip V of Macedon in the Second
Macedonian War: II 4.2

Florence, Florentines: I 1.3,12.1,1 7.3,1 7.4, I 8.3, I 11.5, I 33.3, I 38.2, I 38.3, I 39.2, I 45.2, I
47.3,149.2,149.3,1 52.1,1 52.2,1 53.5,1 54,1 55.4,1 56,1 59, II 9, II 10.1, II 11.1, II 12.4, II

15.2, II 16.2, II 19.2, II 21.2, II 22.1, II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.3, II 25.1, II 27.3, II 27.4, II 30.2,
II 30.4,11 33,111 1.3, III 3, III 6.16, III 6.20, III 7, III 9 3, III 12.1,111 12.2, m 15.2, III 16.3,111

18.3, III 27.2, III 27.3, III 27.4, III 43, III 48.2

Foix, Gaston de, duke of Nemours (1489-1512), French captain, recovered Brescia, won and was
killed at Ravenna: II 16.2,11 17.1,11 17.4, II 24.3,111 44.2,111 44.3
Forli: III 6.18

Forty, the, judicial council in Venice: I 49.3

France, French (as ancient Gaul, Gauls): I 7.5,1 8.1,1 15,1 23.3,1 24.2,1 29.2,1 56,1 57, II 1.1, II

1.3, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 12.4, II 19.2, II 28.1, II 29.1, 1129 2, II 30.1, III 1.2, III 10

I, III 10.3, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 22.1, III 33.1, III 36 T, III 36.1, III 36.2, III 37.1, III 37.3, III

37.4, III 43, III 48.2

France, French (modern): I 12.2,1 16.5,1 19.2,1 21.2,1 23.4,138.3,7 39 2, 7 53 1, I 55.2, I 55.3,
I I 56, I 58.2, I 59, II Pr.2, II 8.2, II 11.1, II 12.2, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.3, II

17.5, II 18.4, 77 79 7, 19.2, II 21.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 27.4, II 30.4, III 1.5, III 10.3, III 10.4, III

II. 2, III 15.2, III 27.4, III 36 T, III 36.1, III 36.2, III 37.3, III 41, III 43, III 44.2

France, king of: I 23.4,1 38.3, II 11.1, II 12.2, II 12.4, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 18.4, II 22.1, II 24.2, II
30.2, III 15.2, III 18.1, III 27.4, III 31.3, III 41, III 44.2. See also Charles VIII; Francis I; Louis
XII

Francesco Maria; see Rovere, Francesco Maria della

490

Francis (of Angouleme) I, king of France (1515-47), succeeded Louis XII, invaded Lombardy and
fought the Swiss (1515): I 23.4, II 18.4, 1121 2, II 22.1, III 18.1
Francis, Saint (1181-1226), established Franciscan order (c. 1218): III 1.4
Franks, the, rulers of France: II Pr.2, II 8.2

Fratesca, Frateschi, faction in Florence, followers of Friar (Frate) Girolamo Savonarola: I 54
Fregoso, Ottaviano, doge of Genoa (1513-15), governor of Genoa under France (1515-22): II 21.2,
II 24.2

French (language): II 17.1

Fribourg, German town north of Lake Geneva: II 19.2

Fulvius, Gains, shrewd Roman legate (302 B.C.) in Tuscany: III 48.1

Fulvius, Marcus, identified by NM as plebeian master of horse, though Livy calls him Marcus Folius:
15.4

Gabades, king of Persia (488-531), ended the siege of Amida in 503: II 26
Galba Servius Sulpitius (4-69), Roman emperor, assassinated: I 10.4
Galeazzo, Giovan; see Visconti, Giovanni Galeazzo
Gallia Cisalpina, ancient name for modern Lombardy: II 8.2
Gallia Transalpina, ancient name for part of modem France: II 8.2

Gambacorti, Piero, Messer, lord of Pisa, assassinated by Jacopo d’Appiano in 1392: III 6.3
Gascony, Gascons, part of France: II 18.4

Gaul, Gauls: II 4.1, III 10.1, III 37.1. See also France, French (as ancient Gaul, Gauls)

Geganius Macerinus, Marcus, consul (443 B.C.) who reconciled the Ardeans: III 27.1
Genoa, city in Liguria, repeated target of French kings: II 21.2, II 24.2, II 24.3
Genucius, Lucius, first plebeian consul to lead an army in Rome, defeated (362 B.C.): III 35.1
Germany, Germans, province east of the Rhine and north of the Danube: I 55.2, I 55 3, II Pr.2, II 2
1, II 8.1, II 8.4, II 12.4, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 30.2, III 43
Gesco, Carthaginian envoy (whom NM calls Hasdrubal) to rebels after First Punic War, killed by
them: III 32

Giacomini, Antonio, Florentine captain in charge of failed siege of Pisa in 1505: 1 53.5, III 16.3
Giannes; see Artiganova, Jean d’

Gonzagci, Francesco, marquis of Mantua (1481-1519): I 53.1, III 44.2, III 44.3
Goths, ancient people who seized Western Roman Empire: II 8.1, II8 2
Gracchi, late 2d-century B.C. reformers in Rome. 14 1,1 6.1,1 37.2,1 37.3

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, consul (215, 213 B.C.), led successful Roman army composed of
slaves: II 26, III 13.3, III 18 2, III 38.1
Great Council, Venetian council I 50

Greece, Greeks, I 6.4,1 9 4,1 18.3,126,131 1,1 40.6,1 53.4,1 59, II Pr.2, II 1.1, II 1.3, II 2.1, II
3,114.1,11 10.1,1128.2,1131.2,111 16.1
Gregory the Great, Saint, pope (590-604), extinguished ancient sects: II 5.1
Guicciardini, Giovanni (1385-1435), blamed for defeat of Florence at Lucca in 1430: 1 8.3
Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, duke of Urbino (1482-1508), lost and regained his state: II 24.2

Hadrian, popular Roman emperor (117-138): I 10.4

Hannibal (247-182 B.C.), Carthaginian general (became commander 221 B.C.), fought in Italy
against Rome in Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), defeated in Africa, later poisoned himself to
escape capture: I 11.1,1 23.3, 1293 ,1 31.1,1 31.2,1 47.2,1 53.2,1 53.3, II 2.4, II 9, II 12.1, II

12.3, II 12.4, II 18.2, II 19.2, II 26, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 30.4, III 9.1, III 9.4, III 10.1, III 10.2, III

10.3, III 17, III 20, III 21 T, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 31.4, III 40.1
Hanno, unsuccessful Carthaginian poisoner in 350 B.C.: III 6.19

Hanno (270-190 B.C.), leader of aristocratic party in Carthage during Second Punic War (218-201
B.C.): II 27.1, II 30.4, III 31.2

491

Hasdrubal (1); see Gesco

Hasdrubal (2) (245-207 B.C.), brother of Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, fought Claudius Nero in
Second Punic War: II 10.2, II 27.4, III 17
Hebrews, ancient Middle Eastern people: II 8.2
Hellanicus, see Nelematus

Henry VIII, king of England (1509-47), attacked France: I 21.2, II 30.4
Heraclea, Greek city on the Black Sea: I 16.5, III 6.16
Hercules, fabulous Egyptian who defeated Antaeus: II 12.2
Hemici, the: I 38.1, 138 2, III 8.1

Herod, the Great, king of Judea (31 B.C.-A.D. 4), executed his wife, Marianne. I 58.2
Herodian (170-255), historian: III 6.15
Herodotus III 6.7 (Q)

Hiero II (306-215 B.C.), king of Syracuse, grandfather of Hieronymus: DL, I 58.1, II 2.1, II 30.2
Hieronymus, king of Syracuse, assassinated in 214 B.C.: I 58.1, II 2.1, II 15.2, III 6.6
Hipparchus, see Diodes

Hippias, tyrant of Athens (527-510 B.C.), exiled in 510 B.C.: III 6.16
Hirtius, Aulus, consul (43 B.C.), fought against Mark Antony in 43 B.C.: I 52.3
Horatii, Roman triplet brothers, fought the Alban Curiatii triplets, one Horatius survived and killed
one of the Curiatii’s Roman fiancees (670 B.C.): I 22 T, I 22,1 24.1
Horatius, one of the Horatii: I 22,1 24.1

Horatius Barbatus, Marcus, consul (449 B.C.), spoke against decemvirs: 140.4,144.1,1 44.2
Horatius Coclus, Roman hero, defended bridge over Tiber against Etruscan army: I 24.2, III 1.3
Horatius Pulvillus, Lucius, consular colleague under Camillus (386 B.C.): III 30.1
Hungary: II 8.2, II 8.4

Hydra, mythical creature who grows two heads for every one cut off: II 24.1
Illyria, Balkan region, ancient name for Slavonia: I 29.2, II 8.2

Imbault de la Bade, French captain sent to help Florence recover Arezzo in 1502: 1 38.3
India, king of: III 14.3

Ismail I, the Sophy, shah of Persia (1501-24), defeated by Selim I at Chaldiran (1514): II 17.5, III

35.1

Italy, Italians: I 6.4, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 12.2, I 21.2, I 23.4, I 29.2, I 31.1, I 37.2, I 47.2, I 53.3, I

55.2.1 55.3,1 56, II Pr.2, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 8.4,119,11 10.3, II 12.1, II 12.4,
II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.4, II 18.3, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 27.4, II 30.4, II

31.1, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 11.2, III 15.2, III 20, III 21.1, III 31.3, III 34.3, III

36.2, III 37.4, III 43

Jerusalem: II 32.1
John, gospel writer: II 2 2

Joshua (c. 1250 B.C.), son of Nun, succeeded Moses: II 8.2
Judea, Roman-supported kingdom in Israel: I 29.2, II 8.2
Jugurtha, king of Numidia (118-103 B.C.), lost war with Rome: II 8.1

Julius II (Giuliano della Rovere) (1443-1513), pope (1503-13): I 12 2,1 27.1, I 27 2, I 53 1, II
10.1,11 22.1,11 24.2,1119.3,77/ 77 2, III 31 3, III 44.2, III44 3
Juno, Roman goddess, wife and sister of Jupiter: I 12.1
Jupiter Ammon, oracle in Africa: I 12.1
Justin, writer: I 26 (Q), III 6.7 (Q)

Juvenal (c. 55-140), satirist: II 19.2 (Q), 1124 1 (Q), III 6.2 (Q)

Lacedemon, Lacedemonians, region around Sparta: I 5.1,1 21.3. See also Sparta

492

Lampagnano, Giovanni Andrea da, conspired against the duke of Milan (1476), succeeded but killed:
III 6.18

Lant, Monsieur de, NM’s name for Antoine de Langres, French general sent to replace Imbault
(1502) and restore several towns to Florence: III 27.4
Largius, Titus (c. 500 B.C.), identified by Livy as the first dictator: 133 1
Latin (language): II 5.1

Latium, Latins: I 38.1,738 2, II 1.1, H 4.1, II 6.1, II 13.2,11 14, II 15.1,11 16.1,11 18.1,11 22.1,11
22.2, II 23.2, II 24.1, II 24.4, II 30.4, II 33, III 22.4, III 30.1, III 32
Lavinium, Lavinians, Latin city, supposedly founded by Aeneas, failed to aid other Latin cities: II

15.2

Lenatus, Gnaeus Popilius, conspired against Julius Caesar (44 B.C.): III 6.16
Lentulus, Lucius, Roman legate at Caudine Forks (321 B.C.): III 41

Lentulus Sura, Publius Cornelius, consul (71 B.C.), participated in Catiline’s conspiracy (63 B.C.): III
6.19

Leo X (Giovanni de’ Medici) (1475-1521), pope (1513-21): II10 1, II 22.1, III 18 1
Leonidas, conspired successfully against Clearchus (353 B.C.) but killed by Satirus: III 6.16
Letus Quintus Aelmilius, conspired with Marcia and Elettus against Commodus: III 6.10, III 6 20
Libya: II 12.2

Liguria, Ligurians, Italian region: II 1.1
Lipari, island off Sicily: III 29

Livius, Marcus, consul with Claudius Nero (207 B.C.): II 10.2, III 17

Livy, Titus: I Pr.2,1 1.6,1 7.1,1 7.5,1 12.1 (Q), I 13.1,1 13.2 (Q), I15 (Q), 115 (Q), I 34 4 (Q), I

37.2 (Q),I40 3 (Q), 140 3 (Q), 140 3 (Q), 140 4 (Q), 140 4 (Q), 140 4 (Q), 144.1 ,1442 (Q), I
46 (Q), 147.1 (Q), 147.1 (Q), / 49 1, I 56,1 57 (Q), I 57,1 58.1 (Q), / 58 1 (Q), 158 3, 159 (Q),
II 2.3, II 2.4, II3 (Q), II 3 (Q), II 4.2, II 7, II 8.1, II 10.3, II 11.1 (Q), II 13.2 (Q), II15 1 (Q), II

15.2 (Q), II 16.1, II 16.1, II 16.1, II18 2 (Q), II 19.2 (Q), II 20, II 21.2 (Q), II 23 1 (Q), II 23.2
(Q), II 23.4 (Q), II23 4 (Q), 1123 4 (Q), 1128 1 (Q), II 29.1, II 29.1 (Q), 1130 1 (Q), 1130 4 (Q),

II 31.1, II 33, III 1.2 (Q), III 2, III 6.6, III 6.15 (Q), III 8.1 (Q), III 8 2, III 10 1 (Q), III 10.2 (Q),

III 12 2 (Q), Ill 12 2, III 12 3 (Q), III 12.3, III 13.1, III 15.1 (Q), III 15.2 (Q), III 22.1 (Q), III

22.4 (Q), III 22.4 (Q), III 23 (Q), III 23, III 25 (Q), III 25 (Q), III 28, III 29 (Q), III 30.1 (Q), III

30.1 (Q), 11131 1 (Q), III 31 2 (Q), III 31 4, III 31 4 (Q), IU 33 1 (Q), 11133 1 (Q), III 33.1 (Q), III

36.1 (Q), III 36.2 (Q), III 37.1 (Q), III 37.3 (Q), III 38.1 (Q), III 39.2 (Q), III 40 1, III 40 2 (Q),
III44 1 (Q), III 46

Lombardy, region of northern Italy formerly known as Gallia Cisalpania: I 7.5,1 23.3,1 23.4,1 55.4,
II 1.1,112.1,114.1,118.1,118.2, II 12.4, II 13.1, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 24.3, III 11.2, III
18.1, III 43

Longobards, rulers of northern (and other parts of) Italy: I 12.2

Louis XII, king of France (1498-1515): 138.3, 153 1, 159, II 15.2, II17 1, II 22.1, II 24.2, II 24
3, II30 4, III 15.2, III 27 4, III 31 3, III 44 2, III 44 3
Lucanians, Italian people who invited Alexander of Epirus into Italy: II 31.1
Lucca, Lucchese, one of three republics in Tuscany: I 8.3,1 55.4, II 9, II 12.4, II 21.2, III 48.2
Lucilla, sister of Commodus, unsuccessfully conspired against him: III 6.15
Lucretia, committed suicide after rape by Sextus Tarquinius (510 B.C.): III 2, III 5, III 26.2
Lucretius, Spurius, father of Lucretia: III 2

Lucullus, Lucius Licinius (115-49 B.C.), Roman general, defeated Mithridates VI (king of Pontus) in
74 B.C. and Tigranes (king of Aimenia) in 69 B.C.: II 19.1, III 13.3
Lucumo, seduced Arruns’s sister/wife: I 7.5
Ludovico, Signor; see Sforza, Ludovico
Luke, gospel writer: I 26 (Q)

Lycurgus (9th century B.C.), founder of Sparta: I 2.1,1 2.6,1 2.7 , 1 6.2,1 9.3,1 9.4,1 11.3, II 3

493

Lydia, Lydians, people of Asia Minor: II 10.1

Macedon, Macedonians, region north of Greece, under Alexander the Great ruled much of the known
world, later an enemy of Rome: I 9.4,1 20, II1 1, II 4.2, III 13.3
Macedonia, king of: II 4.2, II 10.1, II 28.2. See also Alexander the Great; Antigonus; Antipater;
Demetrius; Perseus; Phillip II; Phillip V

Macedonian War, Second (200-196 B.C.), won by Rome over Macedon: II 1.1, II 4 2, III 10 2, III

49.1

Macedonian War, Third (172-167 B.C.): III 16 2

Macrinus, Marcus Apellius (164-218), conspired against Caracalla; Roman emperor (217-18),
assassinated by Heliogabalus in 218: III 6.11
Madonna Caterina; see Sforza-Riario, Madonna Caterina

Maelius, Spurius, tried to make himself king at Rome in 439 b.c., executed: III 1 3, III 28
Maenius, Gains, plebeian dictator (314 B.C.), called Marcus Menenius by NM: I 5.4
Magus, Magians, Persian priestly caste, one of whom seized the kingdom: III 6.7
Mahomet II, Ottoman sultan (1451-81), conquered Constantinople (1453): I 19.2
Mamelukes, military order dominant in Egypt from 1250 to 1517:1 1.4, II17 5
Mamercus, Manlius Aemilius, dictator (433 B.C.), opposed censors and fought the Fidenates: I 49.1,
III 14.3

Mamertines, invaded Sicily: II 1.3

Manilius, Gaius, or perhaps Gnaeus Manlius, consul (480 B.C.), killed in war with Veientes: I 36, II
25.1,11112.2

Manlii (1), brothers Publius and Gnaeus Manlius sent as consuls (379 B.C.) against the Volsci: III

33.1

Manlii (2), Roman family: III 46

Manlius, Aulus, sent to Athens with Spurius Postumius (1): I 40.2
Manlius, Titus, son of Titus Manlius Torquatus: II 16.1, III 1.3, III 22.4, III 34.2
Manlius Capitolinus, Marcus, consul (390 B.C.), saved Capitol during attack by Gauls (386 B.C.),
executed in 384 B.C.: I 8.1,1 8.4,1 24.2,1 58.1-2, III 1.3, III 8.1-2
Manlius Imperiosus, Lucius, dictator (363 B.C.): I 11.1, III 22 1, III 34.1, 111 34 2
Manlius Torquatus, Titus, dictator (353 B.C.), son of Lucius Imperiosus Manlius, fought an
exemplary duel with a Gaul: I 11.1, II 16.1, II 23.2, III 1.3, III 19.1, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 22.3-
6, III 23, III 34.1-2, III 34.4, III 36.1, III 37.1
Mantua, marquis of: III 44.2. See also Gonzaga, Francesco
Marches, region of Italy on central east coast: II 10.2, III 17

Marcia, concubine, conspired with Letus and Elettus against Commodus: III 6.10, III 6 20
Marciano, Rinuccio da, count, head of a Florentine army that defeated the Venetians near Marradi
through knowledge in 1498: III 18.3

Marcius Rutulus, Gaius (1), called Rutilius by NM, consul (342 B.C.), quelled conspiracy at Capua:
III 6.20

Marcius Rutulus, Gaius (2), consul (310 B.C.), son of preceding, wounded in battle with the Samnites,
replaced by Papirius Cursor: III 47

Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor (161-180) and philosopher: I 10.4,1 10.5
Marianne, wife of King Herod of Judea, executed in 29 B.C.: I 58.2

Marignano, Battle of (1515), near Milan, battle in which France defeated the Swiss: 123 4, II18 4, II
22 1, III 18 1

Marius, Gaius (c. 157-86 B.C.), consul seven times (first in 107 B.C., last in 86 B.C.), head of
Marian party: I 5.2,1 17.1,1 28,1 37.2, II 8.1, III 6.14, III 8.2, III 24, III 37.4
Mark, Saint (San Marco), patron saint of Venice: III 31.3

494

Marradi, village in Romagna, seized in 1498 by the Venetians from the Florentines, who then
recaptured it in an odd victory: III 18.3
Martial, centurion, assassinated Antoninus Caracalla (217): III 6.11
Matzocco, the Florentine lion: III 27.4
Massaged, Asian people menaced by Cyrus: II 12.1
Massilians, invaded ancient Gaul: II 1.3, II 8.3, II 30.2, II 32.2

Massinissa, king of Numidia (213-206 B.C.), ally of Rome during Second Punic War (218-201
B.C.) II 1.3, II 30.2

Maternianus, Flavius, warned Antoninus Caracalla in writing of a conspiracy: III 6.11
Matho, Libyan, led revolt against Carthage after First Punic War, killed Hasdrubal: III 32
Maumsians, ancient people who fled Syria, eventually for Mauritania: II 8.2

Maximilian / (1459-1519), Holy Roman emperor (1493-1519), king of the Romans (1486-1519):

153 7, Ell.1,7/22 1, III 11 2, III 43
Maximinus, Roman emperor (235-38), killed by his own troops: I 10.4
Maximus; see Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Quintus
Media, ancient Middle Eastern kingdom: II Pr.2

Medici, family: I 33.3 ,145 2, 147 3, 152.2,159, II 213,1111 3, UI3, 1116.2,1117
Medici, Cosimo de’ (1389-1464), Florentine prince (1434-64), banished from Florence in 1431,
restored 1434: 1 33.3,1 52.1

Medici, Giuliano de’ (1453-78), brother of Lorenzo, murdered in Pazzi conspiracy: III 6.5, III 6.13,
III 6.16

Medici, Lorenzo de’ (1449-92), the Magnificent, the elder, survived Pazzi conspiracy: I 56, III 6.5,
III 6.13, III 6.15, III 6 16, III 29 (Q)

Medici, Piero (1471-1503), expelled from Florence in 1494: 147.3
Megaria, Megarians, city in Greece, near Attica: III 6.19
Menenius, Marcus, see Maenius, Gaius
Mentus, Gnaeus Julius, consul (431 B.C.): I 50

Mesopotamia, ancient kingdom between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers: III 6.11
Messina, Messinians, Sicilian city: II 9

Messius, Vettius, Volscian general at Algidus (431 B.C.): III 12.3

Mettius, dictator (NM says king) of Alba (670 B.C.), sent the Curiatii against the Roman King Tullus
Hostilius: I 22,1 23.1

Milan: I 17.2,123.4,138.3,11 12.4, II 15.2,11 18.4, II 22.1,11 24.2,111 11.2, HI 15.2
Milan, duke of: II 12.4, II 15.2, II 18.4, II 24.2, II 25.1, III 6.18, III 43. See also Lrancesco Sforza;
Galeazzo Maria Sforza; Ludvico Sforza; Visconti; Lilippo Maria Visconti; Giavanni Galeazzo
Visconti

Milichus, revealed Scaevinus’s conspiracy to Nero: III 6.5
Milonius, Latin praetor: II 15.2

Mintumae, Mintumans, city in central Italy, seized Marius: III 6.14
Minucius Esquilinus Augurinus, Lucius, consul (458 B.C.), relieved by Cincinnatus: III 25
Mirandola, Lodovico della, count, killed by artillery at Lerrara in 1509: II 17.4
Mithridates (132-63 B.C.), king of Pontus: III 13.3

Montesecco, Giovambatista da, in Pazzi conspiracy, beheaded in 1478: III 6.13
Morat, Swiss town where Charles of Burgundy was defeated in 1476 by the Swiss: III 10.4
Moses (c. 1300 B.C.), led Israel out of Egypt: I 1.4,1 9.3, II 8.2, III 30.1
Mucianus, Gaius Lucinius, deputy to Emperor Vespasian (68-69): I 29.2

Mucius Scaevola, Gaius, attempted to kill Porsenna, failed and burnt his hand in 506 B.C.: I 24.2, III

1.3

Mugello, town in the Apennines: III 18.3

Mutolo, Alfonso del, offered to betray Pisa to Florence in 1508: III 48.2

495

Nabis, tyrant of Sparta (207-192 B.C.), killed by Alexamenus: I 10.2,1 40.6, III 6.7, III 6.15
Naples: I 17.2,1 29.2,1 55.4,1 59, II 24.3, III 11 2, III 21.4. See also Palaepolis
Naples, king of: II 11.1, II 12.2. See also Ferdinand I
Natalis, arrested in conspiracy against Nero: III 6.5

Nelematus, NM’s name for lustin’s Hellanicus, led successful conspiracy against Aristotimus of
Epirus (272 B.C.): III 6.7, III 6.11

Nemours, duke of: II 17.4. See also Foix, Gaston de; Armagnac, Louis d’

Nero, Roman emperor (54-68): I 10.4,1 17.1, III 6.5, III 6.8, III 6.9
Nerva, Nervus, Roman emperor (96-98): I 10.4,1 10.5

New Carthage, Carthaginian colony on the southwest coast of Spain, captured by Scipio Africanus in
209 B.C.: II 32.1, III 20

Nicias (c. 470-413 B.C.), Athenian general, opposed Sicilian expedition in 415 B.C.: I 53.4, III 16
1

Nicomachus, told Cebalinus about plot to kill Alexander the Great in 330 B.C.: III 6.5
Nile, river in Egypt, on which Alexandria was built: I 1.5
Nocera (Lucera), town in Campania near Caudine Forks: III 40.2
Nola, town in Campania. II 2.4

Novara, town in Piedmont, site of battle between victorious Swiss and France in 1513: II 17.5, II
18.4, II 19.1, III 10.4

Numa, Rome’s second king (715-673 B.C.): I 1.5, I 11.1, I 11.2, Ill 3, I 11.4, I 19.1, I 19.3, I
19.4,149.1

Numa Pompilius; see Numa
Numidia, North African kingdom: II 27.4

Numisius, Lucius, Latin praetor sent to Rome in 340 B.C.: II 22.1, II 22.2
Nun (c. 1300 B.C.), father of loshua: II 8.2

Octavian; see Augustus, Gaius Octavius

Oddi, faction in Perugia, failed to remove Baglioni in 1495: III 14.1
Ortanes, initiated effort to recover Persia from the Magus: III 6.7
Orti Oricellari, see Buondelrnonti, Zanobi, and Rucellai, Cosimo

Ottacilius, Titus, consular candidate (214 B.C.), criticized by Fabius Maximus: III 34.4

Paccius, Ovius, Samnite priest at Samnite defeat at Aquilonia in 293 b.c.: 115.

Pacuvius Calanus, NM’s name for Livy’s Pacuvius Calavus, reconciled factions in Capua (216 B.C.):
147.2

Palaepolis, city in Campania taken by Rome in 326 B.C.: II 32.1, III 24. See also Naples
Panciatichi, a faction in Pistoia: III 27.2
Pandolfo; see Petrucci, Pandolfo
Pannonia, ancient name for Hungary: II 8.2

Pansa, Gaius Vibius, Roman consul, fought against Mark Antony, killed in 43 B.C.: I 52.3
Papirius; see Papirius Cursor, Lucius (2)

Papirius Cursor (1); see Papirius Cursor, Lucius (1)

Papirius Cursor (2); see Papirius Cursor, Lucius (2)

Papirius Cursor, Lucius (1), fought during Second Samnite War (327-314 B.C.): I 31.2, III 1.3, III
36.2, III 47

Papirius Cursor, Lucius (2), consul (293 B.C.), son of Lucius Papirius Cursor (1), defeated Samnites
at Aquilonia in 293 B.C.: I 14.2,1 15, II 2.3
Papirius, Spurius, nephew of Lucius Papirius Cursor (2): I 14.2
Paris, Parlement of, a French judicial institution: III 1.5
Parthians, Middle Eastern kingdom: II 18.3, II 30.2, III 12.2

496

Paullus Macedonius, Lucius Aemilius (228-160 B.C.), called Paulus Aemilius by NM, consul who
defeated Macedonians at Pydna in 168 B.C.: III 16.2, III 25, III 35.3
Paulus; see Paullus Macedonius, Lucius Aemilius
Paulus Aemilius; see Paullus Macedonius, Lucius Aemilius
Pausanias, assassinated Philip II of Macedon in 336 B.C.: II 28.2, III 6.2
Pazzi, family, conspired against the Medici: III 6.2, III 6.5, III 6.13, III 6.16
Pazzi, Cosimo de\ son of Guglielmo, bishop who gave his father bad advice: III 6.20
Pazzi, Guglielmo de’, banished from Florence after Pazzi conspiracy in 1478: III 6.20
Pelopidas (c. 410-364 B.C.), liberated Thebes with Epaminondas in 379 B.C.: I 6.4, I 21.3, III
6.16, III 13.3

Peloponnesian War, between Athens and Sparta (431-404 B.C.): II 2.1, II10 3, II12 2, III 16.1
Peloponnesus, southeastern Greek region including Sparta: II 10.3

Penula, Marcus Centenius, formed volunteer army against Carthage in 212 B.C., defeated by
Hannibal: I 53.3

Perennius, conspired against Commodus: III 6.3
Pericles (c. 495-129 B.C.), Athenian statesman: II 10.3

Perseus, king of Macedon (179-168 B.C.), son of Philip V, defeated by Aemilius Paulus at Pydna in
168 B.C.: DL, III 10.2, III 35.3, III 37.4
Persia, Persians: II Pr.2, II12 1, II 17.5, II 26, III 6.7, III 35.1
Pertinax, Roman emperor (192-193), assassinated by troops: I 10.4
Perugia, Perugians, in Umbria: I 27.1, 127 2, II 30.2, III 14.1, III 40.1

Petieius, Marcus, Roman general who lost to Julius Caesar at Ilerda in Spain in 49 B.C., but defeated
him in Africa in 46 B.C.: III 13.2

Petrucci, Pandolfo (1452-1512), lord of Siena (1500-1512), survived conspiracy: III 6.2, III 6.17,

III 6.19

Phalaris, tyrant of Acragas (c. 570-554 B.C.), executed by his people: I 10.2, III 6.2
Philip II, king of Macedon (359-336 B.C.), father of Alexander the Great, assassinated by
Pausanias: I 20,1 26,1 59, II 13.1, II 28.2, III 6.2

Philip V (237-179 B.C.), father of Perseus, king of Macedon (221-179 B.C.), fought and lost to
Rome in the Second Macedonian War (200-196 B.C.), I 31.1, II 1.2, II 4.2, III 10.2, III 37.4
Philip of Macedon (1); see Philip II
Philip of Macedon (2); see Philip V

Philo, Quintus Publius, consul (327 B.C.), hrst proconsul in 326 B.C.: III 24
Philotas (360-330 B.C.), plotted against Alexander the Great, executed: III 6.5
Piombino, city in Tuscany: II 8.1, III 18.3

Pisa, city in Tuscany, under control of Florence: I 38.3,1 39.2,1 53.5, II 1.1, II 8.1, II 16.2, II 24.1,

II 24.3, III 6.3, III 16.3, III 18.3, III 27.2, III 43, III 48.2

Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens (546-527 B.C.): I 2.6,1 28,1 58.3, II 2.1, III 6.19
Piso, Gains Calpumius, conspired against Nero: III 6.5, III 6.8, III 6.9

Pistoia, Pistoiese, town in Tuscany under control of Florence: II 21.2, II 25.1, III 27.2, III 27.3
Plato, mentor of conspirators: III 6.16

Plautianus, Gaius Fulvius, executed for conspiracy against Septimus Severus in 205: III 6.3, III 6.8,

III 6.15

Plautius, Gaius, Roman consul who spoke about the rebellious Privernates: II 23.4
Plutarch (c. 50-120), historian: 121 3, II 1.1, II 24 4 (Q), Ill 12 2, III 35 3, III 40 1
Po, river in Lombardy: III 18.1
Poland: II 8.4

Polybius (c. 200-c. 118 B.C.), historian: III 40.1

Pompey, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106-48 B.C.), consul (70), leader of the Optimates, enemy of
Julius Caesar, executed by Ptolemy XIII: I 33.4,1 37.2,1 59, III 13.2

497

Pomponius, Marcus, tribune (362 B.C.) who accused Lucius Manlius: III 22 1, III 34.1
Pontius, Claudius, NM’s name for Livy’s Gaius Pontius, Samnite general, defeated Romans at the
Caudine Forks in 321 B.C.: III 12.2, III 40.2, III 42
Pontius, Herennius, father of the Samnite general who defeated the Romans at the Caudine Forks: II

23.4.11140.2

Popolonia, coastal town in Tuscany, where Rome defeated Gauls in 282 B.C.: II 1.1
Porsenna (6th century B.C.), Etruscan king of Clusium, attempted to restore Tarquins to Rome in 506
B.C.: I 24.2,1 32, II 2.1

Postumius, Spurius (1), decemvir, sent to Athens for laws in 453 B.C.: I 40.2

Postumius, Spurius (2), one of the consuls at the Caudine Forks (321 B.C.): III 41, III 42

Praeneste, Praenestines, a city in Latium: III 33.1

Prato, town in Tuscany, decisive for Soderini: I 2.1, II 27.3

Pregai, Council of the, largest Venetian council: I 49.3

Privernum, Privernates, Latin city in the Abruzzi, rebelled against Rome in 329 B.C.: II 23.4, II

24.1.1124.4

Procopius (6th century), historian: II 8.2 (Q)

Ptolemy XIII (63-47 B.C.), king of Egypt (51-48 B.C.), killed Pompey: I 59
Publicola; see Valerius Corvinus Publicola, Marcus

Publicoli, Roman family: III 46. See also Valerius Corvinus Publicola, Marcus and Valerius
Publicola, Publius (1) and (2)

Punic War, First: I 14.3, II8 1, II 12.4, II18 4, III32

Punic War, Second: II1 1, 112 4, II15 2, II26, III 9 1, Ill 10 2, III 34.4

Pyrrhus (319-272 B.C.), king of Epirus (297-272 B.C.), invaded Italy (281-275 B.C.): II 1.1, III

20.11121.4

Quintianus, Claudius Pomplianus, attempted to assassinate Commodus: III 6.15
Quintius Capitolinus Barbatus, Titus, consul who won a battle against the Volsci in 468 b.c., consul
and colleague of Furius Agrippa in 446 B.C.: III 14.1, III 15.2, III 19.1
Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (1) (c. 519-439 B.C.), consul in 460 B.C., called to the dictatorship
from his plough in 458 b.c., again in 439 B.C.: 113 2, III 24, III 25 T, III 25, Ill 28
Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (2), Camillus’s consular colleague in 386 B.C.: III 30.1
Quintius Cincinnatus, Titus (1), Roman consul (431 B.C.): I 50
Quintius Cincinnatus, Titus (2), dictator (380 B.C.): III 33.1
Quintius Poenus, Titus, dictator (NM says consul) in 361 B.C.: III 22.1
Quintius, Titus; see Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (1)

Ragusa, town in modern Croatia: I 1.4

Ravenna, coastal city in Romagna, site of French victory over the Spanish in 1512:7 72 2, II 16.2, II

17.3.1117.4.1130.2

Regillus, Lake, site of Roman defeat of Latins (c. 496 B.C.): II 18.1

Regulus Attilius (Atilius), Marcus, Roman general in First Punic War, defeated Carthaginians,
captured and executed in 250 B.C.: II 18.4, III 1.3, III 25
Rehoboam (c. 900 B.C.), king of Israel, son of Solomon, grandson of David: I 19.2
Remus, brother of Romulus, killed by him (c. 753 B.C.): 191, 19 2,1 9.5, 118 5
Rhegium, Rhegini, Italian city: II 20
Rhodes, Rhodians, Greek city: II 30.2, II 32.2

Riario, Girolamo, count of Forli, killed in 1488, avenged by wife: III 6.18

Ridolfi, Giovambatista (1448-1514), Florentine commissionei in 1500, aided in siege of Pisa: III

15.2

Robert of Anjou, king of Naples (1279-1343), defender of Florence: II 9, II 12.4
Romagna, Italian region north of Rome: 138 2,1 55.4, II 12.2, II 24.3, III 29

498

Rome, Romans: passim

Romulus, Rome’s first king (753-715 B.C.), founder of Rome (see also Aeneas), brother of Remus: I
1.5,12.7,19.1,19.2,19.5,1 10.6,1 11.1,1 11.2,1 19.1,1 19.3,1 19.4,149.1, III 1.2
Ronco, river near Ravenna (in Romagna): II 17.3

Rovere, Francesco Maria della, nephew of Pope Julius II, expelled by Pope Leo X from duchy of
Urbino in 1516: II10 1 , II 24.4

Ruberius, Publius, credited by NM with decisive speech (made according to Livy by Publius Valerius
Publicola) about the controversy over the Terentillan law during the capture of the Capitol by
Appius Erdonius (460 B.C.): I 13.2
Rucellai, Cosimo (1495-1519), friend of NM in the Orti Oricellari DL
Rutilius; see Marcius Rutulus, Gaius (1)

Sabines, ancient people of Latium: I 9.1,1 18.5,1 40.4,

Sacred Mount (Mons Sacer), hill near Rome to which plebs retired while protesting Decemvirate in
449 b.c.: 140.4,144.1

Saguntum, Saguntines, republic in Spain: I 59, II 1.3, II 9

Sallust, Gaius Crispus (86-35 B.C.), historian: I 46 (Q), II 8.1, III 6.19

Samnium, Samnites, east central region of Italy, conquered by Rome: I 14.2,1 15 T, I 15,121.1,1

31.2, II 1.1, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 6.1, II 9, II 10.3, II 11.2, II 13.2, II 14, II 20,
II 23.4, III 6.20, III 12.2, III 22.4, III 37.3, III 38.1, III 39.2, III 40.2, III 41, III 42, III 44.1, III

44.3, III 45, III 47

San Giorgio, Raffaelo Riario, cardinal of, member of Pazzi conspiracy: III 6.13
San Marco; see Mark, Saint

Santa Cecilia, town in Lombardy, site of French victory over Swiss, Pope Leo X, and Spanish in
1515:11118.1

Santo Regolo, town in Tuscany where Pisa defeated Florence in 1494: II 16.2
San Vicenzo, tower in Maremma near Pisa: I 53.5, II 1.1
Saracen, sect that seized Eastern Roman Empire: II Pr.2
Sardinia, Mediterranean island: II 1.2, III 32

Satirus, tyrant of Heraclea, avenged Clearchus’s assassination by Chion and Leonidas in 353 B.C.: III
6.16

Satuminus, tribune, exposed Plautianus’s conspiracy against Severus: III 6.8, III 6.15
Savonarola, Girolamo (1452-98), Dominican friar, came to Florence in 1481, led party of Frateschi,
excommunicated and burned at stake: I 11.5,1 45.2,1 56, III 30.1
Scaevinus, plotted to kill Nero: III 6.5
Scaevola; see Mucius Scaevola, Gaius

Scipio, Publius Cornelius, father of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, brother of Gnaeus
Cornelius Scipio Calvus, died fighting the Carthaginians in 211 B.C.: III 13.1, III 34 3
Scipio Africanus Major, Publius Cornelius (236-182 B.C.), the Elder, consul, defeated Hannibal in
202 B.C.: I 10.2,1 11.1,129.3,153.4,158.3,160, II 12.1, II 32.1, III 1.3, III 9.1, III 10.2, III

10.3, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 34.3
Scipio Asiaticus, Lucius Cornelius, brother of Scipio Africanus Major: III 1.3

Scipio Calvus, Gnaeus Cornelius, brother of Publius Cornelius Scipio, uncle of Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus Major, died fighting the Carthaginians in 211 B.C.: III 13.1
Scythia, region of Asia: II 8.4

Sejanus, Lucius Aelius (d. 31), conspired against Tiberius, failed and executed: III 6.3
Selim I, sultan of Turkey (1512-20), the “Grand Turk,” son of Bajazet II, successfully invaded Syria
and Egypt in 1515-16: 1 1.4,1 19.2,1 30.1, 1117.5, III 6 2, III 35.1
Semiramis, Assyrian queen who fought the king of India: III 14.3
Sempronius; see Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius

499

Sempronius, Publius, tribune criticized by Appius Claudius the censor in 310 B.C.: III 46
Sempronius Atratinus, Aulus, master of the horse in 380 B.C.: III 33.1
Sergius Fidencis, Manlius, consul, defeated by the Veientes in 402 B.C.: I 31.2
Servilius Fidenas, Quintus, Camillus’s consular colleague in 386 B.C.: III 30.1
Servius Tullius, Rome’s sixth king (578-535 B.C.), killed by Tarquin the Proud: 1 49.1, II3, III 4, III
5

Setinus, Annius Lucius, Latin praetor (341 B.C.): II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1
Severus, Septimus, Roman emperor (193-211): I 10.4, III 6.3, III 6.8, III 6.15
Sforza, family: II 24.2

Sforza, Francesco (1401-66), count, duke of Milan (1450-66): II 24.2
Sforza, Galeazzo Maria (1444-77), duke of Milan (1466-77): III 6.18

Sforza, Ludovico (1450-1510), duke of Milan (1494-1500), fought Louis XII in 1499-1500: II

15.2, II24 2, III 11.2

Sforza-Riario, Madonna Caterina (1463-1509), countess of Forli, avenged husband Girolamo Riario:

III 6.18

Sicily, Sicilians: 17.1,1 11.1,153.4, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 9, II12 1, II 12.2, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 29, III
32, III 49.1

Sidicinum, Sidicim, ancient Italian city: II 9, II 10.3, II 11.1, II 13.2

Siena, Sienese, republic in Tuscany, controlled by Pandolfo Petrucci in 1500-1512: I 55.4, II 21.2,
1125.1,1116.2,1116.17,1116.19, III 12 1
Signoria, Florentine magistracy: I 39.2,1 45.2
Sigovesus, Gallic chieftain, invaded Spain (6th century B.C.): II 8.1
Sitalces, king of Thrace (440-424 B.C.), unharmed by conspiracy: III 6.14

Sixtus IV ( Francesco della Rovere ) (1414-84), pope (1471-84), attacked Florence in 1479: II11 1,
II 24.2,11111 2

Slavonia, modern name for Illyria: II 8.2

Soderini, Francesco (1453-1524), bishop of Volterra: I 54

Soderini, Pagolantonio, one of the Frateschi in Florence: I 54

Soderini, Piero (1452-1522), gonfalonier of justice in Florence from 1502 to 1512, NM’s employer:

I 7.4,1 52.2,1 56, 7 59, 1127 3, III 3, III 9.3, III 30.1

Solomon (c. 950 B.C.), peaceful king of Israel, son of David, father of Rehoboam: I 19.2
Solon (c. 640-560 B.C.), founder of Athenian constitution in 595 B.C.: I 2.6,1 9.3,1 11.3, I 40.2, II
10.1

Sophy, the, family dynasty in Persia (1500-1736); see Ismail I
Sora, town in Samnium, site of Roman victory in 315 B.C.: II 18.3

Spain, Spanish (as ancient Hispania): I 59, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 8.1, II 9, II 19.2, II 32.1, III 13.1, III
17, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 34.3

Spain, Spanish (modem) I 7.4,1 12.2,1 29.2, / 53 1, 1 55.2,1 55.3,159, II 16.2, II 17.3, II17 4, II
19.2,11 27.3,11 27.4,111 11.2,111 18.1
Spain, king of: II 22.1, III 6.2, III 31.3. See also Ferdinand the Catholic

Sparta, Spartans: I 2.1,1 2.6,1 5.2,1 5.3,1 6.1,1 6.2,1 6.3,1 6.4,1 9.4,1 21.3, I 35, I 40.6, I 58.2,

II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1, II 10.1, II 10.2, II 10.3, II 24.4, III 6.7, III 6.19, III 13.3, III 16.1. See also
Lacedemon, Lacedemonians

Spendius, led revolt against Carthage after First Punic War, killed Hasdmbal: III 32
Spurs, Battle of the (16 August 1513), where England defeated France: I 21.2, II 30.4
Suetonius (1st century), biographer of Roman emperors: III 13.2 (Q)

Sulla, Lucius Cornelius Felix (c. 138-78 B.C.), dictator (81-79 B.C.): I 1.3, I 28, I 34.1, 137.2, III

8.2, III 24

Sulpitius; see Sulpitius, Gaius

500

Sulpitius, Gaius, Livy’s name and one of NM’s names for NM’s Gnaeus Sulpitius, dictator in 358
B.C., refused to fight Gauls: III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 14.3
Sulpitius, Gnaeus; see Sulpitius, Gaius

Sulpitius Camerinus, Publius, sent to Athens with Spurius Postumius (1): I 40.2
Sultan (of Turkey): I 1.4, 130 1, II Pr.2, II 17.5

Sutri ( Sutrium ), Latin colony in southern Tuscany, site of Fabius s victory over the Etruscans in 310
B.C.: II 33

Swabia, League of, modem German league (1321-1534): II 4.2

Switzerland, the Swiss: I 12.2,123.4, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 10.1, II 12.4, II 16.2, II 17.5, II 18.4, 1119.1,

11 19.2, II 22.1, II 30.2, III 10.4, III 18.1

Sybilline books, containing responses of Sybils, used against Terentillus in 461 B.C.: I 13.2
Syphax (fl. c. 210 B.C.), king of the Maesulu, defeated by Scipio in 203 B.C.: II 27.4, III 10.3
Syracuse, Syracusans, city in Sicily: I 17.1,1 58.1,1 58.2, II 2.1, II 30.2, II 15.2, III 6.20 III 6.6
Syria: II 8.2, III 31.2, III 35.1

Tacitus, Cornelius (c. 56-c. 115), historian: I 29.1 (Q), 1126 (Q), III 6.1 (Q), III 19.1 (Q), III 19.1
Tamyris ( Tomyris ), queen of the Massaged, successfully defended her kingdom against Cyrus in 545
b.c.: II 12.1

Taranto ( Tarentum ), Tarentines, town in Apulia: II 11.2, II 24.3

Tarquinius, Lucius, master of the horse, fought on foot under Cincinnatus in 460 b.c.: Ill 25
Tarquinius, Sextus, son of Tarquin the Proud, raped Lucretia in 509 b.c.: Ill 5

Tarquin Priscus (originally Lucumo), Rome’s fifth king (616-579 B.C.), killed by the sons of Ancus:
III 4, III 5

Tarquin the Proud, Rome’s last king (534-510 B.C.): III 4, III 5, III 6.5

Tarquins, family of Roman kings: I 3.2,1 4.1,1 9.2,1 16.1,1 16.6,1 17.1,1 28,1 32, III 7, III 26.2
Tartars, the: II 8.4

Ternpanius, Sextus, centurion who saved Roman camp during war with Aequi (actually Volsci) in 423
B.C.: III 18.2

Ten, Council of, Florentine magistracy: I 34.3,149.3
Ten, the; see Decemvirate, decemvirs
Ten of War, Florentine magistracy: I 39.2

Terentillan law, proposal to codify the laws in 462 B.C.: I 13.2, 139 2, 140 2
Terentillus Arsa, Gaius, proposed Terentillan law in 462 B.C.: I 13.2,1 39.2
Thebes, Thebans, Greek city: I 6.4,1 17.3,1 21.3, II 3, III 6.16, III 6.19, III 13.3
Themistocles (c. 528-462 B.C.), Athenian: I 59
Theodoms; see Theodotus

Theodotus, Livy’s name for NM’s Theodoms, conspired against Hieronymous of Syracuse, captured
(215 B.C.): III 6.6

Theseus, founder of Athens (c. 1234 B.C.): I 1.2
Thessaly: I 59, III 13.2

Thucydides, Greek historian (5th centuiy B.C.): III 16.1
Tiber, river in Rome: II 4.1

Tiberius, Roman emperor (14-37), survived conspiracy of Sejanus: III 6.3

Tibur {Tivoli), town in Latium, through which the Gauls retired in 361 B.C.: III 37.1, III 37.4

Ticino (Ticinus), river in Lombardy, where Scipio Africanus saved his father in 218 B.C.: I 23.3, II

12 4, 1130 4, 111 9 1, III 31 2, III 34 3

Tigranes, king of Armenia (c. 98-56 B.C.), his cavalry defeated by Lucullus’s infantry in 69 B.C.: II
19.1

Timasitheus, prince of Lipari: III 29

Timoleon (400-334 B.C.), Corinthian who liberated Sicily: I 10.2,1 17.1, III 5

501

Titus, Roman emperor (79-81): I 10.4

Titus Tatius (8th century B.C.), Sabine king, killed by his coruler Romulus in c. 750 B.C.: I 9.1, /

9.2. 19.5.1 18.5

Torquatus; see Manlius Torquatus, Titus
Trajan, Roman emperor (98-117): I 10.4

Trasumemus, Lake, site of Roman loss to Hannibal in Second Punic War: II 12.4, II 30.4, III 9.1, III
31.2, III 40.1

Tullia, daughter of Servius Tullius, wife of both sons of Tarquin Priscus, one of whom became
Tarquin the Proud: III 4

Tullus Hostilius, Rome’s third king (672-640 B.C.): I 19.1, I 19.3, I 19 4,1 21.1, I 21.3, I 22, I

23.1.149.1

Tully; see Cicero, Marcus Tullius

Turkey, Turks: 11 4 , 1 19.2,1 30.1, II Pr.2, II 17.5, III 6.2
Tuscan (dialect): II 16.1

Tuscany, Tuscans (as ancient Etruria, Etruscans): I 7.5,1 15,121.1,1 23.3,1 24.2, I 31.2, II 1.1, II
1.2,11 1.3,112.1,114.1,114.2,115.2, II 6.1, II 8.1, II 12.4, II 25.2, II 28.1, II 33, III 30.1, III
31.4, III 33.2, III 43, III 44.1, III 44.3, III 45, III 47, III 48.1. See also Etruria, Etruscans
Tuscany, Tuscans (modern): I 38.2,1 55.4,1 56, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 19.2, II 21.2, III 12.1
Tyre, city in Phoenicia, resisted Alexander the Great, but conquered in 332 B.C.: II 27.2, II 27.4

Umbria, Umbrians: 115

Urbino, town in the Marches: II 10.1, II 24.2, II 24.4
Urbino, duke of: II 24.2

Utica, African town that Scipio failed to take in 203 b.c.: II 32.1
Uzzano, Niccolo da (1359-1439), Florentine politician: I 33.3

Vaila ( Agnadello ), town in Lombardy, site of French victory over Venice in 1509: III 31.3

Val di Chiana, valley in Tuscany: II 23.3, III 6.20, III 27.4

Val di Lamona, valley in Tuscany: III 18.3

Val di Tevere, valley in Tuscany: III 27.4

Valentino, Duke; see Borgia, Cesare

Valerius Corvinus Publicola, Marcus, Roman consul six times between 348 and 299 B.C., defeated
Samnites (343 B.C.): I 60, II 26, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 22.3-6, III 23, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 38.1
Valerius Potitus, Lucius, consul in 449 B.C., criticized decemvirs: 140.4,1 44.1-2
Valerius Publicola, Publius (1), consul in 507 B.C.: I 28

Valerius Publicola, Publius (2), son of preceding, consul killed in 460 B.C. while recapturing the
Capitol from Appius Erdonius, perhaps also the speaker NM calls Publius Ruberius: I 13.2
Valori, Francesco (1439-98), supporter of Savonarola: I 7.3
Vandals, the, seized Western Roman Empire: II 8.1, II 8.2

Varro, Gaius Terentius, consul (216 B.C.), lost to Hannibal at Cannae: I 31.2,1 53.2

Veii, Veientes, Etruscan city captured by Rome after long siege: I 12.1,1 13.1, I 22, I 31.2, I 36, I

53.1.1 54,1 55.1,1 57, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 7, II 25.1, II 25.2, II 26, II 29.1, II 29.2, II
30.1, II 32.1, III 12.2, III 12.3, III 15.1, III 23, III 29

Velitrae, rebellious Roman colony: III 32

Venice, Venetians: I 1.2,1 5.1,1 5.2,1 5.3,1 6.1,1 6.3,1 6.4,1 12.2,1 34.3,1 35,1 36, I 49.3, I 50,
I 53.1,1 55.6, II 10.1, II 17.1, II 17.4, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 27.2, II 30.2, II 30.4, II 33, III 11.2,
III 12.1, III 18.3, III 22.6, III 31.2, III 31.3, III 44.2, III 44.3
Venice, League of, set up against Venice: III 11.2
Verona: II 22.1,11131.3,11143

Vespasian, Titus Flavius, Roman emperor (69-79): I 29.2

Via Nuova, road in Rome, where superhuman voice was heard in 386 B.C.: I 56

502

Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro) (70-19 B.C.), poet: I 21.3 (Q), I 54 (Q), 1124 1 (Q)

Virginia, killed by her father Lucius Virginius in 450 B.C.: 140.4,1 44.1,1 57, III 26.2
Virginius, Lucius, father of Virginia: 140.4,1 44.1,1 45.1

Virginius Tricostus Esquilinus, consul, abandoned Sergius in a battle with the Veientes in 402 B.C.: I
31.2

Visconti, dukes of Milan: III 43

Visconti, Bemabo (1323-85), lord of Milan (1354-85), murdered by his nephew Giovanni Galeazzo
Visconti: II 13.1

Visconti, Filippo Maria, duke of Milan (1412-47): I 17.2, II 18.4, II 25.1

Visconti, Giovanni Galeazzo, first duke of Milan (1385-1402), murdered his uncle Bemabo Visconti:
1112 4,11 13.1

Vitelli, Paolo and Vitellozo (15th century), condottieri from Citta di Castello: II 24.2, III 6.20, III
27.4

Vitellius, Roman emperor (69), assassinated: I 10.4,1 29.2

Volsci, the, ancient enemy of Rome: I 13.2,1 38.1,140.4, II 1.1, II 1.2, II 29.1, III 12.3, III 13.1,
III 14.1, III 18 2, III 26.1, III 30.1, III 33.1
Volterra, town in Tuscany, part of ancient Etruscan league: I 54, II 4.1
Volterra, bishop of; see Soderini, Francesco

Volterra, Antonio da, Messer, in Pazzi conspiracy in 1478: 111 6.13, III 6.15

Xenophon (c. 430-360 B.C.), historian: II 2.1, II 13.1, III 20, III 22.4, III 22.5, III 39.1, III 39.2

503